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PREFACE 
In order to better understand this thesis, it is necessary to have some background information 
regarding my research journey and my intellectual confrontations so far. I did my Master at 
the Vienna University of economics and business (WU Wien), specializing in tourism & 
leisure management and with additional courses in regional & urban planning1. It was the 
regional & urban planning courses that were highly motivating, so I decided to do my master 
thesis with Prof. Edward Bergman from the regional & urban planning institute. Prof. 
Bergman works for example on cluster life cycles (Bergman, 2008) or methodology issues 
regarding cluster studies (Bergman & Feser, 1999a, 1999b). 
 
Prof. Bergman proposed me to candidate to the NEURUS programme in order to intensify my 
master thesis research experience. NEURUS stands for “Network for European and United 
States Regional and Urban Studies” and is an international consortium of universities 
dedicated to the collaborative study of urban and regional development issues2. This 
consortium paved my way to acquire my first research scholarship and to conduct my first 
research semester abroad. I spent this research semester at the UNC Chapel Hill (North 
Carolina, USA) in the department of City & Regional Planning and under the supervision of 
Prof. Harvey Goldstein (for example working on the link between industrial growth and 
regional clustering (Feser, Renski, & Goldstein, 2008)). 
 
In my Master Thesis I studied the research triangle park in North Carolina. The title of my 
master thesis was “The Impact of Mergers on Regional Systems - The Case of North 
Carolina” (A. Glaser, 2007) and focused on the impact (regarding innovation, firm 
establishments, employment and research collaborations) of the 1995 pharmaceutical merger 
between Glaxo and Burroughs Wellcome in and around the research triangle park. The 
methodologies I used for this master thesis were shift-share analysis and network analysis. 
 
Retrospectively, I owe a lot to this NEURUS programme because, even though at that time I 
was not at all conscious about it, it showed me how research can be done in Europe and the 
United States. It allowed me to expose my first research endeavours to various professors in 
                                                 
1
 Already during my undergraduate studies I took additional courses in geography at the University of Vienna 
(the main university in Austria). 
2
 For further information: http://www.neurusinfo.org/ 
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the urban/regional studies and planning field during NEURUS seminars, for example the 
current American coordinator Prof. Feser (2008; 2000) or the current European coordinator 
Prof. Van Steen (Pellenbarg & Van Steen, 2001, 2003) which were already active at my time 
as well.  
 
Even though the NEURUS programme prepares the students to continue with a PhD thesis, I 
decided that working in the “real world” is a better choice then continuing an academic 
endeavour. However, after one year in the policy evaluation department at the International 
Labour Organisation in Geneva and two years in a market research company (TNS Sofres) in 
Paris, I decided that I am ready again to confront myself to a new “academic journey”.  
 
The only thing I knew when I took the decision to go back to the academic world was that I 
wanted to continue studying this “regional system” phenomenon and the innovation and 
entrepreneurial activities that are happening within these “regional systems”. My profound 
motivation regarding this topic was properly in the beginning to identify why some regions 
succeed and others don’t and finally what “one” (be it public or private actors) can do to help 
the local actors to “survive” in a globalized and highly competitive world. 
 
I thus looked for a PhD programme in the Paris Region and I was luckily admitted to the 
management PhD programme at ESCP Europe, with Prof. Jean-Michel Saussois, as well as to 
the French doctoral programme at Mines ParisTech, with Prof. Thierry Weil. Working with 
Prof. Weil and the Cluster observatory (“Observatoire des pôles de compétitivité”) at Mines 
ParisTech (and the members of this observatory I met during my application process (such as 
Prof. Frédérique Pallez or Ass. Prof. Philippe Lefebvre) was a great opportunity. 
 
ESCP Europe, while providng a very stimulating research context, did not have a dedicated 
research unit on clusters but only on public management more broadly. I thought that the 
combination of both intensive focus on clusters at Mines ParisTech and more broadly public 
management3 at ESCP Europe would be a perfect combination. I am immensely grateful to 
                                                 
3
 Prof. Saussois was not particularly focusing on clusters but more broadly on public management, but when I 
started my PhD he was working on a cluster study with colleagues from Novancia Business School to investigate 
the entrepreneurial dynamics in French clusters (Bonnafous-Boucher & Saussois, 2010). This research project 
also financed me a short fieldwork trip to Austria to investigate the differences with the French system and to 
write a research note about the Austrian system (A. Glaser, 2011). 
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my advisors because even though it was sometimes a difficult endeavour, it gave me a very 
rich learning and studying experience. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the background of my three research supervisors. All three professors 
and their research environments strongly influenced how I conceive research in general and 
cluster research in particular. As Table 1 shows, the common denominator between all three 
researchers is that they are interested in studying regional clusters. However, besides this 
common denominator, the manner of how they perceive clusters and conduct research is very 
different.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of my master and PhD theses supervisors’ environments 
 Prof. Edward 
Bergman 
Prof. Thierry 
Weil 
Prof. Jean-Michel 
Saussois 
My supervisor for Master thesis PhD thesis PhD thesis 
Nationality American French French 
Master in City Planning Engineering Management 
PhD in Urban & Regional 
Development  
Physics Sociology 
HDR (French 
Qualification for 
Ph.D. Supervisor) 
n.a. Management Sociology 
Last institutional 
affiliation 
Vienna university of 
Economics and Business 
(Austria) 
Mines ParisTech (a French 
engineering school) 
ESCP Europe 
(a French management 
school) 
Research collective Network for European and 
United States Regional and 
Urban Studies 
(multinational consortium) 
French cluster observatory 
(“Observatoire des pôles 
de compétitivité”) at 
Mines ParisTech 
Centre for Research and 
Development in Public 
Management 
(“Centre de Recherche et 
Développement en 
Management Public”) at 
ESCP Europe 
Institutional 
affiliation in the 
USA (permanent or 
for research period) 
University of 
Pennsylvania, UNC 
Chapel Hill 
Stanford University Georges Washington 
University 
Common 
denominator 
interest in Regional 
Clusters 
interest in Regional 
Clusters 
interest in Regional 
Clusters 
 
Retrospectively, when I started my PhD I had a more economic approach to clusters (by 
conducting shift-share analyses, network analyses, or looking at quantitative indicators of 
regional differences) than a management (or public management) approach to clusters. I was 
at a certain distance regarding the actual local actors that are situated within the clusters and 
the public policies that are put in place to foster their development. However, the French 
cluster policy and my PhD supervisors influenced me to completely change my approach to 
the subject.  
 vi
 
When I started my PhD, Prof. Weil (T. Weil, 2010; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2008), thanks to 
his large and detailed knowledge on the subject and his intensive relationship with 
practitioners on the field (be it within the French cluster organisations or at the French 
political level), had just accessed the raw data of the national cluster policy evaluation4. This 
French cluster evaluation (CMI & BCG, 2008) not only evaluated the policy in itself but also 
the 71 cluster organisations located on the French territory. It was an ideal starting point for 
my PhD. For me, at least in the beginning, it “simply” presented an opportunity to continue 
quantitative analyses regarding regional cluster differences, something I started during my 
Master Thesis. However, very fast I realized that the collected data and the notion of cluster 
was not the same as the data and the cluster notion I was used to during my Master Thesis.  
 
Instead of studying spontaneous clusters (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006) by for example analyzing 
a cluster’s life cycle (Bergman, 2008) or by analysing a cluster’s internal structure (Morrison 
& Rabellotti, 2009; Salman & Saives, 2005) or internal-external relations (Boschma & Ter 
Wal, 2007) through network studies, I was suddenly confronted to a highly political cluster 
construct. Meaning the political wish to support emerging or nascent clusters at a certain 
location. Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005) or Chiaroni & Chiesa (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 
2006) call this type of clusters “policy-driven clusters”. 
 
The data I started working with in the beginning of my PhD were the reflection of this highly 
political construct called French “clusters” (for example which type of local actors are 
governing the policy-driven cluster, how much fund does the policy-driven cluster have, who 
are its “members” meaning who has paid its membership fee). The work with this data was 
transformed into two articles: (1) one article which was published in the journal “European 
Planning Studies” and which focuses on how pre-existing R&D activities of a region 
influence the performance of these policy-driven cluster initiatives (performance i.e. the 
amount of state funding received by the cluster members for their R&D projects) (Gallié, 
Glaser, Mérindol, & Weil, 2013a)5, and (2) another article (in the revision phase for the 
journal Entrepreneurship & Regional Development) focuses on how the governance structure 
                                                 
4
 See Chapter 1, Section 2 for a detailed explanation of the French cluster policy and the conducted evaluations.  
5
 A previous version of this article was presented at three conferences: at the European Academy of Management 
(EURAM) conference (T. Weil, et al., 2010a), at the European Localized Innovation Observatory (EUROLIO) 
conference (Mérindol, et al., 2010) and at the European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS) conference 
(T. Weil, et al., 2010b). 
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of policy-driven cluster influences its capability to attract resources (A. Glaser, Gallié, & 
Weil, 2012)6. 
 
In parallel of this work with Prof. Weil on the performance differences between the various 
policy-driven cluster initiatives that were set up on the French territory thanks to the national 
cluster policy, I was also working with Prof. Saussois on the historical development of the 
French industrial policy (Porcher, Glaser, & Saussois, 2010). Prof. Saussois has a rich 
knowledge on the policy developments in France and the United States thanks to his research 
endeavours on industrial policies at both sides of the Atlantic (Saussois, 1988, 1990). He thus 
wanted me to step one step backwards in order to look at this French “cluster policy” from a 
more distant level and how it is inserted in a French historical and cultural context. 
 
Even though working on the performance of cluster initiatives with Prof. Weil and on a more 
global historical approach of industrial policies with Prof. Saussois, I realized very fast that 
somehow a “wall” is separating me from them. My knowledge on regional innovation 
systems (Asheim & Isaksen, 1997; Cooke, Uranga, & Etxebarria, 1998; Tödtling & 
Kaufmann, 2001) acquired during my Master Thesis was not helping me in really 
understanding the French context and what they were talking about. I was suddenly 
confronted to terms and notions that were completely new for me but which were apparently 
necessary to really understand the French system and how it tries to create regional innovation 
systems, be it7 
- at a political-institutional level, for example DIRECCTE, DREAL, DRAAF, CIADT, 
DATAR, DGCIS, GTI, ANR, OSEO, FUI, or CDC and their relations to each other, 
- at a political-functioning level, meaning the relation between the State and its different 
regions, of a unitary country like France compared to the federal countries like USA 
or Austria I was used to when studying clusters, 
- at a political-policy level, for example SPL, CRITT, RRIT, or Technopoles, or 
- at a political-historical level, for example Jacobin, Girondin, Colbert, or Général de 
Gaulle and the planification à la française,  
 
                                                 
6
 A previous version of this article was presented at the Association Internationale de Management Stratégique 
(AIMS) conference (A. Glaser, Gallié, Mérindol, & Weil, 2010). 
7
 For the time being I will not explain the terms listed hereinafter. A French cluster scholar will know what these 
terms mean, a foreign scholar will probably, just like me in the beginning, not know what these terms mean. I 
will come back to these terms little by little throughout the thesis.  
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I knew that if I really want to understand the French policy-driven cluster system, I had to 
immerge into the system and not only stay with my quantitative data. I had to get in contact 
with the actors on the field; otherwise I would have had the impression that my conclusions, 
so far only drawn from my quantitative analysis and from my slowly starting theoretical 
knowledge on the French system, are maybe wrong. I thus decided with my PhD supervisors 
to start conducting a qualitative study in one of the 71 French cluster organisations (see 
Chapter 5 for a detailed description of my methodology and data collection process). At that 
point I really felt like Henry in Jules Verne’s book “A journey to the center of the earth” 
(1864) who is sitting at the bench of a black hole where the bottom was completely invisible 
(see Box 1).  
 
Box 1: Henry’s adventure and thoughts 
Extracts from: Jules Verne, ‘A journey to the center of the earth’, 1864: 
 
Preparation for the journey: “Neither you nor anybody else know anything about the real state of the earth's 
interior. All modern experiments tend to explode the older theories. Were any such heat to exist, the upper crust 
of the earth would be shattered to atoms, and the world would be at an end.” A long, learned and not 
uninteresting discussion followed, which ended in this wise: “I do not believe in the dangers and difficulties 
which you, Henry, seem to multiply; and the only way to learn, is like Arne Saknussemm, to go and see.” 
“Well,” cried I, overcome at last, “let us go and see. Though how we can do that in the dark is another 
mystery.” “Fear nothing. We shall overcome these, and many other difficulties. Besides, as we approach the 
centre, I expect to find it luminous”” 
 
Starting the journey: “While we were seated on this extraordinary bench I ventured once more to look 
downwards. With a sigh I discovered that the bottom was still wholly invisible. Were we, then, going direct to 
the interior of the earth?” 
 
Discovering the mantle: “However, few as the minutes were during which I gazed down this tremendous and 
even wondrous shaft, I had a sufficient glimpse of it to give me some idea of its physical conformation. Its sides, 
which were almost as perpendicular as those of a well, presented numerous projections which doubtless would 
assist our descent.” 
 
Approaching the core: “I have very strong doubts if the most determined geologist would, during that descent, 
have studied the nature of the different layers of earth around him. … Not so the inveterate Professor. He must 
have taken notes all the way down, for, at one of our halts, he began a brief lecture. “The farther we advance,” 
said he, “the greater is my confidence in the result. The disposition of these volcanic strata absolutely confirms 
the theories of Sir Humphry Davy. … I at once regret the old and now forever exploded theory of a central fire. 
At all events, we shall soon know the truth.” 
 
Thinking about the return: “Each of us could now descend by catching the two cords in one hand. When about 
two hundred feet below, all the explorer had to do was to let go one end and pull away at the other, when the 
cord would come falling at his feet. In order to go down farther, all that was necessary was to continue the same 
operation. This was a very excellent proposition, and no doubt, a correct one. Going down appeared to me easy 
enough; it was the coming up again that now occupied my thoughts.” 
 
Still afraid about the French political system, like Henry who is afraid to start climbing down 
the earth, I particularly wanted to focus on how the cluster organisation creates innovation 
and linkages between its actors (thus still highly influenced by the regional innovation system 
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literature I initially knew). During several months, I regularly participated in a range of 
internal and external meetings of a cluster organisation situated in the Paris Region. 
 
However, very fast I realized that the day-to-day occupation of the cluster organisation was 
less on innovation put for example on labelling, the management of internal conflicts, the 
management of their (sometimes conflictual) relationships with cluster members or the 
French national or regional cluster administrations, or the (sometimes difficult) negotiation of 
responsibilities with other political entities of the region regarding additional services to local 
actors. The political part of the system was thus again much more present in my observations 
than the innovation part (which existed but was not the main part). 
 
Thanks to this first qualitative fieldwork, I started to apprehend the system a little bit better, 
but I still felt that I needed to go one step further down in order to really understand (or at 
least try to) the French policy-driven cluster system, its relation to innovation and the role of 
the political institutions in this system. I thus felt that the core of my journey was not reached 
yet or expressed in a methodology language that I did not reach “theoretical saturation” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; B. G. Glaser & Strauss, 1967 (2009)) and that I still did not really 
understood how the French try to construct regional innovation systems.  
 
I thus started to conduct interviews with cluster members to get to know how they actually 
construct R&D projects and which role the local (political) cluster organisation plays in this 
endeavour. My first qualitative results were then presented at several conferences such as at 
the Public and Non-Profits (PNP) Doctoral Student Professional Development Consortium of 
the Academy of Management (AOM) conference (A. Glaser, 2012a), the Proximity Days 
(organised by MOSAIC at HEC Montréal) conference (A. Glaser, 2012b) and the Danish 
Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics (DRUID) conference (A. Glaser, 2013b). 
 
In parallel to this qualitative fieldwork, the attended conferences and the constant reading of 
the cluster literature, some additional elements considerably helped me to continuously try to 
confront my fieldwork observations and to making sense of what I observed on the field. 
 
On the one hand two research collectives:  
- The cluster observatory at Mines ParisTech: The first important research collective 
that helped me to confront my fieldwork observations was the cluster observatory 
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(“observatoire des pôles de compétitivité”)8 at Mines ParisTech of which I am a 
member since the beginning of my thesis. The cluster observatory particularly helped 
me through the monthly seminars that we organised. In these monthly seminars we 
always invited researchers and cluster practitioners (cluster managers, representatives 
of the State and the regional authorities, CEO’s of companies, academics, 
consultants…) to expose a certain cluster issue during one hour followed by one hour 
discussion with all participants. This platform allowed me to confront my single 
cluster case study observations to the reality of other clusters and thus allowed me to 
identify if what I observed is particular related to my cluster observation or also the 
reality in other clusters. Additionally to the monthly seminars, this cluster observatory 
also allowed me to be integrated in a research collective, retrospectively maybe one of 
the most valuable things during my PhD. It was extremely enriching to exchange 
regularly, additionally to my two PhD supervisors9, with three other French cluster 
specialised. Prof. Frédérique Pallez (particularly interested in public administration 
and evaluation (Aggeri & Pallez, 2005; Fen Chong & Pallez, 2008; Fixari & Pallez, 
2014; Pallez, 2014b)), Ass. Prof. Philippe Lefebvre (particularly interested in the 
management of policy-driven cluster initiatives (Lefebvre, 2008, 2013)), and Dr. 
Emilie-Pauline Gallié (particularly interested in R&D collaborations and proximity 
(Gallié, 2009; Gallié & Guichard, 2005)). 
- The GEME at UQAM Montréal: The second important research collective was my 
visiting semester at UQAM Montréal with Prof. Anne-Laure Saives (particularly 
interested in the strategic value of clusters for firms (Desmarteau & Saives, 2003; 
Salman & Saives, 2005)). This visiting semester happened exactly in the middle of my 
qualitative fieldwork, after my observation and interview period within the cluster 
organisation and before my interviews with the cluster members. My integration in the 
GEME10 research team which focuses, amongst others, on Canadian clusters, allowed 
me to confront my French observations to external parties and to gain some additional 
distance to my French data. 
 
On the other hand two intensive guided theoretical reflections: 
                                                 
8
 http://observatoirepc.org/ 
9
 It was also very important to exchange with all my colleagues at ESCP Europe, even though they were not 
specialised in cluster studies, they always gave me extremely valuable advices.  
10
 The GEME stands for “Groupe d'Études en Management des Entreprises”. Within the GEME research unit 
there are two teams: the GEME-Bio team focusing on the biotechnology industry and the GEME-AERO team 
focusing on the aeronautics industry. 
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- Focus on cluster evaluations: The first important theoretical reflections concern my 
work and my debates with Prof. Pallez and Dr. Gallié on policy-driven cluster 
evaluations. We first analysed the French 2008 policy-driven cluster evaluation 
(Gallié, Glaser, Lefebvre, & Pallez, 2012) and then compared this French to other 
European policy-driven cluster evaluations (Gallié, Glaser, & Pallez, 2014)11. One 
important conclusion of this work on the French policy-driven cluster evaluation and 
its comparison to international examples is that the act of evaluating cluster policies 
might not only serve to evaluate the performance of the cluster policy but also clarify 
the underlying objectives of the policy. Most of the time it is only at the moment when 
an evaluation has to be conducted that the policy-driven cluster “leaders” decide on 
the actual “objects” that are important to evaluate. These “objects” then reveal the 
objective of the policy. Again this work on evaluations of cluster policies not only 
allowed me to apprehend a large variety of cluster policies but also position the 
French way of doing into an international context.  
- Focus on organisational studies: The second important theoretical reflections were 
my debates with Prof. Saussois. Whenever I talked with Prof. Saussois (an 
organizational sociologist in his heart) about my fieldwork observations, he constantly 
proposed me to look at traditional organisational and sociology studies (like for 
example (Brunsson, 1989; Crozier, 1964 (2010); Gouldner, 1954 (1964); Hofstadter, 
1979 (1999); Selznick, 1949; Sennett, 1992 (1977), 2012)). He thus oriented me 
towards apprehending these French policy-driven cluster constructs like organizational 
entities where similar power plays and hierarchical issues emerge like in traditional 
organisations.  
 
As one can see, I completely dived into the French cluster policy system and tried to make 
sense of my observations from different angles. My research process was also a highly 
abductive one (Dubois & Gadde, 2002) constantly going back and forth between data and 
theory12. Somewhen during my PhD I had the impression that I completely lost my initial 
objectives namely how one can analyze regional systems and help local actors particularly 
                                                 
11
 A previous version of this article was for example presented at the Regional Science Association International 
– British and Irish Section (RSAI-BIS) (Gallié, Glaser, & Pallez, 2010) and at the Seminar of the Institute for 
Public Management and Economic Development (IGPDE) in 2012. 
12
 This confrontation with the French system also lead to an article (accepted by the DRUID conference in 2013) 
where I tried to look at the system through the eyes of Richard Sennett (A. Glaser, 2013a) 
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regarding innovation. Instead I was just observing political tension and problems at every 
level. 
 
The first time I heard about that it can be completely normal to be in “confrontation” or 
“depressed” with one’s fieldwork was during a PhD methodology course on ethnographic 
methods (held by Christina Garsten (Garsten, 2013)) at ESCP Europe. Pollard (2009) for 
example summarizes the difficulty of ethnographic fieldwork in 24 feelings: “alone, 
ashamed, bereaved, betrayed, depressed, desperate, disappointed, disturbed, embarrassed, 
fearful, frustrated, guilty, harassed, homeless, paranoid, regretful, silenced, stressed, trapped, 
uncomfortable, unprepared, unsupported and unwell.” Even though I cannot identify with all 
of these feelings, I certainly crossed the majority of them.  
 
However, at that time I was profoundly convinced that my research endeavour is far away 
from an ethnographic methodology. I was convinced that it is a classical case study analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009) where I just had to define the number of cases and the units of 
analysis studied. One is not allowed to forget that I was coming from a quantitative 
background during my master thesis thus anything which was based on a highly qualitative 
data collection process was frightening me (also intensified through the fact that my mother 
tongue is not French). However, as I was moving down the latter (from first looking only at 
the quantitative evaluation data of the French cluster policy over the policy-driven cluster 
organisation observations to interviewing the policy-driven cluster actors) in order to 
completely apprehend the French policy-driven cluster system it was more and more difficult 
for me to define the number of cases studied or the attached units of analysis. The units of 
analysis were constantly moving when further descending to the core of the cluster policy as 
also the initial focus on innovation was fading away.  
 
It was only during the final writing up of my research and the intensive studying of other 
PhDs on French clusters that were recently defended (Bardet, 2011; Berthinier-Poncet, 2012; 
Chabault, 2009; Dang, 2011; Fen Chong, 2009; Lallemand, 2013) that I realized that one of 
the added values of my PhD compared to the other PhDs on French cluster policies was 
maybe the fact that I am simply not French. As an Austrian researcher studying the French 
system, I somehow had a different position compared to the other PhDs on French cluster 
policies. I was more an external observer that just discovered the system and my cluster 
knowledge has maybe developed a little bit more in an international context and not only in a 
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French context. Things that seemed obvious to French scholars were not at all obvious for me 
as an Austrian scholar. 
 
Additionally, my thesis, compared to the other thesis on the French policy-driven clusters, is 
written in English language. Automatically when writing in English one addresses itself not to 
a French community that knows the French system but to an international community that 
might not know the French system. Bourdieu (1982) for example underlines that there are no 
neutral words and hat language is not only a communication tool but also reflects the social 
reality of the ones who use the language. The explanation of the policy-driven cluster system 
to a non French speaking person has to be much more detailed but at the same time simplified 
and has to be constantly compared with other international examples in order to try making 
the observed French elements more comprehensive to an external research community.  
 
These reflections on my position regarding my research and my methodology, lead me to the 
conclusion that my data collection regarding the French policy-driven cluster system actually 
started at the first day of my PhD. That studying policy-driven clusters is a highly systemic 
endeavour and that all these different manners of confronting me to the French system lead 
me to conduct a single case study with an ethnographic (Garsten, 2013) and grounded theory 
(B. G. Glaser & Strauss, 1967 (2009)) approach. All the different levels of my analysis (from 
the quantitative analysis to the qualitative analysis, from the discussions with French scholars 
and international scholars) form a whole to apprehend in detail “What is a cluster?” and 
particularly “What is a French policy-driven cluster?”. 
 
I would like to finish this preface with referring to inspiring scholars, such as Coase (1937), 
Rosenberg (1982) or Jacobs (1961), that see research as a life journey. At the beginning one 
does not really know towards what one is heading, one has a certain interest and feeling and 
start doing research. However, it is only at the end of one’s career that the whole makes sense. 
Coase (1988, p. 47), for example nearly 50 years after his influential book “The nature of the 
firm” (1937) admits that in the beginning he only had a vision, and now at the end of his 
career he has dreams but still he does not know if at the end he will discover what he thought 
that he will discover: 
“It has been said that young men have visions and old men have dreams. My dream is to 
construct a theory which will enable us to analyze the determinants of the institutional 
structure of production. In "The Nature of the Firm" the job was only half done [...] My dream 
is to help complete what I started some fifty-five years ago and to take part in the development 
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of such a comprehensive theory. […] I intend to set sail once again to find the route to China, 
and if this time all I do is to discover America, I won't be disappointed.” (Coase, 1988, p. 47). 
 
In the beginning of my PhD I thought that I will focus on analysing regional systems and the 
innovation processes happening in this regional systems. However, during the research 
process I realized that my incomprehension of the French system and the strong political 
component has to be integrated in the analysis, a political component that is strongly varying 
between different countries implementing cluster policies. From the outside it looks the same, 
from the inside it is definitely not the same, strongly impacting multi-country cluster analyses. 
 
This thesis is the wish to make the French system comprehensible to outsiders, and on the 
other hand this thesis is the wish to discuss the different structural, political, organisational 
and evolutionary diseases that might emerge when implementing cluster policies around the 
world and which all actors involved in cluster policies should be conscious about. Probably 
50 years from now, when I look back to this thesis again, I will just see it as a little point in 
my general knowledge on clusters. This thesis is just an additional element in my research 
endeavours of studying regional systems and helping local actors to better understand how to 
succeed in a globalized world. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
1 Cluster: the (new) buzzword 
The academic cluster literature started to intensify during the 1990s, and literally exploded in 
the beginning of the 21st century (Cruz & Teixeira, 2009). The birthplace of the cluster policy 
fashion in the literature (Porter, 1998c) and among governments (OECD, 1999, 2009; Sölvell, 
Lindqvist, & Ketels, 2003) can though be traced back to the 1980s. The 1980s experienced 
three important shifts of thought. First, the period experienced a shift from neoclassical 
(exogenous) economic growth models (Solow, 1956, 1957; Swan, 1956) to endogenous 
economic growth models (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986). Economic growth was no longer only 
explained by labour and capital accumulation but also by knowledge accumulation. 
Additionally, an increased role was attributed to institutions for fostering economic growth. 
Second, the period experienced a shift from a mass production era, where the region did not 
play an important role, to a post-mass production era, where the region played an important 
role (Storper, 1997). The region was increasingly considered as a crucial element where 
flexible specialization takes place (Christopherson & Storper, 1986; Piore & Sabel, 1984; 
Storper & Christopherson, 1987) and where embedded actors (Granovetter, 1985) have a 
higher capacity for innovation and knowledge acquisition (Aydalot, 1986; Aydalot & Keeble, 
1988; Jaffe, 1986; Oakey, 1984). Finally, the concept of comparative advantage (Ohlin, 1933; 
Ricardo, 1817 (1821)), for a long time used to explain national success, was increasingly 
criticised by Porter (1990). Porter (1990) developed the concept of competitive advantage 
explaining that every nation or region goes through different development stages which can 
be influenced by government authorities. The large diffusion of the concept of “cluster” will 
be analysed in the first part of this thesis through an “archeological” analysis of the notion. 
 
These shifts of thoughts, embedded in an increased global competition, led policy makers to 
take example on highly successful regions. The two regions that were particularly scrutinized 
are the Third Italy in Emilia-Romagna (Italy) (Becattini, 1979; Capecchi, 1990; Putnam, 
1993; Trigilia, 1986) and Silicon Valley in California (USA) (Miller & Cote, 1985; Rogers & 
Larsen, 1984; Saxenian, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1994; T. Weil, 2010). Scholars and governments 
started to reflect on how to “grow” (Miller & Cote, 1985), “breed” (DeBresson, 1989), or 
“clone” (D. Rosenberg, 2002) these successful regions so that every nation could have its 
competitive hub. 
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The objective during the 1990s was to decorticate the natural conditions of “spontaneous 
clusters” to be able to create “policy-driven clusters” (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006). In policy-
driven clusters, there is a “strong commitment of governmental actors whose willingness [is] 
to set the conditions for the development of the […] cluster” (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006, p. 
1073). The real breakthrough of the cluster idea and that governments can take the faith of 
their regions in their hands, came with the publication of Porter’s seminal work on clusters 
(Porter, 1998b, 1998c). Porter (1998c, p. 78) who scrutinized in detail a multitude of “healthy 
regions” in the United States summarized that these healthy regions or “clusters” are 
“geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular 
field.” Additionally, “many clusters include governmental and other institutions […] that 
provide specialized training, education, information, research and technical support” (Porter, 
1998c, p. 78). Porter (1998c, p. 79) established mappings of these healthy regions and called 
it “the anatomy” of a cluster that governments could strive for. 
 
2 The rising implementation of cluster policies 
Using the cluster approach (Porter, 1998c) to foster a country’s competitiveness started to 
emerge during the 1990s and since then the approach experienced a considerable entry into 
the policy realm, be it for example in Europe (Ahedo, 2004; Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 
2005; Gallié, Glaser, Mérindol, & Weil, 2013b; Lefebvre, 2013), America (Altenburg & 
Meyer-Stamer, 1999; Arthurs, Cassidy, Davis, & Wolfe, 2009; Ciravegna, 2012; Doloreux & 
Shearmur, 2009), Asia (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011a, 2011b) or Africa (Cammett, 2007). 
The cluster policy approach combines under one header traditionally separated policies, such 
as regional, science & technology and industrial policies (OECD, 2007). 
 
The specificities of cluster policy approach appear to be the following; 
- compared to the traditional science & technology policy approach, cluster policy does 
not focus on financing individual single sector projects but on financing collaborative 
research (OECD, 2007);  
- compared to the traditional industrial policy approach, cluster policy does not focus on 
national champions but on supporting common needs of firm groups, particularly the 
needs of SMEs (OECD, 2007); 
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- compared to the regional policy approach, cluster policy does not redistribute from 
leading to lagging regions but tries to build competitive regions by fostering networks 
among local actors (OECD, 2007). 
 
Cluster policies try to build policy-driven clusters (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006) by fostering 
networks among local actors. This particularly happens through financing collaborative 
research and supporting common needs of local firm groups (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011b; 
Sölvell, et al., 2003). The objective of cluster policies is to transform agglomerations of non-
interconnected local actors into “functioning” policy-driven clusters where local actors are 
interconnected and innovate together. In fine, this process is supposed to be leading to a 
greater competitiveness of the individual actors and the whole region (Schmiedeberg, 2010).  
 
In order to replicate conditions of spontaneous clusters and start building policy-driven 
clusters, government authorities establish cluster organisations employing cluster managers 
(Coletti, 2010). Two recent studies underline that one of the most important elements of these 
cluster organisation managers is to foster networks among people and firms (Coletti, 2010; 
Sölvell, et al., 2003). The tasks of these managers embrace for example “fostering exchanges 
between cluster members […], networking with stakeholders, lobbying, identifying and 
integrating new cluster members, strategy development for the cluster […], organising 
events” (Coletti, 2010, p. 685). 
 
3 Increasing critics: towards a crisis of clusters? 
Numerous governments around the world have implemented cluster policies (Sölvell, 2008; 
Sölvell, et al., 2003) and the European Union has put cluster policies to advance innovations 
in Europe at the centre of its strategy recommendations (European Commission, 2006), as 
knowledge management is considered as crucial (Saussois, 2000). Europe currently counts 
approximately 1205 cluster organisations13. However, there has been recently an increasing 
amount of academic literature that has a very critical stance regarding the positive impact of 
cluster policies and how they are implemented (Hospers, 2005; Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; 
Shearmur, 2011a). The critics of the academics are of multiple nature:  
- Shaky theoretical basis: Several academics criticise that government authorities have 
rushed ahead with implementing cluster policies based on the ideas of Michael Porter 
                                                 
13
 European Cluster Observatory: www.clusterobservatory.eu (2010) 
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(1990 (1998), 1998c) even though the cluster concept in itself continues to stay on a 
very shaky theoretical ground (Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; R. Martin & Sunley, 2003; 
Nathan & Overman, 2013); 
- Multiplication of objectives, closed system thinking and disconnection to local 
specificities: Some other predominant critics are for example that cluster policies 
combine too many different objectives (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008), that governments 
consider the region as a closed system (H. Bathelt & Dewald, 2008; Rugman, 1992; 
Shearmur, 2011a), or that best practice examples serve as role models and are then 
implemented in regions without taking into account the specific local characteristics 
(Eklinder-Frick, Eriksson, & Hallén, 2014; Hospers, 2005; G.-J. Hospers, P. 
Desrochers, & F. Sautet, 2009); 
- High entanglement of actors. Policy-driven clusters are highly complex because there 
exists an entanglement of different action spaces (for example governments, policy-
driven cluster managers, policy-driven cluster members) with different views 
(Brachert, Titze, & Kubis, 2011; Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; Sellar, Emilova, Petkova-
Tancheva, & Mcneil, 2011; Steinle, Schiele, & Mietzner, 2007; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 
2009). This complexity leads some other authors to argue that the outcome of policy-
driven clusters cannot be “manipulated” and thus a better approach would be to 
abandon cluster policies altogether and to focus instead on “agglomeration policies” 
(Nathan & Overman, 2013, p. 397). 
 
While practitioners implemented cluster policies, academics have not yet fully embraced an 
analysis of these implementation processes. Scholars continued studying the characteristics of 
clusters, by for example focusing on clusters’ life cycle (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; 
Bergman, 2008; Menzel & Fornahl, 2010), on clusters’ internal structure (Morrison & 
Rabellotti, 2009; Salman & Saives, 2005), on clusters’ internal vs. external relations (Harald 
Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004; Boschma & Ter Wal, 2007; Huggins & Johnston, 2010; 
Lechner & Dowling, 2003; Maskell, Bathelt, & Malmberg, 2006), on clusters’ network 
facilitators (Ingstrup, 2010; McEvily & Zaheer, 2004; Mesquita, 2007), or the importance of 
trust between actors in clusters (Cooke, 1996; Cooke & Wills, 1999; MacKinnon, Chapman, 
& Cumbers, 2004; Murphy, 2006; Ottati, 1994). However, they somehow seem to ignore the 
rise of the managerial issues that went along with the implementation of cluster policies. Be it 
for example the managerial issues regarding fostering innovation (Lefebvre, 2013), regarding 
implementing the cluster policy (Burfitt, Macneill, & Gibney, 2007), or evaluating the cluster 
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policy (Gallié, et al., 2014). This doctoral dissertation aims at taking these managerial and 
organisationnal challenges into account. 
 
4 The growth of a relevance gap  
The consequence of this drift between academics and practitioners is the progressive 
constitution of a “relevance gap”, i.e. a growing alienation between academics and 
practitioners (Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; R. Martin & Sunley, 2003). This leads to the paradox 
situation that even though “libraries of incredibly useful books and articles on clusters” 
exists (Swords, 2013, p. 369), they seem not to be focusing on the challenges practitioners 
face when actually building policy-driven clusters. As we will demonstrate in our literature 
review, cluster literature mostly continues describing how a cluster looks like. Swords (2013, 
p. 369) recently pointed to the problem that “the translation of clusters into, and then through 
local and national policy” is not studied in the cluster literature. In the same stream of 
research, Ebbekink & Lagendijk (2013, p. 737) point to the fact that scholars have to start 
investigating “cluster policy as a policy challenge”. 
 
The academic community somehow still tries to define what a cluster is and what the 
conceptual differences are between clusters and similar concepts such as global, national, 
regional, sectoral or ‘combined’14 innovation systems (Asheim, Smith, & Oughton, 2011; 
Edquist, 2001; Niosi, 2011). The plenary debate of the 2013 DRUID conference even raised 
the polemic question15 if the systems of innovation (SI) approach is still a promising line of 
research. We will argue in this doctoral dissertation that the cluster and SI approach is more 
than ever a promising line of research but has lost track of its most basic elements: the 
practitioners on the field who try to put the theoretical cluster concept, mainly Porter’s cluster 
concept (McDonald, Huang, Tsagdis, & Tüselmann, 2007), into action. Governments around 
the world heavily used and still use the various cluster and SI approaches to frame their 
innovation policies (Edquist, 2005). Abandoning the research on clusters and SIs would be 
like abandoning en route all the authorities and governments that believed in these concepts 
and consequently invested a considerable amount of public money16. 
                                                 
14
 For Edquist (2001), a combined system corresponds for example to a sectoral and regional innovation system, 
which according to him relates for example to the cluster concept of Porter (1998c). 
15
 Source (10/02/2013): http://druid8.sit.aau.dk/registrant/index/login/cid/13 
16
 For example, the French government invested 3 billion Euros in its competitiveness cluster policy between 
2005 and 2011 and the Walloon government plans to invest 618 million Euros in its cluster policy between 2006 
and 2014.  
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The multitude of components constituting the clusters and SI17 (Edquist, 2001, 2005), the 
endless range of activities that influence the development, the diffusion and use of 
innovation18 (see Edquist, 2005, p. 191 for a complete list), the boundless quantity of 
observable relations among components and between components and activities19 (Edquist, 
2005), and the multitude of different stakeholders involved (e.g. public authorities, policy-
driven cluster managers, policy-driven cluster beneficiaries) make the cluster and SI approach 
look like a conceptual “monster” where one does not know which element to prioritise. 
Instead of getting absorbed into this academic whirl of concepts and relations, and thus 
developing ivory-tower theories that risk not helping policy makers at all, we emphasise in 
this thesis a return to the practitioners in clusters and SI and the identification of the dilemmas 
they face when trying to build policy-driven clusters. 
 
5 Research questions and design 
The critics regarding policy-driven clusters are rising over the last years. Yet, it is still 
necessary to understand deeper the drivers of these critics as well as to address them in a 
constructive manner in order to help the practitioners on the field overcome their difficulties. 
When scrutinizing the policy-driven cluster literature, we will demonstrate that governments 
constantly face a multitude of cornelian dilemmas, i.e. a set of decisions and choices for 
which there is no “one best choice”. They have to decide upon these dilemmas without 
knowing if in fine the decision taken will really lead to the development of a policy-driven 
cluster that gains international visibility and competitive advantage. For example during the 
set-up phase, those that implement cluster policies have to decide if they privilege direct 
subsidies or indirect subsidies (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011b), if they focus on regional 
development or industrial excellence (T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2008; Younès, 2011), if they 
implement a policy-driven cluster organisation at national or at local level (Burfitt & 
Macneill, 2008; Perry, 2005). 
 
                                                 
17
 Organisations (i.e. the players or actors as for example companies, universities, venture capital organisations 
and public innovation policy agencies institutions) and institutions (i.e. the rules of the game as for example the 
legal system, norms, routines standards)  
18
 For example R&D, competence building, formation of new product markets, incubating, financing  
19
 For example between organisations (competition, transaction, networking) or between organisations and 
institutions (the influence of institutions on organisations, the organisational embeddedness in the institutional 
environment) 
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In this thesis, we will study these organisational dilemmas and their consequences in policy-
driven clusters. Facing a dilemma means that there is no “one best choice”, so by going in one 
direction one certainly produces also negative effects, or side-effect pathologies, that in some 
cases might hinder the policy-driven cluster to function effectively. We will define 
“pathology” in a cluster setting as the visible managerial symptoms that policy-driven clusters 
may endure. These pathologies are directly generated by “organizational dilemmas”, by 
having privileged one direction over another. The challenge in cluster policy study is to 
pinpoint these side-effect pathologies and their associated dilemmas in order to improve 
cluster policy implementation and to better adapt the cluster policy to the local settings. In 
this thesis, we will not give an answer to whether one dilemma direction or another is better. 
Instead, we will first summarize and establish a taxonomy of the different dilemmas that we 
identified in the literature, by using a systematic literature review (SLR) methodology 
(Denyer & Neely, 2004; Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer, & Neely, 2004; Tranfield, 
Denyer, & Smart, 2003). Second, we will empirically analyse the extent to which these 
dilemmas produce organisational pathologies in a French policy-driven cluster situated in the 
Paris Region: the HealthCluster Paris Region (HCPR)20 is analysed in the second part of this 
doctoral dissertation. 
 
HCPR is a policy-driven cluster that consecutively received a low performance evaluation, 
from national cluster policy evaluators (CMI & BCG, 2008; Erdyn, Technopolis, & 
BearingPoint, 2012) but also from academics (Bonnafous-Boucher & Saussois, 2010). HCPR 
thus represents an “extreme case” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006) in the cluster 
landscape, a case of a pathologic policy-driven cluster. This pathologic case allows, in a 
Popperian falsification tradition, to look at a “black swan” and to start a new critical reflection 
process (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228; Popper, 1959) on how a policy-driven cluster works and 
which pathologies it might produce. As HCPR is an extreme case, we see the pathologies 
through a magnifying glass. There are numerous policy-driven clusters in France that seem to 
encounter much less difficulties (the “white swans”) (see for example (Bidan & Dherment-
Férère, 2009; Chabault, 2008; Retour, 2009b; Therme, 2008)) than HCPR. The knowledge 
gained through the in-depth analysis of cluster pathologies in an extreme case will prove to be 
precious, because it will help us rethink how a policy-driven cluster actually works and what 
can be improved during the management of the implementation and evaluation processes. 
                                                 
20
 Name changed.  
General Introduction 
 
 8
 
We study HCPR by using a case study methodology (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009) that combines observation, interviews, documents and archival 
data. Even though we were continually embedded and confronted with our cluster policy 
fieldwork (as we will explain in the research design chapter), we had two main qualitative 
fieldwork periods. The first main qualitative fieldwork period took place between September 
2010 and January 2011, and the second main fieldwork period took place between November 
2011 and March 2012. Using a longitudinal approach in case studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Leonard-Barton, 1990) is particularly recommended when operating in nascent research 
fields (Edmondson & McManus, 2007), as it is the case for cluster policy implementation and 
the study of its challenges. The methodological issues and details processes for data collection 
and analysis will be presented in chapter 4. 
 
Overall, we will argue in this thesis that it is necessary to shift from the sole study of the 
“anatomy of clusters” (Porter, 1998c) to the deeper study of “pathology of clusters”. The 
traditional static cluster approach has become a dynamic approach with organisational 
dilemmas (see Figure 1). The thesis that we defend in this doctoral dissertation can be 
formulated as follows:  
Implementing cluster policies produce organisational dilemmas that generate side-
effect pathologies. 
 
And we defined three associated Research Questions (RQs):  
RQ1: What are the organisational dilemmas that can be observed in the 
implementation of the French cluster policy (the case of HCPR)?  
RQ2: To which extend do these organisational dilemmas generate side-effect 
pathologies?  
RQ3: How can the knowledge of these pathologies benefit to cluster policy 
(implementation and evaluation)?  
 
General Introduction 
 
 9
Figure 1: Problem statement and Research Questions  
 
 
6 Expected contributions 
This thesis is expected to make several theoretical, methodological and managerial 
contributions.  
 
Expected theoretical contributions: We wish to contribute to the new critical line of 
research that urges academics to start focusing on the dilemmas of policy driven-clusters that 
emerge when transforming the theoretical cluster concept into the policy realm (Burfitt & 
Macneill, 2008; Burfitt, et al., 2007; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; Swords, 2013). We wish 
to contribute to the cluster policy literature by first establishing a taxonomy of potential 
cluster dilemmas and second by identifying the caused pathologies. Second, by studying a 
pathogenic case, we offer the academic community a look at an extreme case that will help 
rethinking how a policy-driven cluster works, can be better implemented and evaluated. The 
studies of “black swans” are particularly important to get new scientific conversations going 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
 
Expected methodological contribution: We wish to contribute to the study of policy-driven 
clusters from different angles. Previous research has already shown that policy-driven clusters 
have highly entangled actors (T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009) with competing strategic 
objectives (Brachert, et al., 2011; Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; Sellar, et al., 2011; Steinle, et al., 
2007). Our case study set-up will allow us to study HCPR from different angles (for example 
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the operational team, the cluster members, or other policy-driven clusters of the region). 
Second, we also wish to contribute to the systematic literature review (SLR) methodology 
(Denyer & Neely, 2004; Pittaway, et al., 2004; Tranfield, et al., 2003) that will be used in this 
thesis to scan the cluster policy literature in order to frame the literature of a nascent field.  
 
Expected managerial contribution: We wish to contribute to the cluster policy evaluation 
literature (Bellandi & Caloffi, 2010b; Diez, 2001; Gallié, et al., 2012; Raines, 2003; 
Schmiedeberg, 2010; Sölvell & Williams, 2013), by focusing on the study of cluster 
organisation effectiveness (Gallié, et al., 2014). We wish to improve the evaluations that take 
an “in the action” (Chanut, 2009) cluster policy evaluation approach. We hope to improve 
the methodology and indicators of cluster policy evaluations by pinpointing the different 
dilemmas of policy-driven clusters and the potential pathologies that emerge. The thesis 
wishes to contribute to the “management model” of cluster policy evaluations (Gallié, et al., 
2014). On the other hand, we wish to contribute to the cluster policy implementation field 
(Burfitt, et al., 2007; Foray, David, & Hall, 2011; Nauwelaers, 2001). We will summarize the 
different implementation dilemmas to help the ones who implement policy-driven clusters to 
structure their reflections in a more systematic manner. 
 
7 Structure of the thesis 
Figure 2 presents the structure of the thesis, divided in three parts and nine chapters. 
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Figure 2: Structure of thesis 
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FIRST PART: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is split in three chapters. In the first chapter, we embed this research in 
an historical context, in order to highlight genealogies of the “cluster” notion. In the second 
chapter, we focus on the most recent academic literature on clusters and particularly on the 
cluster-policy literature: this allows us to review the dilemmas encountered when 
implementing cluster policies. In the third and final chapter of this literature review, we 
identify research gaps and formulate the research questions that are empirically tested in this 
thesis. 
 
We use two different types of methodologies to conduct this literature review. In the first 
chapter, we mostly conduct a descriptive and narrative literature review as traditionally done 
in the business and management fields (Denyer & Neely, 2004). According to Denyer & 
Neely (2004, p. 133) this type of literature review, if done wisely, “can provide the reader 
with an overview of the different perspectives in a field of study, including its key 
methodological and theoretical traditions.” However, this type of literature review, when 
done poorly, also “run the risk of only reflecting the reviewer’s perspective or position” 
(Denyer & Neely, 2004, p. 133). 
 
In the second chapter, focusing on the cluster policy literature, we apply a more systematic 
literature review (SLR) methodology (Leseure, Bauer, Birdi, Neely, & Denyer, 2004a; 
Pittaway & Cope, 2007; Pittaway, et al., 2004; Thorpe, Holt, Macpherson, & Pittaway, 2005; 
Tranfield, et al., 2003). The main difference between a traditional descriptive or narrative 
literature review and a SLR is that, in the latter, “the [investigation] process is reported 
openly in the same way that empirical research would be” (Pittaway, et al., 2004, p. 480). 
This exact description of the literature investigation process “should enable readers, whether 
academics, practitioners or policy-makers, to determine for themselves the reasonableness of 
the decisions taken and the appropriateness of the conclusions” (Denyer & Neely, 2004, p. 
133). We use a SLR approach to investigate the current state of the “cluster policy” research 
stream not only to overcome any type of critics that might be associated with a descriptive 
and narrative literature review, but also to render our literature review as useful as possible for 
further research on this topic. 
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Chapter 1:  An archaeology of cluster research 
Cluster research started to intensify in the 1980s and then exploded in the 1990s. The 
following historical review not only allows us to understand the political and societal context 
of the period but also the paradigm changes that happened during this time. If we wish to 
better understand cluster research that started to intensify in the 1990s (see Figure 3) and then 
exploded with governments implementing cluster policies at the beginning of the 21st century, 
it appears necessary to turn back the clock for 30 years and understand what happened during 
the 1980s. The events, discussions and publications of this period still heavily influence 
today’s governments and policy decisions.  
 
Hereinafter, we give a brief overview of some of the important cornerstones of this period: 
economic growth, region and competitive advantage. Undertaking this “archaeological” 
(Foucault, 1966 (1994)) work and discussing the general context that surrounded the 
birthplace of modern cluster research is all the more necessary as a cluster is a highly 
systemic research object. Researchers who are concentrated on a certain research object 
sometimes lose sight of why they are actually focusing on this particularly object. The object 
thus becomes a mere theoretical object, with little societal implications. A relevance gap 
emerges (Mesny & Mailhot, 2012), something increasingly underlined by cluster policy 
scholars (Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; R. Martin & Sunley, 2003). However, cluster research was 
born out of a specific societal context and with the intent to perform a societal impact. If we 
wish to go forward in improving the currently adopted cluster policies around the world, we 
first have to understand again (and relearn) under which context cluster research intensified 
and cluster policies emerged. The following theoretical journey is a try to dismantle and 
analyse the “thought-styles” (Fleck, 1935 (1980)) of the 1980s in order to understand why 
cluster policies emerged. Even though we are now as well embedded in a certain “thought-
style” we will try to show that a certain shift happened during the last 30 years of cluster 
research and that we are now confronted with new challenges compared to the 1980s and 
1990s.  
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Figure 3: Evolution of the articles published on ‘clusters’ (1962-2007) 
 
 
Source: Cruz & Teixeira (2009, p. 3)21 
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 ad Figure 3: Cruz & Teixeira (2009, p. 3) conducted their search in Business Source Complete and EconLit 
databases (EBSCO), they identified 2 940 relevant articles, they used following keywords: “cluster and 
industry (thus considering these words’ derivations, such as clustering, clusterized, industrial, etc.), in 
addition to some of their close-to-synonymous concepts, namely agglomeration, external economies, 
spatial concentrations, and industrial districts” 
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1 Economic growth: the knowledge and institutional turns 
“Economic growth” is indeed a large and complex field of research22, and not the central 
object of our research. However, it is useful for management scholars interested in clusters to 
understand, at least schematically, the debates on economic growth – its indicators, theoretical 
models and the role of institutions - that emerged shortly before the “hype” of cluster research 
began in the 1990s, and that subsequently led to cluster policies implemented by governments 
around the world. 
 
1.1 Economic growth: performed through indicators 
When economists analyse the economic situation (or “healthiness”) of a country, they look at 
annual changes of different macroeconomic variables as for example household consumption, 
export rate, import rate, private consumption, government’s financial balance, etc. (Lequiller 
& Blades, 2006). However, the most important indicator economist look at is the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and its variations from one period to the next.23 
 
For now exactly 70 years24, governments around the world constantly strive to increase their 
GDP25. In order to increase a country’s GDP, government authorities have to find the “right” 
policies to positively stimulate the economic actors and consequently their outcomes. 
Theories that explain what leads to economic growth, measured by GDP increase, vary over 
time and, as we will see hereinafter, generally stay vague. A Harvard economist recently said 
that economic growth remains a mystery: “What makes some countries rich and others poor? 
Economists have asked this question since the days of Adam Smith. Yet after more than two 
hundred years, the mystery of economic growth has not been solved” (Helpman, 2004, p. ix).  
                                                 
22
 In case the reader is not an economist and a novice to economic growth theories, but interested in deepening 
its knowledge about it, we can recommend following readings: the undergraduate textbook of economic growth 
by Weil (2012), the graduate textbook of economic growth by Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2003) and the handbook 
of economic growth by Aghion & Durlauf (2005, 2014). 
23
 “GDP combines in a single figure, and with no double counting, all the output (or production) carried out by 
all the firms, non-profit institutions, government bodies and households in a given country during a given 
period, regardless of the type of goods and services produced, provided that the production takes place within 
the country’s economic territory.” (Lequiller & Blades, 2006, p. 15) 
24
 In 1934, Simon Kuznets (the chief architect of the United States national accounting system) presented the 
newly developed GDP measure to the American Congress. In 1944, exactly ten years later, leaders of the allied 
nations reunited in Bretton Woods and decided to use the GDP as the primary measure for economic growth 
(Costanza, Hart, Talberth, & Posner, 2009). 
25
 We will not discuss in this thesis if the GDP is the right indicator to measure the “healthiness” of a country. 
See for example Costanza et al (2009) for an informative discussion on this subject. 
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Economic growth theories only enter reality when they are somehow “performed” by 
countries, governments and economic actors. However, every country is different so that 
economic theories, developed on an aggregate level, might turn out differently on the field. 
Lucas (1988, p. 41) formulated it this way “[…] there is no one pattern of growth to which all 
economies conform, so a useful theory needs also to capture some forces for change in these 
patterns, and a mechanics that permits these forces to operate.” In other words, economic 
growth and all policy measures that go along with it are constantly confronted to our 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1955) which limits us to find the “absolute truth” and only 
allows us to find the best solution under particular circumstances.  
 
1.2 Economic growth models: from exogenous to endogenous 
Economic growth theories generally follow the curve of a life cycle: they are born, they 
experience growth and a peak period, before they start declining again to ultimately being 
replaced by “better” growth theories (but sometimes growth theories also experience revivals) 
(for a discussion of the different waves see for example Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2003; 
Helpman, 2004; Maier & Tödtling, 2002; Snowdon, 2006). During the peak period of an 
economic growth theory, the academic community particularly concentrates on a few 
mainstream models until an alternative theory gains enough momentum to start a new cycle, 
putting a new economic growth model in the centre of attention. Starting a new wave is a 
difficult endeavour as following retrospective reflection of one of the fathers, Paul M. Romer, 
of a new wave trying to introduce knowledge into the models shows: 
“My greatest regret is the shift I made while working on these external effects models, a shift 
that took me away from the emphasis on research and knowledge […] I am now critical of this 
work, and I accept part of the blame. Looking back, I suspect that I made this shift toward 
capital and away from knowledge partly in an attempt to conform to the norms of what 
constituted convincing empirical work in macroeconomics. No international agency publishes 
data series on the local production of knowledge and inward flows of knowledge. If you want 
to run regressions, investment in physical capital is a variable that you can use, so use it I did. 
I wish I had stuck to my guns about the importance of evidence […].” (Romer, 1994, p. 20) 
 
Hereinafter, we focus on two important economic growth paradigms that managed to impose 
their worldviews on the academic community. The two waves under scrutiny happened 
during the second half of the 20th century: the neoclassical growth theories (also called 
exogenous growth theories) mainly stimulated by Robert M. Solow (1956, 1957) and Trevor 
W. Swan (1956) in the middle of the 1950s, and 30 years later, the endogenous growth 
theories mainly stimulated by Paul M. Romer (1986) and Robert E. Lucas (1988).  
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1.2.1 The neoclassical (or exogenous) economic growth model 
In the neoclassical growth models there are three factors that contribute to the long-term 
growth of countries: capital accumulation, labour input, and technical progress (Maier & 
Tödtling, 2002, p. 64). This means, that “sustained increase in real GNP26 must be due either 
to an increase in the quantity of capital and labor used in production or due to a more 
efficient use of these inputs (e.g., technical and/or organizational progress)” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 
110). However, the neoclassical growth models do not put technical progress within the 
equation of the model (i.e. technical progress is not an endogen factor of the model), but they 
put technological progress outside of the model (i.e. technical progress is considered to be an 
exogenous factor of the model). This means, that for Solow (1956, 1957), “technology (unlike 
capital and labor) cannot be observed or measured directly” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 111), it is thus 
not part of the model but the residual of the equation. 
 
The neoclassical growth theories are therefore unable to explain why economic change or 
innovation happens, the theory “assumes that progress in technology is produced by random 
scientific and technological breakthroughs” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 112). The incapacity of the 
model to explain the reasons for technical progress paired with the fact that Solow’s model 
predicts declining growth rates in the long run27 “leads to the conclusion that government 
policies can do little to accelerate the long-term rate of economic growth” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 
110). 
 
This neoclassical (or exogenous) economic growth model dominated scientific thoughts from 
the 1950s up to the 1980s. According to Helpman (2004), there were some exceptions that 
tried to integrate explanations for technical progress into their models (for example Arrow 
(1962) or Uzawa (1965)) but for the majority of economists, technical progress stayed an 
exogenous factor of economic growth that cannot be manipulated intentionally.  
 
                                                 
26
 GNP means “Gross national product”. However, GNP is no longer used and was replaced by GNI (or gross 
national income). As already discussed, “GDP measures the total production occurring within the territory”, 
while “GNI measures the total income (excluding capital gains and losses) of all economic agents residing 
within the territory (households, firms and government institutions).” (Lequiller & Blades, 2006, p. 18) 
27
 Solow’s model predicts declining growth rates in the long run. The model assumes thus that in the end all 
nations will converge to the same level of development 
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1.2.2 The endogenous economic growth model 
What happened in the 1980s? Snowdon (2006, pp. 81-83) lists a whole list of possible reasons 
why economists finally accepted an endogenous economic growth model, that considers 
technical change as an internal factor and not as an external residual. Snowdon (2006, p. 82) 
mentions for example that there was an increasing awareness that developing countries did 
not seem to catch up with developed countries (something they were meant to do according to 
the neoclassical model), the availability of new data sets, the collapse of the Soviet Union, as 
well as other reasons.  
 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) initiated a considerable revival of interest in economic 
growth theories by introducing endogenous economic growth models that were finally 
accepted by the academic community. Hereinafter, a very simplistic summary of the new 
approach:  
“[…] the new theory incorporates technological progress and advances in knowledge as 
endogenous factors within the growth model. Technological advance is considered endogenous 
because technological innovations are the result of conscious investment decisions taken by 
entrepreneurs and individual firms. Firms are assumed to invest in research and development 
activities for the same reasons that they invest in other factors of production; that is, on the 
basis of the expected profitability of the investment. In effect, the new growth theory assumes 
that knowledge, technology, and/or "know-how" constitute a separate factor of production in 
addition to capital and labour" (Gilpin, 2001, pp. 112-113). 
 
Knowledge is thus only considered as an “official" economic factor, leading to economic 
growth, for little less than 30 years. 
 
Knowledge as a factor of production 
The first major revolution that endogenous growth theories initiated was the integration of 
knowledge as a third factor, next to capital and labour, in their economic growth models. 
Lucas (1988) for example based its argumentation heavily on the works of Jane Jacobs (1961, 
1969). Jane Jacobs observed the city like an anthropologist and illustrated with a multitude of 
examples what happens on the sidewalks, parks, or public spaces of cities. She gives a very 
thick and detailed description of how a city works and her work was and still is a crucial 
masterpiece for community and urban planners. The reason why Lucas (1988) comes back to 
the works of Jacobs is because she describes in a very illustrative manner how information 
and knowledge is transported in a city. Jacobs (1961) credits this knowledge flow in the city 
to the multitude of public characters, i.e. “anyone who is in frequent contact with a wide 
circle of people and who is sufficiently interested to make himself a public character” 
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(Jacobs, 1961, pp. 89-90). These public characters live and work within a city’s boundary and 
it is through these public characters that information travels easily: “his main qualification is 
that he is public, that he talks to lots of different people. In this way, news travels that is of 
sidewalk interest” (Jacobs, 1961, pp. 89-90). 
 
Lucas (1988) thus picks up the ideas and observations of Jacobs and integrates them into his 
economic growth models. For him, capital and labour alone can no longer explain why cities 
exist. He argues that if we consider that economic actors act in a rational manner, then they 
would have no reason to stay somewhere where land is more expansive than somewhere else. 
So for Lucas (1988) there must be another explanation why economic actors stay within the 
city and this explanation is the knowledge gain one can earn in a city compared to when being 
outside of a city: 
“If we postulate only the usual list of economic forces, cities should fly apart. The theory of 
production contains nothing to hold a city together. A city is simply a collection of factors of 
production - capital, people and land - and land is always far cheaper outside cities than 
inside. Why don't capital and people move outside, combining themselves with cheaper land 
and thereby increasing profits? […]. Cities are centered on wholesale trade and primary 
producers, and a theory that accounts for their existence has to explain why these producers 
are apparently choosing high rather than low cost modes of operation. It seems to me that the 
'force' we need to postulate account for the central role of cities in economic life is of exactly 
the same character as the 'external human capital' I have postulated as a force to account for 
certain features of aggregative development.” (Lucas, 1988, pp. 38-39) 
 
Investments in knowledge thus play an important role because the more a firm invests in 
knowledge, the more knowledge will circulate between the economic actors at a certain 
location. When a firm invests in knowledge, Romer (1986, p. 1003) considers that 
“knowledge cannot be perfectly patented or kept secret”. Therefore, “the creation of new 
knowledge by one firm is assumed to have a positive external effect on the production 
possibilities of other firms” (Romer, 1986, p. 1003). There will always be externalities that 
cannot be protected by a firm and therefore the investment in knowledge by one firm is 
considered by Romer (1986) to have a multiplier effect28. 
 
The role of public policy in economic growth 
The second major revolution of endogenous growth theories is that it integrates the possibility 
that the growth rate does not need to decline in the long run (as do the neoclassical growth 
                                                 
28
 We would like to alert the reader that there is a major difference between Jacobs (1969) and Romer (1986) 
understanding under which circumstances these knowledge spillovers occur (see for example Beaudry & 
Schiffauerova, 2009). For pedagogical reasons, we will not yet enter this debate but come back to this point 
when we will focus on the region. 
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theories), meaning that in the end, there is a possibility that countries do not converge to the 
same level of development (Helpman, 2004): 
“The new growth theory is important because it permits or even encourages the use of 
government policies to increase the long-term rate of economic growth. […] [it] assumes that 
increasing returns to scale and positive investment economies can lead to an increased growth 
rate, especially in high-tech sectors. […] [additionally, it] suggests that government policies, 
through promotion of increased national savings and investment rate and also increased 
support for R&D, can lead to a sustained higher rate of economic growth” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 
113). 
 
This has of course an important impact on the role public policies can play in economic 
growth. Instead of being considered as “useless in the long run” because all countries will 
anyhow converge to the same level, they might actually be a crucial indicator to differentiate 
the economic growth patterns of countries. For example, Morgan & Nauwelaers (2003 
(1999)) underlined that even the World Bank changed its mind about State intervention in 
order to foster innovation and economic growth:  
“The state is gradually being rehabilitated as a necessary and legitimate agent in economic 
development, after a period when it was denigrated, especially in the UK and the US, as a 
'dead hand' on social and economic process. That the state has a positive role to play in 
promoting innovation and economic development was recently affirmed by no less an 
institution than the World Bank, which in the past has been criticised for extolling the market 
over the state and for downplaying the institutional architecture of market-based economies.” 
(Morgan & Nauwelaers, 2003 (1999), p. 11)29 
 
Instead of being a “dead hand”, the World Bank started thus to explicitly recommend state 
intervention and to be an “animator” of the emerging knowledge economy.  
 
1.3 Economic growth: the rising importance of institutions 
The discussions about economic growth during the 1980s went hand in hand with a revival of 
institutional theories, an important cornerstone to better understand today’s cluster policies. 
Hereinafter, we thus particularly concentrate on the revival of institutional theories in 
economics and their possible impact on economic growth (North, 1986, 1989, 1990)30. Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988) were not the only ones at that time who wanted to overcome the 
                                                 
29
 Morgan & Nauwelaers (2003 (1999)) refer to a speech that James D. Wolfenshon, the president of the World 
Bank between 1995 and 2005, held during a Keynote speech at Peking University in 2002: “We at the Bank fully 
support this move towards embracing the potential of the “Knowledge Economy” and see our role as a catalyst, 
a facilitator, a broker and a connector, positioned at a major intersection in the network economy, connecting 
global learning opportunities together with investment assistance for local development.” Source: 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/wolfensohn-implementing-a-global-partnership-for-poverty-reduction-
29052002-2002-05-29 (15/05/2014) 
30
 For the time being we will not particularly focus on institutional theories in economics treating “only” 
transaction costs (Coase, 1937, 1988; Commons, 1931; Williamson, 1973), or on institutional theories in 
sociology (for example Gouldner, 1954 (1964); Selznick, 1949) having impacted organization theories 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March & Olsen, 1984; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; W. R. Scott, 1987). 
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established growth theories, for example Matthews (1986) or North (1986, 1989) had the 
same endeavour. However, compared to economists like Romer and Lucas, who were 
particularly focusing on formal economic growth models, economists like Matthews (1986) 
and North (1986, 1989) had a more historical approach. 
 
The objective of North (1990, p. 3) was to appreciate “the role of institutions in economic 
performance“ and to develop an “analytical framework to integrate institutional analysis into 
economics and economic history”. North tried, in a similar manner as Romer and Lucas, to 
overcome the neoclassical economists by proposing another explanation for economic growth 
(North, 1989), this time the focus laid less on knowledge externalities and more on 
institutions. 
 
North (1990, p. 3) defines institutions as the “rules of the game in a society”. For North 
(1990, p. 3), institutions “structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, 
or economic”. More precisely, he underlines that “they consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights)” (North, 1991, p. 97). According to North, these existing 
“rules of the game” differ from country to country and might explain that economic growth 
differs as well. For North, organizations are a group of individuals that pursue a common goal 
and at the same time organizations are also the actors of the system that can change the 
institutions. However, this change happens “incrementally rather than in discontinuous 
fashion” (North, 1990, p. 6). For North, compared to neoclassical scholars, human interaction 
is not optimal. So there has to be a third person that structures the exchange, but not only for 
disciplinary reasons.  
 
Also for Matthews (1986, p. 915), institutions construct themselves over time, step by step, 
where every new step is influenced by the previous step. However, Matthews (1986, p. 914), 
compared to North (1990) is particularly reluctant regarding experimenting with institutions 
on a national level. He particularly underlines that institutions are very complex, “much more 
complicated than appears on the surface” which also means that “it may be quite difficult to 
see why an institution has arisen and what purposes it currently serves”. For Matthews 
(1986) experimenting with these institutions would lead to a “random walk” where one does 
not know the end destination. Matthews (1986, p. 917) underlines that experimentation on a 
single firm level would be fine “because it does not much matter for the economy as a whole 
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if it does not work”. However, he is more reluctant to experiment with institutions on a 
national level, “we have to recognise candidly that institutional changes can easily lead in the 
long run to results that are quite different from intended” (Matthews, 1986, p. 917). 
 
North (1990) on the other hand underlines the importance of the State and according to him 
the State should go beyond a simplistic Public Choice theory, which sees the State only from 
a redistribution angle. However, North (1990, p. 99) also points out that once a certain path is 
taken this path is difficult to change as “the network externalities, the learning process of 
organizations, and the historically-derived subjective modelling of the issues reinforce the 
course”. The choice to go in a certain direction might thus have a huge impact. A mediocre 
development might thus continue in a mediocre path. These words are particularly interesting 
to retain when discussing cluster policies. 
 
A major cornerstone of the 1980s was thus the turn from exogenous to endogenous economic 
growth theories and thus everything which goes along: a focus on knowledge, knowledge 
externalities, knowledge investment, the assumption that countries do not converge to the 
same development level, and the increasing role accredited to institutions in economic 
growth. Additionally this went hand in hand with the rise of institutional theories and the role 
institutions, or more particularly the State, might play in economic growth. We will see that 
this development is particularly important when we start discussing cluster policies in chapter 
2. In the next section we will focus on another important change: the emergence of the region 
as an economic organization. 
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2 The emergence of regions as economic organizations 
Regional economics experienced a strong revival during the 1980s. Storper (1997, p. 3) 
summarises this re-emergence as following: “Something funny happened in the early 1980s. 
The region, long considered an interesting topic to historians and geographers, but not 
considered to have any interest for mainstream western social science, was rediscovered 
[…]”. Even though, regional development was studied by researchers before the 1980s, what 
was new was that the region was suddenly considered as a “unit of social life in 
contemporary capitalism equivalent to […] markets, states or families” and there was the 
assumption that it might be a “fundamental basis of economic and social life ‘after mass 
production’” (Storper, 1997, p. 3). Again, in order to understand what Storper exactly means 
by “after mass production” and why the “region” emerged as a unit of analysis in the 1980s, 
we have to dig further down the history. 
 
We first discuss in detail the seminal propositions of Marshall on regions, then discuss the 
revival of Marshallian industrial districts during the 1980s and finally focus on the most 
emblematic cluster “role models” that were “created” during this period.  
 
2.1 The rise and fall of Marshall’s industrial district 
Even though the main focus of Marshall’s work was not specifically on clusters or industrial 
districts, Marshall (1890 (1920)) is widely cited in cluster studies because of his chapter: 
“The concentration of specialized industries in particular localities”. In this chapter, he 
describes his observation gained from studying England’s industrial organization at the end of 
the 19th century. He observed that skilled and fortunate workers often “gathered within the 
narrow boundaries of a manufacturing town or a thickly peopled industrial district” (1890 
(1920), p. IV.X.6).  
 
Marshall draws five main observations of why this happens (see Table 2): 
- Knowledge circulation: First of all he observed that knowledge circulates “in the air” 
within these industrial districts, that new ideas are immediately passed on to other 
manufactures and that “the mysteries of the trade become no mysteries” (p. IV.X.7). 
- Specialisation through division of labour: The second important observation concerns 
the economies of scale the individual manufacturer can make through the division of 
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labour within an industrial district. When machinery is expensive, he observed that the 
different manufactures specialize in one task of the value chain, which allows them to 
save money because they can use their machinery more efficiently at full capacity.  
- Pool of skilled workers: The third important point of industrial districts according to 
Marshall is the pool of skilled workers which attracts employers because they know 
that they will find skilled employees at this location, and which attracts more 
employees because they know that they will easily find work.  
- Physical conditions: Then Marshall also observes that some industrial districts seem to 
exist because the physical conditions (for example easy access, specific natural 
resources) of the location are favourable for the industry.  
- Patronage of a court: The “patronage of a court” is the last important point that 
Marshall mentions and that according to him explains why industries locate in a 
certain location. Under patronage of a court, he understands how kings, lords or other 
important personalities have the power to “invite” artisans to locate in a certain 
location. These rulers created in a certain manner “artificial” industrial districts where 
they wished to have the industry set up31. Another reason to deliberately set up an 
industrial district was for example when the location was specialized in mining but did 
not offer any other jobs, particularly for women or children, which were not strong 
enough to do the hard physical work. Marshall gives the example of Barrow, a village 
known for its railway and mining activities, where a textile district was set up 
“deliberately on a large scale in order to give variety of employment in a place where 
previously there had been but little demand for the work of women and children” (p. 
IV.X.10). 
 
                                                 
31
 Two concrete examples Marshall gives to underline the benefits the “patronage of a court” brought for the 
different artisans in advancing their skills: “[…] the mechanical faculty of Lancashire is said to be due to the 
influence of Norman smiths who were settled at Warrington by Hugo de Lupus in William the Conqueror's time” 
(p. IV.X.4); “[…] the greater part of England's manufacturing industry before the era of cotton and steam had 
its course directed by settlements of Flemish and other artisans; many of which were made under the immediate 
direction of Plantagenet and Tudor kings” (p. IV.X.4). 
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Table 2: Co-location: main advantages and reasons according to Marshall 
Topic Marshall’s observations 
Knowledge 
circulation 
“Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in 
processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly 
discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with 
suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas.” (1890 
(1920), p. IV.X.7) 
Specialisation 
through division 
of labour 
“The economic use of expensive machinery can sometimes be attained in a very high 
degree in a district in which there is a large aggregate production of the same kind […]. 
For subsidiary industries devoting themselves each to one small branch of the process of 
production, and working it for a great many of their neighbours, are able to keep in 
constant use machinery of the most highly specialized character, and to make it pay its 
expenses […] and its rate of depreciation very rapid.” (1890 (1920), p. IV.X.8) 
Pool of skilled 
workers 
“[…] a localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a constant 
market for skill. Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a 
good choice of workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking 
employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need such skill 
as theirs and where therefore it is likely to find a good market.” (1890 (1920), p. IV.X.9) 
Physical 
conditions 
“[…] such as the character of the climate and the soil, the existence of mines and 
quarries in the neighbourhood, or within easy access by land or water.” (1890 (1920), p. 
IV.X.3) 
Patronage of a 
court 
“When an Eastern potentate changed his residence […] the deserted town was apt to 
take refuge in the development of a specialized industry, which had owed its origin to the 
presence of the court. But very often the rulers deliberately invited artisans from a 
distance and settled them in a group together.” (1890 (1920), p. IV.X.4) 
 
Besides the advantages of co-location and the reasons of industries to co-locate, Marshall 
(1890 (1920)) also stressed the negative effects of co-location as for example the increasing 
“ground-rents” and the “competition for dwelling space” within the city limits which forced 
a lot of companies to go to the suburbs of cities or to the neighbouring regions. Additionally, 
even though Marshall favours specialization for knowledge spillovers, Marshall also points 
out the high risk of a one-sided industrial specialization32: 
“A district which is dependent chiefly on one industry is liable to extreme depression, in case 
of a falling-off in the demand for its produce, or of a failure in the supply of the raw material 
which it uses. This evil again is in a great measure avoided by those large towns or large 
industrial districts in which several distinct industries are strongly developed. If one of them 
fails for a time, the others are likely to support it indirectly; and they enable local shopkeepers 
to continue their assistance to workpeople in it.” (1890 (1920), p. IV.X.12) 
 
Marshall was an influential economist of his time, but not particularly for his works on 
industrial districts. However, one century later, he is one of the most cited authors in regional 
research (Cruz & Teixeira, 2009). Today, researchers studying clusters constantly retake his 
observations just discussed and develop them further. In the following chapters we first 
present why Marshall’s observations experienced a revival (during the mass production 
period industrial districts and thus regions were not in the center of attention) and underline 
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 In the second half of the 20th century, Detroit and its automotive industry experienced exactly what Marshall 
tried to alert about at the end of the 19th century.  
First part: Literature review - Chapter one 
 26
the strong focus on his idea of “knowledge circulation” within industrial districts, although, 
criticized by Krugman (1991 (1993)). 
 
2.2 The revival of industrial districts 
For economists interested in institutions (North, 1989) and economists interested in 
knowledge externalities (Lucas, 1988) it might have been the fight against neoclassical 
theories that spurred their rebirth during the 1980s. For scholars interested in the region (be it 
geographers, economists, political scientists, etc.) this rebirth seems to be related to additional 
explanations. According to Storper (1997), and others that we discuss hereinafter, the 
increasing interest in the “region” as a unit of analysis for economic studies might have been 
initiated by a change in the production system. Storper for example underlines that in the 
early 1980s the production system moved from a mass-production system to a “post-Fordist, 
flexible, learning based” system (1997, p. 4) and that in this process “the region” was 
suddenly (re)considered as a “fundamental basis of economic and social life” (1997, p. 3). 
Hereinafter we discuss three important developments regarding the region as a new unit of 
analysis: flexible specialization, innovation and embeddedness.  
 
2.2.1 The region, a locus for flexible specialization 
At the beginning of the 20th century the production system changed considerably compared to 
the production system of the 19th century and thus the time Marshall did its observation of 
industrial districts in England. When Marshall wrote Principles of Economics (1890 (1920)), 
the production system was still mainly organized in crafts and so within one industrial district, 
several different crafts participated in the production of a certain product. In other words, the 
production system was based on a “vertically disintegrated, small-firm industrial system” 
(Rocha, 2013, p. 100). 
 
However, at the beginning of the 20th century the craft production system was replaced by a 
mass production system that exploded after the end of WWII. Piore & Sabel (1984) call this 
change in production system at the beginning of the 20th century, the “first industrial divide”. 
Instead of having predominantly vertically disintegrated companies, the first industrial divide 
lead to big vertically integrated companies which paved the way to mass production and mass 
consumption. Vertically integrated companies have the different production steps assembled 
within one company and are thus able produce an increased amount of standardized products 
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in a much faster and cheaper way than before. One prominent example is the Ford Motor 
Company founded in 1903. The mass production system initiated mass consumption and led, 
especially after WWII, to strong economic growth and wealth, known in France as “the 
glorious thirty” or in Germany and Austria as the “economic miracle”. 
 
However, this production system that procured increasing wealth and nearly full employment 
started to fall apart in the 1970s. Again it is difficult to pinpoint the exact causes of this 
change (for example some important events of the 1970s: end of the Bretton Woods system, 
oil crisis, stock market crash). Jones (2007, p. 150), a business history scholar, for example 
points out that at that moment a “new global economy” has started to emerge and that “from 
the late 1970s, deregulation and Iiberalization stimulated increased globalization.” 
According to Jones (2007), this was accompanied with “China's adoption of market-oriented 
policies and opening to foreign investors in 1979” (p. 150), one decade later by the “collapse 
of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe” (p. 150) but also an “accelerating growth in 
India” (p. 151). Finally, this opening up of boarders, deregulation, and liberalization 
“resulted in significant geographical shifts in economic power” (Jones, 2007, p. 151). 
 
This geographical shift in economic power might have helped China or India, but was 
perceived as a threat by the western world. In the beginning of the 1980s, American scholars 
like Piore & Sabel’s (1984) perceived the economic situation as extremely gloom as this 
introduction to their famous book called “The second industrial divide” shows:  
“The times are troubled indeed when the good news is almost indistinguishable from the bad. 
Economic downturns no longer seem mere interruptions in the march to greater prosperity; 
rather, they threaten to destroy the world markets on which economic success has dependent 
since the end of World War II. Meanwhile, upturns avert disaster without solving the problems 
of unemployment and slow growth, which have become chronic in almost all the advanced 
countries. No theory seems able to explain recent events, let alone predict what will happen 
next.” (Piore & Sabel, 1984, p. 3) 
 
Today, exactly thirty years later, the opening words of Piore & Sabel’s book might be seen as 
still very accurate. Has something changed? One of the punching bags of the observed and 
frightened economic decline in the 1980s was the vertical integrated company which was able 
to produce at large scale for minimal cost, but which was perceived as not flexible and unable 
to adapt to fast changing and increasingly demanding (global) consumer tastes. Piore & Sabel 
(1984, p. 6) identified two strategies “for relaunching growth in the advanced countries”. 
 
First part: Literature review - Chapter one 
 28
The first strategy was build “on the dominant principles of mass-production technology” 
(Piore & Sabel, 1984, p. 6). They argued that if one wishes to maintain this system, it 
“requires a dramatic extension of existing regulatory institutions, including a redefinition of 
economic relations between the developed and the developing worlds” (p. 6). However, for 
them another additional promising strategy was to go “back to those craft methods of 
production that lost out at the first industrial divide” (p. 6). 
 
The second strategy, called by Piore & Sabel (1984) “flexible specialization”, was thus in a 
certain manner a modern version of the production system Marshall already described at the 
end of the 19th century. Instead of having one big vertically integrated company, small-
specialized companies located in a certain region might be more capable to compete in the 
new globalized economy. Sabel (1984, p. 344) underlines that “[…] there is a growing 
consensus […] that changes in the conditions of competition in mass markets for standard 
goods are a the root of the crisis, and that the reorientation of industry toward the production 
of more specialized goods by more flexible technologies and more skilled workers will be on 
of the principal outcomes”. 
 
In the same stream of research, Christopherson and Storper (Christopherson & Storper, 1986; 
Storper & Christopherson, 1987) dedicated a whole research stream to the role of flexible 
specialization and the social and economic impacts of this new mode of production and thus 
confirmed the observation of Piore & Sabel. Christopherson and Storper (Christopherson & 
Storper, 1986; Storper & Christopherson, 1987) particularly focused on Hollywood’s film 
industry where a vertically integrated studio system (i.e. production, distribution and 
exhibition were combined under one roof) has predominated up to the 1980s but then shifted 
to a vertical disintegration system. Storper & Christopherson (1987, p. 115) underline that the 
shift towards vertical disintegration considerably changed the importance of urban centres. 
According to them “flexible specialization creates powerful agglomeration tendencies at the 
regional level” (1987, p. 115) and that this is “further strengthening external economies”.  
 
Also Allen J. Scott (1988a, 1988b), an American geographer and political scientist, focused in 
his research on the impacts of these “new” flexible production systems. Scott (1988a, p. 174) 
called these production systems “new industrial spaces” in contrast to the “rigid structure” of 
“mass production”. For Scott (1988a, p. 174), these “new industrial spaces” are 
“characterized by an ability to change process and product configurations with great 
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rapidity”. Additionally, “they are […] typically situated in networks of extremely malleable 
external linkages and labour market relation. […] they tend as far as possible to externalize 
production processes by buying in services and products that might otherwise by supplied 
internally […]” (A. J. Scott, 1988a, p. 174). The sectors in which these new production 
systems were established experience a “vigorous revival of entrepreneurial behavior, 
renewed market competition and active technological innovation” (A. J. Scott, 1988a, p. 
174).  
 
There are two particularities of Scott’s analysis. First, Scott already started to mention the role 
of increased technological innovation in these “new industrial spaces” a topic of increasing 
important in the following years. Second, instead of concentrating on urban centres 
(Christopherson & Storper, 1986; Storper & Christopherson, 1987), Scott had a more regional 
approach to these flexible production systems (Hudson, 1989; Komninos, 2002), also an 
approach that intensified in the following years. 
 
However, we would like to underline that the flexible production system “hype” was also 
criticized. For example Gertler (1988) warns the research community of the “perils of 
generalization”. Gertler (1988) criticizes that a lot of research done on flexible specialization 
bases its arguments on the automotive sector. However, according to Gertler (1988) the 
automotive sector was (already for the vertical integrated company) and will always stay a 
specific case. Gertler (1988, p. 430) admits that “significant changes are happening” but 
argues that the flexible specialization is not something completely new and challenges “the 
assertion that these changes are all-pervasive and present a distinct break with the past and 
the dawning of a new era of production”. For him it is just an “intensification and 
development of historical trends established long ago” (Gertler, 1988, p. 430). Additionally, 
Gertler (1988, p. 431) warns that "the flexibilization of the firm represents first and foremost 
an ideology to undermine the power and rigidity of labour so that firms can achieve greater 
levels of current and future profitability". 
 
At the same time as Piore & Sabel, Christopherson & Storper or Scott started to focus on 
flexible specialization and the new role of the region in this process for companies also other 
researchers started to focus on the role of the region in the economic system. However, 
instead of having a pronounced flexible specialization approach, the focus laid more on 
innovation. 
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2.2.2 The region, a locus for innovation 
Besides the focus on flexible specialization, the region was also increasingly considered as the 
new locus of innovation. In the beginning of the 1980s, several researchers started to 
investigate this assumed relationship between innovation and region.  
 
Oakey et al (1980) studied if technological change varies between the regions in Britain. 
Their study showed that there exist regional variations of innovative activity. In this early 
study, they concluded that this might be particularly due to the variances on non-production 
workers (or skilled workers). Some years later, in another study, Oakey (1984) went one step 
further and investigated for example the impact of various regional resources (as for example 
finance, labour and technical information) on innovation in high technology SMEs located in 
Britain and the USA. This time the focus laid particularly on the role of government aid, 
which was more developed in the USA than in Britain for high tech companies. 
 
Another early researcher focusing on these questions is Jaffe (1986). Jaffe (1986), who 
studied if the R&D productivity of firms was increased if located next to other R&D intensive 
firms or “technological neighbours”. Jaffe (1986) concluded, based on American company 
data sources, that this was the case for R&D intensive firms. However, firms with low own 
R&D suffer from very strong R&D intensive neighbours. 
 
These studies were important bricks to get the research stream going. However, their visibility 
was maybe weaker due to their scattered results on some regional data. Philippe Aydalot, a 
French regional and urban economist, founded an association that tried to bundle the 
investigation efforts of researchers interested in this interplay between innovation and region. 
In 1984, Philippe Aydalot founded a research group called the “European Research Group on 
Innovative milieus“ (“Le Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs”, 
abbreviation: GREMI). The particularity of this well-known research group33 was that they 
set up a common methodology and studied a multitude of regions with the same hypotheses, 
the same criteria and the same questions (Matteaccioli & Tabariés, 2006). This allowed a high 
comparability of results and a certain “industrialisation” of the research question. The 
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 We think the GREMI example is a great “role model” how research on such a complicated topic can be done. 
Instead of pursing individual research agendas in social sciences, we should much more often bundle our 
research effort to increase the quality and impact of our findings. Also Porter (1990 (1998)) collaborated with 
several research teams in order to conduct a multi-country study using the same methodology. 
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objective of the GREMI was to study “the relations between technical innovation and 
territory” (Matteaccioli & Tabariés, 2006, p. 3). 
 
Even though the title stipulates “European Research Group”, not only European research 
teams participated but also North-American research teams (Matteaccioli & Tabariés, 2006). 
Instead of taking a “company” approach or a “technology” approach to tackle the question of 
how innovation emerges and gets fostered, the research group decided to take an explicit 
“milieu” approach. The question among the GREMI scholars (Aydalot, 1986; Aydalot & 
Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1991; Maillat & Lecoq, 1992; Maillat & Perrin, 1992; Maillat, 
Quévit, & Senn, 1993) thus laid less on flexible specialisation or employment questions but 
on how the local environment and culture stimulates the innovativeness of the companies:  
“Il s’agit de se demander quelles conditions extérieures à l’entreprise sont nécessaires pour la 
naissance de l’entreprise et l’adoption de l’innovation. On considère que l’entreprise (et 
l’entreprise innovante) ne préexiste pas aux milieux locaux, mais qu’elle est sécrétée par eux. 
Les milieux sont considérés comme des « pouponnières » d’innovations et d’entreprises 
innovantes. Ce choix implique que les comportements innovateurs ne sont pas nationaux, mais 
qu’ils dépendent de variables définies au niveau local ou régional. L’accès à la connaissance 
technologique, les injonctions d’un tissu industriel, l’impact de la proximité d’un marché, 
l’existence d’un pool de travail qualifié... Ce sont là des facteurs d’innovation qui vont 
déterminer sur un territoire national des zones de plus ou moins grande innovativité.” 
(Aydalot, 1986) 
 
The idea that the “region” plays an increasing role for the innovation process started in the 
1980s together with the changes happening in economic growth theories and the orientation 
towards a knowledge economy. During the 1990s this regional innovation literature further 
developed and lead to different innovation system literature streams as for example national 
innovation systems (Lundvall, 1992), regional innovation systems (Cooke, 1992), or learning 
regions (Asheim, 1996; Florida, 1995). However, another concept that is important to 
understand in this context is the notion of “embeddedness”. The economic actors were 
increasingly seen as embedded in a certain regional milieu that will lead them to be more 
innovative. 
 
2.2.3 The region, a locus for embeddedness 
The last important concept that emerged during the 1980s and that is important for cluster 
studies concerns embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985). Embeddedness put at the forefront the 
role of sociology in economic reflections and thus the role of humans - and human 
interactions - in economic systems. Not only economists or geographers but also economic 
sociologists tried to add their knowledge to the profound changes that were happening during 
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the 1980s. In the case of economic sociology, Swedberg (2003) for example puts forward that 
economic sociology experienced maybe a revival due to external factors such as 
Thatcherism34 or Reaganism35. Swedberg (2003) joins the list of different types of political 
and societal factors (see also Snowdon (2006) or Rocha (2013)) that try to explain this 
intensification and renewal in economics, geography and sociology during the 1980s. 
However, this research does not base its argumentation on political or societal factors to 
explain their “rebellion” or “revival” of the 1980s, but on the criticism of neoclassical 
thinking (or in the case of the regional economies discussion on the death of mass production 
systems in developed countries). 
 
Granovetter is considered as the father of the economic sociology revival (Swedberg, 2003). 
Particularly due to his famous article “Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness” (Granovetter, 1985). In this article Granovetter (1985) critics that there is no 
“middle ground” to analyse social structure and relations. He criticizes that social relations 
are either “oversocialized” by sociologists, that consider economic actors as “obedient to the 
dictates of consensually developed systems of norms and values” (1985, p. 483), or 
“undersocialized” by neoclassical economists, that consider economic actors as rational and 
“atomized” individuals. At the contrary, Granovetter argues that “most behavior is closely 
embedded in networks of interpersonal relations” (1985, p. 505) and that this would avoid to 
undersocialize or oversocialize human actions: 
“The embeddedness argument stresses […] the role of concrete personal relations and 
structures (or "networks") of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. 
The widespread preference for transacting with individuals of known reputation implies that 
few are actually content to rely on either generalized morality36 or institutional arrangements37 
to guard against trouble.” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 490) 
 
It is thus this embeddedness in a social network which builds trust and which might impact 
the economic outcome of the individual. Granovetter also criticizes institutionalists like 
Williamson (1973), because the question should not centre on markets or hierarchies but on 
embeddedness of the economic actor. For Granovetter, relying only on explanations of the 
institutional framework, “discourage[s] the detailed analysis of social structure” which he 
considers as the “key to understanding how existing institutions arrived at their present state” 
(Granovetter, 1985, p. 505). Granovetter concludes his article with encouraging sociologists 
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 Prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990. 
35
 President of the United States from 1981 to 1989.  
36
 Granovetter uses “generalized morality” in reference to his thoughts about “oversocialization”. 
37
 Granovetter uses “institutional arrangements” in reference to his thoughts about “undersocialization”. 
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to start debating again the role of human actions in economic domains. He believes that 
“there is a place for sociologists in the study of economic life but that their perspective is 
urgently required there” and that “sociologists have unnecessarily cut themselves off from a 
large and important aspect of social life” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 507). 
 
During the twentieth century, sociology was for a long time considered as the “science of 
leftovers” and as “a pseudoscience that had nothing to offer [to economists]” (Granovetter, 
1990, p. 89). However, the re-emergences of new institutional theories, also stimulated 
sociologists like Granovetter to participate again in this scientific debate and the new 
economic sociology was born, re-integrating human actors and their exchanges in the core of 
economic debates. According to Swedberg (2003, p. 34), the basic approach of the new 
economic sociology is that the “core economic phenomena should be analyzed with the help 
of sociology” and that three approaches are particularly helpful in this endeavours “network 
theory, organization theory, and cultural sociology”. These different approaches are used to 
analyse “economic organizations”, which is not to be understood as a firm, but as “the 
organization of whole economies” (2003, p. 53). One of these economic organizations are for 
example industrial districts (Swedberg, 2003). This shift of thought is similar to Becattini’s 
(1979) thoughts. Already at the end of the 1970s, Becattini (1979) wrote that in order to 
understand the particularity of industrial districts, the “unit of analysis” had to shift from the 
“single firm” to the “cluster” level (characterized by “interconnected firms located in a 
small area”)38. 
 
To sum up, the 1980s also experienced an important revival of the role of social interactions 
in economic discussions. Besides, understanding the role of knowledge externalities and 
institutions for economic growth, sociologists advocated to concentrate as well on the 
embedded human interaction to explain change and economic development. Finally, the 
region experienced a revival as a locus of where all these observations seem to take place. 
 
2.3 The stabilisation of regional “role models” in the 1980s 
In this last part, we focus on two regional “role models” that emerged during the 1980s. The 
Italian economist Sebastiano Brusco (1982) and the American political scientist AnnaLee 
Saxenian (1983), started to focus on the economic organization of regions. However, instead 
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of primarily focusing on the changing production system or solely on the role of innovation 
and embeddedness, Brusco’s and Saxenian’s focus laid more on observed performance 
differences between regions and the wish to explore the causes. By doing so, they underlined 
the superior economic performance of these regions and created two role models that are still 
seen as the main examples why we are implementing cluster polices today. Even though 
10 000 km apart, not only Brusco (1982) and Saxenian (1983), but a range of economists, 
economic sociologists, economic geographers and political scientists scrutinized these two 
regions during the 1980s: California (in the United States of America) and Emilia-Romagna 
(in Italy). The common denominator of both regions was a superior economic performance 
compared to other regions in the respective countries. Even though the explanations that were 
put forward and the angle of analysis are slightly different, both regions served as major role 
models in the subsequent cluster “hype”. We think it is important to focus on these two role 
models when discussing cluster policies, as elements of their success were subsequently tried 
to be replicated in other regions (with more or less success). We will first focus on Emilia-
Romagna (and its ceramic industry) before discussing California (and its semiconductors 
industry in Silicon Valley). 
 
2.3.1 Emilia-Romagna: The third Italy 
Emilia-Romagna, just beneath Italy’s Northern regions, gained in fame because of its superior 
economic performance and better resistance to crisis in the 1970s and 1980s (Brusco, 1982). 
The region is part what scholars named the “Third Italy”39. The term “Third Italy” was first 
coined40 by Bagnasco (1977). The main characteristics of the “Third Italy” were the “dense 
networks of flexible, strongly related, small and medium-sized firms in craft-based industries 
[…] in a number of specialized industrial districts”. The industrial organization of the “Third 
Italy” thus stood in sharp contrast to the “industrial heartland of the North” (First Italy; 
vertically integrated companies specialized in mass production), and the “backward South” 
(Second Italy) (Boschma, 1998, p. 1). Several scholars tried to describe and understand the 
special characteristics that made the success of Emilia-Romagna and the “Third Italy” 
(Becattini, 1979, 1990, 2002; Brusco, 1990; Capecchi, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Pyke, Becattini, 
& Sengenberger, 1990; Trigilia, 1986).  
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 Several important writings of the period were only published in Italian language. For example the book of 
Bagnasco (1977) discussing the “Third Italy”, or the article of Becattini (1979) discussing the industrial districts 
of Northern Italy. Due to our lack of Italian, we had to read secondary literature in order to understand their 
writings. The secondary literature on which we base our argumentations is mentioned in the footnotes so that the 
main text is not overcharged with citations.  
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Becattini (1979), one of the major scholars studying the “Third Italy”, studied it through the 
lens of the works of Marshall (1890 (1920)), and is thus one of those who initiated the revival 
of Marshall’s observations to analyse modern industrial districts41. However, the focus of 
Becattini (1979) (and others studying the region) laid much more on the “historical and 
territorial-specific sociocultural factors”42 to explain the regional particularities. This is 
different compared to Marshall (1890 (1920)) who did not pay much attention to these 
factors. However, the major common denominator of the English industrial districts at the end 
of the 19th century and the Italian industrial districts at the end of the 20th century is this 
particularity of small firms specialising in a certain tasks, and the localised division of labour 
for production.  
 
Becattini (1990, p. 38) defines an industrial district as “a socio-territorial entity which is 
characterized by the active presence of both a community of people and a population of firms 
in one naturally and historically bounded area”. In this definition of industrial districts, 
Becattini (1990) mentions several important concepts. First, Becattini (1990) underlines the 
importance of a “community of people” in the region. For Becattini (1990, p. 39), a “good” 
community is a community with a “relatively homogeneous system of values and views”. 
Second, Becattini (1990) mentions that a “population of firms” has to be present in the 
“historically bounded area”. For Becattini (1990, p. 39), the different firms in the region are 
not installed there accidentally. He argues that as the population of firms represent a 
“localised realisation of a division of labour”, the firms are not only attracted by “pre-
existing localising factors” but are “rooted in the territory” (1990, p. 40). To understand this 
strong connection with the territory, Becattini (1990, p. 39) argues that one has to understand 
the historical development of the region.  
 
These arguments go hand in hand with the arguments of Putnam (1993), an American public 
policy researcher who conducted an in-depth study of twenty Italian regions. The particularly 
of this study was that in 1970, Italy simultaneously established 15 ordinary and 5 special 
regions. This represented a unique opportunity for researchers to investigate the birth and 
development of new institutions. The central question of Putnam’s research was: “What are 
the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions?” (Putnam, 
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1993, p. 6). The main condition he identified as crucial for effective representative institutions 
was strong “social capital” in the region. For Putnam (1993, p. 167), social capital can be 
described as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”. This for example also 
includes "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement" (1993, p. 167). 
 
A good example of Putnam’s (1993) social capital theory is the Emilia-Romagna Region. One 
of the particularity of the Emilia-Romagna Region was that “the Italian Communist and 
Socialist parties had an absolute majority” (Capecchi, 1990, p. 28) in the Region after WWII 
up to the 1980s. Several studies were particularly interested in this political dimension that 
might explain the success of this Region (Brusco, 1982; Trigilia, 1986). The governing 
Communist party in Emilia-Romagna was for example actively helping the local companies 
to get started, co-ordinating associations for the local artisans or providing day-care centres 
for children so that women can work (Capecchi, 1990). For example this included the 
establishment of a ceramics centre43 in the region, or the provision of a centralised service 
regarding “information […] [on] patents, and foreign markets” (p. 32), the provision of 
professional training or the help to start co-operations with universities. However, all this help 
was not rigid but very flexible and tailored to the individual needs of the companies. Capecchi 
(1990, p. 32) underlines that “the point to stress about these undertakings is their flexibility 
[…]. Flexible specialisation of the production system was taken as a model also in the area of 
services to the firms”. This was very helpful for training the local entrepreneurs and helping 
them to survive but also created a common spirit among them. 
 
Another reason, next to the regional social capital, that might explain the strong solidarity 
among the local population might have been the consciousness (or readiness) to join forces in 
order to survive, not against a global threat, but a national threat: “This “common” 
management of industrialisation in Emilia-Romagna has had a “common enemy”, the 
national government which, being Christian-Democrat, has traditionally supported the large 
enterprises of the north and threatened the factories of Emilia” (Capecchi, 1990, p. 28). 
 
From an organizational theory point of view the “readiness” of organizational members is 
often discussed in change management articles (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993). 
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Readiness is defined as “the cognitive precursor to the behaviours of either resistance to, or 
support for, a change effort” (Armenakis, et al., 1993, pp. 681-682). In an organizational 
context change managers need to influence their organizational members’ “beliefs, attitudes, 
and intentions regarding the extent to which changes are needed and the organization’s 
capacity to successfully make those changes” (Armenakis, et al., 1993, p. 681). Applied to the 
Emilia-Romagna Region, we could say that the ruling parties have successfully managed to 
influence the population’s readiness. 
 
2.3.2 California: Silicon Valley 
The industrial organisations of two areas in California were particularly investigated during 
the 1980s: Silicon Valley and its semi-conductor industry (Miller & Cote, 1985; Rogers & 
Larsen, 1984; Saxenian, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1994) and Hollywood and its motion picture 
industry (Christopherson & Storper, 1986, 1989; Storper & Christopherson, 1987). We 
already discussed the Hollywood and its motion picture industry in the flexible specialization 
section. In this section we will now focus on Silicon Valley. We will see that the 
circumstances of Silicon Valley’s performance fame are (slightly) different compared to the 
Emilia-Romagna Region in Italy. 
 
Silicon Valley is located in the Northern part of California, more precisely in the southern part 
of the San Francisco Bay Area. The history of Silicon Valley is very rich thus we will not 
summarize it in detail (see for example Rogers & Larsen, 1984; Saxenian, 1983, 1994; T. 
Weil, 2010). Hereinafter, we will just point to the most important developments that we 
consider relevant for the subsequent development of cluster policies that try to replicate the 
Silicon Valley model.  
 
Santa Clara County, the part of the Bay area were Silicon Valley is located today, was still a 
“peaceful agricultural valley” in 1940, but by 1970 “the region had gained international 
fame as [...] the capital of the semiconductor industry and the densest concentration of ‘high 
technology’ enterprises in the world” (Saxenian, 1983, p. 7). The question is what happened 
in-between? As in the Emilia-Romagna region, the political environment of the epoch played 
an important role in the industrial growth of the region. However the reasons were much 
different. At the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War, the government of the 
United States of America decided to invest a considerable amount of money in university 
research “to develop war-related technologies” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 11). The two universities 
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that benefited most from these subsidies were the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) in Eastern Massachusetts (on the East coast) and Stanford University in Northern 
California (Saxenian, 1994). The cutting edge research, which was done thanks to these 
investments, spore the development of technical skills and therefore the development of 
human capital. This again attracted companies and initiated new firm formations (Saxenian, 
1994). Compared to the Emilia-Romagna region, the formation of the Silicon Valley was not 
due (at least in the beginning) to a regional government providing associational help and 
training for local companies. In the Silicon Valley, the government help was targeted to 
university research that triggered firm attraction.  
 
However, even though Silicon Valley and Route 12844 received research subsidies, their 
respective starting points and developing paths were not at all the same (Saxenian, 1994). The 
Route 128 was already a successful and established hub for technological innovation before 
the government started its research investments, while the area of Silicon Valley was an 
agricultural region (Saxenian, 1994). The total employment in the high technology sector 
(Figure 4), or more particularly in electronic components and semiconductors firms (Figure 
5), differed considerably. Silicon Valley was still far behind in numbers of high technology 
jobs during the 1950s. However, this changed in the 1970s, when Silicon Valley took the 
incontestable lead until today. 
 
Figure 4: Total high technology 
employment 
Figure 5: Employment in electronic 
components and semiconductor firms 
Source: approximately adapted from Saxenian (1994, 
p. 3) 
Source: approximately adapted from Saxenian 
(1994, p. 79) 
 
                                                 
44
 For a detailed case study of Route 128 see Dorfman (1983) 
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Saxenian (1994) tried to explain the differences between these two regions in order to 
understand the cause that lead to these different developments. One the one hand, she 
underlines that “both Stanford and MIT encouraged commercially oriented research and 
courted federal research contracts” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 12). However, one the other hand she 
points out that “MIT’s leadership focused on building relations with government agencies 
and seeking financial support from established electronics producers” while “Stanford’s 
leaders, lacking corporate or government ties or even easy proximity to Washington, actively 
promoted the formation of new technology enterprises and forums for cooperation with local 
industry” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 12).  
 
The relationship between the universities and the local industry were thus substantially 
different in the two regions. While the MIT, close to Washington, focused on official 
connections with government agencies and big established companies, Stanford knew that the 
distance to these established companies and Washington was too far (Saxenian, 1994). The 
pioneers of Silicon Valley “saw themselves as outsiders to the industrial traditions of the 
East” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 29). This distance “facilitated experimentation with novel and 
productive relationships” (1994, p. 27) and created “a more flexible industrial system, one 
organized around the region and its professional and technical networks rather than around 
the individual firm” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 30). Collaboration, mutual help, informal 
relationships, openness and no secrets were the main premises of this local culture.  
 
On the other hand, for the firms situated at Route 128, there was no urgency to change 
something because they were the leader in technological innovation and so the “technology 
enterprises adopted the autarkic practices and structures of an earlier generation of East 
Coast businesses” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 59). The local culture continued as before and was 
characterised by “secrecy and territoriality ruled relations between individual and firms, 
traditional hierarchies prevailed within firms, and relations with local institutions were 
distant – even antagonistic” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 59). This had as a consequence that “the 
regional economy remained a collection of autonomous enterprises, lacking social or 
commercial interdependencies” (Saxenian, 1994, p. 59).  
 
There are certain similarities between Silicon Valley and Emilia-Romagna. Emilia-Romagna 
knew that they are disadvantaged as the government mainly focused on the “First Italy”. The 
consequence was that they created a common culture of mutual aid and exchange, similar to 
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Silicon Valley. In both cases, there was an underlying understanding that in order to succeed, 
they really had to battle together and try something new; there was a “readiness” of the local 
population to create a common culture. Besides this common feeling of being an outsider, 
Silicon Valley and Emilia-Romagna have not that much in common (see Table 3). Silicon 
Valley focuses on the high technology industry and the government particularly helped with 
research funding. Emilia-Romagna is characterised by a craft based industry where 
government intervention mainly deals with forming associations and training. Also Porter 
(1990, p. 73) mentioned that “companies gain advantage against the world’s best competitors 
because of pressure and challenge”. The importance of this “outsider” feeling in order to 
generate a strong local culture and economic growth might be an element of particular 
importance for cluster policy studies. 
 
Table 3: Differences and similarities between Silicon Valley and Emilia-Romagna 
 Silicon Valley Emilia-Romagna 
Craft based industry  X 
High technology industry X  
Government helped mainly in the 
form of research subsidies 
X  
Government helped mainly in the 
form of associations, professional 
training 
 X 
“Outsider” feeling because of Route 128 “First Italy” 
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3 The rise of (regional) competitive advantage 
In the 1980s, besides the reconsideration of the existing growth theories and the consideration 
of the region as a crucial element where the economy is organised, the 1980s also represent 
the birthplace of modern strategic management, and the creation of the notion “competitive 
advantage” at the firm, regional or national level by Michael Porter (1985 (1998)).  
 
The writings of Michael Porter heavily influenced companies and strategic management 
research (Barney, 1986, 1991; Huggins & Izushi, 2011) but also governments around the 
world in their quest for competitiveness (Lundequist & Power, 2002; McDonald, et al., 2007). 
The central idea of Porter’s work concerns “the nature of competition” (Huggins & Izushi, 
2011). In order to understand Porter’s theories, its critics and the differences compared to the 
scholars discussed so far we have to understand Porter’s particular “thought-style” (Fleck, 
1935 (1980)) which is somehow different to the scholars already discussed. Porter at the 
beginning of his career had a strong company approach, a point of differentiation compared to 
the other researchers already discussed. However, Porter such as the authors we already 
discussed also tried to overcome neoclassical economic thoughts (Aktouf, Chennoufi, & 
Holford, 2011)  
 
In 1999, a poll conducted among Strategic Management Society members elected Porter as 
“the most influential strategic management scholar over the previous twenty-five years” 
(Huggins & Izushi, 2011, p. 1) and even though Porter influenced governments and 
businesses around the world like maybe nobody else, his research was criticized by a large 
number of scholars (for example by geographers (R. Martin & Sunley, 2003; Swords, 2013), 
by business scholars (Davies & Ellis, 2000; Dunning, 1993; McDonald, et al., 2007), or by 
policy scholars (Motoyama, 2008)). Hereinafter we will try to explain this ambiguity, 
understand these critics and why he nevertheless managed to become the guru of 
competitiveness clusters. We split this section on competitive advantage in three different 
parts: First we present the birth and development of Porter’s business approach to clusters, 
then we discuss the meaning of competitiveness for regions and nations, and finally we focus 
on the critical voices against Porter and national competitiveness. 
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3.1 The birth of Porter’s business approach to clusters 
In the preface of Porter’s first book he wrote that his research situates “at the intersection 
between the mainstream economic research in industrial organization and the preoccupation 
of research in business administration with problems of the manager” and that he believes 
that “innovative research and teaching in both economics and administration will benefit 
greatly from exposure to the other's territory” (Porter, 1976, p. xi). Using concepts and 
theories form other disciplines is considered as crucial to facilitate the production of new 
knowledge (Greckhamer, Koro-Ljungberg, Cilesiz, & Hayes, 2008; Schmidt, 2007) and 
Porter is definitely somebody who did it in an extremely successful manner (see Porter, 
1981). Porter was “[…] the first author to bring together […] industrial organization 
economics and strategic manager – in order to provide a better discussion of the strategic 
choices made by firms” (Aktouf, et al., 2011, p. 76). However, he did not stop at the 
intersection between industrial organization economics and strategic management. In his later 
works he also transcended the barriers versus economic geography or regional science 
(Huggins & Izushi, 2011). As we already saw with Romer (1994) it is difficult to impose new 
ideas and theories within one discipline, doing it across different disciplines is even more 
complicated as the worldviews, vocabulary, or methodologies vary and simply being 
understood is already a challenge. The four most influential books of Porter are “Competitive 
Strategy” (Porter, 1980 (1998)), “Competitive Advantage” (Porter, 1985 (1998)), “The 
competitive advantage of nations” (Porter, 1990 (1998)) and “On competition” (Porter, 
1998d). However, the two earlier books (1980 (1998), 1985 (1998)) stand in contrast to the 
two later books (1990 (1998), 1998d). Table 4 briefly summarizes the evolution of Porter’s 
ideas45. 
                                                 
45
 For a more detailed discussion of Porter’s work we can recommend following book: Huggins, R. and H. 
Izushi, Eds. (2011). Competition, competitive advantage, and clusters: the ideas of Michael Porter. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
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Table 4: Evolution of Porter’s ideas on competition 
 
Competitive 
Strategy (1980) 
Competitive 
Advantage (1985) 
The competitive 
advantage of 
nations (1990) 
On Competition 
(1998) 
Main level of 
analysis Industry Firm Nation Region 
Observation 
Cross-industry 
variations & Intra-
industry variations in 
profitability 
Differences in the 
translation of generic 
strategies into 
actions 
Lack of a convincing 
explanation of a 
nation’s influence on 
its competitiveness  
Clusters enhance 
productivity 
Key 
questions 
What factors 
determine the 
attractiveness of 
industries for long-
term profitability? & 
What is the source of 
intra-industry 
variations in 
profitability?  
How does a firm put 
the generic strategies 
(cost, differentiation, 
focus) into practice 
in order to create 
competitive 
advantage?  
What are the sources 
of high levels of 
productivity and 
long-run 
productivity growth 
achieved by a 
nation’s successful 
internationally 
competing firms?  
na 
Results 
- Profit potential in 
an industry is 
determined by the 
collective strength of 
five forces 
- Profit potential of 
firms is determined 
by a firm’s ability to 
(1) analyze the 
sources of each of 
the five forces; (2) 
find a position in the 
industry where it can 
best defend itself 
against competitive 
forces or influence 
them in it’s favour.  
- Value a firm 
creates stems from 
(1) the many discrete 
activities it performs 
in designing, 
producing, 
marketing, 
delivering and 
supporting products; 
(2) its ability to 
identify and map 
those activities and 
to put them in 
accordance with the 
chosen strategy 
- But overall 
industry structure 
(five forces) has an 
impact on value 
creation 
Identification of four 
sets of determinants 
of national 
advantage: firm 
strategy, structure 
and rivalry; demand 
conditions; related 
and supporting 
industries; factor 
conditions  
The concept of 
clusters helps to 
capture important 
linkages, 
complementarities, 
and spillovers of 
technology, skills, 
and information that 
cut across firms and 
industries 
Competitive 
performance 
measurement 
Goal for firm: profitability 
Measurement: comparing receipts and costs 
Type: financial measure 
Improvement through: for example pricing 
strategies 
Goal for national or regional economies: 
productivity 
Measurement: output produced per unit input 
Type: physical measure 
Improvement through: technical efficiency or 
technological progress 
Framework Five Forces Value Chain Diamond 
Cluster (already at 
the core of the 
diamond) 
Disciplines Industrial Economics, Strategic management Industrial Economics, Strategic management, Economic geography, Regional science 
Audience firms and industries governments and policy makers 
Source: based on the first chapter of Huggins & Izushi (2011, pp. 1-22) 
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For the time being it is important to underline that the main level of analysis varies 
considerably between the different books. While the first book concentrates on an industry 
level, the second book digs down on the company level, the third book takes again a broader 
view by focusing on the nation, and the last book digs down again, but this time not to 
analyse firms but regional advantages. Each of the four books is associated with one main 
concept: the five forces46 concept to analyse an industry (Porter, 1980 (1998)), the value 
chain47 concept to analyse firms (Porter, 1985 (1998)), the diamond48 concept to analyse a 
nation’s advantages (Porter, 1990 (1998)) and the cluster concept to further develop the 
diamond model on a regional level (Porter, 1998d). 
 
The audiences of these books are not the same. In the first two books Porter particularly 
focused on firms and industry, in order to give recommendations for managers. In the last two 
books, the focus laid more on governments and policy makers. This also changed Porter’s 
views regarding the role of innovation and cooperation (see Table 5). Innovation is only 
treated as a marginal feature in the first two books while being one of the central elements for 
competitive advantage in the last two books. Also the role of cooperation is not really treated 
in the first two books, but is, like innovation, an important element in the last two books, 
particularly regarding knowledge exchange (Huggins & Izushi, 2011). 
 
Table 5: Porter’s major contradictions  
 
Competitive Strategy (1980) & 
Competitive Advantage (1985) 
The competitive advantage of nations 
(1990) & 
On Competition (1998) 
Role of 
innovation 
is only a marginal feature in the proposed 
tactics 
very important, creates competitive 
advantage 
Role of 
cooperation no role, sole focus upon competition 
very important, creates competitive 
advantage; coexists with competition 
Source: based on Huggins & Izushi (2011) 
 
According to Porter (Porter, 1985 (1998), 1990 (1998)), competitive advantage for a firm 
signifies not the same as for a nation or region. The goal for a firm is profitability measured 
                                                 
46
 Porter’s five forces (1980): threat of new entrants, intensity of rivalry among existing competitors, threat of 
substitute products, bargaining power of buyers and bargaining power of suppliers 
47
 Porter’s value chain (1985): isolation of nine categories of activities; four support activities (firm 
infrastructure, human resource management, technology development, procurement) and five primary activities 
(inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, services) 
48
 Porter’s diamond (1990): firm strategy, structure and rivalry; demand conditions; related and supporting 
industries; factor conditions 
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by comparing receipts and costs. It is thus a financial measure that can be improved through 
for example pricing strategies. The goal for a nation however is productivity measured by 
output produced per unit input. The national productivity measure is more a physical measure 
that is improved through technical efficiency or technological progress. This progress and 
efficiency can be gained by innovation: “A nation's competitiveness depends on the capacity 
of its industry to innovate and upgrade” (Porter, 1990, p. 73). The ideas on innovation and 
technical progress are in vogue at the end of the 1980s, as we have already seen with Romer’s 
(1986) and Lucas’s (1988) discussions on the importance to integrate “technological change” 
or Aydalot’s (1986) discussion on innovative milieus. 
 
Hereinafter we will now dig deeper into the development of Porter’s view on the productivity 
of nations and regions, which is particularly important for cluster researchers. For this we will 
discuss the rise of the competitiveness’ notion, Porter’s advisory role in Ronald Reagan’s 
government in the 1980s and the difference between comparative advantage (Ohlin, 1933; 
Ricardo, 1817 (1821)) and competitive advantage of nations (Porter, 1990 (1998)). 
 
3.2 The competitive advantage of regions and nations 
Besides the changes happening on a research and political sphere during the 1980s, we have 
to recall that the economy was also more and more struggling during the 1980s. Economic 
growth and regional competitiveness was not in the centre of attention during the period after 
World War II up to the 1970s because the economy in the developed countries was doing 
well. However, this started to change in the 1970s and was strongly visible in the 1980s. 
 
The discussed changes had a strong impact on how national competitiveness was perceived in 
an increasing globalised world. Krugman (1994, p. 29) calls it the “rhetoric of 
competitiveness” or “competitiveness metaphor”. In the beginning of the 1990s, Krugman 
wrote that “the view that, […], each nation is ‘like a big corporation competing in the global 
marketplace’ - has become pervasive among opinion leaders through out the world” (1994, p. 
29). An illustrative example of the influence of this “competitiveness” quest on politician is 
for example the establishment of an “advisory committee on industrial competiveness” by 
Ronald Reagan in 1983. 
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3.2.1 An opportunity to apply the notion at national level 
In 1981 Ronald Reagan (Republican Party) succeeded Jimmy Carter (Democratic Party) as 
the 40iest president of the United States. Beginning of the 1980s the economic situation of the 
United States was very gloom, which was one of the reasons of Carter’s defeat in the 
America’s presidential elections of 1980s49. The election of a republican president went along 
with profound changes regarding the direction of American policy (Duiker, 2009). Instead of 
continuing to promote a social welfare state, Reagan considerably cut spending in social 
areas, cut taxes and invested heavily in military (Duiker, 2009). Even though his approach is 
considered as conservative and in opposition to social welfare policies, this did not mean that 
Reagan believed in deficit reduction (as conservative parties might do today). Instead, Reagan 
considerably increased the American deficit in order to relaunch the economy: “In 1980, the 
total government debt was around $930 billion, by 1988, the total debt had almost tripled, 
reaching $2.6 trillion” (Duiker, 2009, p. 173). 
 
Retrospectively, an important initiative of Ronald Reagan was the establishment of an 
“advisory committee on industrial competiveness”50 (see  
Annex 1 for more detail). Ronald Reagan explained the role of the committee as follows:  
“I charged the Commission with advising me and my administration on ways to strengthen the 
competitiveness of U.S. industry. This nation's greatest competitive advantage in the past were 
ideas that helped America grow. We need to put the power of ideas to use again, for the good 
of our future. […]. To sustain high rates of real economic growth, we must continue to create 
new "miracles" of high technology - miracles both for innovation and for modernization of the 
major areas of our economy in manufacturing, agriculture, and services. The Commission 
members I am appointing today are distinguished leaders from large and small businesses, 
from labor, and from academia. […]. The Commission will focus its attention on […]: 
- Identifying the problems and opportunities for the private sector to transform new knowledge 
and innovations into commercial products, services, and manufacturing processes. 
- Recommending policy changes at all levels of government to improve the private sector's 
ability to compete in the international marketplace and to maintain and create opportunities 
for American workers.”51 
 
                                                 
49
 Americas economic situation in the 1970s and 1980s: “The period from 1973 to the mid-1980s was one of 
economic stagnation, which came to be known as stagflation - a combination of high inflation and high 
unemployment. In 1984, median family income was 6 present below that of 1973. The economic downturn 
stemmed at least in part from a dramatic rise in oil prices […] By 1980s, the Carter administration was facing 
two devastating problems. High inflation and a noticeable decline in average weekly earnings were causing a 
perceptible drop in American living standards.” (Duiker, 2009, p. 173) 
50
 Source: Ronald Reagan: "Executive Order 12428 - President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness," 
June 28, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41529 (accessed 15/05/2014) 
51
 “Statement on Establishment of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness”, August 4, 1983. 
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41678 (accessed 15/05/2014) 
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The committee had as objective to find new ways to generate economic growth in order for 
the USA to succeed in the future. The emphasis of the committee should particularly lie on 
the identification of problems and opportunities as well as the recommendation of policies. In 
1983, one of the academic scholars that was appointed by Ronald Reagan to participate in this 
advisory committee on industrial competiveness was Michael Porter (1985 (1998)). In 1985, 
the commission published a final report named “Global Competition - The New Reality”52 
and particularly emphasized the lack of investment or policy frameworks in four areas: 
technology, capital resources, human resources and international trade. 
 
In 1986, John A. Young (president of the Hewlett-Packard Co) who also chaired Reagan’s 
initial committee on industrial competiveness decided to found the “Council on 
competitiveness”53. Retrospectively, Ronald Reagan initiated a national reflection on 
competitiveness that still prevails today. Today, this council on competitiveness is a non-
governmental organization and similar to the times of Reagan’s initial idea includes 
“corporate CEOs, university presidents, labor leaders and national laboratory directors”.  
 
The council wishes to be a “powerful ‘brain trust’”54 which tries to ensure America’s 
prosperity in the future. In order to become member of this elite circle one has to be invited, 
however once invited to the network, the Council membership gives access to all important 
policy makers ranging from national to regional level. Additionally, the membership allows to 
be invited to policy dialogues and conferences. Michael Porter, nearly thirty years later, still 
occupies a place in the executive committee of this Council on competitiveness.  
 
For Porter, the appointment to Reagan’s “advisory committee on industrial competiveness” 
had an impact on his subsequent ideas and thoughts. The writings of Porter from the 1980s 
onwards are influenced by this quest for national competitiveness something he considered 
was not accurately grasped at that time (Porter, 1990). The participation of Porter in Reagan’s 
advisory committee on competitiveness has helped him as well to increase his already 
existing notoriety to become one of the most influential policy advisors in the world. 
 
                                                 
52
 The final report “Global Competition - The New Reality” of the commission on industrial competitiveness 
was published in 1985 and can be accessed here: 
http://www.wedc.wa.gov/Download%20files/Global_Competition-The_New_Reality.pdf (accessed 15/05/2014) 
53
 See: http://www.compete.org/ (accessed 15/05/2014) 
54
 See: http://www.compete.org/ (accessed 15/05/2014) 
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3.2.2 From “comparative advantage” to “competitive advantage of nations” 
Porter, stimulated by its participation in Reagan’s advisory committee on industrial 
competitiveness, more and more criticized the dominant views of “comparative advantage” 
(Ohlin, 1933; Ricardo, 1817 (1821)). Porter (1990, p. 73) particularly criticizes that “there is 
a growing tendency to experiment with various policies intended to promote national 
competitiveness – from efforts to manage exchange rates to new measures to manage trade to 
policies to relax antitrust”. He argues that these experiments “usually end up only 
undermining [competitiveness]” and that instead “new perspective and new tools” are needed 
(Porter, 1990, p. 73). Very simplistic, he argues that: “We need to know, very simply, what 
works and why. Then we need to apply it.” (Porter, 1990, p. 73). 
 
However, Porter also tried to overcome a certain deterministic body of thought. According to 
Porter (1990 (1998), intro.), in a “modern global economy” every country has its future in its 
hands, nevertheless which resources it possesses in the beginning. This means that 
“prosperity is a nation's choice” and that “competitiveness is no longer limited to those 
nations with a favourable inheritance” (Porter, 1990 (1998), intro.). Instead “nations choose 
prosperity if they organize their policies, laws, and institutions based on productivity” 
(Porter, 1990 (1998), intro.) 
 
It is the national productivity, the “only meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national 
level” (Porter, 1990 (1998), Ch. 1, Sec. 2), that has to be stimulated and increased in order to 
generate more wealth. Porter identified four sources of competitive advantage (commonly 
known as the diamond model): (1) factor condition, (2) firm strategy, structure, and rivalry, 
(3) demand conditions, and (4) related and supporting industries. Each of these four sources is 
increasingly present in the four stages of national competitive development that he identified 
as well (see Table 6). The first stage of national competitive development is factor-driven, the 
second stage investment-driven and the third stage innovation-driven. According to Porter 
(Porter, 1990 (1998)), it is this innovation-driven stage that, according to Porter, that 
generates the greatest wealth and that countries should strive for. However, as soon as a 
country enters the wealth-driven stage it is declining again.  
 
Porter completely reinterpreted the comparative advantage (Ohlin, 1933; Ricardo, 1817 
(1821)) debate. First, for Porter (1990 (1998)) location still matters besides a shrinking world 
and globalization. Second, nations do not have to detect a comparative advantage to challenge 
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their “competitors” but “simply” create their own “competitive advantage”. In the centre of 
this idea lies the cluster concept, for Porter “the basic unit of analysis in understanding 
national advantage” (Porter, 1990 (1998), Ch. 10). Finally, if we think in the mind frame of 
organisational scholars, Porter might be closer to organisational learning scholars (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) than to population ecology scholars (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977, 1989 (1993)).  
 
Table 6: Porter’s stages of development intersected with his sources of competitiveness 
 
Sources of competitive advantage (Diamond model) 
Factor condition 
Firm strategy, 
structure, and 
rivalry 
Demand 
conditions 
Related and 
supporting 
industries 
Stages of 
national 
competitive 
development 
1. Factor-
driven 
Basic factors are 
the essential 
source of 
advantage 
   
2. 
Investment-
driven 
Basic factors 
remain an 
advantage; more 
advanced factors 
are created 
Motivation of 
individuals and 
firms is high; 
domestic rivalry 
is intense 
Size and growth 
of domestic 
demand 
becomes an 
advantage 
 
3. Innovation-
driven 
Advanced and 
specialized factors 
are created and 
upgraded; 
selective factor 
disadvantages  
Firms develop 
global strategies 
Demand 
sophistication 
becomes an 
advantage; 
domestic 
demand begins 
internationalizin
g through a 
nation’s 
multinationals 
Related and 
supporting 
industries are 
well developed 
4. Wealth-
driven 
Cumulative past 
investment in 
factor creation 
persists as an 
advantage 
Motivation falls, 
rivalry ebbs 
Demand 
advantages 
narrow to 
present or past 
wealth-related 
industries 
Clusters thin 
Source: based on Porter (1990 (1998), Ch. 10, Sec. 2) 
 
Porter started to develop its cluster concept in its book on the competitive advantage of 
nations (Porter, 1990 (1998)) and further refined the concept the following years (Porter, 
1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 1998d; Porter & Stern, 2001). Generally Porter 
(Porter, 1998c, p. 78) defines clusters as “critical masses - in one place - of unusual 
competitive success in particular fields”. 
 
More precisely, Porter (1998b, p. 215) defines a cluster as a “a geographically proximate 
group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by 
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commonalities and complementarities”. The geographic scope of a cluster can take multiple 
forms, ranging “from a single city or state to a country or even a network of neighbouring 
countries” (Porter, 1998b, p. 215). However, the boundaries of a cluster are defined “by the 
linkages and complementarities across industries and institutions that are most important to 
competition” (Porter, 1998c, p. 79). 
 
According to Porter (1998b, p. 215), the actors of the cluster vary but “most include end-
product or service companies; suppliers of specialized inputs, components, machinery, and 
services; financial institutions; and firms in related industries.” Next to these core cluster 
actors, clusters also count a range of additional actors. Such as 
“firms in downstream industries [that is, channels or customers]; producers of complementary 
products; specialized infrastructure providers; government and other institutions providing 
specialized training, education, information, research, and technical support [such as 
universities, think tanks, vocational training providers]; and standards-setting agencies. 
Government agencies that significantly influence a cluster can be considered part of it.” 
(Porter, 1998b, p. 215) 
 
Between 1998 and 2001, the “Council on competitiveness” launched, together with Porter 
and his consultancy group Monitor, a “Clusters of Innovation” initiative55. This initiative had 
as objective to investigate “healthy regions”, “to map” them and based on these findings 
“develop the right policy recommendations” (Porter, 2001, p. ix). The assumption was, that 
“competitiveness and innovation are concentrated in clusters, or interrelated industries, in 
which the region specializes” (Porter, 2001, p. ix). So in order for a nation “to produce high-
value products and services that support high wage jobs”, governments have to “creat[e] 
and strengthen[…] these regional hubs of competitiveness and innovation” (Porter, 2001, p. 
ix).  
 
For example, in order to support healthy clusters and regions, the report (Porter, 2001) 
recommends to implement an explicit cluster development program to raise awareness among 
the local actors, to specifically recruit companies for the region after analysing the existing 
value chain and its gaps, or to detect opportunities at the intersection of different clusters to 
further enhance growth. Also national, regional and local governments need to implement the 
right policies, particularly focusing on innovation and encouraging cluster development, to 
further strengthen the regional and national competitiveness. 
 
                                                 
55
 Source: “Council on competitiveness” website (http://www.compete.org/publications/detail/220/clusters-of-
innovation-initiative-regional-foundations-of-us-competitiveness/) (accessed 06/05/2014) 
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The clusters of innovation initiative catapulted Porter to one of the most wanted policy 
advisor in the world as this citation nicely summarizes:  
“From the OECD and the World Bank, to national governments such as the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, to regional government agencies, and to 
local and city governments (including various US states), policymakers at all levels have been 
eager to receive his advice. […] [But also] an expanding array of developing countries in 
Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa […] vie for his expertise in economic 
development policy” (Huggins & Izushi, 2011, pp. 3-4). 
 
The particularity of Porter’s approach was that he mapped the different actors of a cluster like 
he did for the different functions of a company (the value chain) (Porter, 1985 (1998)) in 
order to determine the missing chain elements of the region and the potential dangers to create 
an endogenous competitive advantage. However, the Porterian “mapping” approach stays a 
relative static approach. For example he recommends that “regions should […] identify gaps 
within clusters, and seek to attract companies to fill them” (Porter, 2001, p. xvi). Porter, 
analysing the wine cluster in California and mapping the different local actors and their 
linkages, called this representation “the anatomy of the California wine cluster” (Porter, 
1998c, p. 79). 
 
To summarize, Porter, at the end of the 1980s and embedded in the though style of his time, 
advocated that every country could take into his own hand the creation of its competitive 
advantage. He underlines that “the most important sources of prosperity are created not 
inherited” (Porter, 2001, p. x). According to him, government authorities at every level need 
to foster the “right” elements in order to pass to the next stage of national competitive 
development (from the factor-driven stage to the innovation-driven stage). At the centre of 
Porter’s reflections on national competitiveness stands the concept of “productivity” that can 
only be sustained in the long run by continuous innovation:  
“The only meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national level is productivity. The 
principal goal of a nation is to produce a high and rising standard of living for its citizens. The 
ability to do so depends on the productivity with which a nation's labor and capital are 
employed. Productivity is the value of the output produced buy a unit of labor or capital. […] 
Sustained productivity growth requires that an economy continually upgrade itself. [...] [A 
nation's companies] must finally develop the capability to compete in entirely new, 
sophisticated industries.” (Porter, 1990, pp. 76-77) 
 
In the end of the 1980s we thus observed a shift from “comparative advantage” to 
“competitive advantage”. Governments around the world were eager to start creating their 
own “competitive advantage”. The end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s were thus a 
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paradigm change of how to consider competitiveness. However, as we will see in the next 
section, this shift also created strong criticisms from plenty of scholars. 
 
3.3 Competitiveness and its emerging critics 
The increased worldwide competition (Thurow (1992 (1993)) compares it to a chess play)56 
was increasingly debated by policy makers and academics alike. For example, Krugman 
(1994, p. 29) stresses that during this time a “whole industry of councils on competitiveness, 
“geo-economists” and managed trade theorists has sprung up in Washington”, all trying to 
help the USA gain the competitiveness race of the 21st century. Additionally to the rise of 
competitiveness advisors, the establishment of a global competitiveness index also reflects 
this new development of “competitiveness thinking” at the national level. Since the 1979, the 
World Economic Forum (WEF)57 publishes an annual competitiveness report and since 2004 
the WEF also introduced a global competitive index58. Each country started to strive for its 
competitiveness by implementing policies to reach the “innovation stage” of development. 
 
Today we even rank regions like companies (see Table 7). CEOs such as local and national 
authorities strive for the same objective: creating innovation within their defined boundaries. 
However, this quest for national competitiveness is also firmly criticized out of several 
reasons. 
                                                 
56
 See Krugman (1994) for a list of bestsellers on the global competitiveness race of this time 
57
 The WEF is a foundation that allows worldwide economic and political leaders to exchange on the economic 
options of the planet. Porter regularly participates in the discussions of the WEF. 
58
 The WEF, similar to Porter’s definition, defines competitiveness as a “set of institutions, policies, and factors 
that determine the level of productivity of a country” (WEF, 2011, p. 4). The index used for the ranking is 
composed out of three components: (1) basic requirements (e.g. infrastructure, institutions, macroeconomic 
stability, health, primary education), (2) efficiency enhancers (e.g. Higher education and training, technological 
development, size of the market, financial market development, efficiency of the market), and (3) innovation and 
sophistication factors (e.g. business sophistication). The weight attributed to each of these components varies 
according to the degree of development of the country. The index attributes a higher weight on innovation and 
sophistication factors for highly developed economies than for less developed economies. Today the main 
underlying paradigm is that innovation leads to higher productivity, which again will lead to higher wealth. The 
global competitive index allows the WEF to rank the majority of all nations (142 nations in 2011) according to 
their respective “competitiveness”. 
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Table 7: Top ten most innovative companies and regions in Europe 
Rank Companies (Country)59 Regions (Country)60 
1. ARM Holdings (UK) Stockholm (SE) 
2. Pernod Ricard (FR) Västsverige (SE) 
3. Danone (FR) Oberbayern (DE) 
4. Essilor International (FR) Etelä-Suomi (FI) 
5. Reckitt Benckiser (UK) Karlsruhe (DE) 
6. Diageo (UK) Stuttgart (DE) 
7. L’Oreal (FR) Braunschweig (DE) 
8. Beiersdorf (DE) Sydsverige (SE) 
9. Dassault Systemes (FR) Île de France (FR) 
10. Technip (FR) Östra Mellansverige (SE) 
Source for company ranking: Sharf (2012), Source for region ranking: Hollanders (2006) 
 
3.3.1 The critic of competition between territories 
For example, Krugman (1994, p. 29) underlines that this competitiveness race leads countries 
to compete with each other like companies (Krugman, 1994). For Krugman (1994, p. 29) 
“thinking in terms of competitiveness leads, directly and indirectly, to bad economic policies 
on a wide range of issues, domestic and foreign, whether it be in health care or trade” (p. 
30). Additionally he warns that “competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to 
national economies and the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous” (p. 
44). Also Delaplace (2011) and Gaffard (2008) argue that it would be dangerous to think that 
territories and regions are in competition to each other. 
 
3.3.2 The critic of blindness on knowledge and innovation 
Krugman (1991 (1993), p. 54) also firmly criticized the increased focus on local knowledge 
spillovers and the ignorance that other location factors might be more important. He describes 
this increased blindness and focus on only one type of location factor as falling in a 
“‘megatrends’ style of thought”. He might have been right but was not able to avoid the trend 
that already started. 
 
                                                 
59
 Ranking criteria for companies: “The Innovation Premium is a measure of how much investors have bid up the 
stock price of a company above the value of its existing business based on expectations of future innovative 
results (new products, services and markets). Members of the list must have $10 billion in market capitalization, 
spend at least 1% of their asset base on R&D and have seven years of public data.” (http://www.forbes.com/ - 
accessed: 18/04/2013) 
60
 Ranking criteria for regions: The ranking is based on seven indicators (for a detailed explication of the 
calculation see (Hollanders, 2006)): (1) Human Resources in Science and Technology, (2) Participation in life-
long learning, (3) Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing, (4) Employment in high-tech 
services, (5) Public R&D expenditures, (6) Business R&D expenditures, (7) EPO patent applications 
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Twenty years later, Shearmur (2011b), in a certain Krugmannian manner continues this 
criticism. The cluster policies’ that were implemented at the end of the 20th century and 
beginning of the 21st century, based on Porter’s ideas, strongly focus on local buzz, networks 
and knowledge but rather ignore other agglomeration factors, equally important for creating 
innovation. For Shearmur (2011b, pp. 1238-1239), in order to maintain or create 
“proximities” between local actors “physical infrastructure and basic services (such as air 
transport, highway maintenance, hotels, etc.) are also required”. He argues that by only 
focusing on “intangible resources such as governance, networks, and knowledge” the hoped 
positive outcomes of policy-driven clusters might not be happening (Shearmur, 2011b, pp. 
1238-1239).  
 
Today, for plenty of politics but also academics, innovation and networking are at the core of 
cluster policies. For example Capron (2011, p. 107) underlines that “cluster policy is 
considered as one of the main strategic priorities for successfully promoting innovation”. Not 
surprisingly, a range of researchers automatically try to address the innovation and 
networking issue in their research endeavours (see for example (Cumbers, Mackinnon, & 
Chapman, 2003; Huggins & Johnston, 2009; Mans, Alkemade, Van der Valk, & Hekkert, 
2008; McDonald, et al., 2007)) and generally focus less on other important agglomeration 
factors.  
 
3.3.3 The critic of regions as closed systems 
Nations and then clusters were somehow more and more considered as closed systems that 
can be managed in order to increase their competitiveness (Shearmur, 2011a). These 
developments lead to the belief, that if nations or clusters are organised in the “right manner”, 
they can climb up the ladder to reach the innovation-driven stage and competitive advantage 
as defined by Porter (1990 (1998)). However, this closed system thinking is strongly 
criticized (H. Bathelt & Dewald, 2008; Rugman, 1992; Shearmur, 2011a). 
 
For example, Rugman (1992) firmly criticized a study Porter (1991) conducted on the 
Canadian economy. Porter (1991), scrutinizing the Canadian economy by applying his 
diamond model, concludes that Canada is weak in “developing global competitive 
advantage” as it is still mainly specialized in resources. According to Porter’s stages of 
national development thinking, resources belong to the “old economic order” which will not 
allow a sustainable long-term growth. However, Rugman (1992) argues that Porter’s 
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arguments are incorrect because the diamond model does not take into account that each 
nation is highly interlinked with other nations and that this is not at all taken into 
consideration in the diamond model:  
“[…in order] to become globally competitive, Canadian managers need to design strategies 
across both the U.S. and Canadian diamonds. They need to benchmark decisions on a North 
American basis, not just a Canadian one. Yet Porter rejects this approach […]. Porter's old-
fashioned, naïve and politically mischievous viewpoint is inconsistent with Canada's support of 
the free trade agreement, tax reform, constitutional renewal and other economic, social and 
political measures aimed at improving, the climate for doing business in a Canadian economy 
that is interdependent with a that of the U.S.” (Rugman, 1992, p. 59) 
 
Shearmur (2011a) such as Rugman (1992) argue that every nation or cluster is integrated in a 
broader regional and national system and therefore necessarily interlinked with other systems. 
One regional system might for example be the helping hand of another regional system. For 
Bathelt & Dewald (2008, p. 163), Porter created a confusion of the concept because he 
applied it “to the competitiveness of both national industry bundles and inter-linked regional 
industry networks”. 
 
Additionally, according to Porter, an important element of every cluster to compete 
internationally is to possess a local value chain. In case one important chain element is 
missing, entrepreneurship should be fostered to plug the hole. However, some researchers are 
completely opposed to this value chain view. The results of McDonald et al. (2007, p. 46) 
who analysed clusters in the UK show that “that there is no strong evidence that established 
local supply chains are significantly associated with international competitiveness.” 
However, they identified that “there is a link between established local supply chains and 
employment growth” but at the same time they underline that “this need not be a strong 
indicator of long-term regional competitiveness in terms of international competitiveness” 
(McDonald, et al., 2007, p. 46). According to their results, supporting a complete value chain 
within a closed system might bring an employment growth in the short-run but not an 
international competitive position in the long run. 
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4 Summary of chapter one 
Figure 6 summarizes graphical the different elements discussed in chapter one. On the one 
hand, the research sphere of the 1980s was characterized by the paradigm shift of economic 
growth theories (focus on knowledge and institutions), the change of production, an 
increasing role attributed to the region as a place where the economy is organized, and the 
shift from comparative advantage to competitive advantage. On the other hand the political 
and societal sphere was characterised by the opening of the Chinese market and the end of the 
cold war, the start of a power shift of economic activity, the oil crises, the abandon of 
Keynesian economics with the arrival of Thatcher and Reagan, and the rise of the computer61 
and the Internet. The two spheres were, in a certain manner, characterized by antagonistic 
developments: increasing globalisation, global integration and economic liberalism vs. 
increasing regionalisation and institutionalism. 
Figure 6: Timeline of events 1980s 
 
                                                 
61
 The computer was elected by Time Magazine as the machine of the year in 1983 (Time Magazine, 1983). 
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The 1980s witnessed three major shifts in the research realm that constitute important 
elements for the birth of cluster studies. The main differences are summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Summary of research shifts during the 1980s 
 From To 
Focus on 
economic 
growth 
- Neoclassical (or exogenous) economic 
growth models. Focus on labour and capital 
- Institutions play a minor role in economic 
growth 
- Endogenous economic growth models. 
Focus on labour, capital and knowledge 
- Institutions play a role in economic growth 
Focus on 
regions 
- Region plays a minor role during the mass 
production era. 
- Embeddedness in social networks plays a 
minor role on the economic outcome of the 
individual. 
- Regions play a role in the post-mass 
production era (innovation & flexible 
specialization) 
- Embeddedness in social networks 
influences the economic outcome of 
individuals 
Focus on 
competitive 
advantage 
- Prevailing concept to discuss national 
success: comparative advantage 
- every nation has its own relative advantage 
compared to competitors, the objective is to 
identify this relative advantage 
- Prevailing concept to discuss national 
success: competitive advantage 
- every nation is master of its destiny and if it 
wishes to increase its wealth has to strive for 
innovation 
 
The first important shift concerns how economic growth is perceived. Up to the 1980s 
neoclassical (exogenous) economic growth models dominated. The main focus was on labour 
and capital while institutions played a minor role. From the 1980s onwards, endogenous 
economic growth models emerged. The focus not only laid on labour and capital but also on 
knowledge. Additionally, institutions started to play an increasing role in economic growth.  
The second important shift concerns the new discovered role of the region. During the mass 
production era regions did not play a major role and also the embeddedness in social networks 
was not considered as an important element to increase the economic outcome of individuals. 
However, this changed during the post-mass production era or the knowledge economy where 
innovation and flexible specialization gained in importance. Innovation and knowledge was 
now considered to be embedded in regions with dense networks.  
The third important shift is regarding national success. The prevailing concept up to the 1980s 
was comparative advantage, where the credo was that very nation has its own relative 
advantage compared to competitors. The objective was to identify this relative advantage. 
From the 1990s onwards the prevailing concept to discuss national success was competitive 
advantage, where every nation is master of its destiny and if it wishes to increase its wealth 
has to strive for innovation. 
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During the last 25 years, the cluster concept somehow took on a life of its own. Swords 
(2013) for example recently tried to study the cluster legitimization process in the UK. By 
mobilizing Latour’s actor-network-theory, Swords explains that it was a back and forward 
process of actors criticising the new trend but on the other hand legitimatizing it through the 
increased concentration on the phenomenon. On the one hand, it was the interplay between 
“academics” that “act[ed] as consultants” and “helped legitimize and reproduce clusters”, 
and the academics who “heavily critiqued the concept” (Swords, 2013, p. 380). On the other 
hand, it was the interplay between the central governments that wanted to create 
competitiveness and the regional actors, “bound by central government to foster [clusters]”, 
even though they were not always “convinced of clusters’ efficacy” (Swords, 2013, p. 380). 
Swords (2013, p. 380), underlines that the cluster concept “gained size and strength as 
clusters were simultaneously promoted and critiqued”. 
 
In this chapter we tried to underline that even though the cluster concept experienced a strong 
legitimization process, a great distance emerged between the beginnings of the study of the 
cluster concepts and the recent developments. A world lies between Romer’s or Luca’s 
economic growth theories, Porter’s cluster idea and his mapping approach and finally two 
neighbouring regions trying to “build” clusters. The whole idea to reach economic growth and 
competitive advantage by focusing on regions emerged during the 1980s. Since then, a longue 
road was travelled and governments around the world now establish policy-driven clusters on 
their territories (Motoyama, 2008; Swords, 2013). Governments currently believe, be it in 
developed countries or developing countries, that policy-driven clusters are the key to 
competitiveness and economic growth (OECD, 2007, 2009). However, little is actually 
known about these initiatives (foreword of Michael Porter in (Sölvell, et al., 2003, p. 5)). The 
literature on cluster policies and initiatives compared to the economic or geographic cluster 
literature still stays in the background (Swords, 2013). One has the feeling that the 
accelerating political and managerial reality on clusters, is drifting apart from the academic 
reality on cluster research. The drift between academics and policy makers and cluster 
managers is often related to the fuzziness of the cluster concept in itself, enclosing too many 
different objectives, not knowing to which regional entity it should be applied. The static 
mapping approach and the focus on the structure which Porter even calls “the anatomy” 
(Porter, 1998c, p. 79) of a cluster has become a dynamic approach with managerial 
challenges. In the next chapter we will now focus on the dilemmas and pathologies that 
emerge by implementing policy-driven clusters.  
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Chapter 2:  Dilemmas and pathologies in policy-driven clusters 
In the 21st century, policy-driven clusters have completely entered the policy realm. They 
have become a “buzz word” for policy-makers (Lundequist & Power, 2002, p. 699). Having 
policy-driven clusters on its territory was suddenly considered to be important for creating 
“healthy regions”, and hopefully regional and national competitiveness. Ahedo (2004, p. 
1099) for example underlined that even regional industry associations suddenly changed their 
name “from 'Interest Groups' to 'Cluster Organizations'” as it was considered that they “can 
easily function as 'cluster-organizations'” in order to foster “collaboration and cooperation 
between firms and other related actors”. However, some argue that governments were and 
are just “riding the wave of new regionalist fashions” (Swords, 2013, p. 369) and that all the 
hype is just a “flavor of the month” (Doloreux & Shearmur, 2009, p. 526) instead of showing 
real results.  
 
Clusters were long-time considered as the “economic weapons of a country” (Aziz & 
Norhashim, 2008). However, policy-driven clusters are somehow “often poorly designed” 
(Aiginger, 2007, p. 297) and are not always keeping up with their “natural” counter-parts 
(Doloreux & Shearmur, 2009, p. 526). Cluster policies started to be more and more “under 
fire” because they are not reaching the expected goals (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). The 
general malaise regarding the results of policy-driven clusters seems more complex than the 
criticisms on Michael Porter we already discussed (i.e. that competitiveness applied to 
territories creates competition between territories, a certain blindness on knowledge and 
innovation, or the belief that territories function as closed systems). At the beginning of the 
21st century, more than 10 years after Porter (1990 (1998)) first introduced his cluster concept, 
Martin & Sunley (2003, p. 5) underlined that even though “cluster concept” is very 
“seductive”, the fuzziness of the concept will lead to increased policy problems. But what are 
exactly these policy problems? One of the objectives of Porter’s “Cluster of Innovation” 
initiative (1998 – 2001) was to investigate “healthy regions” and to develop policy 
recommendations (Porter, 2001, p. ix). However, even though policy-driven clusters should 
replicate these healthy regions, Martin & Sunley’s (2003, p. 5) underlined that the “the 
cluster concept should carry a public policy health warning”. Also Hospers et al (2009, pp. 
297-298) advocated that the best motto for officials in charge for cluster policy is perhaps: “If 
you can’t help, please do not harm”. In a somehow strange manner, policy-driven clusters, 
that were meant to help countries to succeed, are apparently not always able to do so. We 
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therefore have to start investigating “cluster policy as a policy challenge” (Ebbekink & 
Lagendijk, 2013, p. 737). By conducting a literature review focusing on these cluster policy 
dilemmas, we might finally lay the foundation stone to start investigating the treatments that 
in fine will probably cure these diseases. In this second chapter we will now focus on the 
study of the dilemmas and pathology of policy-driven clusters. 
 
Box 3: Content of chapter two 
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1 Cluster policies and their impact 
In this section we will start explaining the important gap that exists between practitioners and 
academics, which leaves ample room to a lot of policy-driven cluster problems that are not 
addressed in the literature. In a second step, we explain what pathology means in medicine 
and how we could apply it to cluster studies. Finally, even though our literature review 
focuses on the study of dilemmas and pathologies, plenty of positive effects of cluster policies 
are also discussed in the literature. We will shortly come back to these positive effects. 
 
1.1 Cluster policies: a new weapon to succeed in a globalized world? 
From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, governments around the world increasingly strived 
to create their own “healthy regions”62 in order to win the global competitiveness race within 
the newly emerging knowledge-dominated economy63. Clusters were considered as one of 
these national elements in order to help creating and fostering regionally interconnected 
knowledge hubs. Porter’s views on clusters had the biggest impact on “policy-makers and 
opinion-formers” in the United State and in Europe (McDonald, et al., 2007). 
 
The word cluster though is source of a lot of confusion. For example Silicon Valley is called a 
cluster but differs to clusters that are fostered by specific policies. Instead of talking about 
“spontaneous clusters”, which have “been a result of the spontaneous concentration of the 
key factors enabling [the cluster’s] birth and development” (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006, p. 
1073), Chiaroni & Chiesa (2006, p. 1073) talk about “policy-driven clusters”, “where the 
trigger was the strong commitment of governmental actors whose willingness was to set the 
conditions for the development of the […] cluster” (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006, p. 1073). These 
policy-driven clusters are initiated by cluster policies that are meant to upgrade a “mere 
agglomeration to a regional (innovation) system” (Schmiedeberg, 2010, p. 390). From the 
1990s onwards, cluster policies were increasingly considered “as a promising approach to 
strengthen the innovative capacities of regional systems, leading to greater competitiveness of 
a region and its actors” (Schmiedeberg, 2010, p. 390). Similarly to Schmiedeberg (2010), 
Doloreux & Shearmur (2009, p. 526) underline that the a cluster policy “aims at harnessing 
                                                 
initiatives62
 Expression stems from Porter (2001, p. ix) 
63
 Powell and Snellman (2004, p. 199) define the key component of a knowledge economy as the “greater 
reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources”. 
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local interactions, knowledge spillovers, and institutions in order to encourage local growth 
and competitiveness”. 
 
Several scholars consider that the Silicon Valley belongs to the category of “spontaneous 
clusters”. However, it is important to underline, as already discussed, that also in Silicon 
Valley the State invested a considerable amount of money in university research. The 
difference with an explicit “policy-driven cluster” is that this did not happen under the header 
of a “cluster development program” (Porter, 2001) and all the additional activities that go 
along with such a program (e.g. collaboration support, regional marketing, etc.) (Sölvell, 
2008; Sölvell, et al., 2003). 
 
Normally a cluster policy implements one or several cluster initiatives on its territory. Cluster 
initiatives are “organised actions carried out to launch, develop and manage clusters with the 
involvement of involving private industry, public authorities and/or academic institutions are 
called ‘cluster initiatives’” (Coletti, 2010, p. 681). Very often these cluster initiatives “entail 
a cluster organisation”, which “are intermediate bodies employing people in charge of 
animating clusters, the so-called cluster managers” (Coletti, 2010, p. 679). However, 
according to Coletti (2010), cluster manager might be a too narrow description of his/her 
tasks. A better nomination would be “cluster facilitator” because he/she is “a networker and 
a facilitator of relations” who “manages weak and strong ties with cluster members, 
potential members and stakeholders and, when a shared vision emerges, she encourages its 
collective realisation” (Coletti, 2010, p. 686). 
 
Even though the World Bank changed its mind regarding state intervention in order to foster 
innovation and economic growth at the end of the 20th century (Morgan & Nauwelaers, 2003 
(1999)), policies supporting research and economic activities within a specific country in 
order to stay competitive are not very new (Maguire & Davies, 2007). Government 
intervention in the name of scientific progress and thus a superior competitive position 
compared to other nations is a recurrent theme in history. Box 4 for example gives an 
illustrative example of how the United States some decades ago already faced and discussed 
similar policy issues as today. However, the novelty with cluster policies is that they try to 
group under one header several types of policies that were historically treated separately. It is 
important to place cluster policies in this broader context of policies, in order to better 
understand the current dilemmas of cluster policies. 
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Box 4: Government intervention in the name of scientific progress - a recurrent theme 
United States, 1940s (Jankowski, 2001, pp. 5-6): “Prior to World War II, the federal government’s role in the 
science system of United States was relatively minor and its funding for research and development … was 
generally small. However, successful wartime experiences demonstrated the potential for productive 
partnerships among the federal, industrial, and academic research sectors might be extended to peacetime 
needs as well.” Therefore, President Roosevelt asked in November 1944 to addressee these questions: “(1) the 
declassification of secret wartime research results, (2) the need to develop a program to support health-
related research, (3) conditions through which the government could provide aid to research activities in 
public and private organizations, and (4) the feasibility of creating a program for developing scientific 
talent.” The report (Bush, 1945), that was published one year later, gave the answers to Roosevelt’s questions 
and highlighted the importance of government subsidies for scientific progress regarding the nation’s health 
prosperity and security. Also under President Truman the reflections on the intervention of the State continued 
as a Scientific Review Board was created and its chairman, John Steelman, argued that “the U.S. must 
continually strengthen and expand its domestic economy and foreign trade through constant expansion of 
scientific knowledge and consequent steady improvement of technology.” 
 
1.1.1 Cluster policies: polyvalent by nature 
At the end of the 20th century, “industrial policy seemed to phase out” (Aiginger, 2007, p. 
297). However, “due to globalisation, outsourcing, low growth and high unemployment 
(specifically in Europe)” new types of policies re-emerged that particularly focused on 
clusters (Aiginger, 2007, p. 297). The underlying credence of the new emerging policies is 
that by stimulating regional economic actors to “join forces” and to innovate together, global 
competition can be faced. Nations enter in a certain manner into a war for competitiveness 
and cluster policies are considered to be one of these weapons to win this “war”. 
 
The OECD (2007, p. 41) outlines how the traditional policies have evolved into new 
approaches, that today cumulate into cluster policies and initiatives (see Table 9): 
- Regional policy: Whereas the old approach to regional policy was mainly concerned 
with redistributing all kinds of capitals (human capital, financial capital, etc.) “from 
leading to lagging regions”, the new approach to regional policy concentrates on 
“building competitive regions by bringing local assets and actors together”. The idea 
behind this approach is to collectively awake the intrinsic forces of the region to create 
the region’s competitive advantage. The chances of prosperous regional development 
are evaluated much higher than by simply allocating external help to the region. 
- Science and Technology Policy: Whereas the old approach to science and technology 
policy consisted mainly in financing “individual, single-sector projects in basic 
research”, the new approach to science and technology policy concentrates on the 
“financing of collaborative research involving networks with industry and links with 
commercialisation”. The idea behind this approach is that first of all, real creative 
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ideas spark better together than alone and that second, strong links with 
commercialisation partners are needed to bring inventions really to the market. 
- Industrial and enterprise policy: Whereas the old approach to industrial and enterprise 
policy consisted mainly in allocating subsidies to firms, particularly national 
champions, the new approach to industrial and enterprise policy is to support 
“common needs of firm groups and technology absorption (especially SMEs)”. The 
idea behind this approach is that particularly SMEs drive national growth and SMEs 
are more important in the new flexible specialization approach vs. the old mass 
production approach.  
 
Table 9: Policy streams influencing cluster policies 
Policy stream Old approach New approach Cluster programme focus 
Regional 
policy 
Redistribution 
from leading to 
lagging regions 
Building 
competitive regions 
by bringing local 
actors and assets 
together 
- Target or often include lagging regions 
- Focus on smaller firms as opposed to larger 
firms, if not explicitly than de facto 
- Broad approach to sector and innovation targets 
- Emphasis on engagement of actors 
Science and 
technology 
policy 
Financing of 
individual, 
single-sector 
projects in basic 
research 
Financing of 
collaborative 
research involving 
networks with 
industry and links 
with 
commercialisation 
- Usually a high-technology focus 
- Both take advantage of and reinforce the spatial 
impacts of R&D investment 
- Promote collaborative R&D instruments to 
support commercialisation 
- Include both large and small firms; can 
emphasise support for spin-offs and start-ups 
Industrial and 
enterprise 
policy 
Subsidies to 
firms; national 
champions 
Supporting 
common needs of 
firm groups and 
technology 
absorption 
(especially SMEs) 
Programmes often adopt one of the following 
approaches:  
- Target the drivers of national growth 
- Support industries undergoing transition and 
shedding jobs 
- Help small firms overcome obstacles to 
technology absorption and growth 
- Create competitive advantages to attract inward 
investment and branding for exports 
Source: OECD (2007, p. 41) 
 
1.1.2 The ancestors of cluster policies 
A bibliometric analysis on the different policies influencing cluster policies (see Figure 7) 
also reveals that cluster policies are the newest form of policies that only emerged at the end 
of the 20th century. Science and research policies are the oldest ones, particularly prominent 
after the second world war, followed by the emergence of several new policies at the end of 
the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s such as regional policies, industrial policies, structural 
policies and technology policies. Not surprisingly, innovation policies emerged during the 
1980s. 
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Figure 7: The ancestors (or siblings?) of today’s cluster polices 
 
Note: The date corresponds to the first mention of the policy in the title, abstract or keyword of an article 
referenced in the academic article database Scopus64. This implies that the policy might have already been 
discussed in the corpus of a text. (see Annex 2 for a list of the corresponding academic articles). 
 
Even though cluster policies are implemented throughout the world, they are considerably 
less discussed by the academic research community compared to the other types of policies 
(see Figure 8 and Figure 9). Research on regional policies and innovation policies are the 
most prominent at the moment. What is particularly interesting is research on “industrial 
policy” and “technology policy” experienced an enormous boom of interest in the middle of 
the 1990s, but both are now surpassed by “regional policy” and “innovation policy” research. 
Figure 8: Cluster Policy vs. Science, Research, Technology and Innovation Policy 
 
Note: Bibliometric analysis, Scopus database64 (01/04/13) (x=date of publication, y=number of articles) 
 
                                                 
64
 Date: 01/04/13; Database: Scopus; Search Criteria: Search for "[x] policy" OR "[x] policies" in “Article Title, 
Abstract, Keywords“; [x] = Science, Research, Regional, Structural, Industrial, Technology, Innovation or 
Cluster; Data Range: “all years to present”; Document Type: Article; Subject Areas: “Social Sciences & 
Humanities” AND “Physical Sciences” 
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Figure 9: Cluster Policy vs. Industrial, Regional and Structural Policy 
 
Note: Bibliometric analysis, Scopus database64 (01/04/13) (x=date of publication, y=number of articles) 
 
1.1.3 Cluster policy: just a new industrial policy?  
Even though academics defend a range of opinions of what cluster policies are, Porter (2000a) 
advocates that there is a strong difference between industrial policy and cluster theory (not 
explicitly referring to cluster policies). On the one hand, industrial policy is based “on a view 
of international (or, more generally, locational) competition in which some industries offer 
greater wealth-creating prospects than others” and where “desirable industries (e.g., high 
tech, growing) should be “targeted” for support” (Porter, 2000a, p. 27). The focus lies thus 
on “what a nation (location) competes in” (Porter, 2000a, p. 27). 
 
On the other hand, “the concept of clusters rests on a broader and dynamic view of 
competition among firms and locations, based on the growth of productivity” (Porter, 2000a, 
p. 27). According to Porter’s logic (2000a, p. 27), the regional actors themselves can create 
their own regional advantage and so “all clusters can be desirable” as “all offer the potential 
to contribute to prosperity”. Instead of targeting only certain industries as in the traditional 
industrial policy, “all existing and emerging clusters deserve attention” (Porter, 2000a, p. 
27). In a certain manner Porter advocates that supporting already emerging clusters, 
nevertheless which field they are in, corresponds to a more egalitarian view of governmental 
intervention, than targeting only one industry or national leader. 
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This view is criticised by Hospers et al. (2009) as, according to them, governments 
implementing cluster policies similarly to when implementing industrial policies also have to 
decide which clusters to help, either by “picking winners” or by “backing losers”. A better 
approach according to Hospers et al. (2009) would thus be if governments only intervene 
once the cluster has emerged in form of “cluster marketing” to help the cluster gaining a 
better international visibility. More over it was shown that policy-driven cluster often 
encourage the internationalisation of companies (S. Andersson, Colovic, & Lamotte, 2014; 
Colovic, 2013) or entrepreneurship (de Géry, Laviolette, & Bonnafous-Boucher, 2013). 
 
Some conclude that governments can only contribute little to the performance of a cluster (G.-
J. Hospers, et al., 2009, p. 298) and should therefore concentrate on their “ex-post” role in 
form of “brand[ing] the success of clusters after they have emerged spontaneously in the 
market […] by tak[ing] into account and promote the particularities and realities of an 
area”. For Hospers et al. (2009, p. 298) it is this “Regional Realism” which will make the 
difference between the regions instead of the running behind a certain role model. 
 
1.2 The relevance gap in cluster policy research 
One of the main general problems constantly addressed by policy-driven cluster researchers is 
the growing gap between practitioners introducing cluster polices and academics studying 
clusters in general. While academics are still debating about the right definitions65, 
practitioners have somehow “rush[ed] to employ 'cluster ideas'” (R. Martin & Sunley, 2003, 
p. 5). This had the consequence that the general “cluster ideas” have “run ahead of many 
fundamental conceptual, theoretical and empirical questions” (R. Martin & Sunley, 2003, p. 
5) and that cluster policies stay “on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations” (Nathan & 
Overman, 2013, p. 383). 
 
The theoretical consequence of this growing gap is that “conventional cluster theory” is 
unable to “explain the spread and functions of such [cluster] policies” (Kiese & Wrobel, 
2011, p. 1691). Kiese & Wrobel (2011, p. 1708) alert the cluster community that a strict line 
has to be drawn between “clusters” and “cluster policies, initiatives and organizations” as 
“conceptual differences” exist. In 2013, also Swords (2013, p. 369) underlined that “libraries 
of incredibly useful books and articles on clusters” exists. However, “there remains an 
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 Aiginger (2007, p. 297) for example underlines that “no commonly accepted definition exists” for clusters and 
“concepts differ across nations, regions, stage of development and over time”. 
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absence of work which interrogates the translation of clusters into, and then through local 
and national policy” (Swords, 2013, p. 369). 
 
So even though the cluster literature is constantly growing (see Figure 3), little is still known 
regarding the dilemmas when the spontaneous cluster concept passes into the public policy 
realm and from the public policy realm into the operationalization realm (Swords, 2013). 
Policy-driven clusters stay somehow in a theoretical no man’s land and additionally continue 
to be criticised as “good intentions are overshadowed by bad outcomes” (Aiginger, 2007, p. 
297). 
 
1.3 Positive impact of policy-driven clusters 
Even though we will focus in this chapter on the policy-driven cluster dilemmas, it does not 
mean that cluster policies do not create positive effects. A range of the reviewed cluster policy 
articles mention the positive effects that policy-driven clusters can obtain. Spontaneous 
clusters, increase for example untraded interdependences (Storper, 1995) such as tacit 
knowledge exchange (Gertler, 1995, 2003), knowledge creation dynamics (Saives, Ebrahimi, 
Desmarteau, & Garnier, 2007), collective learning (Lawson & Lorenz, 1999); or trust 
building, thanks to an increased face-to face interactions (Harald Bathelt, et al., 2004; Waxell 
& Malmberg, 2007).  
 
One part of the cluster policy literature shows, that policy-driven clusters, which try to 
replicate the conditions of spontaneous clusters, are able to do so. Lundequist & Power (2002, 
p. 697), for example state that there is not one ideal type of cluster initiatives but that 
“whatever shape cluster initiatives take […] they can be seen as useful regional development 
tools […] to build competitiveness and competence”. Or Karaev et al. (2007) reviewed the 
literature regarding the influence of a cluster approach on the competitiveness of SMEs. They 
conclude that the literature shows that “establishing clusters” is “an efficient tool for 
overcoming the size limitations of SMEs” (Karaev, et al., 2007, p. 830). Additionally, the 
policy-driven cluster creates a “geographical proximity” which goes along with all the 
positive “agglomeration effects” such as “higher specialization, innovation and knowledge 
transfer” (Karaev, et al., 2007, p. 830). These “agglomeration effects” allow the SMEs to 
reduce their costs which again “improv[es] the competitiveness of industrial sectors, regions 
and nations” (Karaev, et al., 2007, p. 830). 
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Hereinafter, we mention some of the most important positive effects cited by the cluster 
policy literature and give some concrete empirical examples: 
- Greater visibility: One important positive effect of policy-driven clusters is the greater 
visibility that they create for their members. Lundequist & Power (2002), conducted 
and in-depth study of Swedish cluster initiatives and highlighted the positive effect of 
joint marketing efforts in order to create greater visibility for the individual company. 
Also Felzensztein et al. (2012), who conducted a survey (among clustered and non-
clustered low-tech firms) in Chile, show the positive effects of joining forces in 
marketing efforts. Finally, Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005, p. 1265), studying 
German and Austrian clusters, also come to the same result, by underlying the “better 
visibility and image of the industry group” thanks to the membership in a policy-
driven cluster (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005, p. 1265). 
- Greater adaptability: Another important positive effect of policy-driven clusters is the 
greater adaptability of the member companies to unforeseen economic changes or 
events. Gadille et al. (2013, p. 340), who conducted an in-depth analysis of a French 
aeronautic cluster underline that the French cluster policy “stimulate(s) important 
changes within local economic structures”. Particularly, because independent SMEs 
join forces due to the cluster policy and that they “are better able to respond to 
changing competitive conditions than the more traditional enterprises within the 
region” (Gadille, et al., 2013, p. 340). 
- Better relations with the public authority: Another important positive effect seems to 
be the construction of a more constructive dialogue between the public and the private 
sector. The Basque country was an early adopter of cluster policies during the 1990s. 
Ahedo (2004) conducted an in-depth analysis of the cluster policy in the Basque 
country that through the implementation of cluster-associations created a dynamic of 
“Industry-Government collaboration” (Ahedo, 2004, pp. 1110-1111). For Ahedo 
(2004, p. 1111) the “traditional lack of regional Industry-Government relations has 
been replaced by a limited but promising dynamic of dialogue and interaction 
between an empowered and committed regional government and more pro-active and 
self-organizing regional industrial sectors and SMEs”. Also Santisteban (2006, p. 37) 
analyzing cluster policies not only in the Basque country but also in Catalonia 
concludes that these policies have, in both regions, “stimulated different forms of 
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collaboration between the empowered regional governments and the regional 
industrial-business systems”. 
- Increased knowledge exchange: Not surprisingly, as it is the core of the cluster 
concept, one of the most often cited advantages of policy-driven clusters is the 
increased knowledge exchange between the policy-driven cluster members. This 
increased knowledge exchange can be observed in a multitude of clusters (Guisard, Le 
Bas, & Nief, 2010; Lundequist & Power, 2002; Saives & Desmarteau, 2005). 
Lundequist & Power (2002, p. 699) conducted and in-depth study of Swedish cluster 
initiatives and particularly underlined the positive effect of the establishment of 
meeting places and competence support structure as for example : “informal firm 
networks for inter-exchange of knowledge and experiences” or “targeted educational 
programmes”. Also Guisard et al. (2010), who did an in-depth investigation of a 
cluster situated in the Lyon region (Lyon Urban Trucks and Bus Cluster, France), 
particularly focused on the “think tanks” that were set up by the local cluster 
organisation. According to Guisard et al. (2010, p. 673) these “think tanks” are 
“discussion and creativity meetings” to bring together a wide variety of local actors in 
order “to enhance the collective knowledge base” of the cluster. The interviewed 
participants in the cluster initiative seem to positively evaluate these local knowledge 
enhancement activities as they create a community feeling and discussions that would 
not take place otherwise. Also Bidan & Dherment-Férère (2009) discuss the cognitive 
levels of value creation process that is happening in the French clusters thanks to the 
various initiatives. Finally, also Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005, p. 1265), 
studying German and Austrian clusters, underline that policy-driven clusters allow 
“increased exchanges of information”. 
- Increased networking: Another important positive effect of policy-driven clusters is 
the stimulation of networking between the local actors. Coletti (2010, p. 682), who 
analyzed the data of a large European survey on cluster managers’ skills and training 
needs, points to the strong networking benefits of cluster organisations thanks to the 
cluster managers which “facilitate the establishment of strategic alliances and 
networks, identify[…] core people with already established mutual trust, attract[…] 
potential partners and help[…] them to create relationships which will bring 
enhanced cooperation”. Also, Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005, p. 1265) 
underline the “new collaboration” benefit of policy-driven clusters.  
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- Increased performance: Research has often highlighted the fact that companies “need 
to optimize the location of their activities in order to remain competitive” (Colovic & 
Mayrhofer, 2011, p. 1481). Nishimura & Okamuro (2011b), who investigated the 
Japanese cluster policy by conducting a survey among R&D-intensive SMEs, 
conclude that the cluster policy’s indirect networking or coordination support seems to 
be important and beneficial for the companies. For example, companies participating 
in the cluster and collaborating with local universities seem to apply for more patents, 
without degrading the quality (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011a). Or Li & Geng (2012) 
conducted a survey among clustered and non-clustered low-tech or medium-low tech 
firms in China. Their results show that clustered and non-clustered firms have a 
different perception regarding shared resources66 and additionally the business 
performance of clustered firms is higher than the performance of non-clustered firms.  
 
All these examples show that cluster policies do “get something going” and create a certain 
dynamism and hopefully reach “the ultimate aim” of cluster initiatives, namely “continued 
economic growth and development” (Aziz & Norhashim, 2008, p. 372). For that it is 
important to continue pursuing studies that investigate successful examples and the benefits 
of cluster policies. However, we think that it is as important to complement these studies with 
the identification of the potential obstacles or “policy challenges” (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 
2013, p. 737). Our knowledge on both, benefits and obstacles, might allow governments to 
conceive more successful cluster policies.  
 
2 Identifying cluster dilemmas & pathologies: a systematic review 
For chapter one of this literature review we opted for a descriptive and narrative literature 
review, as traditionally done in the business and management field (Denyer & Neely, 2004). 
However, in chapter two of this literature review we decided to conduct a more structured 
literature review. We use a methodology called “systematic literature review” (SLR) 
(Tranfield, et al., 2003) that emerged in the United Kingdom among medical professionals 
(Mulrow, 1994; Thorpe, et al., 2005). These medical professionals underlined the necessity 
that only through a systematic review of past literature, intelligent policies might be 
implemented for the future. Descriptive and narrative literature reviews are often biased 
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 Shared resources, i.e. “common reputation, intensity of exchange and combination of resources, mutual trust 
between firms, network of collective learning and knowledge-sharing, dense atmosphere of co-petition, and 
participation and support of the local institutions” (Li & Geng, 2012, p. 363) 
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because they only reflect the authors’ perspective which ultimately reduces the utility of these 
reviews for policy recommendations (Denyer & Neely, 2004). Therefore, due to the explosion 
of articles and contradicting opinions, more and more scholars urge researchers to conduct 
SLRs (Leseure, et al., 2004a; Pittaway & Cope, 2007; Pittaway, et al., 2004; Thorpe, et al., 
2005; Tranfield, et al., 2003). 
 
Particularly for studying dilemmas and obstacles, a systematic literature review is important 
to help practitioners advance in their diagnoses. To explore the different dilemmas of policy-
driven clusters, a SLR seems thus highly valuable. The literature reviews “should enable 
readers, whether academics, practitioners or policy-makers, to determine for themselves the 
reasonableness of the decisions taken and the appropriateness of the conclusions” (Denyer & 
Neely, 2004, p. 133, p. 133). The main difference between a traditional descriptive or 
narrative literature review and an SLR is that in the latter “the [investigation] process is 
reported openly in the same way that empirical research would be” (Pittaway, et al., 2004, p. 
480, p. 480). SLR thus include a detailed methodology section, to render explicit on which 
data the interpretations and conclusions are based, which makes their thought process more 
clear and creates transparency (Thorpe, et al., 2005).  
 
Tranfield et al. (2003) were the first who adapted the SLR methodology to the field of 
management. Denyer & Neely (2004, p. 133, p. 133) (based on Tranfield et al 2003) 
summarized in a consistent manner the most important elements that have to be followed in 
an SLR, for example “development of clear [..] aims and objectives; […] a comprehensive 
search of all potentially relevant articles; the use of explicit, reproducible criteria in the 
selection of articles for review; […] a synthesis of individual studies using an explicit 
analytical framework; a balanced, impartial and comprehensible presentation of the results.”  
 
2.1 What is cluster dilemmas and pathology? 
We finished the first chapter of this literature review by referring to Porter’s “anatomy of 
clusters” view (Porter, 1998c, p. 79). In this chapter we dive into the core of this thesis by 
using another type of medical terminology: pathology. In this thesis, we wish to study 
organisational dilemmas and their consequences in policy-driven clusters. Facing a dilemma 
means that there is no “one best choice”, so by going in one direction one certainly produces 
also negative effects, or side-effect pathologies, that in some cases might hinder the policy-
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driven cluster to function effectively. We will define “pathology” in a cluster setting as the 
visible managerial symptoms that policy-driven clusters may endure. These pathologies are 
directly generated by “organizational dilemmas”, by having privileged one direction over 
another. We consider, that the challenge in cluster policy study is to pinpoint these side-effect 
pathologies and their associated dilemmas in order to improve cluster policy implementation 
and to better adapt the cluster policy to the local settings. Today a rising amount of literature 
concentrates on the different types of “challenges” in policy-driven clusters (Burfitt & 
Macneill, 2008; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). 
 
Pathology is a Greek word and means “the study of suffering” (Duffin, 2010, p. 40). In 
medicine, the central objective of studying pathology is to “construct, recognize and treat 
diseases” and thus to help the patient. In cluster studies, the central objective of studying the 
pathology of clusters is to first identify the different types of “suffering” of the involved 
stakeholders (the pathologies) and then to identify why they suffer (the dilemmas). We 
consider that the understanding of clusters’ organisational dilemmas is crucial in order to help 
governments and cluster managers to notice and pinpoint the potential obstacles of cluster 
policies and in a second step to actively work against these obstacles, to study the obstacles 
and to improve the potential positive impacts of cluster policies. 
 
So far, the problems of policy-driven clusters are not really addressed and thus not well 
understood (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; Swords, 2013). Medicine does not only study the 
anatomy and physiology67 of the human body but also its pathology. So why not fully 
introduce the study of pathology, “the study of suffering” (Duffin, 2010, p. 40), in cluster 
studies? 
 
In medicine, the study of pathology is built on observations, in order to “build” a “disease 
concept”. In doing so, different aspects have to be taken into consideration by the observer: 
“the patient, the illness, and the presumed cause” (Duffin, 2010, p. 40). Why only a 
presumed cause? Because “a cause is implied in the concept construct for a disease even 
when the cause is unknown” (Duffin, 2010, p. 40). Once different types of disease concepts 
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 In medicine, physiology “is the study of the function of living beings” and thus “stands both in relation and in 
opposition to anatomy, the study of structure” (Duffin, 2010, p. 40). If we draw the analogy with cluster studies, 
the physiology of clusters would be the theoretical functioning of the clusters or the traditional cluster literature 
that focuses on networking and innovation. This “cluster physiology” literature is very important, has to be 
understood when studying clusters, constitutes the main part of the cluster literature and is already well 
developed. 
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are build they “are given characteristics (symptoms), names (diagnoses), life expectancies 
(course), anticipated outcomes (prognoses), and recommended treatments” (Duffin, 2010, p. 
40). In this chapter we will try to identify and group the different types of organisational 
dilemmas that are discussed in the cluster policy literature. 
 
In the following literature review we identify groups of dilemmas that go along with cluster 
policies. We will dig into the symptoms of these different organisational dilemmas and also 
see that in order to understand the different dilemmas, cluster policy researchers need to adopt 
a very interdisciplinary approach. However, cluster policy researchers first need to break out 
of the traditional cluster literature streams (such as (Asheim, 1996; Aydalot, 1986; Becattini, 
1989; Cooke, 1992; Marshall, 1890 (1920); Porter, 1990, 1998c; Saxenian, 1994))68 in order 
to bring policy-driven cluster studies on another level of understanding and usefulness for the 
practitioners. 
 
2.2 The need for a review of policy-driven cluster dilemmas and pathologies 
The aim of this policy-driven cluster review is to explore all empirical studies that have been 
conducted on policy-driven clusters in order to summarize the identified obstacles and 
difficulties encountered by the involved actors.  
 
2.3 A Systematic Literature Review 
 
2.3.1 Search for articles 
The first step of a SLR is to constitute a database of articles that will then be reviewed in 
detail. The first time we downloaded in a systematic manner and read through the “cluster 
policies” literature was in March 2013. However, at that time, our ideas were not yet 
structured enough to make sense of our fieldwork, the classical cluster literature, the 
management literature and the cluster policy literature. However, little by little we detected 
this “pathology” problem in our fieldwork data. At the beginning of 2014 we went back to our 
cluster policy database and reviewed the database once again. The literature suddenly made 
much more sense. The last update of our literature review was done on the 25th April 2014. 
                                                 
68
 Examples of traditional “cluster” schools: Italian industrial districts (Becattini, 1979, 1989), innovative milieu 
(Aydalot, 1986), new industrial spaces (A. J. Scott, 1988b), industry clusters (Porter, 1990 (1998), 1998c), 
national innovation systems (Lundvall, 1992), regional innovation systems (Cooke, 1992), or learning regions 
(Asheim, 1996; Florida, 1995). 
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The main database we used for the literature review is Scopus and we used following general 
search parameters in Scopus:  
- Document type: article 
- Subject areas: physical sciences, social sciences & humanities 
- Language: English, French, German 
- Source type: journals 
- Search term location: in Article title, abstract, keywords 
 
The aim of a SLR is “to bring together as many already existing evidence-based studies as 
possible that are relevant to the research being undertaken, irrespective of their published 
location, or even disciplinary background” (Thorpe, et al., 2005, p. 258). For policy-driven 
cluster studies this means that we were not specifically looking in regional studies, 
economics, management studies or sociology, but took a very interdisciplinary approach. In 
order to advance in policy-driven cluster research, we privileged focusing on the dilemmas 
instead of on a specific disciplinary stance. 
 
The crucial element was to define the “right” keywords in order to cover the whole spectrum 
of the policy-driven cluster literature that might be useful to study and analysis the diseases of 
our fieldwork observations and at the same time not to drawn in the existing general cluster 
literature (be it the spontaneous clusters, policy-driven clusters or general “regional system” 
literature). A helping element was that we already went through the cluster policy literature 
and that we knew approximately the keywords that will be useful for analysing policy-driven 
clusters. Finally, we used following keywords to constitute our final policy-driven cluster 
literature database: cluster polic*, clusterpolitik, politique* de* pôle*, cluster initiative*, 
policy-driven cluster*, cluster promotion, promotion of cluster*, cluster promotion polic*, 
cluster organi?ation*, cluster management, cluster manager*, cluster building, breeding 
cluster*, growing cluster*, breeding innovation cluster*, growing innovation cluster*, cluster 
governance. 
 
Additionally we had two criteria for keeping an article in our database. The first criterion was 
that the article was really dealing with regional clusters and not for example with clusters in 
computer programming. The second criteria concerned the quality of the journal in order to 
base our conclusions on quality results. At the beginning we just wanted to retain articles that 
were published in journals listed in the Harzing’s (2013) quality journal list, nevertheless 
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from which disciplinary stance. However, we soon realized that several important articles to 
understand the particularities of cluster policies were published in specialized or national 
journals which were not included in the Harzing’s (2013) quality journal list. For example the 
German journal “Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie”, where German cluster specialists 
publish their articles (for example (H. Bathelt & Dewald, 2008; H. Bathelt & Zeng, 2005; 
Kiese, 2008)), or the French journal “Politiques et Management Public” where French cluster 
specialists publish their articles (for example (Gallié, et al., 2012; Gallié, et al., 2014; Sabine 
Menu, 2011)), or the European specialist journal “European Urban and Regional Studies” 
where for example also Spanish researcher (Santisteban, 2006) publish their cluster policy 
articles (particularly important when one does not speak Spanish and can not consult the local 
journals). We therefore decided to enlarge our quality criteria and also include journals that 
are either listed among the best 10000 journals on the website “http://www.journal-
ranking.com” and/or that are cited more often than 5 times in the Scopus database. 
 
After excluding several articles according to the two criteria just cited, we also included some 
articles that were not referenced in Scopus. According to the SLR methodology adding “key 
references which had been missed by the systematic search process […] [is a useful step] to 
compensate for the rigidity of “mechanistic” searches” (Leseure, Bauer, Birdi, Neely, & 
Denyer, 2004b, p. 172). We added articles that were for example only accessible through a 
French journal database named CAIRN (for example (Bidan & Dherment-Férère, 2009; 
Schmitt, 2011)). Finally, the database counted 139 published articles. However, in our 
discussion we also included conference papers (for example (T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009)) or 
PhDs from French colleagues (for example (Chabault, 2009)) but we did not count these 
“working papers” as official published articles.  
 
2.3.2 Analysis of articles 
All 139 articles citations were downloaded into Endnote and based on the abstracts coded into 
homogenous groups. Even though coding of abstracts is sometimes criticised (Pittaway, et al., 
2004) due to some quality issues, it is also considered a useful tool “for creating a thematic 
structure around which more detailed reviewing can take place” (Pittaway & Cope, 2007, p. 
481). Due to our previous reading on the topic, we already developed a feeling for the subject 
that helped us in the coding process. After the abstract coding we then read through the 
articles in order to analyse which type of dilemmas and obstacles the different articles exactly 
identified. The result of this step is summarized hereinafter. 
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Before summarizing the content, we just want to give some general information regarding the 
articles. First of all, the articles came from a variety of disciplines (see Table 10), ranging for 
example from public sector management to marketing over entrepreneurship and innovation 
management. However, the discipline “Public Sector Management” is, not surprisingly, the 
discipline that most often talks about cluster policies, policy-driven cluster management, or 
policy-driven cluster promotion, etc. The top journals that publish articles these topics are for 
example Environment and Planning C, European Planning Studies and Regional Studies.  
 
Table 10: Articles dealing with cluster policy, management, promotion, etc. 
Discipline69 # of 
Articles 
Examples of journals per discipline 
Public Sector Management 62 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy; European Planning Studies; Regional Studies 
Economics 17 World Development; Research Policy; Regional Science 
and Urban Economics; Journal of Economic Geography 
Innovation 14 
International Journal of Technology Management; Industry 
and Innovation; Journal of Technology Transfer; 
Technovation 
General & Strategy 7 Policy Studies; European Management Journal 
Entrepreneurship 5 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development; International 
Entrepreneurship and Management Journal; International 
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 
Management Information Systems, 
Knowledge Management 5 
Knowledge Management Research and Practice; Maritime 
Policy and Management 
Sociology 5 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research; Growth and Change 
Marketing 4 Industrial Marketing Management; Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing 
Operations Research, Management 
Science, Production & Operations 
Management 
4 Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management; Service Industries Journal 
International Business 2 Asia Pacific Business Review; International Business Review 
Others 14  
TOTAL 139  
Source: policy-driven cluster literature review (see explanations in this section), 2014 
 
Another important and interesting result is that the articles cover a large range of countries 
and a large range of cluster initiatives (see Table 11 and Table 12). This cluster policy 
literature review has shown that cluster policies are really implemented around the world 
reaching from the USA to Japan, to Bulgaria and New Zealand. In the Table 11 there is an 
overrepresentation of articles coming from France this is due to the fact that we had access to 
                                                 
69
 The disciplines and associated journals correspond to the categorization established by Harzing’s (2013) 
quality journal list. In case a journal was not listed in Harzing’s quality journal list, we tried to put the journal 
into the discipline category that corresponds the best.  
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a national French journal database but not for example to a national German database. 
Another interesting observation is that cluster policy studies are mainly qualitative, but in 
Asia they are exclusively quantitative. Table 11 and Table 12 do not include theoretical 
papers on policy-driven clusters that we found during our literature review. However, they are 
numerous as well (see for example (Aiginger, 2007; Aziz & Norhashim, 2008; H. Bathelt & 
Dewald, 2008; Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; G. J. Hospers & S. 
Beugelsdijk, 2002; G. J. Hospers, et al., 2009; Karaev, et al., 2007; R. Martin & Sunley, 2003; 
Nathan & Overman, 2013; Raines, 2003)). This large variety of results coming from different 
countries has made this analysis particularly interesting and on the other hand it corresponds 
exactly to what a medical SLR advocates: that all types of results on a certain “medical issue” 
should be reviewed in order to advance in the knowledge of a certain medical problem. 
 
Table 11: Examples of cluster policy articles per country70 (European countries) 
COUNTRY EMPIRICAL QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL QUANTITATIVE 
Europe   
Austria (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005; 
MacNeill & Steiner, 2010) 
 
Belgium (Bayenet & Wunderle, 2009; Capron, 2011; 
Hermans, Castiaux, Dejardin, & Lucas, 2012; 
Van Haeperen, Lefèvre, & Dejardin, 2009) 
 
Bulgaria (Sellar, et al., 2011)  
Europe (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006; De Propris, 2007; 
Gallié, et al., 2014; Hospers, 2005) 
(Coletti, 2010) 
Finland (Sotarauta, 2012)  
France (Bidan & Dherment-Férère, 2009; Bocquet & 
Mothe, 2010; Carré, Lefebvre, & Madeuf, 
2008; Delaplace, 2011; Gadille, et al., 2013; 
Gaffard, 2008; Gallié, et al., 2012; Gallié, et 
al., 2014; Guisard, et al., 2010; Lefebvre, 
2013; Sabine Menu, 2011; S. Menu, 2012; 
Schmitt, 2011; Younès, 2012) 
(Fontagné, Koenig, Mayneris, & Poncet, 
2013; Gallié, et al., 2013b; A. Glaser, et al., 
2012; P. Martin, Mayer, & Mayneris, 2011) 
Germany (Champenois, 2012; Domdey & Hazouard, 
2008; Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005; 
Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; Sternberg, Kiese, & 
Stockinger, 2010) 
(Engel, Mitze, Patuelli, & Reinkowski, 2013; 
Falck, Heblich, & Kipar, 2010) 
Netherlands (Klein Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 
2005; Van Klink & De Langen, 2001) 
(Mans, et al., 2008) 
Norway (Gausdal, 2008)  
Spain (Ahedo, 2004; Martinez, Belso-Martinez, & 
Mas-Verdu, 2012; Santisteban, 2006) 
 
Sweden (Hallencreutz & Lundequist, 2003; Lundequist 
& Power, 2002) 
(Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2014; Eklinder-Frick, 
Eriksson, & Hallén, 2012) 
United Kingdom (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Burfitt, et al., 2007; 
Swords, 2013) 
(Cumbers, et al., 2003; Huggins & Johnston, 
2009; Learmonth, Munro, & Swales, 2003; 
McDonald, et al., 2007; Sadler, 2004) 
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 In case the methodology was mixed, I put it in the quantitative column. In case the paper was theoretical but 
used a lot of concrete empirical examples I added it in the qualitative column. 
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Table 12: Examples of cluster policy articles per country71 (Not European countries) 
COUNTRY EMPIRICAL QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL QUANTITATIVE 
North America   
Canada (Doloreux & Shearmur, 2009; Rutherford & 
Holmes, 2007; Salazar & Holbrook, 2007) 
(Arthurs, et al., 2009) 
USA (Sternberg, et al., 2010) (James, 2005; Peters, 2005) 
Asia   
China  (Li & Geng, 2012) 
Japan (Kitagawa, 2005, 2007) (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011a, 2011b) 
Taiwan  (Chiu, 2009) 
Africa   
Morocco & 
Tunisia 
(Cammett, 2007) 
 
Oceania   
New Zealand (Perry, 2005, 2007)  
Australia (Liyanage, 1995)  
Latin America   
Chile  (Felzensztein, et al., 2012; Giuliani, 2013; 
Visser & de Langen, 2006) 
Costa Rica (Ciravegna, 2012)  
Mexico (Martinez, et al., 2012)  
Latin America (Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer, 1999)  
 
2.4 Organisational dilemmas as drivers of cluster pathologies 
The literature shows that cluster policies have positive impacts but also negative impacts. 
Those who implement cluster policies constantly face a set of dilemmas that generate side-
effect pathologies. These pathologies are rarely studied in the cluster literature. Burfitt & 
Macneill (2008) already started to investigate the variety of dilemmas faced by cluster 
policies. In their theoretical paper they identified two main dilemmas “operational and 
managerial challenges” and “political challenges”. To the “operational and managerial” 
challenges they count the identification of clusters and the management of cluster policies, 
while to the “political challenges” they count the designation of clusters, the drawing of 
boundaries and the relationship between cluster organizations and politics. 
 
We tried to be independent from their analysis when doing the SLR and finally our SLR lead 
to similar results (see Figure 10). We were able to identify (1) political dilemmas of policy-
driven clusters (such as defining boundaries, subsidies and objectives), (2) organisational 
dilemmas of policy-driven clusters (such as managing multiple actors, innovation and 
collaboration), and (3) structural dilemmas of policy-driven clusters (such as adapting the 
policy-driven cluster to the life-cycle, to the local culture or to the geography) that might turn 
into side-effect pathologies. In this chapter we thus build on Burfitt & Macneill’s (2008) 
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 In case the methodology was mixed, I put it in the quantitative column. In case the paper was theoretical but 
used a lot of concrete empirical examples I added it in the qualitative column. 
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preliminary theoretical work but considerably extend it thanks to our SLR and the identified 
empirical cluster policy studies in the literature. 
 
To sum up once again, from a theoretical point of view we first have to understand which 
dilemmas exist because dilemmas can create side-effect pathologies (in this literature review). 
However, on the field one has to first thoroughly decompose the general view and identify the 
different pathologies before it is possible to go “upstream” again (towards the dilemma) and 
give sense to the whole. 
 
Figure 10: A framework for the study of pathology in policy-driven clusters  
 
 
3 Drivers of pathologies: political dilemmas 
The first types of dilemmas that we identified in the literature are of political nature. We are 
able to distinguish three different types of political dilemmas that seem to have a strong 
impact on the performance of policy-driven clusters (see Figure 11). These three dilemmas 
emerge because of decisions that have to be taken regarding the boundaries of policy-driven 
clusters, regarding the subsidies of policy-driven clusters, and regarding the fuzziness of the 
objectives of policy-driven clusters. 
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Figure 11: Political dilemmas of policy-driven clusters 
 
 
3.1 Dilemmas on defining boundaries 
There are two different boundary dilemmas that policy-driven clusters face: What is the 
geographical boundary (local vs. non-local)? & What is the organisational boundary (local vs. 
national / members vs. ecosystem / thematic vs. regional entity)? Hereinafter we discuss both 
types of boundary dilemmas. 
 
3.1.1 Geographical boundary: local vs. non-local 
Governments launch cluster policies to spore the competitiveness on their territories. 
However, Mans et al (2008, p. 1383) underline that “just labelling a cluster is not expected to 
be enough to reap the benefits ascribed to clusters”, therefore policy makers “include 
incentives for the cluster partners to actually function as a cluster.” Based on the literature 
discussed in chapter one, we know that this “functioning” of spontaneous clusters is 
particularly related to the networking component of the local actors. In policy-driven clusters, 
the incentives to motivate the local actors to collaborate (and thus to transform the region into 
a “functioning” policy-driven cluster) are very often based on R&D subsidies as for example 
done in the French case (Gallié, et al., 2013b) or in the Japanese case (Kitagawa, 2005; 
Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011b). These R&D subsidies are regional bound and only allocated 
to companies situated in a geographical defined area, the policy-driven cluster area. This is 
done so that the policy-driven cluster is incited to start “functioning” like a spontaneous 
cluster. 
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However, several academics advocate that cluster policies should not only foster local 
relationships (Kitagawa, 2005; Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011a) and that regional authorities 
should actually shift “to a regional innovation systems approach”, meaning that they should 
focus “equally on the regional and more global dimensions of knowledge networks” 
(Huggins & Johnston, 2009, p. 227). The theoretical question of what is the right regional 
scale for applying cluster policies is a vivid point of discussion in the academic cluster policy 
literature (Gaffard, 2008). From the beginning onwards, Porter’s idea that governments 
should create a competitive advantage within a specific territory, ignoring thus in a certain 
manner the interrelations with other territories and countries, was firmly criticized (Rugman, 
1992). 
 
Even though a range of studies show that extra-regional collaborations are important for the 
local companies, governments often decide otherwise when implementing policy-driven 
clusters. Hereinafter, we first recall the large range of studies that investigate the impact of 
local cluster networks vs. non-local networks on companies. All studies point in the same 
direction, namely that non-local networks and collaborations are extremely important for the 
competitiveness and development of companies co-located in the same region. However, the 
problem seems to lie somewhere else. In the second section, we come back to the political 
sphere, which, even though results point into the direction that non-local collaborations are 
more profitable than local collaborations for companies, stick to the wish to foster local 
cluster networks. Based on a very scarce literature on this subject, we shortly discuss that 
overcoming these somehow obvious geographical scale problems is more difficult for 
politicians than imagined by pure cluster academics. Finally, in the last section, we present 
some ideas of academics how to overcome this “policy-driven cluster scale” dilemma. 
 
3.1.1.1 The benefits of non-local networks 
Plenty of studies exist that investigate which benefits companies reap when collaborating with 
local cluster actors vs. collaborating with non-local actors. For example already in 2003, 
Cumbers et al. (2003) investigated a spontaneous oil cluster in Scotland and drew important 
conclusions for cluster policies. Cumbers et al. (2003, p. 1703) conclude that “regional 
networks are important in providing support for innovation” but that companies clustered at 
one location are not only interested in local partnerships. Among the analyzed companies they 
conclude that “more innovative SMEs [make] greater use of external networks than less 
innovative firms” (Cumbers, et al., 2003, p. 1703). They particularly underline that more 
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successful SMEs distinguish themselves by their “ability to draw upon localised assets yet 
simultaneously being plugged into wider networks” (Cumbers, et al., 2003, p. 1703). Even 
though “the local milieu remains important as a source of competitive advantage for firms” 
(Cumbers, et al., 2003, p. 1703) it is the wider network a company possesses that in fine 
makes the necessary difference.  
 
Some years later also McDonald et al. (2007) and Huggins & Johnston (2009), both analyzing 
UK clusters, draw similar conclusions. Huggins & Johnston (2009, p. 227) observe that 
“more innovative SMEs possess a balance of inside and outside the region knowledge 
networks” and McDonald et al (2007) conclude that national and international linkages are as 
important as local once. It is “the balance between local, national, and international networks 
in the context of both flows of goods and services, and flows on information and knowledge” 
that “need to be central in cluster policies” (McDonald, et al., 2007, p. 47). 
 
Additionally, McDonald et al (2007) strongly criticizes Michael Porter’s idea that strong 
regional networks and local supply chains are necessary for good performance. Their results 
show that this is not the case and that this might be one of the reasons why the currently 
implemented cluster policies do not reach their goals: “The current Porter-type views on 
cluster policy may not be sufficient to create even the bedrock conditions that would permit 
clusters to provide a good basis for attaining regional development objectives” (McDonald, 
et al., 2007, p. 47). 
 
However not only in the United Kingdom (Cumbers, et al., 2003; Huggins & Johnston, 2009; 
McDonald, et al., 2007) companies seem to profit from non-local partnerships. Also Mans et 
al (2008, p. 1383) studying “self-declared” clusters in the Netherlands conclude that “location 
does not seem to matter much for cooperation”. The “geographical concentration” in cluster 
policies “should thus play a minor role” (Mans, et al., 2008, p. 1383). Instead, they 
recommend that cluster policies should focus on “social cohesiveness” particularly “in high-
technology sectors” (Mans, et al., 2008, p. 1383). By social cohesiveness Mans et al (2008) 
mean direct and indirect connections between local and non-local actors. 
 
Even when we go beyond the European boarders, the results are the same. For example the 
Japanese cluster policy, analyzed by Nishimura & Okamuro (2011a), also tries to foster 
partnerships between local actors. However, Nishimura & Okamuro (2011a, p. 138) results 
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suggest “that local firms collaborating with partners outside the cluster show higher R&D 
productivity both in terms of quantity and quality.” According to them, the Japanese local 
cluster support system should thus help the local companies to find partners that are interested 
in the same research topic nevertheless where these partners are located. 
 
Finally, also on the South American continent the results are the same. Martinez et al (2012, 
p. 657), who conducted an in-depth analysis of one Mexican and one Spanish cluster, also 
conclude that even though local closeness is important and should be fostered, “key 
knowledge players are usually involved in extra-clusters networking”. They not only 
underline that collaborating with outside partners is important but they also indicate that a 
“mere reliance on localized knowledge may result in declining trajectories”. Cluster policies 
that overemphasis the creation of local connections might thus even create negative effects for 
the companies. 
 
3.1.1.2 Public authorities insist on fostering local networks for policy-driven clusters 
Nearly all academics investigating the importance of local vs. non-local collaborations come 
to the same conclusions, namely that non-local collaborations are extremely important for the 
companies. For example Champenois (2012, p. 812), studying the German BioRegio cluster 
initiative concluded that “a more selective policy targeted at sustaining the most promising 
ventures and entrepreneurs, without the ‘‘artificial’’ geographical limits imposed by such 
cluster policies, could have been more relevant for enhancing entrepreneurship in a 
sustainable way”. 
 
However, politicians implementing cluster policies continue to insist on subsidising 
companies located within the policy-driven cluster. One important element that seems to be 
constantly forgotten by the academic cluster research community is the fact that cluster 
policies are embedded in a highly complex institutional setting where for example regional 
authorities from one region might not be willing to invest money in actors that are situated in 
other regional entities. 
 
These dilemmas were recently underlined by Gaffard (2008, p. 271), Chabault (2009) or 
Younès (2011) who all studied the French policy-driven clusters. Chabault (2009) for 
example underlined that during the set-up phase of the French cluster policy some regional 
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authorities were arguing about their respective responsibilities regarding clusters that were 
spread out across the boarders of two administrative regions. Some industrials who wished to 
apply for the set-up of a policy-driven cluster in their regions (and thus profit from the French 
policy-driven cluster subsidies), considered that the policy-driven cluster perimeter should be 
best situated between two regions because the most interesting actors for working towards a 
certain technology or market are situated across the boundaries of two administrative regions. 
However, some regional authorities were not happy about this and refused to sign the policy-
driven cluster framework contract with the State because for them the geographical perimeter 
was important. The regional authorities considered that having a policy-driven cluster that is 
situated across two regions generates administration and responsibility problems. Even 
though, not really discussed in the cluster-policy literature, one is not allowed to forget that 
they are also in competition to each other for attracting companies to their territory.  
 
Even though we found several examples on the French case, it was not possible to track down 
examples from other countries. However, MacNeill & Steiner (2010, p. 444) underlined that 
“geographical limits of clusters are unlikely to be contiguous with administrative 
boundaries”. Therefore, they consider that the “coordination within multilevel or multi-area 
governance” (2010, p. 444) is a real challenge. 
 
A recent theoretical article from Ebbekink & Lagendijk (2013, pp. 736-737), two Dutch 
cluster specialist, also perfectly underline this political problem: “the academic debate on 
cluster reinforcement has focused too much on economic-geographical aspects. It has thus 
tended to ignore the complex institutional context in which policy-making is undertaken.” For 
them, understanding these policy challenges “should clearly be the basis from which effective 
cluster policies are to be developed” (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013, pp. 736-737). 
 
We think that Ebbekink & Lagendijk (2013, p. 737) are right when they say that we have to 
start investigating “cluster policy as a policy challenge”. Our cluster pathology research 
endeavour tries to go in this direction. In this manner, we might also overcome on the one 
hand the permanent observation that yes “economic activity is spatially concentrated” and 
companies clustering are more successful than not clustered companies but on the other hand 
the permanent criticism that “the cluster concept is far less useful as an analytical tool or as a 
means for making policy” (Nathan & Overman, 2013, p. 397). Maybe we just have to create 
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awareness and have to understand the obstacles that limit the policy to unfold its whole 
potential. 
 
3.1.1.3 Going beyond the local vs. non-local collaboration dichotomy 
No other cluster disease seems to be studied in so much detail on an academic level but at the 
same time so much ignored from the cluster policy world (which might also show that the 
academic world simply has not understood the policy world…). Studying the networks of 
local actors is an old theme of regional cluster studies so it is no surprise that this topic is also 
one of the most studied topics in cluster policy studies. In order to overcome the problems of 
cluster policies regarding local vs. non-local collaborations, some of the cluster policy 
specialists argue that new ways have to be taken.  
 
Instead of applying in an artificial manner the advantages of spontaneous clusters, Perry 
(2005, p. 833) proposes that governments should instead base their “policy intervention […] 
on determining how best to work with groups of variable significance and character”. Some 
authors thus propose to change specific elements of the current cluster policies and to also 
change their names. For example Bathelt & Dewald (H. Bathelt & Dewald, 2008, p. 163) 
propose to introduce “relational cluster policies” or Nathan & Overman (2013, p. 397) 
propose to introduce “agglomeration policies”.  
 
Bathelt & Dewald (2008, p. 163) argue to turn towards a “relational cluster policy” and to 
focus more on a “multidimensional cluster approach” that focuses more on the “action 
space” instead of a geographic space. For them “a multidimensional cluster approach” has 
several advantages, because it “highlights the role of agency in economic interaction, focuses 
on the action space of cluster agents, and goes beyond the regional and national scale” (H. 
Bathelt & Dewald, 2008, p. 163). Additionally, such an approach attributes a higher 
importance to external relations as well. 
 
Nathan & Overman (2013) even go one step further and push for abandoning the word 
“cluster” which might constantly introduce a wrong image of what should actually be 
fostered. Nathan & Overman (2013) reviewed the literature regarding the “appropriate 
spatial scale for industrial policy” and then urge for turning to an “agglomeration policy” 
instead of pursuing cluster policies. They argue that “if we cannot manipulate cluster 
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outcomes directly, a better basis for policy is to focus on market failures that affect individual 
firms and people within the cluster” (Nathan & Overman, 2013, p. 397). 
 
By better understanding “market failures”, Nathan & Overman (2013, p. 397) hope to 
understand where the real problems lie, both on a structural level (for example “access to 
finance”), but also on an individual cluster actor level. (Nathan & Overman, 2013, p. 397) 
Some concrete examples of an agglomeration policy would be: “encouraging 
entrepreneurship, subsidizing venture or other early stage finance, building workforce skills 
and management capacity, and helping firms forge international links” or “co-working 
spaces and accelerators” for young companies (Nathan & Overman, 2013, p. 397). 
Additionally, compared to a cluster policy, an agglomeration policy is a more “horizontal 
policy”, “targeting aspects of places rather than sectors as a means of encouraging growth” 
(Nathan & Overman, 2013, p. 399). 
 
Nathan & Overman (2013), similar to Ebbekink & Lagendijk (2013) (who focus on “cluster 
policy as a policy challenge”) and our own approach (who focus on the “pathology of 
clusters”), also turn the wheel around. Instead of investigating the potential positive effects of 
clusters and cluster policies they propose to focus on the challenges. Due to the highly 
systemic nature of clusters, positive effects of certain actions are always very difficult to track 
down and to justify. However, by focusing and analysing the negative effects and challenges 
of policy-driven clusters, more targeted help might be offered to the practitioners.  
 
Be it Bathelt & Dewald’s (2008) who advocated a “relational cluster policy” or Nathan & 
Overman (2013) who advocated an “agglomeration policy”, the common denominator is to 
overcome the problems of a cluster policy’s restraint geographic perimeter where 
collaborations should be fostered. Bathelt & Dewald (2008) solve the problem by only 
focusing on the collaboration aspect and Nathan & Overman (2013) solve the problem by 
only focusing on the location aspect. However, the advantage of both proposed policies is that 
collaboration and location are not intermingled anymore such as in cluster policies. Given that 
administrative boundaries might always exist, the approach of Nathan & Overman (2013) 
might thus be more realistic.  
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3.1.2 Organisational boundary: local vs. national 
Besides the geographical boundary dilemma there also exists an organisational boundary 
dilemma. One of the main elements of policy-driven clusters is the establishment of a new 
organisation or the appointment of an existing organisation to function as a dedicated cluster 
organisation. This cluster organisation is then responsible for “building” a policy-driven 
cluster in a certain sector at a certain location (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). However, most 
of time other types of industrial support structures were already present in the region or at the 
national level before the policy-driven cluster with its dedicated organisation was launched 
(e.g. trade unions72). The question is thus two-fold: (1) in the case of a new organisation: 
Which role does this new organisation play in relation to the “traditional” organisations? (2) 
in case of appointing an existing organisation: At which level should this organisation be 
situated (e.g. regional, national, inter-regional?)? 
 
Perry (2005) , studying several cluster initiatives in New Zealand73, underlines that it is 
important to dedicate some thoughts on the advantages and disadvantages of having several 
small fragmented local organisations or a more centralised national organisation. When we 
want to illustrate Perry’s (2005) thoughts with a concrete example, we could question if it is 
more advantageous to have several not interconnected local cluster organisations specialised 
in biotechnology on its territory, or better to have only one national biotechnology support 
organisation with regional branches. These thoughts are particularly important “because firms 
have limited resources to devote to participation in collective groups” (Perry, 2005, p. 848). 
 
Table 13 summarizes the advantages and disadvantage of local vs. national policy-driven 
support structures. On the one hand, small local organisations might be a better motivation for 
local actors to participate but knowledge might also be spread out among too many different 
places on the national territory (Perry, 2005). On the other hand, concentrating the efforts on a 
national level might decrease the membership but increase the valuable output (Perry, 2005). 
Burfitt & Macneill (2008), supports more the idea that national organisation bring more 
                                                 
72 For example Rutherford & Holmes (2007, p. 194) criticise that the cluster literature does not take into 
consideration the traditional “unions and industrial relations institutions”. They argue that these “traditional 
collective bargaining structures” should play a central role in the innovation efforts of a region because they 
have more legitimacy to do so.  
73
 There are two interesting elements regarding cluster policies in New Zealand. First of all it is such as France 
or Japan a unitary country. Second, in the beginning of the 1990s New Zealand received policy advices from 
Porter and his team. They even published a book with the title “Upgrading New Zealand’s competitive 
advantage” (Crocombe, Enright, Porter, & Caughey, 1991). 
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disadvantages than advantages. They argue that drawing the boundaries of the cluster too 
large and thus integrating too many different structures and interest groups might also have 
negative consequences as they might no longer be able to “meaningfully act as vehicles for 
policy delivery” (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008, p. 500). 
 
Table 13: Advantages and disadvantages of local vs. national support structures 
 Advantage Disadvantage 
Local organisation Higher motivation to participate, more 
members 
Knowledge too much spread out, 
decrease of valuable outcome 
National organisation Knowledge concentrated, increase of 
valuable outcome 
Lower motivation to participate, less 
members 
Policy objectives might not be well 
applied  
Source: based on (Perry, 2005) and (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008) 
 
However, the question of the right organisational boundary of policy-driven cluster 
organisations might depend on the size of the country. In smaller countries, such as New 
Zealand (Perry, 2005), a national organisation might be better as too many initiatives might 
dilute the collective actions. However, in big countries, such as the United States, local 
organisations might be the better solution. 
 
However, not only the level of the organisation needs attention. Also the amount of already 
existing structures is important to take into consideration. During the last two decades more 
and more company support organisations sprung up like mushrooms in order to help 
companies succeed in the global competitiveness race. Skelcher (2000, p. 4), calls this 
phenomenon the congested state, where “a complex of networked relationships between 
public, private, voluntary and community actors have created a dense, multi-layered and 
largely impenetrable structure for public action.” Burfitt et al (2008) stresses that 
understanding the interplay of all these networks are important to decide how the cluster 
policy will and can unfold in this system. 
 
3.2 Dilemmas on defining subsidies 
The subsidies allocated to policy-driven clusters are another important element of discussion. 
There are two main dilemmas that evolve around policy-driven cluster subsidies problem: 
deciding on the type of subsidies (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; S. Menu, 2012; Nishimura & 
Okamuro, 2011b; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009), and subsidies support structure (Chabault, 
2009; Guisard, et al., 2010; Lallemand, 2013). 
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3.2.1 Subsidies type: direct vs. indirect 
Another important problem is the type of subsidies that are associated with the policy-driven 
cluster policy. Partnership research, even though fostered by governments, has several pitfalls 
and overcoming these pitfalls seems difficult (Pallez, 2014a). Nishimura & Okamuro (2011b) 
investigated the Japanese cluster policy implemented by the Japanese government in 200174. 
More particularly they investigated the impact of the different support programmes on the 
local cluster actors. In the Japanese cluster policy programme, the government particularly 
focused on R&D support (55 billion yen between 2001 and 2004; represents 96.5% of the 
“cluster subsidies”) while the focus on indirect networking or coordination support was quite 
small (2 billion yen between 2001 and 2004; represents 3.5% of the policy-driven cluster 
subsidies) (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011b). This is nearly identical to the French cluster 
policy subsidies investments. In total, the French government has spent three billion Euros for 
the competitiveness cluster policy between 2005 and 2012. The three billion Euros had two 
usages: a small portion (3.3%), reinforced by membership fees and local authorities, was used 
for the functioning of the clusters organisations while the main portion (96.7%) was dedicated 
to the specific projects (R&D projects, innovation platforms, or collective actions covering 
very different themes).  
 
One of the main conclusions of Nishimura & Okamuro (2011b) is that the Japanese cluster 
policy’s indirect networking or coordination support is important and beneficial for the R&D-
intensive SMEs. However, compared to this indirect networking or coordination support their 
findings show that the direct R&D support seems to be less important. One explanation of 
these findings might be that “in order to avoid the criticism of wasting public funds, the 
government may finance projects with lower risks and higher private returns, which would be 
undertaken even in the absence of public subsidies” (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011b, p. 724). 
In the case of direct subsidies, the government might have a risk aversion attitude. 
Additionally, direct subsidies might also be used for more individualistic reasons and less for 
collective reasons.  
 
For example Weil & Fen Chong (2009), studying French cluster policies, point to the fact that 
“some companies which were used to receive large subsidies from the state, were told that 
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the money now will flow mostly through the cluster policy”. The consequence is thus that 
some policy-driven cluster actors showed an opportunistic reason to start or to join a policy-
driven cluster, more driven by the fact to access R&D subsidies and less driven by building a 
sustainable policy-driven cluster environment. However, Weil & Fen Chong (2009, p. 15) 
also argue that it was not always “pure window-dressing” and that the strict policy-driven 
cluster R&D subsidies rules (i.e. to involve also SMEs and research and training institutes in 
the R&D consortium) forced the large companies to generate a local dynamic. 
 
Even though at some point the actors have to collaborate with each other, the question 
remains which impact this behaviour might have on the wish to create a sustainable policy-
driven cluster environment with mutual trust and tacit knowledge exchange. Menu (2012), 
also studying French cluster initiatives are a little bit more negative than Weil & Fen Chong 
(2009). Menu (2012) studied two policy-driven clusters located in the region Brittany and she 
concluded that “in both cases [..] the cluster strategy was, at the end of the day, a summary of 
large firms’ (and academics) own interests on R&D issues” (p. 831-832). For example, 
instead of integrating SMEs in the strategic decisions of the policy-driven cluster, “SMEs 
were marginalized both in lobbying activities and in the executive committees” (p. 830). 
 
Menu (2012) explains these observations with the particularity of the French culture. Menu 
(2012, p. 830) observed that the “bargaining between actors within the clusters and outside 
was of hierarchical nature”. She explains this by the “French dirigisme” nature of which the 
cluster policy is just another example, but also by “the close ties between ministry and 
industry”. These strong ties, where SMEs have difficulties to enter, are “close ties born 
during school days (Grandes Ecoles) and/or by belonging to common civil service corps” 
(2012, p. 830). According to Menu (2012) it is this powerful elite which somehow navigates 
the policy-driven cluster interests and orients them towards their own benefits. 
 
Menu (2012) explains her observations by referring to the particularity of the French culture, 
but Burfitt & Macneill (2008), primarily studying cluster policies in the UK and therefore not 
embedded in the French culture, draw similar conclusions as Menu (2012). Burfitt & Macneill 
(2008, p. 500) even think that following the wishes of a few, constitute one of the greatest 
dangers of cluster policies: “cluster institutions are open to influence […] by powerful 
business actors [and] […] the greatest concern relates to their ‘capture’ by particular 
institutional or political interests”. Burfitt & Macneill (2008, p. 500) refer in this context to 
First part: Literature review - Chapter two 
 
 92
Andersson et al. (2004, p. 71) who already alerted to this “government failure” problem 
where “individual needs” are privileged “at the expense of an economy-wide perspective”.75 
 
3.2.2 Subsidies structure: one-shop vs. multiple shop strategies 
The last point we identified concerns the complexity of the cluster support structure. Burfitt & 
Macneill (2008, p. 500), by referring to Enright (2003), underline that “the danger of cluster 
organizations” is to be “overtaken by ‘bureaucracies’”. That at the end, the support 
structure, which is actually meant to help the policy-driven cluster, is “squeezing out firm-
oriented development” (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008, p. 500). Additionally, Burfitt & Macneill 
(2008, p. 500) question if the support structures that wish to create a regional dynamism, 
would be better exerted and cheaper when provided by private support services. 
 
Guisard et al. (2010) and many other French cluster researchers (Chabault, 2009; Erdyn, et 
al., 2012; Gallié, 2008; Lallemand, 2013) observe exactly this and underline that the French 
policy-driven cluster and innovation support mechanisms are generally perceived as quite 
complicated due to the multitude of different agencies involved. 
 
3.3 Dilemmas on defining objectives 
Another political dilemma that we identified in the cluster policy literature concerns the 
objective of the policy and the drivers that motivate the actors to participate in the adventure.  
 
In the first chapter we have already discussed that cluster policies try to combine several 
policies that were historically treated separately. In political terms this also means that a range 
of different political authorities with a range of different objectives try to push their agenda 
into the cluster policy effort (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008). This problem was also identified by 
Burfitt & Macneill (2008, pp. 498-499) who stress that the “holistic nature” of cluster 
policies which was particularly appreciated in the beginning “may ultimately represent one of 
its greatest weaknesses” and that the varying objectives “can distort its objectives and dilute 
its value as a tool for economic development”.  
 
In the 1980s scholars started to discuss how to “grow the next Silicon Valley” (Miller & Cote, 
1985) or how to “breed innovation clusters” (DeBresson, 1989, p. 1). Several other 
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researchers followed in order to investigate how and if governments can “clone” Silicon 
Valley’s in their countries (Bresnahan & Gambardella, 2004; G.-J. Hospers, et al., 2009; D. 
Rosenberg, 2002; Christian Saublens, 2007; Zhang, 2003). Even though governments 
consecrate a high amount of public resources to such policies (Fen Chong, 2009), the results 
stay very mixed. 
 
Some authors argue that one of the reasons why the results stay mixed is because the cluster 
concept is simply too fuzzy and ill-defined (Markusen, 2003; R. Martin & Sunley, 2003), 
touching too many policy areas. Academics are themselves not always one and the same 
opinion where cluster policies stand regarding all the different traditional policy streams.  
 
Some authors think that cluster policies have simply become one of the major axes of 
industrial policies (Aiginger, 2007; Capron, 2011) or that it is simply a “new approach to 
industrial policy” (Guisard, et al., 2010). Others again argue that “cluster policy is…a well-
known instrument in innovation policy” (Mans, et al., 2008, p. 1375), that cluster policies are 
“a powerful instrument at the intersection between regional and industrial policy” 
(Schmiedeberg, 2010, p. 389) or that “cluster policies can be regarded as regional, 
industrial, or technological policies” (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011a, p. 118). Boekholt & 
Thuriaux (1999, p. 382) and Nishimura & Okamuro (2011a), similar to the OECD (2007), 
situate cluster policies at the boundaries of three different policies namely “industrial policy 
(including SME policy), regional development policy, and science and technology (S&T) 
policy”. However, the boundaries stay very blurry. 
 
Discussions about cluster policies and the underlying ambiguity of multiple (maybe 
sometimes contradictory) objectives is far from closed among academics. However, when the 
operationalisation phase of cluster policies starts, this ambiguity of objectives creates 
problems on the field. When we dig further into the cluster policy literature we can identify 
two main issues that can lead to potential dilemmas: industrial excellence vs. regional 
development objectives; and an absence of an intrinsic motivation to build the policy-driven 
cluster. 
 
3.3.1 General objective: industrial excellence vs. regional development 
Several authors criticise that it is difficult to combine industrial excellence objectives with 
regional development objectives. For example Sternberg et al (2010) compared the 
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institutional settings and multi-level government specificities of cluster policies implemented 
in North Carolina (USA) and Bavaria (Germany). They concluded that compared to the USA, 
German “clusters are usually not identified through academic mapping exercises, but rather 
through top-down political decisions, open bargaining, or negotiations among stakeholders 
behind closed doors” (Sternberg, et al., 2010, p. 1077). This leads to the problem that “in 
Germany cluster policies are generally troubled by the traditional orientation of regional 
policy towards the goal of spatial equity, which is fundamentally at odds with the growth and 
competitiveness focus of cluster policy” (Sternberg, et al., 2010, p. 1077).  
 
Sternberg et al (2010) came to this critical conclusion regarding the German cluster policy, 
which according to them is too much oriented towards regional development than on focusing 
on competitiveness and excellence. If we look at research that is done on the French cluster 
policy the picture does not look much different. In 2005, France decided to label 
simultaneously 67 clusters on its territory. For some authors (T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2008) the 
high amount of labelled clusters in France was the proof that the French government finally 
privileged a more regional policy approach (with the objective to also help less performing 
regions) than an industrial “excellence” policy approach only focusing on the most or 
potentially most performing systems (for example such as Germany and its BioRegio 
competition). The orientation of the French cluster policy was not transparent as well 
(Younès, 2011) but such as in the German case (Sternberg, et al., 2010, p. 1077) happening 
“behind closed doors”. 
 
The main problem of the regional vs. industrial development dichotomy is that regional 
development is often associated with helping regions and local actors that struggle to keep up 
with the national or global competition. However, some authors fear that a regional policy 
intermingled with an industrial policy can lead to helping industrial branches that will anyhow 
die at some point. 
 
For example Hospers et al (2009, p. 297) heavily criticise Porter’s opinion that cluster 
policies are “a horizontal and market-friendly approach” that is better than the classical 
industrial policy. Hospers et al (2009, p. 297) argue that cluster policies are also simply 
“reduced to industries”. Additionally, cluster policies such as traditional industrial policies 
function by targeting a certain beneficiary. An industrial policy targets certain companies the 
cluster policy targets certain cluster, and each time the question of whom to choose is crucial 
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but at the same time “a risky venture because of large information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurs and policy makers” (G. J. Hospers, et al., 2009, p. 297). For Hospers et al 
(2009, p. 297) “particular problems emerge when it comes to high-tech cluster policy and 
low-tech cluster policy”. For them supporting high-tech clusters is like an “industrial policy 
of ‘picking winners’” while a low-tech cluster policy is a “backing losers” policy (G. J. 
Hospers, et al., 2009, p. 297). 
 
Similar to Hospers et al (2009), also Giuliani (2013) or Burfitt & Macneill (2008) underline 
that “backing losers” might actually be extremely dangerous. Giuliani (2013, p. 1417) stresses 
that “in a growing cluster, new employment and market opportunities emerge and naturally 
replace those lost due to exiting firms”, if policies intervene that try to “help the weakest 
firms to survive” this might have a negative impact on the region. Burfitt & Macneill (2008) 
even go one step further and say that helping clusters that are on the terminal decline might 
even “manipulate [...] the cluster designation process [which] may […] reinforce lock-in by 
supporting traditional declining clusters on the basis of their political backing or by crowding 
out the development of realistic new ones by promoting politically-motivated (high tech) 
fantasies”. So instead of a natural painful decline that creates space for a new start and a 
healing process, the suffering process is prolonged and the healing process postponed. 
 
A recent quantitative article studying a French cluster policy (SPL) shows that the State 
actually had an involuntary and hidden “backing losers” approach and that the results of this 
policy “are not very positive” (P. Martin, et al., 2011). Even though the policy initially did 
not want to help “lagging regions”, the results showed that this was exactly done and that “the 
policy targeted firms in regions and sectors that were experiencing difficult times in terms of 
productivity and therefore competitiveness” (P. Martin, et al., 2011, p. 119). They concluded 
that this might be “bureaucratic continuity” as the agency in charge of this policy (the 
DATAR) was initially responsible to “promote territorial equity”, something they somehow 
could not abandon. In the end the results show that the “the policy did not succeed in 
reversing the relative decline in productivity for the targeted firms [and] the policy had no 
effect on the employment and exports of firms” (P. Martin, et al., 2011, p. 120).  
 
The literature shows that cluster policies need to be alerted regarding the divergent regional 
vs. industrial development objectives. On the one hand, governments have to be alerted not to 
pursue a “consensus policy” between different political agendas instead of a policy that 
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pursues one goal that the policy tries to fulfil in the best possible manner (Sternberg, et al., 
2010; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2008; Younès, 2011). On the other hand, governments have to 
be alerted regarding the “backing losers” phenomenon and the prolongation of the regional 
suffering process (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Giuliani, 2013; G. J. Hospers, et al., 2009). 
 
3.3.2 Motivation: intrinsic motivation vs. policy prescription 
We already discussed that successful historical examples, like Silicon Valley and the Emilia-
Romagna region, had one common characteristic, namely an external “challenger” that they 
wanted to surpass (in the case of Silicon Valley the Route 128, in the case of Emilia-Romagna 
the First Italy). As the objectives of policy-driven clusters, are often very blurry, actors can 
reinterpret them and develop an intrinsic motivation to build the policy-driven cluster. 
 
These drivers and objectives do not have to be homogenous among the different actors 
involved in policy-driven clusters. For example, Sellar et al (2011) studies the implementation 
of cluster policies in Bulgaria. In their research, they clearly show how the cluster policy is 
situated at different institutional levels and each of these “different groups” use the cluster 
concept for their own purposes. Sellar et al (2011) particularly focused on “the articulation of 
cluster policies at European Union level, Bulgarian national level and local level”. Their 
results show that at the European Union level the cluster concept is used “as part of its 
innovation strategy and a tool to compete with the United States in the generation of new 
knowledge” (2011). However, at the Bulgarian national level things already look quite 
different even though they also brand it as cluster policy. The Bulgarian government sees 
“cluster policies as a tool for economic reconstruction” (2011). After the end of communism, 
the high-tech industry collapsed and the economy went down. Innovation is less important 
than the reconstruction of the economy. So the money for the cluster policy is particularly 
used to inject “capital in a cash-poor economy and [to conduct] substantial reforms of the 
public sector” (2011). If we go another step down, to the local level, we can add a third 
interpretation of the cluster concept. The local level is strongly dependent from foreign 
investors so it primarily used the cluster concept as a marketing tool to attract these foreign 
investors (Sellar, et al., 2011). Also Perry (2005), studying New Zealand cluster initiatives 
underlined that there are different rationalities co-existing in the policy-driven cluster context. 
 
There are plenty of reasons why economic entities decide to join forces (Child & Faulkner, 
1998; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Noteboom, 2004; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Among the 
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most cited reasons are for example the access to resources based on the resource-based theory 
(Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959); cost minimisation based on the transaction cost theory (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1985); shared risk; or learning and innovation (Powell, 1998; Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Even though most of the cluster literature is based on a 
resource based or learning and innovation argumentation, policy-driven clusters might need 
another type of analysis.  
 
In a more public management domain and more precisely in the community-building domain, 
another driver to join forces is often discussed: shared vision. Himmelman (1996) says that in 
order to reach a change in a community, a shared vision has to be created. This shared vision 
can be created in a continuum between collaborative betterment and collaborative 
empowerment. 
 
On the one extreme we find collaborative betterment that “begins within public, private, or 
nonprofit institutions outside the community and is brought into the community” 
(Himmelman, 2002, p. 5). The process of collaboration is not launched within the community 
in an endogen manner, but the community “is invited into a process designed and controlled 
by larger institutions” (Himmelman, 2002, p. 5). 
 
On the other extreme, we find collaborative empowerment that “begins within the community 
and is brought to public, private, or nonprofit institutions” (Himmelman, 2002, p. 5). In the 
collaborative empowerment strategy the community itself starts the collaboration process 
without an outside hierarchy dictating the conditions. Generally, if governments want to 
create shared vision by using empowerment, two types of basic activities are necessary: “(1) 
organizing a community in support of a collaborative purpose determined by the community; 
and (2) facilitating a process for integrating outside institutions in support of this community 
purpose” (Himmelman, 2002, p. 6). 
 
Installing the “right” drivers and objectives for a policy-driven cluster is a challenging 
endeavour. Particularly, because passing from a more betterment condition to a more 
preferable empowerment condition is not obvious “because institutions usually cannot easily 
secure the confidence and trust of those they initially exclude from meaningful decision-
making” (Himmelman, 2001, p. 283). Even though Himmelmann (2001) does not explicitly 
focus on policy-driven clusters, his research seems important to take into account in a policy-
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driven cluster context. Particularly, when governments define policy-driven cluster objectives 
that then have to be transformed by regional actors into concrete actions. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this section we discussed all the “political dilemmas” that we identified in the cluster 
policy literature. Table 14 summarizes the three main political dilemmas (policy-driven 
cluster boundaries, policy-driven cluster subsidies, and policy-driven cluster objectives & 
motivations) and their attributed symptoms discussed in this section.  
 
Table 14: Political dilemmas 
Main dilemmas Associated dilemmas Examples of authors 
Defining 
boundaries 
(PD#1) 
PD#1a - Geographical boundary: local vs. non-
local (difficulty to privilege political vs. 
practitioner reality) 
(Chabaud, Messeghem, & 
Sammut, 2011; Ebbekink & 
Lagendijk, 2013; Gaffard, 2008; 
Kitagawa, 2005; Younès, 2011) 
 PD#1b - Organisational boundaries: local vs. 
national (difficulty to decide on the right level and 
entity to manage the policy-driven cluster) 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Perry, 
2005; Rutherford & Holmes, 2007) 
Defining subsidies 
(PD#2) 
PD#2a - Subsidies type: indirect vs. direct 
subsidies (difficulty to decide how to foster R&D 
networks) 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; S. 
Menu, 2012; Nishimura & 
Okamuro, 2011b; T. Weil & Fen 
Chong, 2009) 
 PD#2b - One-shop vs. multiple shop strategies: 
(advantages and disadvantages of both, always 
depends on the perspective) 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; 
Chabault, 2009; Guisard, et al., 
2010; Lallemand, 2013) 
Defining 
objectives (PD#3) 
PD#3a - General objective: industrial excellence 
vs. regional development objectives (difficulty to 
decide, consensus between different political 
agendas instead of a policy that pursues one goal) 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; 
Giuliani, 2013; G.-J. Hospers, et 
al., 2009; Sternberg, et al., 2010; T. 
Weil & Fen Chong, 2008; Younès, 
2011) 
 PD#3b - Motivation: intrinsic motivation vs 
policy prescription (difficulty to find the right 
balance between guiding the policy-driven clusters 
and leaving them enough space to develop 
motivation) 
(Himmelman, 1996; Perry, 2005; 
Sellar, et al., 2011) 
 
4 Drivers of pathologies: managerial dilemmas 
The second type of policy-driven cluster dilemmas that we identified in the literature is of 
managerial nature. As already discussed in chapter one, a huge amount of grey literature has 
emerged that tries to help policy-driven cluster managers in their management endeavours 
(CLOE, 2006; Cluster Navigators Ltd., 2001; DTI, 2004; GTZ, 2007a, 2007b; Innovation 
America, 2007). Generally these policy-driven cluster manuals read like a pell-mell of 
different business school disciplines, focusing for example on how policy-driven cluster 
managers can set up business plans, conduct stakeholder analyses, or cluster marketing (GTZ, 
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2007a, 2007b). However, they do not look from an organisational point of view on these 
public management challenges, something that though starts to emerge and is particularly 
important in policy implementation (Saussois, 2008). 
 
Also academics start focusing on these management issues as the article from Coletti (2010) 
shows. Coletti (2010) exploits data from a global policy-driven cluster manager survey. The 
results reflect the general policy objectives of policy-driven clusters and not the 
implementation dilemmas encountered on the field (for example who should be the leader?). 
For example the most important tasks mentioned by policy-driven cluster managers are: 
“fostering exchanges between cluster members (e.g. networking), networking with 
stakeholders, lobbying, identifying and integrating new cluster members, strategy 
development for the cluster (e.g. identification of market opportunities), organising events” 
(Coletti, 2010, p. 685). Similar results were already obtained by Sölvell (2003, p. 10) who 
advocated that the most important elements of cluster initiatives is to foster networks among 
people and firms.76  
 
However, below this first level of objectives there is a richness of managerial dilemmas that 
emerge by setting up policy-driven clusters within a defined geographical and organisational 
boundary in which one tries to foster networking and innovation. Innovation is for example 
not mentioned as one of the main policy-driven cluster objectives in the surveys of Coletti 
(2010) or Sölvell (2003) (only at the 8th and 4th place respectively), as cluster policies 
somehow implicitly assume that networking will automatically lead to innovation. 
 
We are able to distinguish three different types of managerial dilemmas that seem to have a 
strong impact on the performance of policy-driven clusters (see Figure 12). These three 
dilemmas emerge because of the difficulty to manage the multiple actors involved in policy-
driven clusters as well as the wish to foster innovation and collaboration within a defined 
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 Coletti (2010) also focuses on the skills that cluster managers need to have, here he identified that the most 
important skills for cluster managers are “knowledge of the cluster’s specific sector/industry, communicative 
skills (e.g. presentation, mediation, negotiating), leadership capabilities, team management”. Nearly 15 years 
early Cooke (1996, p. 170) also already tried to identify the necessary skills of cluster managers and came to 
similar results: “Whichever personnel occupy whatever roles in the Network "hearts" - the Innovation Centres - 
they must: have the five key networking skills [Reciprocity, Trust, Learning, Partnership, Decentralism]; be 
psychologically open, enthusiastic, “fanatical”; combine technology/business management/and marketing skills; 
must be able to convince firms to become members/associates/subscribers/supporters/users of the network, its 
hubs and spokes; must themselves be innovative, initiative-taking; must be well-networked within their country 
and beyond to innovation centres and systems” 
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entity named “policy-driven cluster” but that is very “open” compared to a traditional 
organisational setting. 
 
Figure 12: Managerial dilemmas of policy-driven clusters 
 
 
4.1 Dilemmas on managing actor involvement 
The first important point to discuss concerns the complex nature of policy-driven clusters, 
particularly due to the multiple actors involved and their conflicting views. We first focus on 
the difficult question of leadership in policy-driven clusters and then on the necessity to 
accept that policy-driven cluster actors have a learning capacity that can be hindered by an 
“administrative straightjacket”. 
 
4.1.1 Leadership: who is in charge? 
The leadership issue in policy-driven clusters is increasingly treated by cluster policy scholars 
and identified as a major dilemma. The objective of cluster policies is to make collaborate a 
variety of different actors but this obliges “policy-makers not only [to] mov[e] outside their 
traditional departmental boundaries but also [to] engag[e] with a wide range of relational 
issues amongst firms, institutions and other actors each with their own raison d’être, culture 
and spatial scale of operation” (MacNeill & Steiner, 2010, p. 444). However, it is not evident 
that the policy-makers manage to bring all these different types of actors around one table in 
order to work constructively together. 
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In order to handle this high complexity, Lundequist & Power (2002, p. 698) conclude that it is 
particularly important “to give authorization to one or a few people to act as cluster 
‘drivers’.” They call them “civic entrepreneurs”, coming either “from the public or the 
private sector.” These civic entrepreneurs have to be in the center of the policy-driven cluster 
and “have a capacity to act as a network broker between sectors and individual interests.” 
Hereinafter, we shortly discuss two cluster policy examples where the “civic entrepreneur” 
theory seems to be employed (Bavaria and Austria) and two other examples where the “civic 
entrepreneur” theory seems not to be employed (France and UK) and therefore causing 
several leadership problems. 
 
For example, Menu (2012) analyzed the French policy-driven cluster leadership system (in 
Brittany) and also the German policy-driven cluster leadership system (in Bavaria). In the 
Bavarian policy-driven clusters the leadership question seems well organised by giving one 
“civic entrepreneur” the responsibility for all policy-driven clusters situated in the region and 
thus having concentrated in one local person several responsibilities and also the necessary 
authority to get things done. However, the situation is quite different in France. Menu (2012, 
p. 830) argues that it is not that easy to “understand leadership” in French policy-driven 
clusters because one also has to take into account the “policy dimension”. Menu (2012, p. 
831) underlines that the French policy-driven clusters are, compared to the Bavarian policy-
driven clusters, “weak institutionalized clusters” where leadership emerged only slowly and 
difficultly. Additionally there is no regional umbrella structure but all regional policy-driven 
clusters depend directly from the state. The French state requires from each of the local 
policy-driven cluster leaders “to follow central guidelines” (for example to draft a strategic 
administrative plans) but on the other hand does not accord enough “resources to enact them 
efficiently” (S. Menu, 2012, p. 831). The result is that the French system, compared to the 
Bavarian system, looses a considerable amount of time with administrative and reporting 
tasks and has thus less time to for animating the local network. 
 
The German (Bavaria) policy-driven cluster leadership system seems similar to the Austrian 
(Styria) leadership system. In both cases, a policy-driven cluster leader sets the general 
strategy but at the same time allows the local actors to actively participate in the strategy 
development. According to MacNeill & Steiner (2010, p. 445), in the Austrian case, the 
leadership system is handled in a post-modern’ participative management style, i.e. 
“conceived as an open participative process” allowing “trial[s] and error[s]”. According, to 
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them this creates a favourable policy-driven cluster environment and the policy-driven cluster 
management results are better than when using a new public sector management approach. 
 
MacNeill & Steiner (2010, p. 445) distinguish between two forms of policy-driven cluster 
leadership. On the one hand, they identify “cluster coordination as mutual strategy 
development” which they relate to Gibney et al.’s (2009) “‘post-modern’ participative 
management style” (the case of Styria). On the other hand, they identify a “traditional 
partnership working where a hierarchical leader sets a strategy and goals within the 
‘partnership’” who then do not participate in the amelioration of the process. They relate this 
traditional approach to Gibney et al.’s (2009) “‘New Public Sector Management’” approach. 
The French case, seems thus more similar to this new public sector management leadership 
style while the Austrian and German cases discussed in the literature seems closer to the post-
modern participative management style.  
 
Similar to the French case, also the UK (West Midlands) seems to adopt a more hierarchical 
approach to policy-driven cluster management. Burfitt et al (2007, p. 1288) analyzed a 
medical technology cluster in the West Midlands and conclude, such as Menu (2012) for the 
French case, that not only “resources” were low but that the “institutional capacity and 
leadership […] [was] weak”. This was amplified because of two reasons. First the cluster 
privileged “avoid[ing] division amongst key regional players […] over the creation of a 
workable definition of the cluster” (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008, p. 500) and second “local and 
regional public bodies [had] limited autonomy with regard to national government” (Burfitt, 
et al., 2007, p. 1288). The combination of all these factors seems to hinder the emergence of a 
positive cluster development.  
 
To sum up, local leadership and a dynamic cluster development seem to be particularly 
hindered when resources are low, strategy is not built in a participative manner, and the 
central state keeps too much administrative power compared to the local cluster organisations 
(Burfitt, et al., 2007; MacNeill & Steiner, 2010; S. Menu, 2012). 
 
4.1.2 Learning: learning capacity vs. administrative straightjacket 
Another important element to take into consideration when implementing cluster policies is 
the learning capacity of the involved actors. These cluster actors gain, little by little, more 
experience. If the different policy-driven cluster actors are allowed to and if the cluster policy 
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is not too rigid, they might improve their functioning and so slowly construct a better cluster 
policy. However, several cluster policy specialists underline that policymakers tend to keep 
cluster policies in an “administrative straightjacket” (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013, p. 740). 
 
The following examples will show that several countries seem to have similar problems 
regarding the administrative rigidity when implementing cluster policies. According to Burfitt 
& Macneill (2008, p. 497), the managerial dilemmas that policymakers are facing by 
implementing cluster policies is particularly due to the fact that they traditionally 
“conceptualiz[e] the policy process as a largely linear phenomenon where traditional, 
professional project management skills were at a premium”. However, in the cluster policy 
case they have to move “towards […] [a] more fluid ‘relational’ processes that favour 
association, interaction and collaboration between individuals, institutions, firms and other 
concerned groups.” The logic behind this new type of policy is not the same as in traditional 
industrial or regional policies. 
 
For example, Ebbekink & Lagendijk (2013, p. 738), argue that the “policy processes” are 
happening in “isolation”, “occur at too much of a distance” and that the “communication 
circuits [are] institutionalized and bureaucratized in impenetrable structures”. Therefore 
they urge for privileging “policy leverage” instead of “cluster building” by assigning an 
important role to “civic entrepreneurs” (2013, p. 738). For them policy leverage is among 
others concentrated on “breaking through administrative barrier” and consists of “collective 
strategy-building” meaning “an ongoing, informal strategic dialogue between “all” cluster 
stakeholders” which will collectively allow to learn and create action (2013, p. 738).  
 
Also Sotarauta (2012, p. 792) criticizes that “the policy process is believed to proceed in 
linear discrete stages” and that policy makers are seen as “passive recipient[s] of given 
recommendations in an expert-driven and technocratic policy process.” Instead of a linear 
process, Sotarauta (2012, p. 792) after conducting an in-depth study of a Finish cluster policy, 
argues that “policy making is a learning process in which theory, policy practice, and 
feedback from the ‘‘real world’’ coevolve constantly” and that this process is more an 
“evolutionary story”. 
 
Lundequist & Power (2002), who conducted in-depth studies of Swedish cluster initiatives, 
also conclude that the cluster policy process is not a linear process. Lundequist & Power 
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(2002, p. 697) underline that “policy-makers and practitioners all too often view cluster 
initiatives as programmatics to be developed and implemented along some sort of uni-linear 
timeline”. Instead of this uni-linear timeline approach, Lundequist & Power (2002, p. 697) 
show with their Swedish case studies that a “successful cluster building involves a more 
reciprocal process that can be described as an on-going conversation amongst various 
stakeholders (or even stockholders) in economic development.” 
 
Also several studies analysing the French cluster policy come to the same conclusion (Carré, 
et al., 2008; Gadille, et al., 2013; Gallié, et al., 2012; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009)77. The 
study of Weil & Fen Chong (2009) needs particular attention because they analyzed in detail 
the learning capacity of the different cluster actors and conclude that a cluster is in fact “an 
ecology of fast and slow learners” (T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009, p. 18) Their analysis of the 
French cluster policy shows that “the government has been a slow learner” while the 
different cluster managers are fast learners and the different cluster members “usually adapt 
quite well after some experimentation. Those with high stakes or smart opportunists stay, 
others leave or become sleeping participants” (T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009, pp. 18-19). 
Compared to the other studies they not only identified that the actors of the policy-driven 
clusters are “learning” and evolving but that they also have different learning speeds. 
 
The fact that each learning process needs actually an “organisational learning time” which 
might not always be very fast is also underlined by Carré et al. (2008). Carré et al. (2008) 
even considers that according a cluster this “organisational learning time” is an essential 
dimension of the success of the policy. They particularly alert to the fact that the learning path 
might be much longer when the local actors are not used to working together and in 
metropolitan regions where the cooperation is even more difficult. 
 
To sum up, taking into consideration the learning capacity of the different actors is an 
important element in order to help the cluster policy unfold in an effective manner.  
 
                                                 
77
 The results of the article where I participated (Gallié, et al., 2012) will be presented in the third part (results 
and discussion). 
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4.2 Dilemmas on managing innovation processes 
Another important point to discuss is the management of innovation78 in policy-driven 
clusters. Even though ample literature exists on innovation management in organisations, the 
literature focusing on innovation management in policy-driven cluster is very scarce (Bocquet 
& Mothe, 2010; Lefebvre, 2013). This tendency of not addressing innovation management in 
policy-driven clusters is also reflected in policy-driven cluster surveys. In several surveys 
(Coletti, 2010; Sölvell, et al., 2003), innovation management, compared to networking efforts, 
is not mentioned as one of the top priorities for policy-driven cluster managers. This is 
somehow a great paradox in the policy-driven cluster reality and academic literature, as 
fostering innovation is actually one of the core objectives of every cluster policy. Therefore, 
Lefebvre (2013) recently thus to pass from an “accidental brokering to purposeful 
brokering” process in clusters in order to foster innovation.  
 
A large body of cluster literature treats the advantages of face-to-face interactions within 
territories (Gertler, 1995, 2003; Lawson & Lorenz, 1999; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Storper, 1995; Storper & Venables, 2004). The underlying assumption is that through face-to-
face interactions, people can more easily transfer tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1991; Polanyi, 
1966)79. Additionally, the co-location of companies also creates more trust between the 
companies which facilitates the installation of institutional norms of cooperation (Lawson & 
Lorenz, 1999; Storper & Venables, 2004). Finally, these circumstances increase the 
innovation potential of clustered companies as well as the competitive advantage of the whole 
nation (Porter, 1990, 2000a; Porter & Stern, 2001). Some academics though, like for example 
the geographers Torre (2008) or Shearmur (2011a), have a critical stance regarding clusters 
and innovation. Both argue that the role of permanent geographic proximity on innovation 
remains questioned. 
 
                                                 
78
 Innovation is defined as “the successful implementation of creative ideas” (Amabile, 1996, p. 1) or the 
“commercial exploitation” of new ideas (Swann, 2009, p. 25) that means that “a common feature of an 
innovation is that it must have been implemented. A new or improved product is implemented when it is 
introduced on the market. New processes, marketing methods or organisational methods are implemented when 
they are brought into actual use in the firm’s operations” (OECD & Eurostat, 2005, p. 47). Most of the literature 
(for a comparison between process, product and organisational innovation also see Boer & During (2001)) 
distinguishes four types of innovations (OECD & Eurostat, 2005, p. 46): “the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, [or] a new marketing method, or a new 
organisational method”. (Organisational innovation: for example “a new organisational method in business 
practices, workplace organisation or external relations” (OECD & Eurostat, 2005, p. 46)). Cluster policies 
particularly focus on product innovations. 
79
 Explicit knowledge is codified and can be communicated over long distances. Tacit knowledge is non-
codified, predominantly transferred through face-to-face interactions and thus place bound.  
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In case authors do agree that proximity triggers knowledge exchange and innovation, a 
controversial persists regarding the type of proximity needed in order to generate knowledge 
spillovers between regional actors. Beaudry & Schiffauerova (2009, p. 320) did a great 
literature review on the topic and conclude that three different opinions persist: specialisation, 
diversity and competition (see Table 15). The academics that argue that specialization is 
needed in order to facilitate knowledge spillovers and thus innovation base themselves on the 
MAR (or Marshall-Arrow-Romer) model which was formalized by Glaeser et al (1992)80. 
The ones that claim that regional diversity is an important source of knowledge spillovers 
base their research on the works of Jacobs (1961, 1969). Finally, the ones that advocate that 
regional specialisation is important coupled with high competition, base their work on Porter 
(1998b). However, the discussion about who is “right” is far from closed.  
 
Table 15: Sources of knowledge spillovers in clusters 
 MAR Jacobs Porter 
Specialization + - + 
Diversity - + - 
Competition - - + 
Source: Beaudry & Schiffauerova (2009, p. 320) 
 
So besides the fact that cluster researchers are still not sure what exactly triggers knowledge 
spillovers, governments have implemented cluster policies. They did this, as already 
discussed, mainly based on Porter’s cluster concept, thus privileging regional specialisation. 
The question is in a certain manner no longer which type of proximity generates knowledge 
spillovers but what can policy-driven cluster managers do in order to foster knowledge 
spillovers and innovation in specialist policy-driven clusters. However, the process leading to 
an innovation is treated like a black box. Chiaroni & Chiesa (2006) underlined that the cluster 
literature constantly tries to describe clusters but does not focus on the dynamics of the cluster 
and ignores this black box. 
 
In this section thus we do not focus on the relationship between proximity and innovation but 
on the role that policy-driven cluster managers play in fostering innovation among the 
members of their policy-driven cluster. Hereinafter we fist discuss which types of processes 
lead to innovation, and then we will focus on the dilemmas of the creativity process, the 
                                                 
80
 The MAR model is based on the works of Marshall (1890 (1920)), Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) (thus 
MAR). 
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research process and development process. We will see that each process needs a slightly 
different type of management and can be harmed by certain behaviours. 
 
4.2.1 Introduction: processes leading to innovation 
The literature stipulates that “management cannot ensure innovation success”, however they 
“can influence its odds” (Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999, p. 11). This 
contemporary approach of innovation81 takes into account that a social environment has to be 
created and managed in order to foster the processes that lead to innovations (Caraça, 
Lundvall, & Mendonça, 2009).  
 
It is important to distinguish the processes that lead to an innovation and the innovation itself 
(i.e. the successful commercialisation). The processes that lead to innovations are “complex, 
uncertain, somewhat disorderly, and subject to changes of many sorts” like for example 
“market environment, production facilities and knowledge, and the social contexts” (Kline & 
Rosenberg, 1986, p. 375). What is important, is finding the right activities82 and 
environmental conditions that might positively influence the processes leading to innovation. 
 
Historically the process leading to innovation was seen as a linear process (Swann, 2009), 
going from research over invention to development and finally to hopefully an innovation. 
Today researches have shown that there are multiple processes leading to innovation and that 
these processes are not linear but more complex that go back and forward between various 
stages83. It is a permanent process between exploration of new ideas and exploitation of 
results (March, 1991) (see Figure 13). 
 
                                                 
81
 The traditional approach towards creativity and innovation was very person-centered, meaning that the 
“conventional wisdom” was that “creativity is something done by creative people” (Amabile, 1996, p. 1). 
According to Amabile (1996, p. 1) academic research helped to understand the “backgrounds, personality traits, 
and work styles of outstandingly creative people” but this traditional approach “ignored the role of the social 
environment in creativity and innovation”.  
82
 These innovation activities might be of “scientific, technological, organisational, financial and commercial” 
nature, all “intended to, lead to the implementation of innovations” (OECD & Eurostat, 2005, p. 47). 
83
 see (Caraça, et al., 2009; Swann, 2009) for a discussion of the new processes leading to innovation 
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Figure 13: Processes and intermediary results leading to innovation 
Source: slightly inspired by Swann (2009) 
 
Swann (2009, p. 26) distinguishes four different types of exploration processes that might 
lead to innovation in the end: a creativity process, a research84 process, a development process 
and a design85 process. All of these processes intermingle and create together different types 
of intermediary results: (1) inventions86 in the form of new “ideas, sketches or models for a 
new product or process, that may often be patented” (Swann, 2009, p. 25); (2) “new scientific 
knowledge, hypotheses and theories” that are “expressed in research papers and 
memoranda” (Swann, 2009, p. 26), (3) “blueprints, specifications and samples” (Swann, 
2009, p. 26), or (4) design87 that makes “a product stand out”88.  
 
These intermediary results are important in order to summarise the accumulated knowledge, 
to render the knowledge explicit and thus to better advance towards innovation. The different 
                                                 
84
 Research can be split into basic research and applied research, but I will not distinguish between these two 
types of research in this thesis. Basic research definition: “Basic research is experimental or theoretical work 
undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable 
facts, without any particular application or use in view” (OECD, 2002, p. 30). Applied research definition: 
“Applied research is also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however, 
directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective” (OECD, 2002, p. 30). 
85
 We will not discuss the design process in more detail, as it is the less important process for the time being in 
policy-driven clusters. See Annex 16 for a short introduction to design thinking.  
86
 Compared to innovations, inventions are not commercialised yet. 
87
 Design can be considered as a process but also as a results (Swann, 2009). 
88
 Design “adds the extra dimension to any product” (John Harvey Jones, cited by Swann, 2009, p. 26). Design 
is expressed in the form of “the quality of the way it matches the purpose, skills and personality of the user, of 
the visual communication which goes with it, of the environment in which it is sold, and of the image of its 
maker” (Bernsen cited by Swann, 2009, p. 26).  
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processes and intermediary results already show that the innovation process is highly complex 
and that a constant back and forward between different processes and intermediary results 
exists.  
 
Hereinafter, we will now discuss each of the four innovation processes and the factors that 
influence these processes89. In the end we underline the common and contradicting factors 
between the four processes.  
 
4.2.2 Which stage matters most? – Creativity vs. Research vs. Development  
Three processes simultaneously lead to innovation: creativity, research and development. 
However, all of them need another organisational environment to be efficiently fostered.  
 
4.2.2.1 Creativity process 
First of all, we concentrate on the creativity process. Until recently, companies still thought 
that they just had to invest “in extensive internal research laboratories, hire the most brilliant 
people […] and then wait patiently for novel products to emerge” (Chesbrough, 2007, p. 12). 
However, today, the increasing developing costs coupled with an increasingly short product 
life cycle (Chesbrough, 2007) force companies to improve their innovation processes in order 
to be faster than their competitors. However, a consequence of these acceleration tendencies 
is that “creativity gets killed” (Amabile, 1998, p. 77), particularly if no social environment 
favourable for creativity (and all other processes leading to innovation) is build (Amabile, 
1996).  
 
Amabile (1998, p. 77) argues that creativity gets killed “much more often than it gets 
supported”. This is due to work environments that are meant to “maximize business 
imperatives such as coordination, productivity, and control” but in doing so hinder the 
development of creativity, the most elementary corner stone of innovation (Amabile, 1998, p. 
77). Amabile (1998) and Amabile et al (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996) 
distinguish several factors that are particularly important in the creativity processes: 
                                                 
89
 We only focus on factors that can be influenced by management and we do not focus on context factors such 
as “external background data (such as socio-political continuity or the legal system) […] and internal 
background data (such as the legal form or the size of the organization)” (Ernst, 2002, p. 3) and we do not go 
into the psychological dimensions of expertise, creative-thinking skills, and motivation (Amabile, 1998). 
First part: Literature review - Chapter two 
 
 110
supervisory encouragement and no evaluation culture90; organisational encouragement91; 
different types of work group features such as diversity, trust, respect but at the same time no 
“shotgun weddings”92; control over one’s work93; resources (particularly time and money)94; 
challenging work95; and regularly participation in expertise & creative thinking conferences96. 
 
In the cluster policy literature, two topics regarding creativity start to emerge: the impact of 
financial incentives and the problem of innovation lock-in.  
 
Avoiding financial incentives 
Bocquet & Mothe (2010) analyse two French policy-driven clusters by comparing their 
“knowledge identification” phases, their “knowledge acquisition and utilization” phases, and 
finally the role of the policy-driven cluster governance in this process. The results show that 
                                                 
90
 Supervisory encouragement and no evaluation culture: A good supervisor has to set goals, be supportive or 
shows confidence (1996, p. 1166). Additionally in order to develop a passion for the subject “people need to feel 
as if their work matters to the organization” (1998, p. 83). In highly creative organisation these are not extrinsic 
but intrinsic rewards. However, very often different “layers of evaluation” hinder the creative process (1998, p. 
83). This “evaluation culture” does not spore creativity as people then focus on “the external rewards and 
punishments associated with their output” (1998, p. 83). Such an evaluation culture “creates a climate of fear, 
which again undermines intrinsic motivation” (1998, p. 83). In case an idea is not accepted by the hierarchy, it is 
important to encourage the person to continue his/her efforts despite the drawback: “If people do not perceive 
any "failure value" for projects that ultimately do not achieve commercial success, they'll become less and less 
likely to experiment, explore, and connect with their work on a personal level” (1998, p. 83). 
91
 Organisational encouragement: Creativity is even more fostered if not only the supervisors encourage it but 
the entire organization: allocating rewards (not in monetary form), mandating “collaboration and information” 
sharing, exposing employees “to various approaches of problem solving” (1998, p. 84). However, all kinds of 
political agendas (being “cliquish” or “at war with one another”) threaten creativity and the fluid circulation of 
knowledge. 
92
 Work group features (diversity and trust but no “shotgun weddings”): Another important element is the 
composition of the work group. A work group that best spores creativity is “a diversely skilled work group in 
which people communicate well, are open to new ideas, constructively challenge each other's work, trust and 
help each other, and feel committed to the work they are doing” (1996, p. 1166). However diversity is not 
everything as three other features are important in order for the work group to succeed (1998, p. 82): (1) “share 
excitement over the team’s goal”; (2) “willingness to help […] teammates through difficult periods and 
setbacks”; (3) “recognize the unique knowledge and perspective that other members bring to the table”. 
However, “shotgun weddings” (meaning “the most eligible employee is wed to the most eligible - that is, the 
most urgent and open - assignment”) are “one of the most common ways managers kill creativity” (1998, p. 81). 
93
 Control over one’s work: Another important creativity enhancer is to have “sense of control over one's work” 
(1996, p. 1166). However, only freedom regarding the means (or process) is important for creativity not the 
ends: “People will be more creative, […], if you give them freedom to decide how to climb a particular 
mountain. You needn't let them choose which mountain to climb” (1998, p. 81).  
94
 Resources: The main resources that affect creativity are primarily time and money. On a second level only, 
physical space (1998, p. 82). If there is for example a time crunch to beat a competitor, time pressure can 
stimulate creativity. However, fake deadlines or impossibly tight deadlines, kill creativity as creativity and 
exploring new concepts simply takes time. Adding more resources above a certain level does not boost 
creativity, but below this level it might have a negative impact. 
95
 Challenging work: Managers have to match the right people with the right assignments. To enhance creativity 
it is important to work on “challenging tasks and important projects” (1996, p. 1166). 
96
 Expertise & creative thinking conferences: Finally, “regular scientific seminars and professional conferences 
will undoubtedly add to the scientist's expertise in hemophilia and related fields. And training in brainstorming, 
problem solving, and so-called lateral thinking” (1998, p. 80) are important as well.  
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the most successful policy-driven cluster shows three different characteristics (2010, p. 236). 
First, the policy-driven cluster employed a more egalitarian approach during the knowledge 
identification phase, not only focusing on “technical knowledge that is crucial for the leading 
firms” but focusing on “focus on ‘general’ knowledge to support the growth of (all) cluster 
firms” (Bocquet & Mothe, 2010, p. 236). Second, during the knowledge acquisition and 
utilization phase the policy-driven cluster counted on “strong (non-financial) incentives to 
make firms interact in a transversal logic” which allowed the “emergence of a shared 
cognitive orientation” (Bocquet & Mothe, 2010, p. 236). Finally, the most successful policy-
driven cluster acted more like a “knowledge activist” (Von Krogh, Nonaka, & Ichijo, 1997) 
than a simple “knowledge broker” (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 1998). The more successful 
policy-driven cluster thus took an active role in the knowledge (or creativity) creation process 
by avoiding financial incentives.  
 
Avoiding lock-in 
Innovations can be distinguished according to their degree of novelty. The majority of the 
literature, in an Schumpeterian manner, distinguishes between two broad categories, radical 
and incremental innovation97. A big dilemma of policy-driven cluster managers is to orient 
policy-driven cluster members towards promising new fields and to create ideas for new 
radical innovations98. However, this orienting towards promising new ideas goes along with a 
potential innovation lock-in that in the end prevents radical innovations to develop.  
 
For example, Visser (2009, p. 190) alerts that clusters also go along with “diminishing 
marginal returns of horizontal learning based on pure spillovers may yield cognitive and 
technological lock-in” and that this problem has to be taken into consideration when 
implementing cluster polices. Also Hermans et al. (2012), studying the Belgium cluster 
policy, underline that there is a risk of an idea lock-in within a region. This lock-in “would 
arise from the choices made at both the cluster and the project levels […] once investments 
are made according to those choices, a lock-in may prevent local firms from experiencing 
alternatives and opening new paths” (Hermans, et al., 2012, p. 624). Cluster policies seem to 
                                                 
97
 While “incremental innovation introduces relatively minor changes to the existing product, exploits the 
potential of established design” and “draws from no dramatically new science”, “radical innovation, in 
contrast, is based on a different set of engineering and scientific principles and often opens up whole new 
markets and potential applications” (Henderson & Clark, 1990, p. 9). 
98
 Even though different stimuli are needed to foster incremental and radical innovations (Koberg, Detienne, & 
Heppard, 2003; Verganti, 2011), we will not go into this detail of discussion. For example Christensen (1997) 
and Verganti (2011) argue that a close relationship with consumers might be profitable for incremental 
innovation but not for radical innovation which needs to be based on science. 
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have the tendency to orient the local actors towards a certain direction privileged by the 
government. Schmitt (2011) for example underlines the important role of the French cluster 
policy in promoting green growth thanks to targeted investments into this sector. Even though 
this is highly appreciated, it nevertheless shows that the cluster policies are not only used to 
promote innovation but also to direct innovation in certain directions. 
 
Agogué (2012) did empirical tests in French clusters to show that the actors of a cluster 
follow a certain path and have a cognitive fixation on certain topics. The local cluster actors 
are kind of trapped into a certain world-view that is difficult to leave without a proper 
management tool to help them thinking out of the box. Even though not directly focusing on 
the lock-in problem but on social capital, Eklinder-Frick et al (2012, p. 800) come to a similar 
conclusion namely that too much “bonding can also over-embed companies in their social 
context” which then has a negative impact on their innovation capacity. For Eklinder-Frick et 
al (2012, p. 800) “this highlights the importance of the managerial role in leading and 
defining the tasks of a regional strategic network and the complexity of encouraging other 
actors to participate.” 
 
However, even though a lot of cluster policies would like to strive towards radical 
innovations. It is important to underline that the knowledge bases are not the same in each 
kind of industry. Some cluster specialists underline that the knowledge bases vary between 
the different industries and regional innovation systems (Asheim & Gertler, 2005). Some 
industries use more a synthetic approach meaning that they are more based on incremental 
innovation (for example application or novel combination of existing knowledge, applied 
research, importance of tacit knowledge, innovation is less disruptive) (Asheim & Gertler, 
2005). Other industries use more an analytical approach meaning that they are more based on 
radical innovation (for example the use of scientific knowledge is highly important, the 
knowledge creation processes is more based on formal models, codified science, rational 
process, knowledge input and outputs more codified) (Asheim & Gertler, 2005). For 
governments implementing policy-driven clusters, it is important to acknowledge that 
different types of industries will be more or less prone for radical innovation. 
 
4.2.2.2 Research process 
In a second step, we focus on the positive factors influencing research. Broadly we found two 
different approaches. 
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The first approach is mainly based in the management and medical literature and focuses on 
how to manage scientists effectively in order to improve their research performance (Bland & 
Ruffin, 1992; Chawla & Singh, 1998; La Porte, 1965; Ryan & Hurley, 2007). Scientist are for 
example positively influenced by (Bland & Ruffin, 1992; Chawla & Singh, 1998; La Porte, 
1965; Ryan & Hurley, 2007): the perception of conceptually exciting research programmes, 
autonomy in project selection, decentralized organization, distinctive culture, leadership with 
research expertise, using participatory management practices, appropriate rewards, clear 
goals, access to facilities and resources (particularly human resources), diversity of the 
research group, frequent and effective communication (within and outside the research 
group), positive group climate / work environment. 
 
The second research stream is mainly based in the public policy literature and focuses on the 
positive effects of triple helix collaborations99 (i.e. between universities, the industry and the 
government) on research performance (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997, 2000; Leydesdorff, 
2000). Tödtling et al. (2009) for example underlines that the policy-driven cluster support 
structures have to be adapted to the varying cluster realities. Tödtling et al. (2009) 
investigated if different types of innovation rely on specific kinds of knowledge interaction. 
Their results show that for firms trying to develop more “advanced innovations” cooperating 
“with universities and research organizations” is crucial while “firms having introduced less 
advanced innovations rely more on knowledge links with business services” (Tödtling, et al., 
2009, p. 59). The support structure of a policy-driven cluster thus should be adapted to the 
local reality. 
 
4.2.2.3 Development process 
Third, we focus on the process leading to development, more precisely to product 
development, as this is the predominant type of innovation in policy-driven clusters 
(compared to process, marketing or organisational innovation). Ernst (2002), who himself 
considerably draws from the research results of (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995), gives a large 
summary of the different factors that need to be implemented to foster new product 
                                                 
99
 Triple helix: The triple helix literature (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997, 2000; Leydesdorff, 2000), underlines 
the positive effects on research when universities, the industry and governments cooperate by creating for 
example contracts or other types of industrial liaisons for knowledge and technology transfer. In a certain 
manner, this can be considered as the main cornerstone of cluster policies and that the whole cluster literature 
heavily draws from this idea to foster innovation. However, we have to keep in mind that it is only one part of 
the different processes leading to innovation. 
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development (NPD) in organisations. The most important success factors for NPD are 
(Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995; Ernst, 2002): thorough planning phase100; continuous 
commercial assessment101; oriented towards market needs102; integration of customers into 
early and later phases of the NPD; creation of a dedicated project organization103; cross 
functional teams104; strong and responsible project leader with sufficient know-how and 
devotion to project; autonomy and responsibility of the entire project105; intensive 
communication among team members; material support that goes beyond the R&D budget 
(expenditures for market research and market launch are important for success as well); top 
management that has enough autonomy to stop a NPD project before the official end, in case 
a commercial failure is looming; independent work to develop own ideas; support for 
unofficial projects (that may have been stopped); the availability of internal “venture capital” 
for creative ideas; offering orientation and strategic framework to the sum of single NPD 
projects; also long-term projects that go beyond short- and medium-term NPD projects; 
regular reviews by senior management whether the aims of the entire NPD programme are 
being reached. 
 
One important element in the development is to be fast enough to the market to reap the 
financial benefits. One major dilemma for policy-driven clusters that try to foster exchange 
between their members is to protect their ideas. Guisard et al. (2010, pp. 674-675) underlined 
that one of the main problems of these organised cluster-policy meetings is the “secrecy 
limit”, meaning what to reveal and what not to reveal among potential competitors in the 
region. According to Guisard et al. (2010, pp. 674-675), “participants will often feel 
uncomfortable about whether to speak or not to speak, without ever really being clear about 
the boundary.” The question that emerges is what policy-driven cluster managers do in order 
                                                 
100
 Planning: A thorough planning phase is necessary to select the best project for development. This comprises: 
evaluation of ideas; technical/market-directed feasibility studies; commercial evaluation of project; exact 
definitions of project concept, target market, and the relative increase in benefits of the new product for the 
customer compared to competitor’s product. 
101
 Continuous commercial assessment: The commercial assessment should not only take place in the planning 
phase but “during all phases of the NPD process”. This means unprofitable NPD projects can be terminated if 
necessary. 
102
 Market needs: the NPD process has to be oriented towards the needs of the market through market research, 
the understanding and evaluation of customer needs, accurate prognosis of the market potential, and the 
execution of test markets 
103
 Creation of a dedicated project organization: must ensure that project will not be effected by daily 
routines/departmental influences; assignment of people to the team; enough time to work on project; project 
leader has access to team leaders from other departments 
104
 Cross-functional team: contributes to the resolution of possible interface problems; particularly members 
from R&D, Marketing and Production should be associated. 
105
 Autonomy and responsibility of the entire project: Can be fostered by implementation of project-specific 
material or non-material performance incentives 
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to foster the free knowledge circulation but at the same time overcome this secrecy problem 
felt by the policy-driven cluster members. 
 
4.2.3 Summary 
The innovation management literature is very rich and detailed regarding the factors that 
positively or negatively influence the different processes leading to innovation. However, for 
the time being academics, focusing on policy-driven clusters, are rarely addressing innovation 
management in general and these differences in particular. Chiu (2009, p. 46) underlines that 
“the mechanisms that help translate cluster membership into higher innovativeness are not 
well understood.” Table 16 summarizes the different processes and which influence factors 
are important for which phase. As we can see, some elements are important for several 
processes leading to innovation (e.g. diversity of team members) while others seem to have 
contradictory impacts (e.g. an evaluation culture discourages creativity but is important in the 
development process; monetary rewards are also important in the development process but 
limiting the creativity process). 
 
Table 16: Factors that influence the processes leading to innovation 
Influence factors Creativity Process 
Research 
Process 
Development 
Process 
Diversity of team members X X X 
Constant information sharing & knowledge exchange X X X 
Importance of work and failures permitted X X  
Rewards    
rewards, but not in monetary form X   
rewards (which types of rewards not defined)  X  
rewards in monetary form   X 
Projects integrated in the general organisational strategy   X 
Decentralized organization, project organization  X X 
Culture is important X X  
Resources to accomplish project (time, money, physical) X X X 
Project team identity, trust and mutual understanding X X  
Integration of consumers in the process   X 
Freedom & Autonomy X X X 
Supervision encouragement    
Supervision very important X X  
Responsible project leader but enough distance in case of 
looming commercial failure   X 
Evaluations    
Discouragement if evaluation culture X   
Regular reviews regarding goal accomplishment   X 
Exact project planning (prior to development)   X 
Development of expertise and/or innovation process 
capabilities important X   
Source: own compilation, based on the different authors cited in this section 
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4.3 Dilemmas on managing collaboration processes 
The underlying theory justifying cluster polices is that “all cluster participants need 
assistance in […] strengthening their levels of cooperation, increasing mutual trust and 
developing effective private/public dialogue” (Karaev, et al., 2007, p. 830), in fine these 
actions should lead to an increased innovation capacity of the policy-driven cluster. In 
organisations, managers can influence face-to-face communication by using two types of 
tools: organizational structure and space (Allen & Henn, 2007). In regions, regional 
authorities or policy-driven cluster managers can organise for example networking and 
knowledge exchange events (Guisard, et al., 2010; Lefebvre, 2013). However, very often the 
ultimate tool that governments use to try creating a functioning policy-driven cluster with 
plenty of face-to-face contact is the subsidising of collaborative R&D projects between the 
local cluster actors (see for example the French case (Gallié, et al., 2013b), the Japanese case 
(Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011a), or the Australian case (Liyanage, 1995)). 
 
Several different definitions exist for collaboration106, but one of the most widely accepted 
one is that collaboration is “any situation in which people are working across organizational 
boundaries towards some positive end” (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 4). Collaboration is 
only one stage out of a continuum of “working together” strategies. Himmelman (2001, p. 
277) defines four types of strategies: “networking, coordinating, cooperating, and 
collaborating.” Reilly (2001, p. 55) underlines that these different strategies are “a 
continuum” and that “moving from cooperation to coordination to collaboration moves 
generally from low to high formality.”  
 
Cluster definitions generally have three points in common: spatial proximity, knowledge and 
network (Cruz & Teixeira, 2009). The network element plays a particular role as the 
interaction and communication between firms is the key element that distinguishes a simple 
agglomeration of firms from a cluster (Antonelli, 2000). The cluster literature heavily focuses 
on the manner these collaboration processes are initiated. This starts with analyzing the 
                                                 
106
 Collaboration definitions, for example: “(1) the pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources, e.g., 
information, money, labor, etc., (2) by two or more stakeholders, (3) to solve a set of problems which neither can 
solve individually” (Gray, 1985, p. 912) or “collaboration takes place when people from different units work 
together in cross-unit teams on a common task or provide significant help to each other. […] In all cases, 
collaboration needs to involve people: if all that is going on is shipping data back and forth between units, that’s 
not collaboration” (Hansen, 2009, p. 14). 
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institutional context among regional innovation system specialists (Asheim, 1996; Cooke, 
1996) and continues with more strategy orientated management scholars who define the roles 
of broker organizations107 (Chaskin, 2001), knowledge brokers108 (Arikan, 2009) or trust 
facilitators109 (Mesquita, 2007) in clusters. 
 
4.3.1 How to foster collaboration? – People-driven vs. Space-driven 
Second, we focus on the different tools that support collaborations. In the literature there are 
indeed multiple and various alternatives and propositions to characterize this role of bridging 
communities in order to foster innovation through enhanced collaborations. “Tools” that 
contribute to fostering innovative collaborations are either incarnated in people or in physical 
meeting spaces where communities meet and exchange110. To schematize we can say that 
there are two modes of enhancing collaborations in policy-driven clusters either collaborating 
through (people) or collaborating in (places). Hereinafter we discuss these two tools. 
However, as we will see, additional to the cluster policy literature, we also mobilized some of 
the management literature as for the time being the policy-driven cluster literature on these 
different processes is simply too scarce. 
 
                                                 
107
 Broker organizations are “local intermediaries responsible for fostering and convening partnerships and 
networks of relations among existing organizations.” (Chaskin, 2001, p. 143) 
108
 Definition of knowledge brokers: “Knowledge brokers are parties such as technology brokers, licensing 
consultants, information search companies, public industrial development agencies, and trade associations. 
These entities help firms find knowledge partners.” (Arikan, 2009, p. 669). However, the notion “knowledge 
broker” has several definitions in the literature. The institutions in a RIS resemble more to Arikan’s (2009) 
definition, as it stays much broader, than to the definitions of Hargadon (1998) or Brown & Duguid (1998). 
Hargadon (1998, p. 210) defines knowledge brokers as firms which “span multiple markets and technology 
domains and innovate by brokering knowledge from where it is known to where it is not”. Brown and Duguid 
(1998, p. 103) define knowledge brokers as: “…involves participation rather than mediation. [Knowledge 
brokers] are a feature of overlapping communities, whereas translators work among mutually exclusive ones.” 
109
 Definition of trust facilitators: “Trust facilitators are individuals, governmental agencies, or independent 
organizations that leverage their reputation and abilities in gridlocked interfirm relationships and […] help 
create momentary opportunities for trust to resurface and shift firms out of their noncollaborative inertia.” 
(Mesquita, 2007, p. 73) 
110
 Additionally to people and places, boundary objects can also get conversations going (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 
1998; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Even though boundary objects are often discussed in the management literature, 
we have not identified any article on policy-driven clusters that treat this topic. That is the reason why we do not 
integrate boundary objects in the main text. According to Brown & Duguid (1998, p. 104) “boundary objects 
are objects of interest to each community involved but viewed or used differently by each of them”. Boundary 
objects can for example be “physical objects, technologies, or techniques shared by the communities” (J. S. 
Brown & Duguid, 1998, p. 104). Through these boundary objects the different communities get “intentionally or 
unintentionally” into contact with each other (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 1998, p. 104). For some others the 
boundary object is also something that is constantly transformed by the involved actors (Holford, Ebrahimi, 
Aktouf, & Simon, 2008) as “actors continually co-construct[…] and re-construct[…] it in both the physical and 
imaginary sense.” (Holford, et al., 2008, p. 10). 
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4.3.1.1 People 
Lester & Piore (2006) for example use the metaphor of the manager as a hostess111 who gets 
the conversation going between people. Another important metaphor is the “translator” (J. S. 
Brown & Duguid, 1998; Star & Griesemer, 1989) who is able to “frame the interests of one 
community in terms of another community's perspective” (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 1998, p. 
103). The challenge of the translator is to “be sufficiently knowledgeable about the work of 
both communities to be able to translate” (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 1998, p. 103). Finally, 
McEvily & Zaheer (2004, p. 189) talk about network facilitators who “create trust by taking 
deliberate actions that include identifying shared interests, developing common expectations, 
leveraging a critical mass of influence, and compressing networks in physical space and 
time” (McEvily & Zaheer, 2004, p. 189). The common denominator of all these metaphors is 
that one person has to combine the right people, be very knowledgeable about the different 
actors and start the conversation.  
 
In policy-driven clusters these persons are the policy-driven cluster managers, they are the 
public characters already described by Jacobs (1961) fifty years ago. These policy-driven 
cluster managers create “spaces” to foster exchange between parties (e.g. researchers, 
practitioners, industrials) which otherwise don’t have an institutional connection. We could 
also say that they try to eliminate the structural holes of the system (Burt, 1992) by creating 
connections to weak ties, more suitable to acquire new knowledge (Granovetter, 1973). 
 
For example policy-driven cluster managers have to take into account the structural elements 
or their members. Bellandi & Caloffi (2010a, pp. 71-72) resume them in four points: (1) the 
policy-driven cluster actors have “different nature, knowledge and competencies”, it is thus 
the role of the policy-driven cluster manager to balance these differences; (2) additionally 
there are also “weak ties and strong ties” which have to be balanced; (3) not all policy-driven 
cluster members are stable members, some are also just “temporary members” of the 
network, a balance has thus to be found and (4) finally, actions have to be organised in order 
to “bridge[…] organizations within and across parts of relational space112”. Even though the 
                                                 
111
 “The lessons of the cocktail party can be summarized in a series of distinct but closely related roles for the 
manager: Step One: choose the guests; Step Two: initiate the conversation; Step Three: keep the conversation 
going; Step Four: refresh the conversation with new ideas” (Lester & Piore, 2006, pp. 57-58); “The highest 
compliment that can be paid to the hostess is that she has introduced people who will continue to see and 
interact with each other long after they have left the party.” (Lester & Piore, 2006, p. 57) 
112
 A relational distance between two actors can emerge due to differences in “language, systems of incentives 
and objectives, timescales of reference, etc” (2010a, pp. 71-72) 
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article of Bellandi & Caloffi (2010a, pp. 71-72) is highly interesting as it shows that “specific 
territorial and sectoral contexts” seem to play a role in the establishment of a local 
innovation network, it is based on a quantitative network analysis and thus somehow lacks a 
real in depth discussion of the main challenges of creating these links. 
 
4.3.1.2 Physical meeting spaces 
The last important element are physical spaces that reduce distance between the involved 
actors (Allen, 1977; Allen & Henn, 2007; Morris, 2002). On the one hand it is important to 
think about how to reduce distance (Allen & Henn, 2007, p. 63). For example, “the placement 
of a coffee pot, a conference room, or shared instrumentation” can overcome communication 
problems and overcome distances in organisations (Allen & Henn, 2007, p. 63). 
 
On the other hand, more general, it is important to think about the place where knowledge 
exchange actually should happen on a regular bases. According to Morris (2002, p. 1) “one of 
the most important factors that influences the productivity of knowledge is the place in which 
work occurs”. These facilities can either be for example “an office building, a home office, or 
a research laboratory” (Morris, 2002, p. 1). Also Nonaka (Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka & Konno, 
1998) insisted on the importance of ba, which can, among others, be a physical space. The ba 
is important for every organisation, as it is a “shared space for emerging relationship” and a 
“foundation for knowledge creation” (Nonaka & Konno, 1998, p. 40). Within the created ba, 
the collective and individual knowledge of the company can be advanced (Nonaka & Konno, 
1998, p. 40). 
 
In policy-driven clusters, policy-driven cluster managers can organise these spaces on a 
regular or temporary bases. According to Maskell, et al (2006, p. 997) temporary clusters are 
“short-lived hotspots of intense knowledge exchange, network building and idea generation”. 
These temporary clusters are for example “trade fairs, exhibitions, conventions, congresses, 
and conferences” where “business people and professionals come together regularly”. Also 
the workshops and think tanks organised by the French policy-driven cluster organisations 
and analysed by Guisard (2010) and Lefebvre (2013), can be considered as temporary 
clusters. Guisard et al. (2010) identified that one of the benefits of the studied French policy-
driven clusters is to organise discussion and creativity meetings for knowledge exchange. The 
three main objectives of these meetings were “knowledge dissemination, establishing 
‘communities’ and the development of creativity” (Guisard, et al., 2010). Also Lefebvre 
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(2013) studied the innovation management efforts of French policy-driven clusters. He 
concluded that there are three major types of knowledge management tools used by French 
clusters: “cluster-wide networking, permanent workgroups on the various strategic themes of 
the cluster, and ad hoc working groups based on emerging subthemes” (Lefebvre, 2013, p. 
239). All of these different initiatives form a system of trying to help local actors getting more 
innovative. 
 
Additionally to the temporary clusters, which are organised occasionally, there are also 
permanent physical places that can support the development of collaborations in policy-driven 
clusters. For example in Paris there exists a place called “la cantine” (the canteen). This “la 
cantine” was founded in 2008, and it is a space that allows SMEs in the ICT to exchange, to 
host different kinds of events, but also provides space for “coworking” (for some hours 
people go there to exchange and work) (Le Barzic & Distinguin, 2010). “La Cantine” is 
closely associated to Cap Digital, a policy-driven cluster organisation located in the Paris 
Region and specialised in the ICT sector. 
 
4.3.2 Who collaborates? Even vs. uneven partners 
As we have seen in the innovation management section, having a diversity of team members 
is positive for the innovation potential of the team members. However, collaborating with 
different companies and people can also have a negative impact on one’s capacity.  
 
Collaboration is seen as having the highest formality of “working together”, but it is also an 
angle and a devil at the same time. On the one hand, “collaboration […] when fully achieved, 
can produce the greatest benefits of mutual action” (Himmelman, 2001, p. 278), but on the 
other hand “bad collaboration is worse than no collaboration” (Hansen, 2009, p. 1). Policy-
driven clusters try to foster collaborations between the local companies, but the question is if 
this is always that desirable.  
 
Giuliani (2013) conducted a longitudinal study of a wine cluster in Chile. Giuliani (2013) 
focused on the network formation process and knowledge exchange opportunities between the 
local actors. Giuliani (2013) underlined that connecting the wrong companies, particularly 
high performing with low performing companies, might have a negative impact for the 
region. For Giuliani (2013, p. 1417), this is particularly the case if “measures designed to 
foster the networking of firms […] try to connect technological leaders with laggard firms”. 
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The problem is that “[technological leaders] will not be keen to invest time in interacting 
with and passing knowledge to weak firms; and [laggard firms] are unlikely to be able to 
absorb and learn from the strongest firms” (Giuliani, 2013, p. 1417). Instead of doing 
something good to the region, connecting the wrong companies might also bear a 
considerable risk. Huggins & Johnston (2009, p. 252) draw a similar conclusion, saying that 
there is a risk that SMEs turn to policy-driven clusters if they actually need help or face 
challenges they can not tackle alone: “The relationship between networking and firm 
performance is complex, with SMEs appearing to engage more in networking activities with 
knowledge support organisations when they are facing certain competitive pressures” 
(Huggins & Johnston, 2009, p. 252). Connecting them with large groups might thus have a 
negative consequence as well.  
 
Additionally, large groups might be simply difficult to handle as well, particularly for small 
companies. Younès (2012, p. 835) conducted a qualitative longitudinal study of linkage 
formation in a French cluster located in the Paris Region. She focused on the formation 
process and the obstacles of intersectoral collaborations. Her study shows that obstacles for 
intersectoral formations between cluster actors are due to both “local arrangements” but also 
“employees’ work within firms”. This second point is particularly interesting for cluster 
policy researchers. Younès (2012, p. 835) particularly stresses that the problem of 
collaboration often stems from divergent strategic goals inside the company and not 
necessarily from finding partners: “in some cases policy does succeed in making firms from 
different sectors cooperate, but these partnerships are difficult to maintain — a problem that 
results from negotiations inside large firms with conflicting economic goals and a lack of 
experience in measuring knowledge benefits.” 
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4.4 Conclusion  
In this section we discussed all the “managerial dilemmas” that we identified in the cluster 
policy literature. Table 17 summarizes the three main managerial dilemmas (managing actor 
involvement, managing innovation processes, managing collaboration processes) and their 
associated dilemmas discussed in this section.  
 
Table 17: Managerial dilemmas 
Main 
dilemmas 
Associated dilemmas Examples of authors 
Managing 
actor 
involvement 
(MD#1) 
MD#1a – Leadership: who is in charge? 
(difficulties to decide on which level the 
leadership should be bundled) 
(Burfitt, et al., 2007; Lundequist & Power, 
2002; MacNeill & Steiner, 2010; S. Menu, 
2012) 
 MD#1b – Learning: learning capacity vs. 
administrative straightjacket (difficulties to 
constantly adapt the policy to learning 
capacity of actors) 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Carré, et al., 
2008; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; Gadille, 
et al., 2013; Gallié, et al., 2012; Lundequist 
& Power, 2002; Sotarauta, 2012; T. Weil & 
Fen Chong, 2009) 
Managing 
innovation 
processes 
(MD#2) 
MD#2a – Which stage matters most? 
Creativity vs. Research vs. Development 
to foster creativity: Failures permitted, no 
monetary rewards, no evaluation culture, 
culture and trust is important, etc. 
to foster research: cooperating between 
universities, companies and governments, 
exciting research programmes, autonomy 
in project selection, distinctive culture, etc. 
to foster development: regular reviews 
necessary, exact project planning, rewards 
in monetary form, in case of looming 
commercial failure possibility to abandon 
project, etc. 
Creativity: (Agogué, 2012; Bocquet & 
Mothe, 2010; Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2012; 
Hermans, et al., 2012; Lefebvre, 2013; 
Schmitt, 2011; Visser, 2009)  
(management literature: (Amabile, 1996, 
1998; Amabile, et al., 1996)) 
 
Research: (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997, 
2000; Leydesdorff, 2000; Tödtling, et al., 
2009) 
(management & medical literature: (Bland 
& Ruffin, 1992; Chawla & Singh, 1998; La 
Porte, 1965; Ryan & Hurley, 2007)) 
 
Development: (Guisard, et al., 2010) 
(management literature: (Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1995; Ernst, 2002)) 
Managing 
collaboration 
processes 
(MD#3) 
MD#3a – How to foster collaboration? – 
People-driven vs. Space-driven (which 
tools are the best for which objective?) 
(Bellandi & Caloffi, 2010a; Guisard, et al., 
2010; Le Barzic & Distinguin, 2010; 
Lefebvre, 2013; Maskell, et al., 2006) 
 MD#3b – Who collaborates? Even vs. 
uneven partners (even though diversity is 
important for innovation, linking strong 
and weak partners / SMEs and large 
companies might bear risks) 
(Giuliani, 2013; Huggins & Johnston, 2009; 
Younès, 2011) 
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5 Drivers of pathologies: structural dilemmas 
In the two previous sections we identified and discussed the different political and managerial 
dilemmas found in the literature. In this section we now focus on the structural dilemmas of 
policy-driven clusters. Structural dilemmas are the “soil” on which every policy-driven cluster 
is build. This “soil” has to be taken into consideration as well, because if ignored dilemmas 
can emerge. We are able to distinguish three different types of structural dilemmas (see 
Figure 14): adapting the policy-driven cluster to the life-cycle stages, adapting the policy-
driven cluster to the local culture and adapting the policy-driven cluster to the geographic 
location. 
 
Figure 14: Structural characteristics of policy-driven clusters 
 
 
5.1 Dilemmas on adapting to life-cycle stages 
An important point to take into consideration when implementing policy-driven clusters is the 
evolutionary nature of policy-driven clusters and its members. The cluster policy literature 
particularly focuses on the life cycle stage of policy-driven clusters and the associated risks 
when the policy-driven cluster actions are not adapted to the stage of development of the 
policy-driven cluster. 
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Van Klink & De Langen (2001) insist that clusters should not be considered as static but as 
“dynamic” and from an “evolutionary perspective”. Each policy-driven cluster is influenced 
by its antecedence and goes through different stages of development. In the embryonic stage 
basic networking elements are for example not even existent (Aziz & Norhashim, 2008). In 
the development stage (Van Klink & De Langen, 2001), the cluster experiences an above 
average growth compared to the average industry growth however the relations within the 
cluster are still unstable. In the expansion stage these relationships are stabilized and 
internally oriented (Van Klink & De Langen, 2001). In the maturation phase, the growth starts 
to slow down and falls below average compared to the average industry growth (Van Klink & 
De Langen, 2001). When this happens, the cluster needs to enter into a transformation phase 
in order to survive, otherwise the cluster might decline (Aziz & Norhashim, 2008). In this 
transition stage, the relationships in the cluster are again unstable (Van Klink & De Langen, 
2001). 
 
A particular case is this last phase where a cluster either manages to enter into a real transition 
or declines. Sadler (2004) for example studied an old industrial region in the UK. Sadler 
(2004) underlines that cluster policies have to be aware and take into account the evolution of 
the cluster because at some point it might be important to “abandon” the current industrial 
orientation of a cluster and reorient the cluster in another direction: “The ongoing process of 
change might involve the deconstruction of one kind of cluster [...] and the potentially 
intensified significance of another cluster” (Sadler, 2004, p. 65). However, Sadler (2004) also 
underlines that it is not at all sure if the remaining connected actors of the region will be able 
to enter into a transformation phase and if the whole cluster discourse “simply detracts from 
the need to take a more holistic approach to regional development” (Sadler, 2004, p. 65).  
 
An important dynamic element to consider when using cluster policies on its territory is thus 
the life cycle stage of the cluster that the policy wishes to develop. Before implementing a 
cluster policy, governments need to analyze the stage of development of the cluster they 
would like to foster in order to determine which type of policy they should actually 
implement. The cluster policy also needs to know what to do with a declining cluster and 
when maybe it is necessary to abandon investments. 
 
The different stages call thus for a pro-active policy making adapted to every stage of the 
policy-driven cluster, ranging from raising awareness and linkages between actors in the 
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beginning towards internationalisation and looking for new ways of development during the 
maturation phase. Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005) argue that not only the ways of 
helping the local actors should change with the development of the policy-driven cluster but 
also the involvement of the public authorities. A governments’ top-down approach might be 
useful in the beginning, but a private bottom-up approach better in a more advanced stage of a 
cluster’s development113. 
 
5.2 Dilemmas on adapting to local culture 
Some authors argue that an important element when implementing cluster policies is to take 
into account the local culture. Among the European authors on cluster policies, Gert-Jan 
Hospers, a Dutch economic geography professor, is maybe one of the most critical voices 
regarding the European Union best practice cluster endeavours. Already in 2002, Hospers & 
Beugelsdijk (2002, p. 396), wrote a critical theoretical paper regarding cluster policies and 
that the best practice stance of the European Union might lead to replications that are not 
useful for the specific countries and regions. The different world-wide cluster examples 
should more be seen as “inspirations” rather than “recipes for successful regional economic 
development” that can be “transferred mechanically” (G.-J. Hospers & S. Beugelsdijk, 2002, 
p. 396). Governments should privilege “unique cluster-based strategies based on an 
assessment of region-specific structural and cultural characteristics” (G.-J. Hospers & S. 
Beugelsdijk, 2002, p. 396). Additionally, Hospers & Beugelsdijk (2002, p. 396) argue that “if 
the preconditions for clustering in a region are absent, governments should not try to create a 
cluster from scratch.”  
 
Also three years later, Hospers (2005) continues to firmly criticise the cluster policy best 
practice approach of the European Commission. For Hospers (2005, p. 457) running behind a 
Silicon Valley best-practice example is not very useful and the Commission should better 
favour diversity among European regions, because only by encouraging diversity the “local 
authorities will be stimulated to attune their clusters to area-specific assets as much as 
possible.”: 
“Borrowing successful policies from elsewhere is seen as a means to speed up European 
regional development and achieve it at lower cost. This EU-driven trend of benchmarking 
leads to the set-up of regional policies with similar objectives, instruments and policy 
                                                 
113
 Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005, pp. 1265-1266) argue that a “large strategic, comprehensive public 
efforts are probably the better way for improving cluster basics in raising awareness and numbers of includable 
organizations. After foundations are laid potential ought to get further effectuated by a private promotion 
initiative.” 
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concepts. Everywhere in Europe policy-makers claim to aim for ‘regional competitiveness’ by 
creating ‘framework conditions’ for the formation of ‘high-tech clusters’.”(p.452) [However] 
“at best, they can provide some inspiration, but they entirely fail to be recipes for successful 
regional development.”(p. 456) 
 
And again in 2009, not tired from their claims, and this time integrating more concrete case 
study examples, Hospers et al. (2009, p. 286) continue to repeat that “policy makers should 
move away from strategy aimed at trendy ‘Silicon Somewheres’ towards a no-nonsense 
approach of ‘Regional Realism’”.  
 
Hospers et al. (2009) arguments and case studies are supported by several other empirical 
studies. Fore example, Santisteban (2006) conducted an in-depth analysis of the Basque 
Country’s and Catalonia’s cluster policy initiatives. Even though both regions were motivated 
in the 1990s to start implementing cluster policies, the concrete realisation, support 
mechanisms and evolution of the policies were quite different. For Santisteban (2006, p. 36), 
these examples underline very well that “specific industrial policies” have to be “directed at 
the particular needs of each regional industrial-business system” and that it is not possible to 
ignore the regional pre-conditions and local cultures. 
 
Another interesting study concerning cluster policies and local culture was conducted by 
James (2005). James (2005) conducted an in-depth case study of the high tech cluster in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The Salt Lake City case is definitely an extreme case to study cluster 
policies because there is a strong local Mormon culture. One main result of James’s study is 
that “physical proximity is less important than cultural or 'relational' proximity” (James, 
2005, p. 1212). Shared cultural conventions, norms, attitudes, values beliefs are much more 
important for doing business than geographical proximity. The Salt Lake City case shows that 
non-like firms (meaning not being Mormon) are excluded in favour of firms of similar 
culture, leading cluster policies to fail in their main objective, namely bridging connections 
between heterogeneous local actors114.  
 
Finally, two last interesting study of local culture and cluster policy are an article written by 
Menu (2010) and an article written by Martinez et al. (2012). Menu (2010) compared three 
                                                 
114
 “Dominant tendency within cluster policies is to install the 'right' mix of institutional components deemed 
necessary for an innovative regional economy. In contrast, the present results suggest that the physical 
proximity of firms and other regional institutions, the first usual indicator of a cluster, does not necessarily 
guarantee or automatically generate the cooperative interactions widely theorized to underpin information and 
knowledge spillovers within the region.” (James, 2005, p. 1212) 
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regions - Bretagne in France, Bavaria in Germany and the North-East of England - in order to 
analyse how the regional identities of the three regions play a role in the capability of the 
regions to mobilize the actors to strengthen the local cluster development. Menu (2010) 
concludes that the regional identity seems to play a dynamic resource for economic 
mobilisation and that a region like Bavaria with a strong cultural heritage might have it much 
easier than a region like the North-East of England where far less regional identity exist and 
which thus needs another type of help.  
 
Martinez et al. (2012) on the other hand compared a Spanish and a Mexican cluster and also 
conclude that “knowledge networks differ depending on geographical specific characteristics 
and the resources of the main players. [...] Policy makers should prepare customized public 
programs based on the particular structure of each cluster” (Martinez, et al., 2012, p. 657). 
Additionally, such as James (2005) and his Utah case study, Martinez et al. (2012) conclude 
that just being close to each other is not enough. What counts is being embedded in a 
functioning knowledge network. 
 
Also Doloreux & Shearmur (2009, p. 526), analysing Canadian cluster policies, conclude that 
the Canadian cluster policies did not have the desired effect as they were not adapted to the 
local clusters characteristics. Or Perry (2005, p. 846), analysing New Zealand’s cluster 
initiatives, criticizes that “there has been too much haste in seeking to draw policy 
implications from `natural' clustering experiences” without taking into account the New 
Zealand circumstances. 
 
The problem is that politics currently belief in an universal “cluster credo”, applying the 
same recipe to all types of territories (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). Additionally, it is very 
difficult to measure “local culture”, and to put it in words. One starting point could be to 
analyse the type of state governance, the type and sector of the policy-driven cluster actors 
and the degree of closeness between them. 
 
5.2.1 Type of state governance: federal vs. unitary country 
The type of state governance might also have an impact on how to conceive the right policy 
for the policy-driven cluster. A difference might exist between unitary and federal countries. 
For example Salazar & Holbrook (2007, p. 1139) urges that policy makers in federal 
countries “need to take into account the specific institutional architecture existing in federal 
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countries to fully appreciate research and innovation patterns at national and regional 
levels” as the implementation process of policy-driven cluster initiatives seem different with 
other dilemmas than in unitary states. Or Cammett (2007, p. 1889) argues that the fostering of 
policy-driven cluster development and innovation is very different in “state-dominated 
political economies” and “political economies”. Cammett (2007, p. 1889) explains that 
“state-dominated political economies may be more amenable to implementing 
macroeconomic and infrastructure-related measures” while “political economies with more 
organized business communities may be better equipped to [immediately] pursue […] inter-
firm linkages”. Also when we recall our discussions on enacting leadership in policy-driven 
clusters, a strong dichotomy can be observed between unitary states (UK and France) and 
federal states (Germany and Austria).  
 
Cluster initiatives face the dilemma where they should be anchored, this problem particularly 
emerges in unitary countries. 
 
5.2.2 Type and sector of activity of policy-driven cluster actors 
The general local specificities discussion goes hand in hand with the local actors discussion. 
The type of local actors that actually forms the cluster. In 1996, Markusen, (1996, pp. 298-
299) published a seminal work where she distinguished five different variants of industrial 
districts (i.e. Marshallian industrial district, Italian industrial district, Hub-and-spoke districts, 
Satellite industrial platforms, State-anchored industrial districts). All these different types of 
industrial districts vary regarding the type of local actors present in the cluster: for example 
predominantly SMEs in Marshallian industrial districts but large headquarter firms in satellite 
industrial platforms. So not surprisingly the current cluster policy literature starts to mention 
that the management structure should be adapted to the type of local actors. 
 
For example Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer (1999) identified three different types of clusters in 
the Latin American region (“Survival clusters of micro- and small-scale enterprises”, “more 
advanced and differentiated mass producers”, “clusters of transnational corporations”) and 
argues that each of these different clusters needs a particular management style. A 
considerable amount of cluster policy studies focus on SMEs cluster (Cumbers, et al., 2003; 
Huggins & Johnston, 2009; Karaev, et al., 2007; Li & Geng, 2012), be it in the United 
Kingdom or in China. 
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Another important element that goes hand in hand with the type of the local companies is the 
sector of activity. For example Coletti (2010) distinguishes between Science & Technology 
clusters (high-tech and medium high-tech sectors) and Industry & Services clusters (medium-
tech and low-tech). Based on a cluster manager survey in different European countries, 
Coletti (2010) concludes that the competences of the cluster managers but also their tasks and 
duties depend on the type of the clusters. For example in Science & Technology clusters 
networking and lobbying was perceived as more important than in the Industry & Services 
clusters. Coletti (2010, p. 686) assumes that the reason for this is the fact that R&D resources 
come, most of the time, from public funds. On the other hand the “identification and 
integration of new cluster members, identification of market opportunities and organisation 
of events are comparably more valuable” in Industry & Services clusters than in Science & 
Technology clusters. Also McDonald et al (2007, p. 46), analyzing UK clusters, underline 
that differences have to be drawn between high technology sectors and manufacturing sectors 
when implementing cluster policies. Their results showed that high technology sectors are 
much more international oriented and therefore “promoting deep and established clusters” 
might be less important. To sum up, policy-driven cluster management needs to adapt their 
services to the type of their local company structure but also to the sector of activity. 
However, this would mean that an ex-ante evaluation would be necessary, something rarley 
done (Gallié, et al., 2012). 
 
5.2.3 Degree of closeness between regional actors 
Another important point to take into consideration before implementing policy-driven clusters 
is the already existing closeness between the local actors. Even when support structure are 
implemented, in case the support structure is not adapted to the local environment the 
management effort seems useless. Eklinder-Frick et al (2014) conducted a longitudinal study 
of a Swedish cluster initiative. They collected quantitative and qualitative data at two points 
of time in order to analyze how social capital influences, positively or negatively, innovation 
processes in the network. Their conclusion was that “despite the aim and effort to generate 
innovation, the network failed to do so” (Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2014, p. 10). One main 
obstacle that they identified was that the managers of the policy-driven cluster have not 
enough analyzed the social structure of the local network which hinders all innovation 
initiatives as they are not adapted to the local environment. Eklinder-Frick et al (2014, p. 10) 
underline that policy-driven cluster managers have to “understand[…] and balanc[e] both 
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collective and individual behavior in network settings” in order to “improve[…] the strategic 
managing of innovation networks” (Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2014, p. 10).  
 
Ciravegna (2012), studying ICT clusters in Costa Rica, also underlines that one of the main 
difficulties in Costa Rica is the reluctance of universities to collaborate with the private 
sector. For Costa Rican universities collaborating with the private sector is still seen as 
something bad. So even though the government wishes to implement cluster policies “social 
obstacles to linkage formation” have to be addressed first in order to reach the wished 
outcomes (Ciravegna, 2012, p. 577). Without doing this initial analysis, the proposed help 
(like for example innovation activities), might fail.  
 
Finally, more general, Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005) alert that the type of policy has 
to be adapted to the existing network in the region. In regions “where most actors have so far 
been operating isolated from each other” the best type of “(initial) choice” would be 
“explicit public cluster policies” because they have a “higher internal and external signal 
value” (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005, p. 1265). However, in regions where 
infrastructure already exists and companies are already slightly connected with each other, 
than bottom-up initiatives would be better.  
 
To sum up, having a good knowledge regarding the closeness of local actors seems to be a 
crucial element for implementing successful cluster policies115.  
 
                                                 
115
 Also the management literature distinguishes that there are different phases of collaborations (Gray, 1985; 
Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Lester & Piore, 2006). In each phase other types of 
initiatives are important: The first step often underlines that the “right” kind of members have to be put together 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Lester & Piore (2006) have invented the metaphor of the hostess in this context. The 
hostess has to invite the right kind of people for the cocktail party so that interesting conversations will emerge. 
The first step is always concentrated on identifying the problem or the question that needs to be tackled and to 
identify a requisite number of stakeholders that will be able to communicate on this topic (Gray, 1985). 
However, sometimes it is also just an accidental encounter between two people that gets the conversation going 
(Kreiner & Schultz, 1993). Once the encounter has taken place, it is important to empower the members to 
participate so that no member stays behind (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), but also to keep the conversation going 
between the members and to refresh the conversation when necessary (Lester & Piore, 2006). Additionally the 
members have to belief in a positive outcome, recognize interdependence and consider the endeavour as 
legitimate (Gray, 1985). At the end of course, the objective is to form a formalized collaboration between the 
different members to plan the work and make things happen. However, the maybe important point is to reuniting 
the right kind of people in the beginning and to create an opportunity to discover a collaboration occasion and to 
have an animator that creates the bases for a lively conversation among participants. 
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5.3 Dilemmas on adapting to geographic location 
Another element to take into consideration is the geographic location of the clusters. De 
Propris (2007, p. 341) for example underlines that “clusters can be both engines for local 
development in lagging regions and centres of excellence in the best performing regions”. In 
each case, the cluster policy should be adapted accordingly. The literature discusses this issue 
from two similar but slightly different angles: from the less developed countries vs. developed 
countries angle (degree of development), and from the urban regions vs. periphery regions 
angle (degree of urbanisation). Both literature streams are discussed hereinafter. 
 
5.3.1 Degree of development 
Cluster policies are a worldwide phenomenon. Less developed countries generally consider 
cluster policies as a chance to catch up with the developed world. They incorporated Porter’s 
“American dream” that every country can construct it’s own competitive advantage and reach 
the innovation development stage. For example Bathelt & Zeng (2005) analysed the industrial 
structure of the metropolitan region Nanning in Southern China where no cluster policy 
existed in 2005. They recommend that the implementation of a cluster policy in a less 
developed region such as Nanning, could be “a useful tool to stimulate development if […] 
formulated with care” (p. 1). Also Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer (1999), analyzing several 
Latin American region, or Li & Geng (2012) analyzing Chinese clusters underline that cluster 
policies have to be adapted to the different circumstances prevailing in less developed 
countries. Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer (1999) particularly insist on the fact that the Latin 
American clusters are considerably different from the “complex and innovative clusters” in 
the developed world. According to Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer (1999, p. 1708) the local 
clusters have “main deficiencies in common” particularly regarding their innovation capacity, 
“but the ways to overcome these deficiencies have to be very different.”  
 
5.3.2 Degree of urbanisation 
Some other authors argue that cluster policies not only have to differ between less developed 
countries and developed countries but also within developed countries, namely between urban 
regions and periphery regions. Peters (2005), an American research, for example argues that 
other types of support policies need to be developed for the periphery regions as the cluster 
policies that are normally applied to core regions do not work in periphery regions. Also 
Doloreux & Shearmur (2009) studying the effect of cluster policies implemented in three 
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Canadian regions draw a quite pessimistic conclusion regarding the cluster policies’ effects. 
According to them the cluster policies are often not adapted to and appropriate in all 
circumstances. Doloreux & Shearmur (2009, p. 526) conclude that clustering is actually a 
spontaneous process but additionally it is difficult to build clusters in non-urban regions 
where no entrepreneurship and collaboration culture exist. For them, “it is unlikely that 
cluster policies will succeed unless the [...] sector is already concentrated in or near a large 
urban area and already has some tradition of entrepreneurship and inter-firm collaboration” 
(Doloreux & Shearmur, 2009, p. 526) 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this section we discussed the structural dilemmas of policy-driven clusters. Table 18 
summarizes the result of the literature review.  
 
Table 18: Structural dilemmas 
Main 
dilemmas 
Associated dilemmas Examples of authors 
Adapting to 
life-cycle 
stages (SD#1) 
SD#1a – Degree of cluster developement: 
Every stage of a policy-driven cluster needs 
a particular treatment 
(Aziz & Norhashim, 2008; Fromhold-
Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005; Gallié, et al., 
2013b; Sadler, 2004; Van Klink & De 
Langen, 2001) 
Adapting to 
local culture 
(SD#2) 
Considering the local culture (no best 
practices): Not running behind a best 
practice example but adapting cluster 
policies to the particularities of the local 
culture. By differentiating the policy 
according to the type of state governance 
(SD#2a), the type and sector of activity of 
local actors (SD#2b) (for example science 
& technology vs. industry & services), and 
the degree of closeness between regional 
actors (SD#2c) 
(Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer, 1999; 
Cammett, 2007; Ciravegna, 2012; Coletti, 
2010; Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2014; Eklinder-
Frick, et al., 2012; Fromhold-Eisebith & 
Eisebith, 2005; Hospers, 2005; G.-J. 
Hospers & S. Beugelsdijk, 2002; G.-J. 
Hospers, et al., 2009; James, 2005; 
Markusen, 1996; Martinez, et al., 2012; 
McDonald, et al., 2007; S. Menu, 2010; 
Salazar & Holbrook, 2007; Santisteban, 
2006) 
Adapting to 
geographic 
location 
(SD#3) 
Considering the geographic location: The 
degree of development (SD#3a) and also 
the degree of urbanisation (SD#3b) are 
important elements to take into 
consideration.  
(Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer, 1999; H. 
Bathelt & Zeng, 2005; Doloreux & 
Shearmur, 2009; Li & Geng, 2012; Peters, 
2005) 
 
6 Summary of chapter two: overview of organisational dilemmas 
In the second chapter of the literature review we dug into the cluster policy literature in order 
to present and discuss the various cluster dilemmas that develop due to the fact that this 
“geographical and economic” cluster concept entered into the “policy and management” 
realm. Several researchers have a quite critical stance regarding cluster policies (Doloreux & 
Shearmur, 2009, p. 526; Hospers, 2005). In order to start addressing these criticism and 
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maybe overcoming them we decided to conduct a systematic literature review (Tranfield, et 
al., 2003) on cluster polices implemented around the world. This global cluster policy review 
allowed us to distinguish three types of cluster dilemmas – political, managerial and structural 
– that by themselves do not represent any diseases but in case they are not taken into account 
can have a negative impact on the policy-driven clusters and might hinder their full potential. 
Table 19 gives a detailed overview of all the different dilemmas identified in the literature.  
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Table 19: Overview of organisational dilemmas in the cluster policy literature 
Dilemma 
category 
Main 
dilemma 
name 
Associated dilemmas Examples of authors 
Political PD#1 – 
Defining 
boundaries 
PD#1a – Geographical boundary: 
local vs. non-local 
(Chabaud, et al., 2011; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; 
Gaffard, 2008; Kitagawa, 2005; Younès, 2011) 
  PD#1b – Organisational boundary: 
local vs. national 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Perry, 2005; Rutherford & 
Holmes, 2007) 
 PD#2 – 
Defining 
subsidies 
PD#2a – Subsidies type: direct vs. 
indirect 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; S. Menu, 2012; Nishimura 
& Okamuro, 2011b; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009) 
  PD#2b – Subsidies structure: one-
shop vs. multiple shop strategies  
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Chabault, 2009; Guisard, et 
al., 2010; Lallemand, 2013) 
 PD#3 – 
Defining 
objectives 
PD#3a – General objective: 
industrial excellence vs. regional 
dev. 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Giuliani, 2013; G.-J. 
Hospers, et al., 2009; Sternberg, et al., 2010; T. Weil & 
Fen Chong, 2008; Younès, 2011) 
  PD#3b – Motivation: intrinsic 
motivation vs. policy prescription 
(Himmelman, 1996; Perry, 2005; Sellar, et al., 2011) 
Managerial MD#1 – 
Managing 
actor 
involvement 
MD#1a – Leadership: who is in 
charge?  
(Burfitt, et al., 2007; Lundequist & Power, 2002; 
MacNeill & Steiner, 2010; S. Menu, 2012) 
  MD#1b – Learning: learning 
capacity vs. administrative 
straightjacket 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Carré, et al., 2008; Ebbekink 
& Lagendijk, 2013; Gadille, et al., 2013; Gallié, et al., 
2012; Lundequist & Power, 2002; Sotarauta, 2012; T. 
Weil & Fen Chong, 2009) 
 MD#2 – 
Managing 
innovation 
processes 
MD#2a – Which stage matters 
most? Creativity vs. Research vs. 
Development 
Creativity: (Agogué, 2012; Bocquet & Mothe, 2010; 
Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2012; Hermans, et al., 2012; 
Lefebvre, 2013; Schmitt, 2011; Visser, 2009)  
(management literature: (Amabile, 1996, 1998; 
Amabile, et al., 1996)) 
  
Research: (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997, 2000; 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Tödtling, et al., 2009) 
(management & medical literature: (Bland & Ruffin, 
1992; Chawla & Singh, 1998; La Porte, 1965; Ryan & 
Hurley, 2007)) 
  
Development: (Guisard, et al., 2010) 
(management literature: (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 
1995; Ernst, 2002)) 
 MD#3 – 
Managing 
collaboration 
processes 
MD#3a – How to foster 
collaboration? – People-driven vs. 
Space-driven 
(Bellandi & Caloffi, 2010a; Guisard, et al., 2010; Le 
Barzic & Distinguin, 2010; Lefebvre, 2013; Maskell, et 
al., 2006) 
  MD#3b – Who collaborates? Even 
vs. uneven partners 
(Giuliani, 2013; Huggins & Johnston, 2009; Younès, 
2011) 
Structural SD#1 – 
Adapting to 
the life-cycle 
stages 
SD#1a – Degree of cluster 
developement 
(Aziz & Norhashim, 2008; Fromhold-Eisebith & 
Eisebith, 2005; Gallié, et al., 2013b; Sadler, 2004; Van 
Klink & De Langen, 2001) 
 SD#2 – 
Adapting 
to local 
culture 
 
SD#2a – Type of state governance: 
federal vs. unitary country  
SD#2b – Type and sector of activity 
of policy-driven cluster actors 
SD#2c – Degree of closeness 
between regional actors 
 
(Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer, 1999; Cammett, 2007; 
Ciravegna, 2012; Coletti, 2010; Eklinder-Frick, et al., 
2014; Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2012; Fromhold-Eisebith 
& Eisebith, 2005; Hospers, 2005; G.-J. Hospers & S. 
Beugelsdijk, 2002; G.-J. Hospers, et al., 2009; James, 
2005; Markusen, 1996; Martinez, et al., 2012; 
McDonald, et al., 2007; S. Menu, 2010; Salazar & 
Holbrook, 2007; Santisteban, 2006) 
 SD#3 – 
Adapting 
to geographic 
location 
SD#3a – Degree of development  
SD#3b – Degree of urbanisation 
(Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer, 1999; H. Bathelt & Zeng, 
2005; Doloreux & Shearmur, 2009; Li & Geng, 2012; 
Peters, 2005) 
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Chapter 3:  Literature gap and problem statement 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Western economies experienced profound transformations. 
Economic growth has been more and more driven by the production of knowledge, the 
collaborations between economic actors at regional level, and the structure provided by 
institutions. These knowledge-, regional- and institutional- turns have triggered renewed 
innovation and competitiveness policies in which a country’s competitiveness is no longer 
measured by its sole capacity to produce but by its capacity to innovate. In this new economic 
paradigm, the concept of “cluster” was progressively praised by public and private economic 
actors, as it appears as a powerful articulator to create and share knowledge, to foster 
innovative and collaborative projects and to generate growth and competitiveness at a 
regional scale. Political actors, companies and academics progressively mobilized clusters to 
spore competitiveness, and even create a “national competitive advantage”. As a result, 
cluster policies, cluster initiatives, and cluster organizations multiplied. 
 
However, the term “cluster” in itself is often ill defined and source of confusion (R. Martin & 
Sunley, 2003).  
- First, clusters actually already existed before they entered the political realm. It is 
thus necessary to distinguish between policy-driven clusters and spontaneous clusters. 
Instead of focusing on “spontaneous clusters”, which have “been a result of the 
spontaneous concentration of the key factors enabling [the cluster’s] birth and 
development” (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006, p. 1073), and which have been abundantly 
studied in the literature, we will focus in this thesis on “policy-driven clusters”, 
“where the trigger was the strong commitment of governmental actors whose 
willingness was to set the conditions for the development of the […] cluster” (Chiaroni 
& Chiesa, 2006, p. 1073). For instance, the Silicon Valley is often considered as a 
cluster, but it strongly differs to the clusters that are fostered by a specific public 
policy; 
 
- While some researchers consider policies that foster policy-driven clusters to be an 
“economic weapon” (Aziz & Norhashim, 2008) that will help the country to stay 
upfront in the global competitiveness race, other scholars tend to be more critic 
towards cluster policies. They argue that policy-driven clusters are not reaching their 
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goals and that politics’ belief in a universal “cluster credo” is not realistic (Ebbekink 
& Lagendijk, 2013). Some researchers even argue that policy-driven clusters just 
became a “flavor of the month” (2009, p. 526) or essentially a “buzz word” for policy-
makers (Lundequist & Power, 2002, p. 699); 
 
- Finally, there seems to be a growing discrepancy between policy-driven clusters’ 
goals on the one hand, and their means and processes on the other. This discrepancy is 
related to the fact that policy-driven clusters are by nature multi-level organizational 
objects, that put together policy makers, local agencies, companies of all sizes, 
universities,… Thus, the distinction between the initial intentions of cluster policies 
and their operationalization on the field becomes blurry. Therefore, Kiese & Wrobel 
(2011, p. 1708) recently alerted the cluster policy research community to draw a strict 
line between “clusters vs. cluster policies, initiatives and organizations” and that the 
associated research streams are not the same. Swords (2013, p. 369) for example also 
underlined that the transformation of a cluster policy into concrete policy-driven 
cluster actions creates several dilemmas that are not addressed by the research 
community: “despite libraries of incredibly useful books and articles on clusters, 
there remains an absence of work which interrogates the translation of clusters into, 
and then through local and national policy”. Also Ebbekink & Lagendijk (2013, p. 
737) point to the fact that we have to start investigating “cluster policy as a policy 
challenge”. 
 
In this literature review we have shown that their exists numerous dilemmas that those who 
implement policy-driven clusters have to face. However, sometimes a “wrong” direction 
might hinder the cluster policies to reap the main benefits that were predicted during the 
1980s and 1990s, namely generating more innovation, increasing employment and 
competitiveness. The objective of this thesis is to focus on these dilemmas that emerge when 
implementing policy-driven clusters. These dilemmas are particularly emerging due to the 
“multi-level and multi-actor” nature of policy-driven clusters (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008, p. 
492; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009). In the beginning of the 21st century, Martin & Sunley’s 
(2003, p. 5) underlined that the “the cluster concept should carry a public policy health 
warning” and also recently Hospers et al (2009, pp. 297-298) advocate that the best motto for 
officials in charge for cluster policy is perhaps: “If you can’t help, please do not harm”. In 
order to overcome a “simple” health warning or the avoidance of cluster policies because one 
First part: Literature review - Chapter three 
 
 137 
does not want to do any harm, we considered necessary in a first step to establish a taxonomy 
of potential dilemmas produced by the implementation of policy-driven clusters and in a 
second step to analyse which kind of side-effect pathologies these dilemmas create. 
 
Instead of continuing to analyse in a Porterian manner the “anatomy of clusters”, we suggest 
to study the organisational dilemmas that policy-driven clusters face and that generate side-
effect pathologies. We thus propose to start studying the “pathology of clusters”. This 
approach enables us to address the problems of policy-driven clusters, little studied and not 
well understood so far (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; Swords, 2013). Burfitt & Macneill 
(2008) already started to investigate the different challenges faced by cluster policies. In their 
theoretical paper they identified for example two main challenges “operational and 
managerial challenges” and “political challenges”. To the “operational and managerial” 
challenges they count for example the identification of clusters and the management of cluster 
policies, while to the “political challenges” they count the designation of clusters, the 
drawing of boundaries and the relationship between cluster organizations and politics. In this 
thesis, we conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) (Tranfield, et al., 2003) to explore 
empirical cluster policy case studies that were conducted all over the world. This type of 
systematic literature review, stemming from the medical realm (Mulrow, 1994; Thorpe, et al., 
2005), allowed us to establish a taxonomy of different pathologies, based on existing 
empirical studies and to enlarge the first work of Burfitt & Macneill (2008). 
 
To sum up, we define “pathology” in a cluster setting as the visible managerial symptoms that 
policy-driven clusters may endure. In this thesis we wish to demonstrate how some of these 
pathologies are directly generated by “organizational dilemmas”, i.e. a set of decisions and 
choices for which there is no “one best choice”. By privileging one direction over another in 
such dilemmas, side-effect pathologies can emerge. 
 
Our problem statement is:  
Implementing cluster policies produce organisational dilemmas that generate side-
effect pathologies. 
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And we defined three associated research questions: 
RQ1: What are the organisational dilemmas that can be observed in the 
implementation of the French cluster policy (the case of HCPR)?  
RQ2: To which extend do these organisational dilemmas generate side-effect 
pathologies?  
RQ3: How can the knowledge of these pathologies benefit to cluster policy 
(implementation and evaluation)?  
 
Figure 15 schematizes the relations between our different research questions. From a 
theoretical point of view we first have to understand which dilemmas exist because dilemmas 
can create side-effect pathologies. However, on the field one has to first thoroughly 
decompose the general view and identify the different pathologies before it is possible to go 
“upstream” again (towards the dilemma) and give sense to the whole. Going upstream from 
the field will also allow identifying how the knowledge of these pathologies benefit to cluster 
policy implementation and evaluation. 
 
Figure 15: Problem statement and research questions 
 
 
This thesis will allow us to make a theoretical contribution to the cluster policy literature 
because for the time being, there is not only the problem that “few empirical studies with 
micro data have been conducted […] on the effects of cluster policies” (Nishimura & 
Okamuro, 2011b, p. 715), but also that view studies about cluster policy challenges exist 
(Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). 
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SECOND PART: RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
The second part of this thesis concentrates on the research design and the empirical context. 
In chapter four we present the research design of our case study. We justify our case study 
approach and discuss our research quality criteria. In chapter five and six we give a detailed 
description of the empirical context of our case study. In chapter five we first embed the 
French cluster policy in its European context and then discuss the French relationship to 
policy driven clusters. Finally, in chapter six we explain in detail the specificities of the 
French cluster policy under review, give an overview of the policy-driven clusters in the Paris 
Region, and finally focus on HCPR, the cluster that will be under review during our 
fieldwork. 
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Chapter 4:  Research design 
In this chapter we first explain the reasons that drove us to choose a single “case study” 
methodology approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009). Additionally, as case 
studies are often criticised (Flyvbjerg, 2006) we give a detailed justification why we are 
convinced that it is the best approach to tackle our three research questions. Second, we focus 
on the different research quality criteria (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Yin, 2009) such as 
external validity, construct validity, reliability and internal validity to assure the value of our 
research.  
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1 Using a “case study” approach: justification and usefulness 
The type of research methodology we chose for this thesis is the case study approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). The case study approach is a widely used and accepted 
methodology in cluster studies (Angel, 1991; Dayasindhu, 2002; Feldman & Francis, 2003; 
Harrison, Cooper, & Mason, 2004; Lissoni, 2001; Longhi, 1999; Maillat, Lecoq, Nemeti, & 
Pfister, 1995; Van Klink & De Langen, 2001; Waxell & Malmberg, 2007), and more 
particularly also in cluster policy and policy-driven cluster studies (Bidan & Dherment-
Férère, 2009; Chabault, 2008; Champenois, 2012; Kaiser, 2003; Retour, 2009b).  
 
There are three main reasons why we consider that the case study approach is the best 
approach for investigating our three research questions: 
- First of all, case studies are particularly useful “in the critical, early phases of a new 
management theory, when key variables and their relationships are being explored” 
(Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1465). For the time being our knowledge on the challenges of 
implementing cluster policies is very limited (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Ebbekink & 
Lagendijk, 2013; Swords, 2013). In order to develop a stronger theory of policy-
driven cluster management and implementation we still need more exploratory studies 
that will allow us to formulate more precise hypothesis. 
- Second, case studies “are typically carried out in close interaction with practitioners, 
and they deal with real management situations” (Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1465). 
Therefore, the case study approach “represent a methodology that is ideally suited to 
creating managerially relevant knowledge” (Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1465). Cluster 
studies are increasingly confronted with a relevance gap (Kiese & Wrobel, 2011; R. 
Martin & Sunley, 2003; Swords, 2013) due to the difficult process of transforming the 
theoretical knowledge of the “cluster” concept into an operational knowledge on how 
to manage policy-driven clusters. Using a case study approach will thus allow us to 
increase our capacity to produce “relevant knowledge”, important for the ones who 
whish to implement and evaluate policy-driven clusters. 
- Finally, the case study approach is recommended by Schmiedeberg (2010) as one of 
several cluster policy evaluation methodologies, next to econometric methods, 
systemic approaches (i.e. I/O-analysis, Network analysis, Benchmarking), cost-related 
approaches, and reporting. The advantage of using a case study approach to evaluate 
Second part: Research design and empirical context - Chapter four 
 
 142
cluster policies “lies in their intuitive understanding, flexibility and in-depth view” 
which allows showing “the mechanisms of cluster development in detail” 
(Schmiedeberg, 2010, p. 404). 
 
However, even though case studies bring numerous advantages, they are also heavily 
criticized (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Flyvbjerg (2006) summarized these criticisms in five points and 
argues why these criticisms are, according to him, not true. We share the opinion of Flyvbjerg 
(2006, p. 221) and discuss his arguments hereinafter. This will allow us to further confirm 
that a case study is particularly adapted to our research endeavour. 
 
“Context-dependent knowledge” criticism: The first criticism that is often put forward is that 
“context-dependent knowledge”, as produced in case studies, is less valuable than “context-
independent knowledge”, as produced with for example econometric methods. Through the 
discussion of several examples, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues why this is, according to him, not 
true. We will just pick up one point that is particularly appealing to us as a young researcher 
with the objective to improve our understanding of cluster policy implementation and 
evaluation. Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 223) underlines that case studies “are important for 
researchers’ own learning processes in developing the skills needed to do good research” 
and to become in the long run specialists of their field. As already explained in the preface of 
this document, in our Master thesis (A. Glaser, 2007) but also at the beginning of our PhD 
(Gallié, et al., 2013b; A. Glaser, et al., 2012) we analysed clusters with quantitative data and 
statistical procedures and thus stayed at “great distance to the object of study” (Flyvbjerg, 
2006, p. 223). At the beginning of our PhD we had access to the official French cluster-policy 
evaluation data (CMI & BCG, 2008) that allowed us to do statistical analysis regarding the 
performance differences of policy-driven clusters. We identified performance differences 
according to policy-driven clusters’ pre-existing R&D activities (Gallié, et al., 2013b) and 
their governance structures (A. Glaser, et al., 2012). Additionally we classified the different 
policy-driven clusters in more homogenous sub-groups. However, little by little, we 
increasingly questioned whether policy-driven clusters can and should be measured by for 
example their capacity to attract R&D subsidies or the number of SMEs in their governance 
board, and what this information actually tells us. It was clear for us that if we wish to 
continue working in the cluster policy field and more particularly in the evaluation field 
(Gallié, et al., 2012; Gallié, et al., 2014) we had to dig into the policy-driven clusters and 
leave our office and go to the field. It was at this point that our “journey to the centre of 
Second part: Research design and empirical context – Chapter four 
 
 143 
cluster policies” started to prevent doing research that “leads to ritual academic blind alleys, 
where the effect and usefulness of research becomes unclear and untested” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p. 223). We are convinced that in order to produce accurate “context-independent 
knowledge”, researchers have to first learn and produce “context-dependent knowledge”. This 
thesis should thus also be seen as one element in our learning path towards becoming a 
policy-driven cluster specialist that in fine will be able to draw from its “context-dependent 
knowledge” developed thanks to this research, to generate more reliable interpretations when 
facing “context-independent knowledge” in the future.  
 
“Generalisation” criticism: The second criticism that is constantly put forward by critics is 
that generalisation is not possible from a single case study, so case studies “cannot contribute 
to scientific development” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 227). However, Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 227) 
argues that “a purely descriptive, phenomenological case study without any attempt to 
generalize can certainly be of value”. Case studies are even essential for the generalisation of 
theories as they allow a constant “critical reflexivity”, particularly in social sciences 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 227-228). For Popper something is true (“all swans are white”) as long 
as the argument is not falsified (1959). However, as soon as “one observation does not fit 
with the proposition” (the “black swan”), the proposition “is considered not valid generally 
and must therefore be either revised or rejected” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228; Popper, 1959). 
This process leads to “further investigations and theory building” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228). 
Case studies, because they are close to the field, are ideal devices to keep the scientific engine 
going and to bring “falsification” elements to contradict generalised theories. For example, 
the general political tenor in France is that subsidising collaborative R&D projects will help 
building a functioning cluster ecosystem. The president of the policy-driven cluster that we 
investigated also put forward during a speech that his objective is to create a cluster spirit 
where everybody is working together in a trust relationship. This can certainly be the case, but 
our data also show that the R&D subsidies associated to the policy-driven cluster can create 
distrust between the policy-driven cluster governance and the companies. Additionally, the 
subsidies linked to the policy-driven cluster seem to create more lobbying behaviour than idea 
generation moments. Even though there are policy-driven clusters in France where everything 
seems to function perfectly, the knowledge we gained from our “black swan” case study will 
help rethinking how a policy-driven cluster works, can be implemented and evaluated. 
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“First stage of research” criticism: This criticism is directly linked to the “generalisation 
criticism. There is a general belief that case studies are “most useful for generating 
hypotheses” and “other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory 
building” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221). However, Eckstein (1975), a political scientist, even 
argues that case studies are “better for testing hypotheses than for producing them” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). For this the case selection process is though very important 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). In order for a case study to bring an added value, it has to be chosen 
carefully, as a “representative case or a random sample” might be less useful for generating 
new knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). For Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 229). “atypical or extreme 
cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic 
mechanisms in the situation studied”. We will still discuss our case selection process in more 
detail in the “research quality assurances” section, for the time being we just underline that 
our case study is an “atypical” case in the Paris Region, as the investigated policy-driven 
cluster is, among the Paris Region policy-driven clusters, the lowest ranked policy-driven 
cluster during the first (CMI & BCG, 2008) and second official cluster policy evaluation 
(Erdyn, et al., 2012). Finally, this case study is also a-typical because of the number and 
intensity of difficulties, especially managerial difficulties that this specific cluster 
experienced. This troubled situation has driven us to specifically highlight pitfalls, dilemmas 
and pathologies that would of course not be as present in a majority of clusters.  
 
“Subjective bias” criticism: Another major criticism regarding case studies is the assumption 
that they have the “tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions” (Flyvbjerg, 
2006, p. 221). However, Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 221) gives a range of examples that show that 
“researchers who have conducted intensive, in-depth case studies typically report that their 
preconceived views, assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses were wrong and that the case 
material has compelled them to revise their hypotheses on essential points”. When we left our 
office in 2010 to start our “journey to the centre of cluster policies”, we were most motivated 
to understand how collaboration and innovation is created by policy-driven cluster 
organisations. When we started our investigation process we already knew that HCPR is 
apparently a special case, was evaluated low during the first policy-driven cluster evaluation 
(CMI & BCG, 2008), but we still thought that this will improve during the second policy-
driven cluster phase and we will be able to observe how they build collaboration and foster 
innovation in the region. We were interested in working on the main assumption of why 
policy-driven clusters exist: innovation and collaboration. Both topics are intensively 
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discussed in the cluster literature (Engel, et al., 2013; Giuliani, 2007; Lefebvre, 2013; 
Liyanage, 1995). However, our fieldwork led us to completely revise our initial assumption 
because behind the scene the observed “pathologies” were too strong, innovation and 
collaboration were somehow pushed in the background, as our fieldwork discussion will 
show. Also Flyvbjerg (1998) conducted an in-depth case study on “urban politics and 
planning in the city of Aalborg” and observed little by little that his initial hypotheses were 
not accurate any more. At some point this experience was very “frustrating” because he 
thought that all his collected data was worthless (Flyvbjerg, 2006). It took him some time to 
realize that he had to change his initial assumptions and change his angle of observation. 
Today he thinks that “one must be prepared for such incidents” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 231) and 
that it even increases the value of in-depth case studies. We completely understand what he 
means because we had a very similar fieldwork experience.  
 
“Not possible to develop propositions” criticism: Finally, the last criticism that is often put 
forward is that “it is often difficult to summarize and develop general propositions and 
theories on the basis of specific case studies” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221). Flyvbjerg (2006) 
argues, that this is not the objective of in-depth case studies and that the “thick” descriptions 
are important. By saying this Flyvbjerg (2006) takes a different stance than other case study 
specialist such as Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009)). According to Flyvbjerg (2006), these 
“thick” descriptions allow capturing a wide audience with different interests to learn in the 
best possible manner from the new insights and use the new findings for their own research 
endeavours. However, a lot of in-depth case study researcher are “haunted” by the question 
“Who will want to learn about a case like this, and in this kind of detail?” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p. 237) and thus find it difficult to assume a detailed description. However, for Flyvbjerg 
(2006) this should not be “haunting” them and refers to Nietzsche (1969, p. 238) who says 
that it is the “focus on “little things”” that counts. We also had a lot of difficulties in finding 
the right balance between on the one hand assuming a very thick description and on the other 
hand trying to summarize our ideas and slightly gaining in abstraction something that is 
advocated by case study specialists such as Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009). We hope to 
have found a good balance between both approaches. 
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2 Research quality assurance 
According to Yin (2009), Eisenhardt (1989) or Gibbert et al. (2008) there are several criteria 
that need to be respected in order to build high quality case studies: external validity, 
construct validity, reliability, and internal validity. Every quality test is associated to a certain 
research phase and has specific measures that need to be taken into account (see Table 20). 
Hereinafter, we will now discuss the different quality criteria in the light of our case study. 
 
Table 20: Case study quality criteria 
Research Phase Tests Measures 
Research Design External validity 1. Clear rational for case study selection 
  
2. Detailed description of case study context 
  
3. Cross-case analysis 
  
 
Data collection Construct validity 1. Data triangulation 
  
2. Establishment of a clear chain of evidence 
 Reliability  1. Case study protocol 
  
2. Case study database 
  
 
Data analysis Internal validity 1. Theory triangulation 
  2. Pattern matching 
  3. Clear research framework 
Source: (Gibbert, et al., 2008; Yin, 2009) 
 
2.1 Research design: external validity  
We already addressed the problem of “generalizability”, also called “external validity” 
(Gibbert, et al., 2008), when we discussed the criticisms that are often addressed to case study 
researchers (see section one of this chapter and the discussion of Flyvbjerg’s (2006) article). 
The problem is that there is an “intuitive belief that theories must be shown to account for 
phenomena not only in the setting in which they are studied, but also in other settings” 
(Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1468). However, case studies, be it single or multiple, do not “allow 
for statistical generalization” (Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1468), i.e. to draw conclusions that can 
be applied to the whole population. However, even though no statistical generalization is 
possible with case study research, analytical generalization is possible (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Gibbert, et al., 2008; Yin, 2009). According to Yin (2012, p. 18), analytical generalization 
uses “a study’s theoretical framework to establish a logic that might be applicable to other 
situations.” The end result is a “carefully posed theoretical statement, theory, or theoretical 
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proposition […] that is believed to be applicable to other situations” (Yin, 2013, p. 68)116. In 
order to allow an analytical generalization, several criteria need to be explained: why a certain 
case study was selected, the context of the case study, and the cross-case analysis (Gibbert, et 
al., 2008). 
 
2.1.1 Case study selection 
In order to improve external validity the case study selection process has to be made explicit. 
However, before we can define how we selected the case, we have to define what kind of 
cases we are looking at. We use a single-case design (2009). However, it is difficult to stick to 
Yin’s (2009, p. 46) basic types of design if one wishes to analyse cluster policies and policy-
driven clusters. If we stick to Yin’s basic single-case design we could say that the general 
context of our case is the French cluster policy and the case is the policy-driven cluster called 
HCPR. The objective is to identify pathologies that have emerged within this setting. These 
pathologies are identified through a multitude of different observation points (to be discussed 
in the data collection sub-section). However, this would simplify a situation that is more 
complex, because cluster policies and policy-driven clusters are both embedded in a specific 
national context. Cluster policies (and thus also the implemented policy-driven clusters) are 
not the same in Austria and in France. For the study of cluster policies and policy-driven 
clusters, a better context description is the country, having a particular cluster policy case, 
which has itself one or several policy-driven cluster cases attached (see Figure 16).  
 
Our main cluster policy case is situated in France and our main policy-driven cluster is 
HCPR. However, the analysis of HCPR’s pathologies would have never been possible 
without observing other contexts and cases as well. Since 2009 we were able to analyse for 
example the cluster policy evaluations that were conducted in Germany, Austria and Belgium 
(Gallié, et al., 2014). Additionally, we conducted interviews with other French policy-driven 
clusters (Cap Digital and Sytematic), assisted in the French cluster observatory, and also 
conducted interviews with non-French policy-driven clusters (A. Glaser, 2011). Only this 
broad approach allowed us to better see and analyse the particularities of HCPR and to in fine 
enrich our understanding of cluster policy evaluations. 
 
                                                 
116
 “The generalization can take the form of a lesson learned, working hypothesis, or other principle” (Yin, 
2013, p. 68) 
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Regarding the case selection one question emerge: Why HCPR? The reason to analyse the 
French cluster policy (and not for example the Austrian) was opportunism (Girin, 1989). The 
reason to analyse HCPR was a more active choice. HCPR was the lowest rated policy-driven 
cluster in the Paris Region after the first cluster policy evaluation (CMI & BCG, 2008). We 
started our cluster policy investigations with analysing performance differences of French 
policy-driven clusters (Gallié, et al., 2013b; A. Glaser, et al., 2012), it was thus the most 
interesting choice to do our qualitative case study in a policy-driven cluster that was evaluated 
as “low” performing. However, the interesting point is that HCPR was also badly evaluated at 
the end of the 2nd cluster policy phase (2012), at the end of our fieldwork. In 2012, HCPR 
received the lowest grade (among 3 levels: very powerful, powerful, less powerful) and was 
the only “world class cluster”117 that received such a low grade. 4 of the other world class 
clusters received the “very powerful” and 2 the “powerful” grade. At the beginning the 
picture was not that clear yet, but at the end of our fieldwork, we were able to say that HCPR 
is in an extreme case (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006). Generally we can say that “there is 
a great deal to learn from projects that failed to complete their goals or to deliver promised 
benefits.” (Shipp, Chang, & Wisniewski, 2005, p. 6)118, they are much more interesting to 
analyse and allow drawing new conclusions that could not be drawn when sticking to best 
practice examples (Flyvbjerg, 2006). For the study of pathologies, an extreme case like HCPR 
is particularly interesting and valuable. This allows developing better and more accurate 
insights of the potential problems of policy-driven clusters and in fine the development of 
better evaluation criteria and better policy implementations.  
 
                                                 
117
 Three cluster levels exists: world class clusters, aspiring world class clusters, national clusters 
118
 Idea for looking into the report of Shipp et al.(2005) stems from Schmiedeberg (2010) 
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Figure 16: Research design: Context and cases 
 
 
2.1.2 Case study context 
Another important element that needs to be explained in detail in order to guarantee an 
external validity is the context of the case study (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gibbert, et al., 2008; Yin, 
2009). We dedicated chapter 5 and 6 entirely to this cause. 
In chapter 5, we start with drawing a link between all our contexts (France, Austria, Germany 
and Belgium) by first discussing the European Union’s approach to cluster policies (Context 
1). This allows us to see that there is a general run towards cluster policies as a tool that is 
meant to allow fostering innovation and regional competitiveness. Then we focus on France 
and discuss its ambiguous situation between decentralisation and centralisation tendencies in-
between cluster policy has to be “lived”. Finally, we present the different French initiatives 
that are meant to build “regional systems” of innovation.  
In chapter 6, we then only focus on the French “competitiveness cluster policy” (politique de 
pôle de compétitivité) that was launched in 2004. We will present the specificities of the 
policy and how it was implemented. Then we focus on the policy-driven clusters in the Paris 
Region, by first presenting the economic situation of the Paris Region and then the different 
policy-driven clusters that are implemented in the region. Finally we will present HCPR and 
some statistical indicators that will allow us to better apprehend our qualitative case study 
results. 
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2.1.3 Cross-case analysis 
Finally, the last measure that is meant to guarantee external validity is cross-case analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbert, et al., 2008). On the one hand, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that four 
to ten case studies are necessary to start analytical generalization. On the other hand, 
Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that this is already possible by conducting only one single in-depth 
case study. Our research lays somehow in-between these two spheres. On the one hand, we 
only analysed in detail the pathologies of one policy-driven cluster. However, as already 
mentioned in the “case study selection” sub-section, we also investigated some minor cases 
(see Figure 16). We did not do an exact cross-case analysis between HCPR and the minor 
cases, however the knowledge gained in the minor cases was crucial for the understanding of 
HCPR. According to Eisenhardt (1989) our analytical generalization potential would thus be 
weak, but according to Flyvbjerg (2006) a thick-description of our fieldwork will allow us to 
overcome validity critics. 
 
2.2 Data collection: construct validity and reliability  
Hereinafter we now focus on data collection. We first present our collected data and then 
discuss construct validity and reliability issues.  
 
2.2.1 Presentation of collected data 
Figure 17 gives a general overview of the different data collection phases during our 
fieldwork. Even though we were continually embedded and confronted with our cluster policy 
fieldwork (as we will explain hereinafter), we had two main qualitative fieldwork periods. 
The first main qualitative fieldwork period took place between September 2010 and January 
2011, and the second main fieldwork period took place between November 2011 and March 
2012. Using a longitudinal approach in case studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Leonard-
Barton, 1990) is particularly recommended when operating in nascent research fields 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007) as it is the case for cluster policy implementation and the 
study of its challenges. Hereinafter, we discuss three different data collection levels: cluster 
policy data, policy-driven cluster organisation data, and policy-driven cluster member data.  
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Figure 17: Empirical investigation journey 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Cluster policy data  
We started our thesis in October 2009, thus our thesis covers exactly the second phase119 of 
the French cluster policy120. Right at the beginning of our thesis we got access to the data of 
the national cluster evaluation that took place in 2008. We started exploring this data to detect 
performance differences between French policy-driven clusters regarding their pre-existing 
R&D activities (Gallié, et al., 2013b) and their governance structure (A. Glaser, et al., 2012) 
(see Annex 20). Furthermore, we also worked on cluster policy evaluation more generally by 
first conducting and in-depth analysis of the French cluster policy evaluation (Gallié, et al., 
2012) (see Annex 18) and then by positioning this French cluster policy evaluation in a 
European context (Gallié, et al., 2014) (see Annex 19). Finally, we also regularly participated 
in the seminars organised by the French cluster observatory of which we are member 
(observatoire des pôles de compétitivité). All these elements, together with the reading of 
official reports, the reading of the work of colleagues, and the comparison of the French 
cluster policy with other European examples (Gallié, et al., 2014), helped us understanding 
what the French cluster policy is, how it functions and its particularities. However, we also 
realised that we need to open the “black box” to better analyse the more abstract evaluation 
and performance data we were handling. This led us to investigate policy-driven cluster 
organisations and its members.  
 
                                                 
119
 The 1st phase of the policy lasted from 2005 to 2008 and finished with an official cluster evaluation in 2008. 
The 2nd phase of the cluster policy lasted from 2009 to 2012119 and concluded as well with an official cluster 
evaluation in 2012. The 3rd phase of the French cluster policy will last from 2013 to 2018. 
120
 We started our thesis on the 1st October 2009.  
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2.2.1.2 Policy-driven cluster data: the organisation 
We started our thesis in October 2009, and the first fieldwork experience was the 
HealthCluster Paris Region’s (HCPR) performance signature in November 2009 at which we 
assisted. In June 2010, we contacted and interviewed one of the steering committee presidents 
and asked for authorization to observe the efforts of HCPR’s operational team more closely. 
This authorization was given. From September 2010 to January 2011 (5 months), we 
integrated the operational team of HCPR. Due to the limited office space of HCPR, we were 
not granted authorization to work there permanently. However, we were regularly informed 
and granted authorization to participate in internal meetings among the operational team, 
external meetings between the operational team and important partners of the region, and 
official cluster organisation events (see Table 21). In total, after adding the three meetings at 
which we assisted after the 5 months period (end of 2011 and 2012) we assisted and observed 
65 hours of meetings and events. Before and after these meetings and events we had plenty of 
occasions to discuss in an informal manner with the operational team. Very often the 
information we gained from these informal discussions (for example on the way home of an 
event in the metro) were more insightful than the event itself. 
 
Table 21: Source of evidence: Observations of events and meetings 
# Date Objective of meeting / event Location 
Source of 
evidence 
Length 
of event 
(in min.) Recorded 
1 10/11/09 
HCPR’s performance contract signature 
event 
Bourse de 
Paris 
Observation of 
event 240 yes 
2 04/10/10 "France - Sweden" Medical workshop ARD 
Observation of 
event 120 no 
3 05/10/10 
1st meeting between Polinvest and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network 
Bourse de 
Paris 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 75 no 
4 06/10/10 
1st meeting between “Paris 
Developpement” and HealthCluster. 
Meeting initiated by “Paris 
Developpement” to exchange on the 
respective competencies. HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 120 no 
5 07/10/10 
1st meeting between CCIP and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network 
CCIP (Bourse 
de commerce) 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 150 no 
6 14/10/10 
MeetInnov event (HealthCluster had a 
stand and presented) 
Pavillon 
Baltard 
(Nogent-sur-
Marne) 
Observation of 
event 500 no 
7 18/10/10 
2nd meeting between UbiFrance and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 90 no 
8 20/10/10 
Discussion of the different action plans for 
the Biotech/Health Network HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (internal) 150 no 
9 20/10/10 
2nd meeting between Polinvest and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 60 no 
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10 20/10/10 
1st meeting between ADDVDM and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 60 no 
11 21/10/10 
1st meeting between Optics Valley and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 90 no 
12 25/10/10 HealthCluster Convention  
Cité 
Universitaire 
Observation of 
event 510 yes 
13 26/10/10 
3rd meeting between CCIP, AFNOR and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network 
CCIP (Bourse 
de commerce) 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 300 no 
14 27/10/10 
2nd meeting between Optics Valley and 
HealthCluster to discuss the action plan for 
the Biotech/Health Network HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (external) 90 no 
15 30/11/10 
TIC & Bio day workshop organised by 
Opticsvalley 
Campus les 
Cordeliers 
(University 
Pierre and 
Marie Curie) 
Observation of 
event 450 yes 
16 24/01/11 
Discussion of the different action plans for 
the Biotech/Health Network HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (internal) 120 no 
17 21/10/11 HealthCluster Convention  
Cité 
Universitaire 
Observation of 
event 510 yes 
18 11/01/12 
Project labelling committee meeting for 
project P7 HealthCluster 
Observation of 
meeting (labelling) 15 no 
19 31/01/12 Defi biotech santé HealthCluster - Launch 
Bourse de 
commerce 
Observation of 
event 240 no 
          
total 
3890 
min. 
= 65 
hours  
 
Additionally, we also conducted 8 one-to-one interviews (see Table 22) with HCPR’s 
operational team and its steering committee president, and 4 one-to-one interviews with other 
support structures of the Paris Region (Systematic, Cap Digital, Opticsvalley). In average 
these interviews lasted 78 minutes, were recorded and transcribed. Finally, the operational 
team also provided us with important internal documents (see Table 23) as for example the 
performance contract, documents related to the new developed services, ICT & Health 
workshop minutes, mapping documents, etc. However, we consider important to mention that 
sometimes it was very difficult to get these internal documents, as everything had to be 
validated by the governance and some documents were promised to us but never handed out. 
 
In September and October 2011, 8 months after we stopped our intensive observational phase, 
we conducted 2 follow up interviews with employees of the operational team and participated 
at one additional cluster organisation event of HCPR (the annual convention 2011). The 
policy-driven cluster analysis is heavily concentrated on one policy-driven cluster 
organisation. 
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However, additionally to the investigation of HCPR, we also conducted two interviews with 
Systematic representatives, one interview with a Cap Digital representative and one interview 
with an Optics Valley representative. Besides this we also regularly participated in seminars 
organised by the French cluster observatory (observatoire des pôles de compétitivité, Mines 
ParisTech) at which we are member. Finally, we were also able to interview three Austrian 
cluster managers (A. Glaser, 2011). These comparison points allowed us to get a better grasp 
about the particularities of HCPR. 
Table 22: Source of evidence: Interviews with Policy-driven cluster/other support entity 
# 
Policy-driven 
cluster or other 
support entity Type of interview partner Date 
Source of 
evidence 
Interview 
length 
(in 
minutes) 
Recorded & 
Transcribed 
1 Cap Digital Operational team member 26/01/11 
Face to Face 
interview 100 yes 
2 HealthCluster 
Steering committee president 
(Development & animation) (X) 06/07/10 
Face to Face 
interview 75 no 
3 HealthCluster 
Operational team members 
(Development & animation) (A, 
B, D) 10/09/10 
Face to Face 
interview 60 no 
4 HealthCluster 
Operational team member 
(Development & animation) (A) 05/10/10 
Face to Face 
interview 100 yes 
5 HealthCluster 
Operational team member 
(Development & animation) (B) 13/01/11 
Face to Face 
interview 70 yes 
6 HealthCluster 
Operational team member 
(R&D) (C) 13/01/11 
Face to Face 
interview 90 yes 
7 HealthCluster 
Steering committee president 
(Development & animation) (X) 18/01/11 
E-mail 
conversation - - 
8 HealthCluster 
Operational team member 
(R&D) (C) 14/10/11 
Face to Face 
interview 90 yes 
9 HealthCluster 
Operational team member 
(Development & animation) (A) 21/10/11 
Face to Face 
interview 30 yes 
10 OpticsValley Operational team member 19/01/11 
Face to Face 
interview 110 yes 
11 Systematic General Director 28/07/10 
Face to Face 
interview 105 yes 
12 Systematic Operational team member 28/01/11 
Telephone 
interview 30 yes 
     
total 860 
average 78  
 
Table 23: Source of evidence: Documentations and Archival records 
Internal documents: For example performance contract, documents related to the new developed services, 
general assemble presentations, convention presentations, ICT & Health workshop minutes, mapping 
documents, ICT & Health project documents 
Photos of HCPR’s office and events 
Factiva news paper search about HealthCluster 
Presentations that are accessible on the different websites (Cap Digital, Systematic, HealthCluster)  
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2.2.1.3 Policy-driven cluster data: the members 
In 2012 the DGCIS and the DATAR presented a report, entitled “The R&D projects of the 
policy-driven clusters subsidised by the Single Interministerial Fund (FUI): first 
technological and economic benefits”, which revealed the first results of the competitiveness 
clusters’ research projects. The first page of the report discloses the following statement: (1) 
“The competitiveness clusters [is] a policy in favour of the decompartmentalisation of 
innovation actors”; (2) “Collaborative R&D projects [are] the heart of the competitiveness 
clusters’ business”; (3) “Until today, the competitiveness clusters have contributed to the 
emergence of 1000 collaborative R&D projects subsidies by the State, in the framework of the 
FUI, as well as regional and local authorities”. 
 
The question which triggered us from the beginning onwards was how exactly the policy-
driven clusters have participated in these collaborative R&D projects, something that the 
government claims that they have done. Therefore we also interviewed project leaders that 
submitted at least one project to the ICT & Health initiative. The objective of these interviews 
was to better understand which role policy-driven clusters play in collaborative research 
projects. In order to understand which role policy-driven clusters play in collaborative 
research projects we first needed to understand how project leaders create collaborative 
research projects. We thus had three objectives when interviewing the project leaders:  
- 1st objective: Who are the project leaders and their associated organisations?  
- 2nd objective: How do project leaders create collaborative research projects? This main 
question can be split in several sub-questions: How do project leaders find project 
ideas?, How do project leaders find project partners?, How do project leaders find 
subsidies? 
- 3rd objective: Which role do the policy-driven clusters play in this process? 
 
To investigate these questions, HCPR provided us with a list of all projects that were 
submitted for labelling to the ICT & Health initiative for FUI11 and FUI12 funding. Out of 
this list we were able to contact and interview 10 “project leaders” who had submitted at least 
one project to the ICT & Health initiative and thus to one of the three Parisian policy-driven 
clusters (Systematic, HealthCluster, Cap Digital) between 2009 and 2012 (FUI9 to FUI14), 
and at least one project between 2010 and 2011 (FUI11 and FUI12) (see Annex 6 for the e-
mail template we used to contact them). The projects submitted between 2010 and 2011 were 
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our selection criteria to integrate the project leader in our investigation. The project leader has 
thus at least once in his life submitted a project to a policy-driven cluster and thus was at least 
once in his live in contact with a policy-driven cluster. 
 
Besides the 10 project leaders (see Table 24, signed with *) we also conducted 8 interviews 
with additional project consortium partners (for example academics, doctors,…). In total we 
conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with an average recording time of 85 min. (ranging 
from approximately 30 min. to 210 min). The interviews were conducted face-to-face or by 
telephone (one per e-mail), using a semi-structured interview guideline (see Annex 7). The 
interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. 
 
Table 24: Source of evidence: Interviews with R&D project leaders and their partners  
# 
Type of interview 
partner  Data Source of evidence 
Interview 
length 
(in minutes) 
Recorded & 
Transcribed 
Project 
case # 
1 Academic 30/11/11 Telephone Interview 35 yes P9 
2 Academic 24/01/12 Telephone Interview 35 yes P7 
3 Association* 01/12/11 Face to Face Interview 120 yes P6 
5 Doctor 31/01/12 Face to Face Interview 30 yes P7 
4 Doctor 07/03/12 Telephone Interview 45 yes P9 
6 Doctor 06/02/12 Telephone Interview 30 yes P7 
7 Large Group* 29/11/11 Telephone Interview 45 yes P1 
8 Medium-sized company* 06/12/11 Face to Face Interview 180 yes P7 
9 Micro-enterprise* 30/11/11 Telephone Interview 65 yes P2 
10 SME 14/02/12 E-mail correspondence - - P9 
11 SME 03/02/12 Telephone Interview 50 yes P7 
12 SME* 15/02/12 Face to Face Interview 165 yes P9 
13 SME* 12/12/11 Face to Face Interview 100 yes P5 
14 SME* 22/11/11 Face to Face Interview 30 yes P3 
15 SME* 23/11/11 Face to Face Interview 60 yes P4 
16 SME* 23/11/11 Face to Face Interview 120 yes P8 
17 SME* 02/12/11 Face to Face Interview 210 yes P10 
18 SME 09/01/12 Face to Face Interview 120 no P8 
        
total 1440 
average 85     
Legend: *project leader 
 
Additionally to the 18 interviews we also consulted several additional documents (see Table 
25) as for example project documents that were sent to us by the project leaders or project 
documents found on the Internet. Additionally we continued to track all projects on the 
official funding websites to know if they were finally funded or not.  
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Table 25: Source of evidence: Other documentations 
- Project documents received from the project leaders: Project executive summaries, Project 
presentations, E-mail conversation between project leader and policy-driven cluster, contact names 
- Project documents found on the internet (for example presented at an event, in the newspaper, 
official government reports etc.) 
- Funding web-sites: Monitoring of the discussed administrative projects on official funding / policy-
driven cluster web-sites (if funded, not funded) 
- Follow up e-mails for clarification 
 
We started every interview with an open question: “Please tell me about the genesis of the 
[name of project] collaboration project? Tell me about the initiation of the project: how did 
everything begin?”. As our underlying objective was to understand the role of the policy-
driven cluster in the innovation process of the selected projects, we did not insist on the role 
of the policy-driven cluster at the beginning of the interview (see Annex 7). We specifically 
focused on the role and the help of the cluster organisation in the second part of the interview. 
Initially we planned an in-depth investigation of ten projects (the ones that were provided to 
us by HCPR), but we were never able to solely stick to the project under investigation 
because the project often stemmed from several previous “unsuccessful” submissions (either 
not labelled, or labelled but not financed) or the project was just one of several projects in the 
portfolio of our interview partner (as we will see the project partners are very integrated in the 
collaborative research world), so our interview partner often drifted away. During the 
interviews, the project leaders thus never stuck to the one project we were initially interested 
in. Investigating one project thus actually meant investigating several projects, something that 
we were not completely aware in the beginning but we discovered during our interviews. The 
repeated submissions of similar projects were neither taken into account in the official cluster 
evaluations, nor observed or discussed during our observation period in the cluster 
organisation. In total, these 10 project leaders have told us the genesis of 30 collaborative 
research projects submitted to one of the three cluster organisations. 
 
For example, after every “unsuccessful” submission (either not labelled, or labelled but not 
financed) of a project (1) the content of the project might change (instead of covering two 
themes within one project, the partners might have decided to split the project in two separate 
projects), (2) the project partners between the different submissions might change (adding 
partners or abandoning partners), (3) the targeted subsidies might change (passing for 
example from ANR to FUI to special project calls), and thus (4) the relation to the initially 
contacted policy-driven cluster might change as well (bad experiences, project content not in 
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line with the initial policy-driven cluster any more, no need for the policy-driven cluster 
because other type of subsidies, etc.) 
 
The reality was thus much more complex than initially assumed. We thus realized that our 
angle of analysis, strongly influenced by our top down investigation journey, was not useful 
for our underlying research objective. For two projects we stuck to our initial plan and not 
only interviewed the project leader but also a selection of project partners. However, our 
research objective was not to gain an in-depth knowledge of collaboration projects itself but 
to understand the role of policy-driven clusters for the project leaders in their innovation 
process. We thought that the entry point is the “collaboration project” that was provided to us 
by the cluster organisation and measured in the cluster evaluations, but a better entry point to 
understand the role of cluster organisations is the project leader and its organisation. 
 
Finally, we decided the most appropriate manner to investigate our research questions is to 
change our angle. Instead of focusing on projects, we focused on project leaders, ideas, 
partners, and subsidies. This shift of focus, from solely project to different units, also has a 
second advantage for the analysis of our data. As already mentioned, the organisational 
“cluster” blindness we acquired due to the literature but also due to our observational period 
within the policy-driven cluster, lead us to believe that the policy-driven cluster has a 
particular stand for the project leaders. However, as we will discuss hereinafter, it seems 
important to reposition the efforts of policy-driven clusters into a broader context. Such a 
broadening is possible only if we put the project leaders and his ideas, partners, subsidies in 
the centre of our focus. Focusing for example on project leaders, will not only allow us to 
discuss the role of the policy-driven cluster but also the role of other organisations or 
activities in the innovation process of the project leader. The question is: “Which role does 
the policy-driven cluster play compared to all other organisations or activities?” 
 
To sum up, during the interviews, the 10 project leaders considered important to explain us 19 
project ideas in order for us to understand their relationship with policy-driven clusters and 
the genesis of their collaborative research projects.121 However, a project in project leader 
terms is not the same as a project in policy-driven cluster or cluster evaluation terms. For a 
                                                 
121
 The cluster actors even mentioned more than 19 projects during the interviews. These other projects were 
either targeted towards European Union subsidies or just mentioned very shortly. This is the reason why we 
decided to concentrate our analysis on the projects that were sufficiently explained during the interviews and 
targeted towards French subsidies. 
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cluster actor a project is an idea, an idea that he defends most of the time until it is subsidised 
at some point. The project leader might submit this idea several times to a policy-driven 
cluster and subsequently for financing. Every time he submits his idea he changes either only 
slightly (e.g. by adding just a II behind the name) or considerably the project name but the 
idea behind the project name stays the same. However, for the policy-driven cluster and for 
the cluster evaluation every submitted project counts as a project, nevertheless if the idea 
behind the project stayed the same or not. We observed thus that 19 project ideas (in the 
reality of project leaders) were submitted between 1 and 3 times for labelling and (sometimes 
for) financing (see Table 42 at the end of chapter 8). In policy-driven cluster or cluster 
evaluation terms we thus did not observe 19 project ideas but 30 administrative projects. 
Table 26 summarizes the number of investigated units by level. In chapter 8, we will discuss 
the idea finding processes for 19 project idea cases and the subsidies finding processes for 30 
administrative project cases. Additionally, the ten project leaders told us about approximately 
65 project partner initiations. 
 
Table 26: Number of observation units 
 # 
Project leaders 10 
Number of projects: in project leader terms (=idea) 19 
Number of projects: in policy-driven cluster terms (=administrative) 30 
 
2.2.2 Quality measures 
In the data collection process it is important to look for construct validity and reliability 
(Gibbert, et al., 2008; Yin, 2013). Hereinafter we briefly discuss how we tried to assure both 
data collection quality measures.  
 
2.2.2.1 Construct validity: data triangulation and chain of evidence 
The first measure that is used to assure the quality of collected data is construct validity 
(Gibbert, et al., 2008; Yin, 2013). Construct validity is defined as the “quality of the 
conceptualization or operationalisation of the relevant concept” (Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 
1466) and “refers to the extent to which a study investigates what it claims to investigate”. 
Our hypothesis is that implementing cluster policies produce organisational dilemmas that 
generate side-effect pathologies. When we started our fieldwork at HCPR we knew that the 
organisation was not functioning very well but the problem statement was not yet defined. In 
the beginning, we “just” wanted to observe how the organisation tries to foster innovation and 
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collaboration. However, little by little we observed certain pathologies that where constantly 
repeating it. For example inefficiency due to conflicting points of view between the 
operational team and the governance team, inefficiency because of the difficulty to 
collaborate with other policy-driven clusters, distrust because of the subsidies associated to 
the policy-driven cluster. We observed these situations through the different actors we met on 
the field within HCPR, but also by interviewing other cluster managers in the region who told 
us their view on HCPR and also by conducting interviews with project leaders. These various 
views allowed us to see the problems from several perspectives. Additionally, we constantly 
talked with different people on the field but also with colleagues about our observations. 
During the monthly seminars we organised at Mines ParisTech (French cluster observatory) 
we were additionally able to confront our observations with the realities of other policy-
driven clusters (that were often functioning much better). This allowed us to effectively 
triangulate our data. Our fieldwork discussion (Chapter 7 and 8) will additionally clearly 
discuss our different data points and establish (at least we hope) a clear chain of evidence that 
explains how we came to our results discussed in Chapter 9.  
 
2.2.2.2 Reliability: Case study protocol and database 
The second measure that is used to assure the quality of the collected data is reliability. In 
order to increase reliability, Yin (2013) and Gibbert et al. (2008) argue to keep a case study 
protocol and a case study database. Reliability is assured when the researcher enables 
“subsequent researchers to arrive at same insights if they conduct the study along the same 
steps again” (Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1468). In order to do this one should respect 
“transparency” and allow “replication” (Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1468). At the beginning of 
this subsection we presented in a detailed and transparent manner how we collected our data. 
Additionally, we provide in Annex 6 the e-mail template we used to contact the project 
leaders and in Annex 7 the used interview guide. We also classified our data in a coherent 
manner on our computer and kept an excel file where we kept two excel files (one for the 
project leaders and one for HCPR) where we constantly added every new data source that we 
collected (indicating for example the date, the interviewed person, the observed situation, the 
received document). This will allow us to continue exploiting our data in the future.  
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2.3 Data analysis: internal validity 
Finally, the last point that is necessary to look at to assure the quality of a case study is 
internal validity. Internal validity is the “causal relationships between variables and results” 
(Gibbert, et al., 2008, p. 1466) and is particularly important to keep in mind when analysing 
the data. Internal validity can be improved by theory triangulation, pattern matching, and a 
clear research framework (Gibbert, et al., 2008). However, the problem is that we are 
conducting research in a nascent research field (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Normally, 
mature research fields have already established constructs and measures on which they 
heavily rely (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). However, cluster policy research and the study 
of its implementation challenges is new (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 
2013). In nascent research endeavours few formal measures exist and evidence of construct 
still needs to be established (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Our theoretical framework was 
only developed after our fieldwork took place because it was the fieldwork that allowed us to 
see the existent literature in another way. Our theoretical framework is thus also part of our 
results. However, this also bears the high risk that the theoretical framework is not stable yet 
and that further research is necessary to confront and test it in other settings. However, with 
the help of pattern identification (Edmondson & McManus, 2007), the goal of data analysis in 
nascent research fields, we were able to triangulate our empirical data but also our SLR data. 
In our literature review we conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) (Denyer & Neely, 
2004; Pittaway, et al., 2004, p. 480) that allowed us to identify a range of dilemmas 
governments and those in charge of policy-driven clusters face when implementing cluster 
policy. Our fieldwork is an a-typical case that allows in a perfect manner to observe certain of 
the dilemmas discussed in the literature. In our discussion part we will come back to these 
different literature points in order to position our results in the light of the existing findings on 
the subject.  
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Chapter 5:  Cluster policies in Europe: complexification and saturation 
This is the first of two context chapters (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). In this chapter we first 
draw the general picture of cluster policy development in Europe. This will allow us to 
position our case study, the French cluster policy, in the current European cluster policy 
context. Then, in a second step we discuss the different French cluster policies and we will 
particularly focus on the difficult relationship between France’s situation between 
centralisation and decentralisation where cluster policy has to be “lived”. 
 
Box 7: Content of chapter five 
1 European Union and the saturation of cluster policies ........................................... 163 
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1 European Union and the saturation of cluster policies 
The European Union started to discuss the importance of policy-driven clusters in official 
documents during the 1990s and slowly integrated cluster policies in its main economic 
policy objectives during the 2000s. In the beginning it was a typical Porterian cluster mapping 
exercise, but little by little it developed to important policy-driven cluster management 
supports. 
 
1.1 A multiplication of coordination structures 
In the 1980s and 1990s, not only the United States were afraid about their national 
competitiveness also in Europe the fear to fall behind was (is) big. Annex 3 shows an excerpt 
of the opening words of a European Commission’s White Paper122 entitled “Growth, 
competitiveness, employment. The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century” 
published in 1993. These hesitating opening words not to be able maybe to create enough 
jobs, are not much different than the opening words of Piore & Sabel’s (1984) book nearly 
one decade earlier, or the words we read in today’s newspapers two decades later. 
 
France, like other Western countries, started to struggle with its economy during the 1970s. 
Between 1958 and 1973 France still had an average GDP growth rate of 5.2, but this average 
GDP growth rate plunged to 2.2 between 1981 and 1992. Also when we look at the general 
GDP contribution to global growth we see that the contribution of European countries like 
Germany, France or Italy, was declining since the 1970s, while China’s or India’s 
contribution were on a constant rise (see Figure 19). The American contribution to global 
growth final plunged as well (from the millennium decade onwards), but much later than in 
the European countries. 
 
                                                 
122
 The European Commission regularly publishes two types of Papers: “Green Papers” and “White Papers”. 
Both types of papers are important official documents for debates and proposals for actions within the European 
Union. The “Green Papers” are the “discussion documents to stimulate debate and consultations” whereas the 
“White Papers” are “concrete Commission proposals for EU action” (Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/about/index_en.htm , accessed 15/05/2014) 
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Figure 18: GDP growth rate in France 1950-1992 
 
Source: based on data compiled by Crafts & Toniolo (1996) 
 
Figure 19: Contribution to global growth per country and decade (%) 
Source: based on data compiled by Yifu Lin & Rosenblatt (2012)123 
 
In June 1993, Jacques Dolores124 underlined that "the root cause of European unemployment 
was a lack of competitiveness with the United States and Japan and that the solution was a 
program of investment in infrastructure and high technology" (Krugman, 1994, p. 29). In 
order to strengthen the European competitiveness, the European Commission also 
recommended in a White Paper the development of policy-driven clusters: 
“Better interaction between supply and demand must be strongly encouraged by [..] 
stimulating the development of 'clusters' of competitive activities that draw on the regional 
diversity of the Community. The proliferation within the Community of 'clusters' that combine 
industrial, technological and geographical advantages may hold one of the keys to job 
                                                 
123
 “Calculation is based on the change in constant dollar GDP (at market exchange rates) of the particular 
country as a share of the change in constant dollar GDP of the world.” (Yifu Lin & Rosenblatt, 2012, p. 14) 
124
 The president of the European Commission between 1985 and 1995 
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creation. This requires the active involvement of all the actors concerned, something which 
can be greatly facilitated by structural measures taken at Community and national level. In 
this area, […], the main emphasis should be on a horizontal, transsectoral and 
multidisciplinary approach.” (Commission of the European Communities, 1993, p. 65) 
 
Focusing public policies on clusters slowly started to be considered as important in order to 
maybe overcome what is known as the “European Paradox” (European Commission, 1995). 
The European paradox is that even though the EU has an excellent scientific record, its 
“major weaknesses lies in its inferiority in terms of transforming the results of technological 
research and skills into innovations and competitive advantages” (European Commission, 
1995, p. 5). 
 
However, it was not until the end of the 20th century that clusters and the fostering of policy-
driven clusters started to be integrated in the European Union policy discourse. It started with 
the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and the objective to become “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world” by developing “better policies for the information 
society and R&D”125. The ultimate objective was full employment in Europe until 2010. An 
objective largely missed, due to other macro economical events. This shows that it is difficult 
to predict an exact outcome in policy related fields.  
 
Subsequently, the 6th European Union Framework Programme126 (2002-2006) for Research 
and Technological Development (FP6)127 was particularly oriented towards contributing “to 
the creation of the European Research Area (ERA) by improving integration and co-
ordination of research in Europe” which was considered as too fragmented at that time. One 
element of the FP6 was dedicated to a specific programme to structure the European Research 
Area; and one of the concrete actions within this programme was to overcome the European 
Paradox by “facilitating the creation of groupings or clusters of SMEs that have similar 
innovation needs”128. 
 
                                                 
125
 See Annex 3 for an excerpt of the “European Council” presidency conclusion held on the 23rd and 24th 
March 2000. 
126
 The FP is the main instrument for funding research and development across different European countries. The 
objectives of the multiyear Framework Programmes of the European Union are to strengthen “the scientific and 
technological bases of industry and encourage its international competitiveness while promoting research 
activities in support of other EU policies.” Within these general objectives concrete priorities are fixed and 
projects financed. (see: http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/pdf/fp6-in-brief_en.pdf ; accessed 01/06/2014) 
127
 FP6 budget: 17.5 billion euros (2002-2006) (see: http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/pdf/fp6-in-brief_en.pdf ; 
accessed 01/06/2014) 
128
 Source: “The Sixth Framework Programme in brief”: http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/pdf/fp6-in-brief_en.pdf 
; accessed 01/06/2014 
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From 2006 onwards, policy-driven clusters definitely entered into the centre of the European 
Union’s preoccupation. In 2006, the European Commission published an important 
framework communication (COM(2006) 502 final) that puts “cluster policies” to advance 
innovations in Europe at the centre of its strategy recommendations (European Commission, 
2006).  
 
Not surprisingly, when the FP6 ended in 2006, the subsidies programmes that followed, the 
FP7 (2007-2013)129 and particularly the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme (CIP)130 (2007-2013), were, among others, important funding sources to 
coordinate and advance research and initiatives to foster European policy-driven clusters. 
Hereinafter we shortly present, in a chronological order, a selection of important spontaneous 
and policy-driven cluster projects and initiatives. 
 
1.1.1 European Cluster Observatory (ECO)131 
In 2002, the Observatory of European SMEs132 already underlined in a report on clusters, that 
few mapping and monitoring practices of clusters (be it spontaneous or policy-driven clusters) 
are in place in the EU. Subsequently, Sölvell’s Ivory Tower consultancy firm (in a certain 
manner the European Michel Porter) was asked in 2004 to map all clusters (regarding 
concentration and specialization) that are situated in the ten new EU member countries133. The 
final EU10 cluster mapping report (Ketels & Sölvell, 2006) was based on an extended version 
of the Porter’s cluster mapping methodology and gave the first complete picture of the 
geographic concentration and specialization of clusters in the EU10 countries. In 2006, the 
European Commission awarded an additional grant to Sölvell and its Center for Strategy and 
Competitiveness (CSC) at the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE) to extent its cluster 
mapping to all European countries. In 2007, a dedicated website was set up “The European 
cluster observatory” to make the mapping results and data publicly available. The focus of the 
                                                 
129
 FP7 budget: over 50 billion euros (2007-2013) 
(see: http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/pdf/fp7-inbrief_en.pdf accessed 01/06/2014) 
130
 CIP budget: 3.621 billion euros (2007-2013) 
(see: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/strategies/n26104_en.htm accessed 
01/06/2014) 
131
 See: http://www.clusterobservatory.eu/index.html (accessed 01/06/2014) 
132
 “The Observatory of European SMEs was established by the Commission in December 1992 in order to 
improve monitoring of the economic performance of SMEs in Europe. Its task is to provide information on SMEs 
to policy-makers at the national and European level, researchers, SME organisations and to SMEs themselves.” 
(European Commission, 2002, p. 5) 
133
 EU enlargement 2004 (EU 10): Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia 
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mapping lies on classical economic indicators (e.g. employment rates, FDI, exports, and 
growth in numbers of firms). However, additionally the website also regroups other types of 
information like cluster scoreboards per country or policy-driven cluster organisation 
mappings. The objective of the ECO is to provide data on the framework conditions that 
shape regional competitiveness and to give an overview of European’s spontaneous and 
policy-driven cluster landscape.  
 
1.1.2 European Cluster Alliance (ECA)134 
The ECA was launched in 2006 and is “an open platform established to maintain a 
permanent policy dialogue at EU level among national an regional public authorities 
responsible for developing cluster policies and managing or funding cluster programmes in 
their countries or regions.”135 It is thus a platform that tries to give all those that are involved 
in conceiving cluster policies an exchange and learning environment. The platforms activities: 
regular workshops, expert reviews, case studies, best practice examples and recommendations 
regarding new policies and projects, etc. French members in this platform are for example the 
national policy-driven cluster coordination body “France Cluster”, regional representatives 
from the Paris Region, the Greater Lyon Authority, the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Region, 
etc., but also financing bodies like OSEO. OSEO plays an important part in this network as it 
is one of the bodies that also subsidises the platform.  
 
1.1.3 European Cluster Excellence Initiative 
Sölvell et al. (2003) define cluster initiatives as “organised efforts to increase growth and 
competitiveness of clusters within a region, involving cluster firms, government and/or the 
research community”. Cluster initiatives are thus the managerial part of cluster policies. What 
do policy-driven cluster managers have “to do” to reach the objectives fixed by the cluster 
policies (i.e. competitiveness and growth)?136 
 
In 2003, Sölvell et al. (2003) conducted the first global cluster initiative survey addressed to 
the organisations in charge of “managing” the policy-driven clusters. In the foreword of 
Sölvell et al’s (2003, p. 5) Cluster Initiative Greenbook, Michael Porter underlined that 
“surprisingly little systematic knowledge of these initiatives, their structure, and their 
                                                 
134
 See: http://www.eca-tactics.eu/ (accessed 01/06/2014) 
135
 See: http://www.eca-tactics.eu/ (accessed 01/06/2014) 
136
 see also the Cluster Initiative Performance Model developed by Sölvell et al. (2003) 
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outcomes” exist and that Sölvell et al’s Greenbook is a “pioneering effort to fill this gap”. 
The global cluster initiative survey revealed that the five most common objectives of these 
initiatives are heavily concentrated on networking and innovation: “(1) foster networks among 
people, (2) promote expansion of existing firms, (3) establish networks among firms, (4) 
facilitate higher innovativeness, (5) promote innovation, new technologies” (Sölvell, et al., 
2003, p. 10). The strong concentration on innovation and networking is not surprising.  
 
Besides Sölvell et al.’s (2003) Greenbook on cluster initiatives, several practitioners’ manuals 
for policy-driven cluster manager emerged approximately at the same time (CLOE, 2006; 
Cluster Navigators Ltd., 2001; DTI, 2004; GTZ, 2007a, 2007b; Innovation America, 2007). 
For example the GTZ manuals (GTZ, 2007a, 2007b) read more like a pell-mell of different 
business school disciplines, focusing for example on how policy-driven cluster managers can 
set up business plans, conduct stakeholder analyses, or cluster marketing, than the 
preoccupation of the classical cluster disciplines of the 1980s and 1990s, like for example 
economic growth, regions and competitive advantage. 
 
Besides the emergence of manuals, also cluster management courses were set up. In 1998, the 
first non-profit cluster organisation for cluster practitioners was founded: “The 
Competitiveness Institute” (TCI). The TCI is a “global network of cluster practitioners 
dedicated to facilitating the spread and success of cluster-based competitiveness initiatives 
through networking”137. Cluster Facilitator or Management Trainings were also proposed by 
private companies like “Cluster Navigators” (2001), business schools like IESE Business 
School in Spain (since 2006: “Clusters Summer School”)138, think-tanks like France Cluster 
(since 2010: “Cycle Inter-Preneur”)139 or successful cluster organisation themselves like 
Clusterland Austria (since 2008: “Cluster Academy”)140. 
 
Finally, in continuation of all these developments, the European Commission launched the 
“European Cluster Excellence Initiative” (ECEI) in 2009. The intention of the European 
cluster excellence initiative was “to develop training materials and set up an approach for 
quality labelling of cluster management, in order to help cluster managers achieve high levels 
                                                 
137
 source: http://www.tci-network.org (accessed on 12/12/2010) 
138
 source: http://www.iese.edu/en/events/OtrosEventos/BCSS2010/Introduction/Introduction.asp (accessed on 
12/12/2010) 
139
 source: http://www.franceclusters.fr/dossier.php?idpage=12 (accessed on 12/12/2010) 
140
 source: http://www.clusterland.at (accessed on 12/12/2010) 
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of excellence in their duties and to succeed in the peer-assessments.”141 The European cluster 
excellence initiative was thus a further step away from the initial mapping endeavours as 
proposed by the European cluster observatory towards a far more managerial approach of 
clusters. The ECEI, which was financed between 2009 and 2012:  
- “created a uniform set of cluster management quality indicators a quality labelling 
system for professional cluster management; 
- developed a standardized set of training materials for cluster managers; 
- set up the European Cluster Managers’ Club for recognition of and exchange on 
professional cluster management; 
- supported the development of the European Cluster Collaboration Platform (ECCP), 
a “LinkedIn” for cluster organisations and SMEs.”142 
 
All these initiatives are now continued and further developed by different structures as for 
example the European Secretariat for Cluster Analysis (ESCA), the cluster competitiveness 
foundation, or the European Cluster Group (ECG). 
 
1.2 Towards a saturation of policy-driven clusters 
Before we turn to France and its cluster policies, we also need to mention the European 
Cluster Memorandum. All the developments we just described lead to a strong increase of 
policy-driven clusters in Europe. In 2007143, at the demand of the Council, the European 
Commission (more precisely the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry) prepared a 
report on all ongoing EU activities on clusters and gives an overview of cluster mapping and 
policies in Europe (European Commission, 2007). This report served for the establishment of 
a “European Cluster Memorandum” (The High Level Advisory Group on Clusters, 2008). 
 
The European Cluster Memorandum, prepared by the High Level Advisory Group on 
Clusters144, was “addressed to all cluster policy stakeholders working at regional, national 
and EU level” with the objective to alert the European Commission “to reinforce their efforts 
                                                 
141
 source: http://www.cluster-excellence.eu (accessed: 12/12/2010) 
142
 Source: Cluster excellence initiative (http://www.cluster-excellence.eu/fileadmin/_cluster-
excellence/downloads/121009_Brochure_ECEI_EXIT_Strategy_dst.pdf ; accessed 15/06/2014)  
143
 Following the European framework communication (COM(2006) 502 final) that put cluster policies at the 
center of the European innovation strategy. 
144
 The High Level Advisory Group on clusters was chaired by Pierre Laffitte and composed out of a range of 
important economic company support structures (for example EUROCHAMBRES, Brussels Enterprise Agency, 
Competence Networks Germany) and policy advisors. 
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and cooperation to better and faster respond to the new challenges that clusters are facing 
today in Europe.”145 According to the High Level Advisory Group on Clusters (2008, p. 8) 
“Europe needs better cluster policies rather than more cluster policies” and the objective of 
this memorandum was to contribute to this process by “providing clear orientation and 
support for translating this political commitment into real action throughout Europe”. One of 
the main recommendations was to support “the emergence and growth of world class clusters 
in Europe” (The High Level Advisory Group on Clusters, 2008, p. 8). This exclamation 
followed the creation of the European Cluster Policy Group (ECPG) in 2008146. The creation 
of the European Cluster Policy Group is thus an interesting turning point: a shift, away from 
an increasing number of different national cluster policies and initiatives in Europe towards a 
more collaborative and European promotion of some world-class policy-driven clusters. We 
can thus observe a first maturation and saturation stage of policy-driven clusters in Europe.  
 
2 France and cluster policies: traditions and renewal 
In this section we thus now dig deeper into how France tried to foster policy-driven clusters 
on its territory and tried to foster competitiveness and growth. France introduced its first 
national cluster policy in 1997 (SPL see Annex 5) and a second modified version in 2004 
(“politique de pôles de compétitivité” – competitiveness cluster policy), the policy under 
review in this research. This development was in line with other European countries. For 
example the Styria Region (in Austria) introduced a cluster initiative in 1995 (Clement & 
Welbich-Macek, 2007), the Basque Region (in Spain) introduced a cluster initiative in 1997 
(Ahedo, 2004), and Wallonia (in Belgium) introduced a cluster initiative in 2001 (Lepage, 
2009). Hereinafter, we present the large variety of “regional system” initiatives implemented 
on the French territory. However, before doing so, we have to shortly present the French 
general political functioning and its decentralisation efforts.  
 
2.1 The French way towards decentralisation 
For a long time France was considered to be a highly centralistic state, where the power is 
concentrated in the Paris Region. However, since the beginning of the 1980s this started to 
                                                 
145
 Source: http://www.rralur.si/en/koncani-projekti/clunet/cluster-memorandum/ (accessed 01/06/2014) 
146
 Commission Decision (2008/824/EC) : 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:288:0007:0011:EN:PDF (accessed 
15/06/2014) 
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change. Hereinafter, we will first summarize the origin of France’s centralist culture and then 
discuss the decentralisation efforts.  
 
2.1.1 France’s centralist culture 
France has a centralistic culture, which is strongly visible and grounded in its history. In this 
section, we will not go back to De Tocqueville’s (1856 (1988)) writings and we do not 
discuss in detail the “ancien régime” and absolute monarchy which lasted up to the French 
revolution. The only point that is important to keep in mind is that during the “ancien 
régime” the basis of a very centralistic State was already laid, centred around the different 
kings and rulers situated in the Paris Region. In this section, we will start our explanations 
with the conflicting tradition between Jacobin and Girondin movements that emerged during 
the French revolution (1789–1799) and the political consequences derived from this 
opposition because they are still visible today. In the end we draw the link with our main 
subject, the French cluster policy, as this policy crystallizes very well the difficult and 
conflicting relationship between Jacobin and Girondin tendencies in France. 
 
Up to the French revolution, the Jacobin Club united the most influential names of the French 
revolution and thus the resistance against the ruling order. However, within the Jacobin Club 
two different streams of thought developed from 1792 onwards (Gévart, 2006). On the one 
hand, the Girondin movement147 who was afraid of a “Parisian” dictatorship and privileged a 
more federal system (and thus decentralist system) (Gévart, 2006). The Girondins were for a 
Republic of the citizen, organised on a local level, but with some sort of central control 
(Gévart, 2006). On the other hand, the Jacobin movement148 who was against war and for a 
strong unified and republican nation (and therefore centralist system) (Gévart, 2006): “In the 
Jacobin view, a weak state was a threat to freedom and the republican values149 that the 
nation expressed” (Larsen, 2005, p. 88). It was the Jacobin movement that imposed itself in 
the end and that prevailed officially up to 1982 (Gévart, 2006).  
 
The “French centralist soul” is not only visible in the strong concentration of economic 
activity in the Paris Region but also in how the French government (situated in Paris) was and 
                                                 
147
 Three of the most influential chefs of the Girondin movement were deputies of the Grionde department 
(Gévart, 2006). 
148
 The Jacobin movement kept the name “Jacobin” because this movement continued to meet regularly in the 
former offices of the Jacobin Club (Gévart, 2006). 
149
 Republican values in France means against Monarchy and a strong State that unifies the country and all 
different communities.  
Second part: Research design and empirical context - Chapter five 
 
 172
still is implementing and guiding its industrial policy. In 1946, France installed a 
“Commissariat général du Plan”, an institution responsible for elaborating four-year 
indicative plans150 that allows the head of the government to “identify economic priorities and 
to focus the resources of the state on a few key sectors” (Thibault, 2008, p. 46). Additionally, 
the objective of these plans (in total X plans up to 1992) were “to guarantee the necessary 
industrial development but also national independence” (Thibault, 2008, p. 47). According to 
Jean Monnet, the director of the Commissariat, this “planification à la française” should be a 
place for “consultation and cooperation” (Thibault, 2008). 
 
It was particular under Général de Gaulle (president from 1959 to 1969) that the State saw 
itself as the “captain of industry” with the plan in the centre of its preoccupations (Thibault, 
2008). This “captain of industry” view of the State was particular visible in a speech Général 
de Gaulle gave in 1966 where he affirmed that: “The policy of France is not decided upon at 
the trading floor of the stock exchange”151 and that the State was defining the principal 
orientation and that the national industry has to follow (Thibault, 2008). Still today the State 
acts as the “captain of industry” as the recent example with Alstom152 shows.  
 
In addition to the “captain of industry” view, the government of Général de Gaulle decided to 
create in 1963 the DATAR (“French Delegation for Territorial Development and Regional 
Action”)153. The DATAR was created due to the observation of an increasing disequilibrium 
between Paris and the rest of France in terms of wealth and jobs. The DATAR should help to 
overcome this disequilibrium and by doing this, the delegation was meant to contribute to a 
better implementation of the general plan. The responsibilities of the DATAR were little by 
little extended away from only trying to delocalising jobs from urban to peripheral regions 
                                                 
150
 For an overview of the content of each of the plans developed by the “Commissariat général du Plan” see 
Thibault (2008, pp. 47-48) 
151
 translation: “La politique de la France ne se fait pas à la corbeille”; Source of English translation: “The 
Routledge Dictionary of Cultural References in Modern French” by Michael Mould (2011) 
152
 General Electric, a US company, wanted to acquire Alstom, a French company. The French government 
intervened to block the transaction. “French law permits government intervention to block acquisitions of 
companies deemed to be of national importance.” See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/france-to-
take-20-percent-stake-in-alstom-in-deal-with-ge.html (accessed 20/06/2014) 
153
 The DATAR changed its name two times since its foundation: 
1963-2005: DATAR: “Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale” - “French Delegation for 
Territorial Development and Regional Action” 
2006-2009: DIACT: “Délégation interministérielle à l’aménagement et la compétitivité des territories” – “Inter-
ministerial delegation for regional planning and competitiveness” 
since end of 2009: DATAR: “Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité 
régionale” - “French Delegation for Territorial Development and Regional Attractivity” 
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and towards being the contact person for the European commission to discuss the eligibility 
of French regions for the structural funds as well as being its administrator (Gévart, 2006).  
 
2.1.2 Decentralisation efforts since the 1980s 
The DATAR particularly gained in importance in 1982 (Thibault, 2008). In 1982, under the 
presidency of François Mitterrand (socialist party, president from 1981 to 1995), France 
passed several laws to pave the way away from a centralist system and towards a more 
decentralist, and thus Girondin system (Gévart, 2006). These laws paved the way for more 
regional autonomy and away from a pyramidal system where the central state is on the top 
and the subsequent entities (such as regions, departments, or municipality) have no power 
(Gévart, 2006). 
 
Within this new and more decentralist structure the DATAR was responsible for putting in 
place the contractual arrangements between the central State and the regional authorities 
(Thibault, 2008). However, these decentralisation developments were also negative for the 
DATAR that, as a central State organ, was responsible for a national coherence. The 
multiplication of decision centers throughout the French territory and the decreasing budget 
allocated to the DATAR lead to its strong loss of power (Gévart, 2006). Some voices even 
wanted to suppress the delegation (Gévart, 2006). However, the DATAR survived and still 
operates today. 
 
Additionally, the developments towards decentralisation at the beginning of the 1980s were 
also the advent of the end of the national industrial plan implemented by the Commissariat 
général du Plan. The last full plan was implemented between 1989 and 1992, and the plan that 
started in 1993 was finally abandoned (Thibault, 2008). However, compared to the DATAR 
that “survived” the decentralisation movements, the “Commissariat général du Plan” closed 
its doors in 2006. The State’s decreasing focus on industry can even be observed when 
looking at the titles of the French industrial ministries (see Annex 4 for a list of all French 
minister titles since the beginning of the 5th republic). Up to the middle of the 1990s, the title 
of the ministers of industry always included the word “Industry”. However, this changed 
radically from 1997 onwards, were economy and financed was put at the centre of the title. In 
2012, economy and finance, lost against the word recovery. However, the word “industry” 
has either vanished or considerably decreased in importance (instead of being the first word of 
the title, it was pushed to the end). 
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2.1.3 Summary 
To summarize, also in France, the 1980s represented a period of profound changes that go 
hand in hand with the literature already discussed in this thesis. On the one hand, the French 
regions gained in importance during the 1980s, as the State forced itself by adopting new laws 
to give more power to the regions. On the other hand, the national industrial plan was finally 
abandoned. This is in line with the observed changing production system during the 1980s. A 
shift away from industrial policies and big vertically integrated companies, and towards more 
flexible and smaller innovative companies at a regional level. France, embedded in the global 
world, followed somehow the fashion of its decade, away from a policy favouring national 
champions at a national level and towards cluster support at the local level (Brette & 
Chappoz, 2007). 
 
2.2 Between centralisation and decentralisation: living the cluster policy 
In the previous section we tried to explain to a maybe non-French reader of this thesis the 
French centralist culture but at the same time its decentralisation ambitions. In this section we 
will discuss the French policy-driven cluster supports. From the 1980s onwards, 
decentralisation took place regarding regional planning (Plunket & Torre, 2009), but the 
centralist forces did not completely vanish. 
 
The French cluster policies are built on this ambiguous relationship between centralisation 
and decentralisation, which render the whole French political system rather complex. The last 
French cluster policy evaluation report for example dedicated a whole chapter on the 
perceived complexity of the system (Erdyn, et al., 2012), also recent French PhD theses 
underlined this fact (Chabault, 2009; Lallemand, 2013), or a recent academic report dedicated 
to the French research and innovation policies and the regional R&D attractiveness (Gallié, 
2008). 
 
Menu (2012, p. 831) for example says that it is “a mix of state dirigisme and local 
mobilizations”. Additionally, Menu (2011, p. 106) concludes that these “new modes of 
governance” only have “limited effects”. For Menu (2011, p. 106), who also has a deep 
knowledge of the German cluster policy system (particularly the Bavarian clusters), the 
French cluster policy has mainly been “a tool for the French Government for a new “mise en 
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scène” of its role as a key actor in the industry”. This is heavily criticized by Menu (2011) 
who argues that research has already shown that a more local governance for clusters seems 
to be more efficient. However, there are some French regions which are highly active in 
structuring their regional innovation system on the local level, as for example Nord-Pas-de-
Calais (Malaterre-Vaille, 2010) or the PACA region (Scandella, 2008). 
 
However, there are also opposing voices like Fixari & Pallez (2014) who pledge not to have a 
too simplistic view regarding the complexity of the French cluster ecosystem. Fixari & Pallez 
(2014) argue that yes there is an administrative complexity but maybe sometimes an 
additional layer of coordination might be preferable than a spontaneous simplification. They 
argue that the “administrative simplification, is a thinking …. that should become more 
complex” (Fixari & Pallez, 2014, p. 27). Instead of just focusing on the sheer number of 
structures or appellation and criticizing their increase, new structures might also bring an 
amelioration for certain actors. All depends who is the observer of the system. Finally, Fixari 
& Pallez (2014) argue that there is also just a “complexity feeling” because of the sheer 
cognitive difficulty to capture a highly systemic system. Even though the discussions of 
Fixari & Pallez (2014) are highly interesting, there is nevertheless a big challenge to explain 
this system to a non-French audience in English without getting lost what French people 
themselves call the “mille-feuille administratif”154. 
 
Hereinafter, we first discuss the basic characteristics of the French policy-driven cluster 
initiatives. We particularly focus on the question if the French cluster policy is a bottom-up or 
top-down initiative (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005) and second we present the large 
variety of policy-driven initiatives implemented on the French territory. 
 
                                                 
154
 A “mille-feuille” is a famous French pastry composed out of several layers of puff pastry and pastry cream. 
Literal translated mille-feuille means thousand leaves. The term “mille-feuille administratif” makes an allusion 
to the manifold layers of public administration. This expression is deeply anchored in the consciousness of the 
French population and often mentioned in the newspapers. However, even though different prime ministers 
regularly formulate the wish to simplify this “mille-feuille administratif” (see for example recently the current 
prime minister Manuel Valls: http://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/remaniement/gouvernement-valls/comment-
valls-veut-simplifier-radicalement-le-millefeuille-territorial_572017.html , 08/04/2014), it seems that the 
consciousness of the problem and the reality of action does not convert. Without elaborating this topic further, 
but for me, Crozier’s analysis of the French culture, might contribute in explaining the French incapacity of 
finding a solution to the “mille-feuille” problem. Crozier wrote his work 50 years ago, it would be interesting to 
do a similar study in the innovation age. This would also be a highly interesting avenue for further research.  
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2.2.1 National open calls for tender: Bottom-up or top-down initiatives?  
There are two important basic characteristics one has to understand before immersing into the 
policy-driven cluster initiatives implemented by the French State to foster clusters on its 
territory. On the one hand the French tradition of open calls for tender and on the other hand 
the importance of labels. 
 
In order to mobilize the different actors on the French territory (be it for example training 
institutes, research institutes, companies, regional authorities, or trade unions) to join forces 
around a project to structure their own policy-driven cluster in their region, the State has since 
the 1990s adopted the tradition to regularly launch open calls for tender. These open calls for 
tender then mobilize the local actors around a specific project to structure ex nihilo, or in 
continuation of existing projects, the “regional systems”. The specific objectives vary 
according to the tender, for example more oriented towards innovation, industrial production 
or regional development. In the rest of this section, we will thus not use the word policy-
driven cluster but just “regional system”. 
 
Once the deadline of the tender has passed and the project leaders of the potential “regional 
systems” have submitted their applications, the state (in the form of an expert committee) 
evaluates all the projects and decides if the project fulfils the necessary criteria set out in the 
tender. If yes, the State then attributes an official State label to this “regional system” project. 
First of all, the State label is important because it is perceived as a quality stamp. Second, 
having a label brings an increased visibility on the regional, national or international level. 
Finally, maybe the most important point, the label makes the “regional system” project 
eligible to a certain amount of State subsidies (either directly or through additional calls of 
tender where only the labelled projects can apply to).  
 
These national calls for tender also raise an important theoretical question. For example 
Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith (2005, p. 1256) analysed institutional forms of cluster 
promotions and separated these forms into roughly two opposing categories: (1) “top-down” 
clusters, organized and initiated by public authorities, and (2) “bottom-up” clusters, organized 
and initiated by “private industrial initiatives and organizations”. To which category do the 
French “regional systems” initiatives count, knowing that they are created through open calls 
for tender where mobilized actors could apply to? 
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For example, on the one hand, Lallemand (2013, p. 138), analysing the policy-driven cluster 
initiative launched by the French government in 2004 (“politique des pôles de 
compétitivité”), considers that this French initiative belongs to the “bottom-up” clusters. She 
justifies this point of view by arguing that the actors take a deliberate decision to submit the 
project to the State. This bottom-up opinion is also supported by Fontagné et al (2013, p. 
898), who even underline that “the French competitiveness clusters policy can be said to be 
an archetypal modern industrial policy” as “projects emanate from the firms and the regions, 
within the framework defined by the calls for tender.” For Fontagné et al (2013, p. 898) such 
an initiative can not be a top-down approach “whereby the public authorities decide 
everything”. 
 
On the other hand, Berthinier-Poncet (2012, p. 68), also analysing the French policy-driven 
cluster initiative launched by the French government in 2004 (“politique des pôles de 
compétitivité”), argues that this initiative belongs to the “top-down” clusters as the State 
makes the necessary impulse and closely monitors the system. Also in one of our articles we 
argued that it is closer to a top-down initiative: “although French competitiveness clusters 
evolve in line with their own strategy, they are all embedded in a top-down national policy.” 
(Gallié, et al., 2013b, p. 1660). However, our nuanced description of the French policy 
(Gallié, et al., 2013b), already implicitly underlined that the answer regarding French cluster 
policies is probably: “it depends”, “it depends from which angle one looks at it”. We will 
come back to this point in our discussion.  
 
2.2.2 Large variety of “regional system” initiatives 
France counts different types of “regional system” initiatives that are launched by open calls 
for tender at the State level since the 1990s. Hereinafter, we now list the main French 
examples of “regional system” policies and then classify them according to the main public 
policy actions they wish to cover. However, we not discuss them in detail and limit ourselves 
to just giving some main references.  
 
For the “regional system” initiatives launched before the 1990s, the State did not launch open 
calls for tender, for example: 
- the “Technopoles” initiative (“Technopoles”) launched in the 1970s (Burnier & 
Lacroix, 1996; Cooke, 2001; Longhi & Quéré, 1993); 
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- the “Business incubators” initiative (“Pépinières d’entreprise”) launched in the 1980s 
(Benko, 1989); 
- the “Regional Center of innovation and technology transfer” (“Centre régional 
d'innovation et de transfert de technologie” (CRITT)) launched in the beginning of the 
1980s; 
- the “Conversion Poles” initiative (“Pôle de conversion”) launched in 1984 (Chappoz 
& Poisat, 2000; Chautard & Zuindeau, 2001; Tuppen & Thompson, 1994); 
 
However, from the 1990s onwards, in a more decentralist tendency, the State privileged one 
or several open calls for tender to decide which of the submitted “regional system” projects 
will receive the “label”, for example: 
- the “Local productive systems” initiative (“Systèmes productifs locaux” (SPL)) 
launched in 1997 (Grossetti, 2004; Guillaume, 2008; Pommier & Boilève, 2002)155; 
- the “Research and technological innovation networks” initiative (“Réseaux de 
recherche et d’innovation technologique” (RRIT)) launched in 1998 (Merlin, 2003; 
Ministère, 2002; OECD, 2004)156; 
- the “competitiveness cluster” initiative (“Pôles de compétitivité”)157 launched in 2004 
(Duranton, Martin, & Mayer, 2008; Jacquet & Darmon, 2005; Retour, 2009c; T. Weil 
& Fen Chong, 2008); 
- the “Carnot institutes network” initiative (“Institut Carnot”)158 launched in 2006 
(Guinot, 2010)159, or 
- the “Business cluster” initiative (“Grappes d’entreprises”)160 launched in 2009 
(DATAR, 2010, 2011) 
 
In the beginning of this section we discussed the different traditional policies (regional, 
science and technology, industrial and enterprise policy) that now cumulate into just one type 
                                                 
155
 A productive local system (SPL) is a group of companies, mainly SMEs that put resources in common and 
develop synergies on a territory, to increase their economic efficiency (09/04/2010 : www.datar.gouv.fr). Annex 
5 summarizes the SPL initiative and the differences with the “competitiveness cluster” initiative. 
156
 See also: http://www.cnrs.fr/Cnrspresse/n402/html/n402loietmesures2.htm (accessed 30/06/2014) 
157
 See the project website: http://competitivite.gouv.fr/ (accessed 30/06/2014) 
158
 See the project website: http://www.instituts-carnot.eu/ (accessed 30/06/2014); or website of the national 
research agency: http://www.agence-nationale-recherche.fr/financer-votre-projet/impact-de-la-recherche-et-
competitivite/les-instituts-carnot/ (accessed 30/06/2014) 
159
 To gain a good general overview of the French efforts regarding regional development and 
regional innovation policies we can recommend following articles and reports: Tuppen & Thompson 
(1994), Gallié (2008), the OECD (2010) and Godet (2010). 
160
 See the project website: http://www.datar.gouv.fr/grappes-dentreprises (accessed 30/06/2014) 
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of policy: cluster policies (OECD, 2007). Table 27 summarizes the just listed policies 
supporting the development of French “regional systems”, and classifies them according to 
their main focus of public action. As we can see from Table 27, the “Competitiveness cluster” 
policy but also the “Business cluster” initiative are the most global policies as they cover all 
three types of public action. For France, it is the “Competitiveness cluster” initiative that is 
today the flagship of France’s policy-driven cluster initiatives as it encompasses a more 
international orientation than the more local and smaller “business cluster” initiative. The 
“Competitiveness cluster” initiative launched in 2004 seems to answer simultaneously the 
entire fields necessary to support the innovation systems promoted by the Lisbon strategy 
and, more recently, by the EU 2020 strategy. 
 
Table 27: Examples of policies supporting “regional systems” in France 
Launch Different French policies Regional policy 
Science and 
technology 
policy 
Industrial and 
enterprise 
policy 
1970s “Technopoles” (“Technopoles”)  X X  
1980s “Business incubator” (“Pépinières d’entreprise”) X  X 
1980s 
“Regional Center of innovation and technology 
transfer” 
(“Centre régional d'innovation et de transfert de 
technologie” (CRITT)) 
 X X 
1984 “Conversion Poles”  (“Pôle de conversion”)  X   
1998 “Local productive systems” (“Systèmes productifs locaux” (SPL)) X  X 
1998 
“Research and technological innovation 
networks” 
(“Réseaux de recherche et d’innovation 
technologique” (RRIT)) 
 X X 
2004 “Competitiveness cluster”  (“Pôles de compétitivité”) X X X 
2006 “Carnot institutes network” (“Institut Carnot”)  X X 
2009 “Business cluster” (“Grappes d’entreprises”) X X X 
Source: inspired from Fen Chong (2009, p. 56) and further developed 
 
French counts a multitude of different initiatives that try to structure its “regional systems”. 
Therefore, it is also important to underline that little by little a strong juxtaposition of 
different initiatives emerged, particularly because previous initiatives are normally not 
abandoned but continue to exist in parallel to the new initiatives. This might show the strong 
wish of the French State not to abandon created local dynamics and to constantly improve its 
efforts to structure the “regional systems” located on its territory. However, passing from one 
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type of “regional system” project to the next also creates problems of acceptance (Bardet, 
2011) as little by little different initiatives juxtapose each other creating confusion of 
responsibilities between the different projects and incomprehension among the beneficiaries 
but also competition between the regional systems. Additionally, some regions (such as the 
PACA region), using their increased power thanks to the 1982 decentralisation laws, privilege 
to additionally also launch their own regional initiatives (Scandella, 2008). The French 
system can therefore be perceived as highly complex, even though, as already mentioned, the 
complexity always depends from which perspective one looks at it (Fixari & Pallez, 2014). 
 
However, there are some initiatives that try to reduce the complexity by ignoring the different 
types of policies and instead focusing on the main objective, namely helping those that 
manage “regional systems” to do their best. For example there is the “France Clusters” 
platform161 or the RETIS innovation association162 both supported by the State. For example 
“France Clusters” was previously called “French club of industrial districts” (“club français 
des districts industriels” (CDIF)). The club adopted its current name in 2009 to have a more 
international name. However, the club already exists since 1997. Today they have 
approximately 150 French “regional systems” as members (be it for example “Local 
productive systems”, “Business clusters” or “competitiveness clusters”). “France Clusters” 
tries to be a platform of exchange, access to other “regional systems” (local and international), 
expertise and training for all French “regional system” managers on the French territory.  
 
Additionally, in 2011, France Cluster also supported the creation of a French-German Master 
called “Management of clusters and regional networks” (“Animateur de cluster et de réseaux 
territoriaux” / “Management von Clustern und regionalen Netzwerken”), the first and only of 
this type in Europe163. This master, delivered by the University of Strasbourg and the 
Hochschule in Kehl further underlines the increasing professionalization of this sector.  
 
                                                 
161
 See the initiative’s website: http://www.franceclusters.fr/ (accessed 20/06/2014). 
162
 See the initiative’s website: http://www.retis-innovation.fr/ (accessed 20/06/2014). RETIS stands for 
“Recherche, Education, Territoires, Interventions, Sociabilités” and is the French national branch of the IASP 
that labels technopoles.  
163
 See the Master’s website: http://www.master-clustermanager.eu/ (accessed 20/06/2014) 
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Chapter 6:  The case of the French “competitiveness cluster” policy 
In this chapter we now describe the case of the French “competitiveness cluster” policy and 
HCPR. We first describe the specificities of the French cluster policy, how it was set-up and 
implemented. Then we will turn to the one of the clusters that the cluster policy initiated: 
HCPR. The policy-driven cluster we investigated is situated in the Paris Region and more 
particularly specialized in biotechnologies & health. We first focus on the particularity of the 
Paris Region’s economic indicators, second we focus on the policy-driven clusters situated in 
the Paris Region, and finally on HCPR in particular. In doing so we lay the ground stone for 
our fieldwork analysis. As discussed in the literature review, the type of activity of the policy-
driven cluster (Coletti, 2010; McDonald, et al., 2007) but also its geographical location 
(Altenburg & Meyer-Stamer, 1999; H. Bathelt & Zeng, 2005; Doloreux & Shearmur, 2009; 
Li & Geng, 2012; Peters, 2005) are important characteristics that need to be discussed and 
presented to guarantee an external validity (Yin, 2013).  
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1 The specificities of the French “competitiveness cluster” policy 
We first discuss the emergence of the cluster policy idea, then focus on the implementation of 
the policy and finally look at some emerging organisational dilemmas that can be observed. 
 
1.1 The idea of the policy 
As we have already seen, France’s GDP growth rate (see Figure 18) as well as its contribution 
to global growth (see Figure 19) declined considerably during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2002, 
under these quite gloom macroenvironmental circumstances, the CIADT164 approved to 
launch new initiatives to revitalize the French territory (Younès, 2011). The French prime 
minister at that time (Mr Jean-Pierre Raffarin) decided to commission two reports: one with 
the DATAR (2004) and one with a parliamentarian called Christian Blanc165 (2004) to dig 
into the subject of economic and regional development. However, instead of being 
complementary to each other, the two reports defended two opposing opinions (Younès, 
2011). Table 28 synthesises and opposes the two reports. 
 
Initially, the two reports had two different objectives: to describe the French current situation 
(DATAR, 2004), and to review what is done in terms of fostering regional networks in other 
countries (Blanc, 2004). However, the two reports also gave recommendations what they 
considered should be done in France and here the opinions went in opposite direction: 
According to the DATAR (2004) the industry is the most important element for jobs, 
national wealth and competitiveness, but the industry is in difficulties (due to an increased 
global and European competition) and should be supported. The entities that play a central 
role in this process are the large companies, because only the large companies are able to 
create employment (and not the SME). Additional, the report considered important to foster 
networks in a Markusen (1996) “hub-and-spoke” style, this means fostering typical client-
supplier networks where a main company is surrounded by a multitude of SMEs. Finally, one 
main theoretical inspiration for the DATAR (2004) report was the new economic geography 
                                                 
164
 Interministerial Committee on Regional Planning and Development, this committee is responsible for 
national policy decisions (“Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de développement du territoire”) 
165
 Christian Blanc is a former chairman of RATP, Air France, and Merrill Lynch (Younès, 2011). 
Cohen (2007, p. 223) underlines that appointing important personalities is a recurrent tradition in 
France which also represents the French Jacobin mentality: “In France, a country stemming from the 
Jacobin tradition, problems of public action enter the national agenda after ritually designating 
prestigious personalities to write a report to the President”.  
Second part: Research design and empirical context – Chapter six 
 
 183 
theory developed by Krugman (1991 (1993)), placing international trade and exports in the 
center for national job creation and growth. According to Christian Blanc (2004), 
innovation is the most important element for jobs, national wealth and competitiveness. 
Breakthrough innovations are not able to develop because there exists an old and inflexible 
regional organisation of actors, still inspired by Taylorism and not adapted to modernity. To 
turn the wheel around, Blanc (2004) recommends the fostering of proximity at the regional 
level in order to get the different actors to talk and work with each other. At the centre of 
Blanc’s (2004) arguments stay the SMEs. The SMEs have to be supported because they have 
a higher regional anchorage than large companies. Additionally, networks between research 
and teaching institutes and SMEs have to be strengthened. The best way to strengthen these 
networks is to set up a governance and specific performance objectives. Finally, one main 
theoretical inspiration for Blanc (2004) was the competitive advantage and cluster theory of 
Porter (1990 (1998)). 
 
Table 28: Two opposing views: the conflicting base of the French cluster policy 
 DATAR (2004) report C. Blanc (2004) report 
Main objective of 
report 
Describing the French situation, 
finding the reasons for the 
deindustrialisation 
Describing what is done in other countries in 
terms of fostering regional networks166 
Reason for gloom 
economic situation 
in France 
Globalisation and enlargement of 
the European Union (increased 
competition)  
Old and inflexible regional organisation of 
actors, inspired by Taylorism and not adapted to 
the modernity 
Main problems High location costs hinders 
industrial development 
Higher education oriented towards engineering 
and management; R&D in the Paris Region and 
production in the regions; lack of breakthrough 
innovation  
Key element for 
jobs, national 
wealth and 
competitiveness 
Industry; exporting and conducting 
foreign investments 
Innovation; fostering proximity and easy tacit 
knowledge exchange; the regional level is the 
best level for innovation 
Central role Large companies because they 
create employment (compared to 
SMEs) 
SMEs because they have a higher regional 
anchorage (compared to the large companies) 
Network type Company networks; particularly 
client-supplier networks; 
implementing necessary financing 
structure and infrastructure 
Networks between research and teaching 
institutes and SME networks; set up of 
structured networks with governance and 
performance objectives  
Centralist vs. 
Decentralist  
Centralist: the State plays a major 
role in organising the initiative; 
administrative organisation is not 
criticized 
Decentralist: Against the high centralisation in 
France; delegation of specific State function to 
the regional level to better manage the regional 
economic actors; administrative organisation is 
criticized 
Theoretical 
inspiration 
Inspired by the new economic 
geography of Krugman (1991 
(1993)) 
Inspired by the competitive advantage and 
cluster theory of Porter (1990 (1998)) 
Source: Summary based on Younès’s (2011, pp. 51-59) analysis 
                                                 
166
 Report is based on studies of different clusters in the United-States and other European countries. 
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The government and the different ministries based their reflexions regarding the concrete 
terms and conditions of the planned French cluster policy on these two reports. Three 
ministries were particularly integrated in these reflections: the Ministry of Industry, the 
Ministry of Research and the Ministry of Regional Planning (Younès, 2011). However, the 
two opposing reports, created more opposing views when exposed to three different ministries 
(see Table 29).  
 
Whereas the Ministry of Regional Planning put a great emphasis on maintaining a territorial 
equilibrium and also investing in regions that are less developed, the Ministry of Industry had 
the exact opposite view by emphasising the selection of national champions that are already 
known and that can be promoted rapidly on an international level. For the Ministry of 
Research, universities and research centres play a crucial role in regional and national growth, 
and therefore they should be put in the centre of any policy-driven cluster initiative. 
 
The fuzziness of the cluster concept, allowed building a broad consensus among the different 
parties. Based on the two reports and the different views of the ministries, the French cluster 
policy (“politique de pôles de compétitivité”) was born in 2004. 
 
Table 29: Three different ministries: the basis for conflicting interests 
 Ministry of Industry Ministry of Research Ministry of Regional 
Planning 
Principal position National champions, fight 
against international 
competition, support the 
sectors and big 
companies that are 
already well positioned 
internationally and which 
are most important for 
the Nation 
Innovative milieus, 
universities and research 
centres play the most 
important role for 
growth, regional 
anchorage is important 
Territorial equilibrium 
must be maintained, 
SMEs in the center, 
construction regional 
networks, also structural 
weak regions must be 
supported (and not only 
national champions) 
Closer to  DATAR (2004) report C. Blanc (2004) report Both reports but closer to 
C. Blanc (2004)  
Source: Summary based on Younès’s (2011, pp. 60-66) analysis 
 
1.2 The implementation of the policy 
In this section we focus on the set up of the policy. We will first present the set-up of the 
policy and then focus on several challenges regarding the liberty of policy-driven clusters vs. 
public authorities.  
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1.2.1 A centralised implementation… 
In a first step, we discuss the conditions of the national call for tender that grants the official 
policy-driven cluster label. In a second step, we discuss the main financial subsidies 
associated to this cluster policy label and to which the labelled policy-driven clusters can 
apply. Finally, in a third step, we focus on the governance structure of policy-driven clusters. 
 
1.2.1.1 Call for tender 
In 2004, the CIADT167 published a press kit where it explained the new French cluster policy 
and announced a national call for tender regarding the implementation of policy-driven 
clusters - called “pôles de compétitivité” (“competitiveness clusters”) - on the French territory 
(CIADT, 2004). The French cluster policy was conceived to be mainly built around subsidies 
for collaborative R&D projects that the future policy-driven cluster members could apply for. 
Additionally, each policy-driven cluster was meant to set up a governance structure. 
 
The French policy-driven clusters should combine on “a given territory, companies, training 
centers and research units”, all “committed to a partnership approach for synergies around 
innovative projects” (CIADT, 2004, p. 5). Additionally, they should have “the critical mass 
necessary for an international visibility” (CIADT, 2004, p. 5). Depending on the structure of 
the policy-driven cluster “the partnership [should] be organized around a market, a 
technological field or industry”. This wide definition let all options open. On the one hand, 
“clusters dominated by technology, where research and development are preeminent” were 
invited to candidate, as well as “cluster[s] predominantly industrial, more structured by the 
density of production and commercialization” (CIADT, 2004, p. 5). The only thing which 
was important was that a potential policy-driven cluster applicant should be composed out of 
three types of actors - i.e. companies, training centers, and research units – and pursue three 
objectives - i.e. partnership, innovation, and international visibility (CIADT, 2004, p. 5). 
Additionally, the different actors of the policy-driven cluster should be concentrated “in the 
same region” (CIADT, 2004, p. 5).  
 
Besides these central elements and the strong orientation towards innovation (following the 
ideas stipulated in the report of Blanc (2004) and thus influenced by Porter (1990 (1998))), 
                                                 
167
 “Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de développement du territoire” 
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the press kit (CIADT, 2004) showed that the different ministries privileged a broad consensus 
between the opinions of the various ministries. The announcement of the cluster policy left 
plenty of room of interpretation, targeting a very large number of heterogeneous actors 
situated on the whole French territory. 
 
The first tender to apply for an official policy-driven cluster label was launched at the end of 
2004. According to Jacquet and Darmon (2005, p. 77) (cited by (Chabault, 2009)) the 
submitted projects were evaluated according to following criteria: 
- Targeted markets, growth perspective, competitive position of France 
- Critical size of the retained technology, competitive advantage on the market or 
markets, coherence of the proposition 
- Development strategy of the policy-driven cluster 
- Accordance of training objective with development strategy 
- Quality of the partnerships 
- Stability of the planned governance, characteristics of the organisation  
- Realistic nature of the R&D projects, in line with the policy-driven cluster’s strategy 
 
105 potential policy-driven clusters applied168 to the first tender and in 2005 the first 67 
selected policy-driven clusters were announced. At the end of the first phase France counted 
for 71 policy-driven clusters (see Figure 20). Instead of focusing on key sectors or key 
regions, the French policy opted to focus on a wide range of different sectors and to select one 
or several policy-driven clusters in nearly all of its 27 regions. For example, HealthCluster 
Paris Region (the policy-driven cluster we study in our empirical part) is one out of seven 
policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region and one out of seven policy-driven clusters 
specialised in the Biotechnology/Health sector in France. Finally, to prevent criticism to only 
be a regional development policy, the 71 clusters were categorised into three categories (7 
world-class policy-driven clusters, 11 potentially world-class policy-driven clusters and 53 
national policy-driven clusters). This allowed accentuating those policy-driven clusters having 
the critical mass and competence to succeed internationally. 
 
The different policy-driven clusters covered the whole French territory and all possible 
industry sectors, reflecting the French industrial variety. The policy-driven clusters ranged 
                                                 
168
 Some applicants were already structured around the previous “local productive system” (SPL) initiative. 
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from traditional industries such as textile, automobile, or wood to technologies such as 
nuclear or biotechnology. The common denominator of all these policy-driven clusters was to 
fulfil a range of different objectives, for example strengthening the industrial activities on the 
territory, increase the attractiveness and international visibility of France, develop 
employment in the local area, develop new partnerships thanks to subsidised R&D projects, 
develop new innovations capable to succeed in a globalised market, or increase the 
competitiveness of the companies (Bardet, 2011; Chabault, 2009). The rules were the same 
for every type of policy-driven cluster.  
 
The wish of the State that the policy-driven clusters reach a critical mass, lead to the fact that 
SMEs of all industries were accepted to join the policy-driven clusters nevertheless if they 
were active in R&D or not (Bardet, 2011). However, another requirement of the state was that 
it is not enough to only have a certain number of local actors that join the policy-driven 
cluster; it was also asked that the policy-driven cluster members participate in the 
collaborative R&D projects. Today, France counts its third policy-driven cluster phase (see 
Figure 20, the empirical fieldwork of this thesis is situated in the 2nd phase). Once a new 
phase is approved, the state guarantees to continue financing the policy at least until the end 
of the newly announced phase (currently at least up to 2018). The first and second phase both 
ended with an official policy-driven cluster evaluation (see Annex 18 and Annex 19 for two 
articles on this topic). Figure 20 shows that the number of policy-driven clusters was not 
stable but evolved with time due to additional labels, mergers and loss of policy-driven cluster 
labels. Today, June 2014, France counts 71 official policy-driven clusters on its territory. 
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Figure 20: Main milestones of the French cluster policy169 
 
Source: own compilation but slightly inspired by Lallemand (2013, p. 140) 
 
1.2.1.2 Main financial subsidies 
The R&D projects, around which the policy-driven cluster members should structure 
themselves, stand in the center of the French cluster policy. The policy-driven cluster 
members can apply for three different national subsidies. They can apply to the French 
National Research Agency (ANR), to the Unique Interministerial Fund (FUI) and to 
OSEO170. However, not only the national authorities subsidies the policy-driven cluster 
projects. For example, projects that are accepted by the FUI are then also co-financed by 
regional authorities. In case a project is not subsidised by a national fund, it can happen that 
the regional authority finances the project alone, particularly if the regional authority 
considers the project to be important for the local territory. 
  
The three agencies (ANR, FUI, OSEO) distinguish themselves regarding which projects they 
except to subsidies. The funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR) 
finances research projects based on partnerships between public and private actors, or more 
rarely, just between public laboratories. The aim of the ANR is to fund exploratory research 
projects that focus on developing new knowledge, meaning they are relatively distant from 
the market. ANR selects projects based on criteria of scientific excellence and then grants a 
“policy-driven cluster bonus” to the projects selected that have been accredited by a policy-
                                                 
169
 The date of the “Tenders & Applications” section corresponds to the announcement of the selected candidate. 
The tender itself was often launched in the previous year.  
170
 Today called Bpifrance 
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driven cluster, indicating that the project is in line with the policy-driven cluster’s strategy. 
The budgets of the projects are generally not higher than 4 million Euros.  
 
OSEO on the other hand supports innovation and economic development of French SMEs, 
whether they are members of a policy-driven cluster or not. There are various types of aid for 
SMEs (e.g. technological transfer, funding for commercializing a new product). The budget of 
the OSEO projects is general not higher than 3 million Euros.  
 
Finally, the Unique Interministerial Fund (FUI) is a one-stop shop that grants funding to 
joint research projects coming exclusively from policy-driven cluster projects. The FUI is 
thus the main funding entity for the policy-driven clusters. The fund brings together 
contributions from all ministries. To be eligible, projects must involve at least a minimum of 
two companies and a research laboratory. The projects financed must relate to innovations 
relatively close to the market. Local authorities can co-fund joint research projects funded by 
the FUI. The fund was set up in 2006 and issues regular project calls (most of the time twice a 
year). The financial subsidies do not go above 30% of the total budget (ranging from 1 to 10 
million Euros) and are of 45% for SMEs situated in the R&D zone of the policy-driven 
cluster.  
 
In order to be eligible to apply to the main policy-driven cluster subsidies fund (FUI), 
projects have to reply to the national project calls and meet several criteria of which the most 
important are: 
- Policy-driven cluster label. The submitted projects need at least one policy-driven 
cluster label from one of the 71 policy-driven cluster organisations. This policy-driven 
cluster label states that the quality of the project was officially recognised by one of 
the policy-driven clusters. 
- Collaborative R&D projects. To be eligible, projects must involve at least a minimum 
of two companies and a private or public research laboratory/institute or training 
institute. 
- Innovation. The projects financed must relate to innovations relatively close to the 
market and should develop one or several products / services with a strong innovative 
content.  
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- Economic impact. The projects should have an impact on the national territory in 
terms of employment, investment, sector development or economic change 
anticipation. 
- Geographical proximity. The project should be composed out of companies 
conducting R&D primarily in the territory of the policy-driven cluster that attributed 
the label. Companies of the research consortium that are situated outside the defined 
policy-driven cluster perimeter (of the policy-driven cluster that attributed the label) 
are not eligible to the highest percentage of subsidies. 
 
Additionally to the three main financing funds (OSEO, ANR and FUI), the “Caisse des 
dépôts et consignations” (CDC) (short “Caisse des dépôts” or in English “Deposits and 
Consignments Fund”) brings an additional support to the policy-driven clusters. This 
happened particularly during the second policy phase (2009-2012) (Chabault, 2009). The 
CDC is an old government institution not necessarily oriented towards research but generally 
towards helping French companies and territories. For example three of the CDC programmes 
were oriented towards the policy-driven clusters (Bardet, 2011): strengthening the funds of 
the companies that participate in the policy-driven cluster, developing high speed internet on 
the whole French territory (together with the regional authorities), helping with real estate for 
companies and apartments for researchers to balance the urban-rural equilibrium.  
 
To sum up, the French cluster policy, accompanied by the FUI and the other national funds, is 
responsible for accelerating the clustering process in a defined geographic area where maybe 
no collaboration or only a weak collaboration culture previously existed. The clustering 
process should be mainly advanced through collaborative R&D projects.  
 
1.2.1.3 Governance structure 
Generally, the governance structure171 of a French policy-driven cluster can be split into two 
broad categories: strategic governance (comprising the supervisory board and the board of 
directors) and operational governance (comprising the management committee) (Bocquet & 
Mothe, 2009). 
 
                                                 
171
 A more detailed discussion of the gouevrnance of French policy-driven clusters can be found in our paper 
entitled “Governance Structures as Determinants of Resource Attraction? Evidence from French Clusters” (A. 
Glaser, et al., 2012) (see Annex 20) 
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The strategic governance is generally composed of the (1) supervisory board and the (2) 
board of directors. On the one hand, the supervisory board normally consists of different 
colleges (i.e. SMEs, large groups, research and/or training institutes or support entities), 
which meet a few times a year. The objective of the supervisory board ranges for example 
from deciding on the general strategic orientation of the policy-driven cluster, to nominating 
and supervising the board of directors, and to establishing links with the larger environment 
of the policy-driven cluster (e.g. other policy-driven clusters, institutions). On the other hand, 
the board of directors is composed of representatives of the supervisory board and the 
management committee. The board of directors watches if the general policy-driven cluster 
orientation, defined by the supervisory board, is correctly implemented by the management 
committee. Additionally, the board of directors for example raises new future oriented 
questions for the well functioning and development of the association. Each of the 71 French 
policy-driven clusters is steered by a different proportion of small and large companies, 
research and/or training institutes as well as support entities (e.g. local development 
agencies). 
 
The operational governance (or management committee) is responsible for the operational 
day-to-day activities of the policy-driven cluster. There are three different options of who this 
management committee can be: either the activities are assured by a permanent team, or by 
local authorities, or by employees from large companies. Most of the French policy-driven 
clusters registered as an association with a permanent team. The objective of this management 
committee is for example to enhance new partnerships between local actors, build strategic 
collaborative research and development projects, and promote an overall environment 
conducive for policy-driven cluster members in general and for innovation in particular. One 
important element of their day-to-day operations is to help local actors to set up their research 
projects, help with the writing of the projects, to label the most promising projects, to help 
presenting the projects to the national financial authorities and to guarantee a follow up. 
 
1.2.2 …that generates emerging organisational dilemmas 
Now we focus on the dependences between policy-driven clusters and governments. In total, 
for the time being we identified four strong dependences between policy-driven clusters and 
governments (see Table 30 for a summary). 
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1.2.2.1 State influence on the composition of the governance 
The first dependence concerns the state influence on the composition of the governance. The 
state, even though defining the general objectives and conditions (Jacquet & Darmon, 2005, 
p. 77), decided not to intervene on the legal status of the policy-driven clusters. In order to be 
considered as an official policy-driven cluster (and thus receive the official label), the state 
just had to be convinced that there will be a stability of the planned governance and that this 
governance will help the regional actors reach the stipulated goals (particularly in fostering 
R&D collaborations on the policy-driven cluster territory). Most of the potential policy-driven 
clusters opted for the status of a non-profit association. However, even though the sate did not 
intervene regarding the legal status of the policy-driven cluster, it did precise who should be 
involved in its governance. The official CIADT definition (CIADT, 2004) stipulates that 
companies (be it SMEs or large companies), training centers and research units should be the 
main actors of the policy-driven clusters. Therefore, all of these parties should be responsible 
for organizing in an equal and tripartite manner the policy-driven cluster’s governance. All 
parties had to sign a framework contract with the state that specifies exactly this governance 
structure, the economic development strategy and the policy-driven cluster’s R&D zone. 
 
1.2.2.2 Role of the regional authorities in the governance structure 
The second dependence concerns the role of the regional authorities in the governance 
structure. Even though the companies, training centers and research units should distribute the 
governance among themselves and independently from national and regional authorities 
(Jacquet & Darmon, 2005), the regional authorities de facto also play a major role in the 
functioning of the policy-driven clusters. Some regional authorities were strongly active in the 
set up of some of the policy-driven clusters, before they were submitted for labelling to the 
national tender. On the one hand, the regional authorities were involved because they wanted 
to guarantee a fit between the strategy of the policy-driven cluster and the strategy of the 
region (Bardet, 2011). On the other hand, the regional authorities are involved because they, 
such as the state, are responsible for financially supporting the policy-driven clusters. 
However, the fact that regional authorities are actually involved in the governance of the 
policy-driven clusters also led to considerable tensions (Chabault, 2009) as we will see with 
next point.  
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1.2.2.3 Conflicting opinions around the set up of the R&D zone 
The third dependences focuses on the conflicting opinions around the set up of the R&D 
zone. Defining a policy-driven cluster’s R&D zone is a particular important element of the 
policy. Only those companies that are situated within a policy-driven cluster’s R&D zone are 
eligible to certain tax advantages and higher subsidies when applying for research funds with 
the national agencies. The main problem was though that regional authorities continued to 
think in administrative regional terms and industrials in excellence terms. For industrials it 
was important to set up well functioning policy-driven clusters including the most interesting 
and promising companies and research institutes in a certain domain. Industrials were not 
thinking in administrative regional terms but in excellence terms. The consequence was that 
the regional authorities did not always accept the proposed R&D zones of the industrials. The 
best R&D zones for the industrials (sometimes spanning over several administrative regions) 
were not always the best R&D zones for the regional authorities (keen on respecting the 
administrative layers and boundaries). However, the problem was that the policy-driven 
clusters had to sign a framework contract with the regional and national authorities. The R&D 
zone quarrels sometimes lead regional authorities to refuse to sign the “framework contract” 
and intensive negotiations with all parties were necessary in order to find a solution 
(Chabault, 2009). 
 
1.2.2.4 Financial resources are dependent on national authorities 
Even though the management committee has to assure the functioning of the cluster, its 
financial resources are quite scarce and strongly depended on national authorities. In total, the 
French government has spent three billion Euros for its cluster policy between 2005 and 2012. 
However, only a small portion (3.3%), reinforced by membership fees and local authorities, 
was used for the functioning of the policy-driven cluster, while the main portion (96.7%) was 
dedicated to specific projects (R&D projects, innovation platforms, or collective actions 
covering very different themes). The State preferred to invest relatively little into the structure 
and to reserve most of the money for R&D projects. However, this does not mean that each 
policy-driven cluster is eligible to the same amount of research money or eligible the same 
number of R&D projects. Subsidies for the projects are mostly distributed through official 
national calls for tender. Every policy-driven cluster has to motivate its members to submit 
potential R&D projects. In a first step to the policy-driven cluster which scrutinizes the 
projects and if the scientific committees of each policy-driven cluster considers that the 
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project might have a chance to get financial subsidies from the state, it attributes an official 
policy-driven cluster label to the project. The labelled projects can then, in a second step, be 
submitted to the national financial agencies (FUI, ANR, OSEO). The state did not allocate to 
each policy-driven cluster a certain amount of money that can then be used independently by 
the policy-driven cluster, either for structuring the ecosystem or financing research. The 
decision of granting financing to a particularly project is thus not situated with the policy-
driven cluster but with the national financial authorities. The policy-driven cluster continues 
to stay in a strong permanent dependence with the national authorities. 
 
1.2.2.5 Summary 
Based on secondary literature, we identified four dependences between policy-driven clusters 
and governments: regarding the composition of the governance, regarding the strong role of 
the regional authorities, regarding the set up of the R&D zone, and regarding the financial 
resources (see Table 30). 
 
Table 30: First dependences observations 
 Theoretically But… 
Composition of the 
governance 
State does not intervene regarding the legal 
status of the policy-driven cluster 
But the state does stipulate that companies 
(be it SMEs or large companies), training 
centers and research units should be 
responsible for organizing in an equal and 
tripartite manner the governance 
Strong role of the 
regional 
authorities  
State underlines that the governance 
should be independent from national and 
regional authorities 
But de facto regional authorities play a 
major role because of regional strategy 
and financial subsidies reasons 
Set up of the R&D 
zone 
The policy-driven cluster’s R&D zone 
should reflect in the best possible manner 
the most important actors of a certain 
territory 
But de facto regional administrative 
boundaries were difficult to overcome 
Financial 
resources 
Local governance has to structure the local 
ecosystem 
But the state keeps the financial resources 
tied to the national level 
 
2 Policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region 
We now focus on the policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region. We first discuss the Paris 
Region and its economic context, before looking at statistical indicators of the policy-driven 
clusters that are situated in the Region.  
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2.1 The economic context of the Paris Region 
In this section we first focus on the position of the Paris Region in France and then compare 
the Paris Region to nine other important core Regions Europe. This comparison will show us 
that the Paris Region is the economic and scientific hub of France but has a dangerous “stuck 
in the middle position” compared to London and Baden-Württemberg. 
 
2.1.1 A leading position in France 
The Paris Region is the economic and scientific hub of France. The Paris Region (in French: 
“Île-de-France”, regional code 75) is one out of 27 French Regions172. Table 31 presents some 
key figures of the Paris Region and the share the Region accounts for in France. 
 
The population in the Paris Region is younger than the French average due to the high amount 
of higher education and research institutes situated in the Region. The education level is also 
much higher than in the rest of France as 40% of the Paris Region population has a higher 
education degree compared to only 29% on the whole French territory. Approximately 1/4 of 
the French jobs are situated in the Region, which produces 31% of the French GDP. The 
Region is also a hub for R&D as 1/3 of the French R&D workforce is situated in the Region 
and 41% of the French R&D money is spend there. 
 
                                                 
172
 In 2014, France counts 27 administrative regions. 22 regions are situated in Metropolitan France (Corse 
included) and 5 regions are situated in oversee. 
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Table 31: Paris Region’s key figures and the share it accounts for in France 
 Paris Region France Year 
Population 11 915 000 18.2% 2012 
Age 0-29* 30.0% 27.0% 2012 
Age 25-39* 20.0% 16.0% 2012 
Age 40-69* 32.0% 33.0% 2012 
Age 70 and over* 18.0% 34.0% 2012 
Higher education level among the 25-64 years* 40.0% 29.0% 2010 
Jobs na 23.0% 2012 
GDP (€ million) 607 439 31.0% 2011 
GDP per capita € 51 118 na 2011 
R&D workforce (including researchers) 150 000 37.0% 2011 
Researchers 100 000 40.0% 2011 
R&D expenditure (€ billion) 18.4 41.0% 2011 
Exports (€ billion) 78 18.0% 2012 
Imports (€ billion) 134 26.0% 2012 
* Comparison of the Paris Region with France 
** EU27 data 
Source: Data assembled from two reports: “Paris Region Key Figures 2014” Report173 & CROCIS (2011) 
 
2.1.2 A comparison to other high performing European regions 
The Paris Region, compared to the rest of France, is definitely in an excellent position. 
Therefore, it seems more interesting to compare the Pairs Region to other high-performing 
regions in Europe. 
 
In order to improve the statistical comparability of European regions, Eurostat174 has created 
the NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) classification175. The NUTS 
classification has three levels NUTS 1 (“major socio-economic regions”), NUTS 2 (“basic 
regions for the application of regional policies”) and NUTS 3 (“small regions for specific 
diagnoses”). The Paris Region (Ile-de-France) is a NUTS 1 region. In total, Eurostat has 
currently defined 97 regions at the NUTS 1 level. Hereinafter we will compare the 10 richest 
(GDP 2008) NUTS 1 regions in Europe (see Figure 21) on several indicators as for example 
R&D, GDP, Patents, etc. We retrieved the Eurostat data from the CROCIS (2011) report176. 
In general, London, Baden Württemberg and Bayern are the three regions, which are the most 
                                                 
173
 The report “Paris Region Key Figures 2014” can be accessed here: http://www.paris-
region.com/sites/default/files/key-figures-bd.pdf (accessed 03/06/2014) 
174
 Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg. (website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ ) 
175
 Eurostat defines the NUTS classification as “a hierarchical system for dividing up the economic territory of 
the EU for the purpose of”: (1) “the collection, development and harmonisation of EU regional statistics”, (2) 
“Socio-economic analyses of the regions”, (3) “Framing of EU regional policies”. (source: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ , accessed 03/06/2014) 
176
 CROCIS = “Centre régional d'observation du commerce de l'industrie et des services” est un centre 
d'observation de la chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris. 
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interesting to look at in order to compare and challenge the Paris Region. We will first 
concentrate on the London region and then on the two German regions.  
 
Figure 21: The 10 richest NUTS 1 Regions in Europe in 2008 
 
Legend A: Every number in the map corresponds to a NUTS 1 Region 
- France: 3. Paris Region (Ile-de-France) 
- Germany: 1. Nordrhein-Westfalen, 4. Bayern, 8. Baden-Württemberg 
- Italy: 2. Nord-Ovest, 7. Nord-Est, 9. Centro 
- Netherlands: 10. West-Nederland 
- Spain: 6. Este 
- UK: 5. London 
Legend B: The order of the number corresponds to the GDP (in billions, in PPS, 2008) rank of the region. For 
example “1. Nordrhein-Westfalen” had the highest GDP (in billions, in PPS, 2008), followed by “2. Nord-
Ovest”, etc.  
Source: CROCIS (2011, p. 4) 
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Table 32: Paris Region’s position compared to other core European regions 
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Legend: dark boxes with white numbers = 1st place; light grey boxes with black and bold numbers = 2nd place; 
PR = Paris Region, EPO = European Patent Office, PPS = Power Purchasing Standard 
Source: Data retrieved from following report: CROCIS (2011) 
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The London and the Paris Region, both very densely populated regions, are very similar in 
several points. Both regions not only have the highest educated population but also the 
highest amount of employment in the tertiary sector (Paris Region: 81.6%; London Region 
81.1%) far ahead of the other eight regions. Additionally, both regions are also the richest 
regions in terms of GDP per capita and household disposable income. However, the GDP per 
capita evolution between 2000-2008 was strong in London (3.8%, the best progress among 
the 10 regions) but only 2.5% for the Paris Region (the 7th place among the 10 regions under 
scrutiny). This means that even though the Paris Region is still one of the richest regions in 
Europe, its competitive edge was shrinking compared to the other richest regions during the 
first decade of the 21st century. The London Region is suitable to compare the Paris Region 
regarding education and richness but not for R&D as the London Region, compared to the 
other core regions, is investing nearly nothing in R&D (only 1.04% of its GDP) and has the 
lowest number of patent applications.  
 
Regarding R&D, the two regions, which are important to look at, are Baden-Württemberg and 
Bayern in Germany. Both regions have a “less” educated and rich population compared to 
London and Paris Region. However, both German regions have other excellent 
characteristics. In 2007, Baden-Württemberg spent 4.47% of its GDP for R&D, which is 
considerably above the 3.0% objective fixed by the European Union’s Lisbon strategy and 
also by far the highest percentage among the ten regions under scrutiny. This high investment 
in R&D is also reflected by the fact that the region submits the highest amount of patent 
applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). The Paris Region in comparison spends 
also a high amount of its GDP in R&D (3.11%, the second highest percentage) but is not able 
to transform this amount in actual patent applications as it submitted less than half the number 
of patents per inhabitant compared to Baden-Württemberg. Bayern, which invests “only” 
2.81% of its GDP in R&D is even more effective than Baden-Württemberg as it submitted 
nearly as many patent applications.  
 
Bayern and Baden-Württemberg have thus a better R&D performance than the Paris Region. 
Additionally, both German regions have the lowest unemployment rates (Bayern 4.4%, 
Baden-Württemberg 4.8%) and one of the highest industry shares in total employment 
(Bayern 26.2%, Baden-Württemberg 31.8%). The Paris Region in comparison has one of the 
highest unemployment rates (8.9%, 8th place) and one of the lowest industry sector shares in 
total employment (12%, 8th place). 
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Table 33: The Paris Region: “Stuck in the middle” in an European context 
 London Paris Region Baden- Württemberg 
Growth: GDP per capita evolution between 
2000-2008 (in PPS) 1
st
   
Richness: GDP per capita (in PPS, 2008) & 
Household disposable income (in PPS per 
inhabitant, 2007) 
1st 2nd  
Education: Higher education level among the 25-
64 years (2010) 1
st
 2nd  
Tertiary sector: share in total employment 
(2007) 2
nd
 1st  
R&D spending: in % of the GDP (2007, except 
for France 2004)  2
nd
 1st 
R&D patent applications: Number of patent 
applications submitted to the EPO per million 
inhabitants (2007) 
  1st 
Industry sector: share in total employment 
(2007)   1
st
 
Low unemployment (2010)   2nd 
Source: Summary of the key learning points of Table 32 (only marked if one of the three regions ranked 1st or 
2nd in a certain category) 
 
To sum up, the three most interesting comparison regions for the Paris Region are London, 
Baden-Württemberg and Bayern. For simplicity reasons we just took Baden-Württemberg in 
order to graphically (see Table 33) underline the “stuck in the middle” position of the Paris 
Region. 
 
The Paris Region seems to have no clear positioning neither “ignoring” R&D and focusing 
only on education and the tertiary sector (like London with its high growth rate), nor showing 
a strong industry sector and a high R&D transformation rate (like Baden-Württemberg with 
its low unemployment rate). Additionally, the PR has a high unemployment rate and a low 
growth rate compared to the other two leading regions. However, the PR stays of course the 
richest region in France and one of the richest regions in Europe but it is stuck between two 
extremes where “something” seems to work better.  
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2.2 Overview of the policy-driven clusters in the PR 
The Paris Region counts seven policy-driven clusters177 (see Table 34): two ICT policy-
driven clusters (one oriented towards digital content, the other towards complex systems), two 
engineering / services policy-driven clusters (one oriented towards urban sustainability and 
eco-technologies, the other towards finance), one aeronautics / space policy-driven cluster, 
one transportation policy-driven cluster, one biotechnologies / health policy-driven cluster. 
 
In 2005, the state initially labelled five policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region, and granted 
two additional policy-driven clusters the official label in 2007. The official applicants for the 
policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region were a mixture of public, private or public/private 
institutions (see Table 34), ranging from the Paris Region economic development agency, in 
the case of HealthCluster Paris Region, to Thales, a CAC 40 company, in the case of 
Systematic Paris Region. 
 
                                                 
177
 Source: http://www.paris-region.com/ (accessed 01/05/2014). Note: The number of policy-driven clusters on 
the website of the Paris Region economic development agency stays stable over time as the agency only counts 
the policy-driven cluster organisations that are actually located on the Paris Region territory. However, the 
number of policy-driven clusters attributed to the Paris Region on the official policy-driven cluster website 
(http://competitivite.gouv.fr/) increases with time. For example on the 01/05/2014 the official policy-driven 
cluster website attributed 11 policy-driven clusters to the Paris Region (Advancity, ASTech PR, Cap Digital PR, 
Cosmetic Valley, Elastopôle, Finance Innovation, HealthCluster PR, Mov’éo, NOvalog, Systematic PR, 
Vitagora). However, one year earlier (on the 09/06/2013) the website attributed only 9 policy-driven clusters to 
the Paris Region (NOvalog and Vitagora were not included at that time). The reason of this “inflation” is that 
little by little the State allows the “policy-driven clusters” to extend their territories to other regions than their 
initial attributed region. This means that more companies can apply for a policy-driven cluster project label. For 
example NOvalog is originally situated in the Normandie Region. For the 3rd policy-driven cluster phase the 
State allowed them to extend their territory to the Ile-de France Region (http://novalog.eu/?p=2680). Companies 
situated in the Ile-de-France Region are now allowed to apply for projects managed by NOvalog (situated in the 
Normandy Region). 
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Table 34: Paris Region’s policy-driven clusters 
Category* Name** Description** 
Label
led 
in*** 
Official 
applicant for 
label*** 
End of 1st 
Phase 
(05-08)  
Eval.**** 
End of 2nd 
Phase 
(09-12) 
Eval.****
* 
Aeronauti
cs / Space 
ASTech 
Paris 
Region 
consolidating the 
region’s positions in 
aerospace, business 
aviation, propulsion 
systems & aerospace 
facilities 
2007 Private: Safran (CAC 40) 
objectives 
reached 
(Cat. A.) 
Efficient 
(Cat. B) 
Bio-
technologi
es / Health 
HealthClu
ster Paris 
Region178 
guiding innovation in 
human healthcare 
(prevention, diagnosis, 
therapies, associated 
technologies), toward 
industry, market & 
patient 
2005 
Public: Paris 
Region 
economic 
development 
agency 
objectives 
only 
partially 
reached 
(Cat. B) 
Less 
efficient 
(Cat. C) 
Engineeri
ng / 
Services 
Advancity
179
 
developing the projects 
promoting urban 
sustainability and eco-
technologies 
2005 
Public: 
Polytechnicum 
de Marne-la-
Vallée180 
objectives 
reached 
(Cat. A.) 
Efficient 
(Cat. B) 
Finance 
Innovatio
n 
developing a leading 
European financial 
information platform & 
training hub 
2007 
Private/Public: 
Paris 
Europlace181 
objectives 
reached 
(Cat. A.) 
Efficient 
(Cat. B) 
ICT 
Cap 
Digital 
Paris 
Region182 
designing and 
developing digital 
content and services 
2005 
Public: Paris 
Region 
economic 
development 
agency 
objectives 
reached 
(Cat. A.) 
Highly 
efficient 
(Cat. A) 
Systemati
c Paris 
Region183 
designing, creating and 
managing complex 
systems 
2005 Private: Thales (CAC 40) 
objectives 
reached 
(Cat. A.) 
Highly 
efficient 
(Cat. A) 
Trans-
portation Mov’éo
184
 
designing and 
developing safer 
transport systems – for 
people and the 
environment 
2005 
Public: French 
National 
Institute for 
Transport and 
Safety 
Research 
(INRETS) 
objectives 
reached 
(Cat. A.) 
Highly 
efficient 
(Cat. A) 
*Source: http://competitivite.gouv.fr/ (acc. 01/05/2014); **Source: http://www.paris-region.com/ (acc. 
01/05/2014); ***CIADT Press Communication on the 12/07/2005 & on the 05/07/2007; ****Source: 1st phase 
evaluation report (CMI & BCG, 2008); ***** Source: 
http://www.elopsys.fr/IMG/pdf/valuation_individuelle_des_poles_de_competitivite-2.pdf (acc. 01/05/2014) 
 
                                                 
178
 initially called “MédiTech Sante” 
179
 initially called “Ville et mobilité durables” 
180
 Polytechnicum de Marne-la-Vallée: an association that regroups universities and research institutes.  
181
 Paris Europlace: association founded in 1993 by private and public institutions. The association represents the 
major players in the financial market and promotes Paris as a financial market. (http://www.paris-europlace.net/)  
182
 initially called “Image, Multimédia et Vie Numérique” 
183
 sometimes also written as System@tic Paris Region. No name change since the beginning.  
184
 The policy-driven cluster was initially called “Vestapolis”, was situated in the Paris Region and specialised in 
road safety. Mov’éo emerged following the merger between Vestapolis and Normandy Motor Valley in 2006. 
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During the first policy-driven cluster phase (2005-2008) all but one policy-driven cluster 
reached its objectives. The only policy-driven cluster that did not reach its objectives during 
the first phase was HealthCluster Paris Region. Also during the second policy-driven cluster 
phase (2009-2012) HealthCluster Paris Region was the only local policy-driven cluster that 
was evaluated as “less efficient” (Category C), the lowest evaluation category. All other local 
policy-driven clusters were either evaluated highly efficient (Systematic, Cap Digital and 
Mov’éo) or efficient (ASTech Paris Region, Advancity, Finance Innovation).  
 
3 Presentation of HealthCluster Paris Region 
HealthCluster Paris Region is the only policy-driven cluster in the Paris Region that only 
partially reached its objectives during the first policy-driven cluster evaluation in 2008. In 
order to better situate the qualitative case study that will follow, it is interesting to dig a little 
bit deeper into the particularities of HealthCluster Paris Region compared to the other policy-
driven clusters in the region. In order to do so we looked at different statistical indicators: (1) 
Type of members and member evolution; (2) NAF category of member organisations, and (3) 
Project funding sources. 
 
3.1 Type of members and member evolution 
The first important indicator to situate a policy-driven cluster is its member structure and 
member evolution. Table 35 summarizes the member structure and member evolution of all 
policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region and also compares each policy-driven cluster to the 
average of all policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region. If we look at the absolute numbers, 
the two policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region that have the highest amount of members 
are Cap Digital and Systematic. Both policy-driven clusters have nearly the double amount of 
members than the average policy-driven cluster in the Region. The same is the case when we 
look more particularly at SME members, both policy-driven clusters, Cap Digital and 
Systematic, have also the highest absolute number and relative share of SME members. 
HealthCluster Paris Region has one of the fewest amounts of members and also a below 
average growth rate. However, such as Cap Digital, Systematic or Advancity it is a policy-
driven cluster that has an above average SME share among its members. So in terms of 
absolute number of members it is not at all comparable with Cap Digital or Systematic, but in 
terms of it’s relative member structure it is. 
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Table 35: Type of members 
    
Average 
of all 
Paris 
Region 
policy-
driven 
clusters 
Advancit
y 
ASTec
h Paris 
Region 
Cap 
Digital 
Paris 
Region 
Finance 
Innovatio
n 
HealthCluste
r Paris 
Region 
Mov’é
o 
Systemati
c Paris 
Region 
 
Total 
members 2007 157 83 67 288 118 109 159 276 
 
2012 329 135 209 595 253 167 320 623 
Increase in 
total 
members   50% 39% 68% 52% 53% 35% 50% 56% 
  
SME 
members 2007 80 18 40 220 13 68 56 147 
 
2012 242 106 129 521 162 131 189 456 
Increase in 
SME 
members   70% 83% 69% 58% 92% 48% 70% 68% 
 
Share of 
SME 
members 
in Total 
members 2007 46% 22% 60% 76% 11% 62% 35% 53% 
 
2012 72% 79% 62% 88% 64% 78% 59% 73% 
Source: 2007 data from the official policy-driven cluster evaluation in 2008185; 2012 data from the official 
policy-driven cluster website (http://competitivite.gouv.fr/) 
Note: Numbers in bold are above the average of all Paris Region policy-driven clusters. 
 
3.2 NAF category of member organisations 
The second important indicator to describe a policy-driven cluster concerns the sector of 
activity of its members. Table 36 and Table 37 summarize for each Paris Region policy-
driven cluster the five NAF codes186 that best represent the policy-driven cluster members. 
We only had access to the five most important NAF categories for every policy-driven 
cluster. The five most important NAF categories cover 60% of Advancity’s members, 61% of 
ASTech Paris Region’s members, 76% of Cap Digital’s members, 72% of Finance 
Innovation’s members, 74% of HealthCluster Paris Region’s members, 57% of Mov'éo’s 
members, and 72% of Systematic Paris Region’s members. This means that Mov’éo (57%) is 
the most heterogeneous policy-driven cluster. Cap Digital (76%) and HealthCluster Paris 
                                                 
185
 Thierry Weil (Mines ParisTech) was able to access the raw data of the 2008 French policy-driven cluster 
evaluation.  
186
 NAF code is the French equivalent of the American Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. NAF = 
“Nomenclature d'activités française” or “French classification of economic activities”. 
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Region (74%) on the other hand are the most homogenous policy-driven clusters in the 
Region as 3/4 of their policy-driven cluster members are covered by only 5 NAF codes.  
 
An important insight of the NAF category analysis is that Cap Digital and Systematic PR are 
not only similar in their member structure (high share of SMEs, high amount of members 
compared to the other local policy-driven clusters) both policy-driven clusters are also kind of 
similar regarding the activities of their members. For example 56% of Cap Digital’s and 50% 
of Systematic PR’s members belong to three NAF divisions, namely “Computer 
programming, consultancy & related activities” (NAF 62), “Publishing activities” (NAF 58) 
and “Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities” (NAF70). HealthCluster 
Paris Region is somehow different.  
 
Even though HealthCluster PR is also a SME policy-driven cluster like Cap Digital and 
Systematic, its members’ activities are very different. HealthCluster PR is the only policy-
driven cluster that has half of its members belonging only to one category, namely “Scientific 
research and development” (NAF 72). HealthCluster is thus by far the most specialist policy-
driven cluster regarding its member structure. Systematic PR on the other hand is the most 
transversal policy-driven cluster as all of its five most important NAF categories are also 
highly present in at least three other local policy-driven clusters. 
 
3.3 Project funding sources 
Other important indicators to look at are the number of projects funded and the type of 
funding received (see Table 38). Cap Digital and Systematic PR are again the two policy-
driven clusters that stick out because nearly 60% of all projects funded in the PR can be 
accredited to members of these two policy-driven clusters. In absolute numbers they are again 
far ahead. However, it is HealthCluster PR that has the best output as in average 0.66 of its 
members participated in a cluster project while only 0.42 of Cap Digital’s members and 0.41 
of Systematic PR members participated in a policy-driven cluster project. Even though 
HealthCluster has far less members, the members it has seem to be (project wise) more 
integrated. 
 
Another important element is the source of the funding as it indicates which type of R&D 
project is done. The aim of the ANR is to fund exploratory research projects that focus on 
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developing new knowledge. The projects financed by the FUI have to relate to innovations 
relatively close to the market. OSEO (today called Bpifrance) supports innovation and 
economic development within French SMEs. HealthCluster PR (58%) and Advancity (63%) 
are the two policy-driven clusters that have most of their projects financed by the ANR, and 
are thus more oriented towards exploratory research projects. On the other hand ASTech PR 
(69%) is the policy-driven cluster that has most of its projects financed by the FUI and which 
is thus more market oriented. 
 
3.4 Summary 
HealthCluster PR (the only biotechnology / health policy-driven cluster of the region) is a 
particular case within the Paris region. HealthCluster PR, was the only local policy-driven 
cluster that “only partially reached its objectives” during the first cluster evaluation in 2008 
and the only local policy-driven cluster that was evaluated “less efficient” during the second 
policy-driven cluster evaluation in 2012. Additionally, it has one of the fewest members and 
also a below average growth rate. 
 
However, such as Cap Digital, Systematic or Advancity it is a policy-driven cluster that has 
an above average SME share among its members. Additionally, HealthCluster is a particular 
case as it is a very homogenous and specialist policy-driven cluster. It is the only policy-
driven cluster of the region where 50% of its members belong to the same NAF category 
namely “Scientific research and development”. Even though it has maybe less members than 
the other policy-driven clusters it is the policy-driven cluster with the best output as in 
average 0.66 of its members participated in a policy-driven cluster R&D project, meaning that 
even though the policy-driven cluster organisation counts less members, at least the members 
that exist seem to be integrated in the policy-driven cluster. Not surprisingly, most 
HealthCluster PR projects are financed by the ANR, and are thus more oriented towards 
exploratory research than the market. 
 
HealthCluster, compared to the other policy-driven clusters in the region, is somehow an 
extreme case, and thus the ideal policy-driven cluster to study pathologies.  
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Table 36: Five most important187 NAF sectors per policy-driven cluster188 in 2012 
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Source: own calculations, data from official policy-driven cluster website (http://competitivite.gouv.fr) 
 
                                                 
187
 For each policy-driven cluster we had access to the 5 NAF categories that account for the most members. We 
then calculated following percentage: “NAF category members / Total members of cluster”. 
188
 Example how to read the table: 50% of all the members of HealthCluster Paris Region belong to the NAF 
category “Scientific research and development”. The “(1st)” (bold number) signifies that this is the NAF category 
where HealthCluster counts the most members. 
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Table 37: Five most important187 NAF sectors per policy-driven cluster in 2012 (cont.) 
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Source: own calculations, data from official policy-driven cluster website (http://competitivite.gouv.fr) 
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Table 38: Number of projects funded and project funding sources 
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Source: own calculations, data from official policy-driven cluster website (http://competitivite.gouv.fr) 
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THIRD PART: EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY - RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
The results and discussion part is structured in three chapters. Chapter 7 presents HCPR’s 
governance and we discuss the observed dilemmas and developed pathologies. This part is 
based on our observation period and our follow up interviews with HCPR and two other 
policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region. Chapter 8 presents the French cluster policy from 
the collaborative R&D projects’ point of view and analyses which role HCPR plays in the set-
up process of R&D projects. This part is based on the interviews we conducted with project 
leaders, some doctors and additional project consortium partners. Finally, chapter 9 discusses 
the entanglement of all layers and the observed pathologies. In this last chapter, we not only 
discuss the observed pathologies, but we also position our findings in the cluster evaluation 
literature. Finally, we ask the question why HCPR exists, besides all the observed 
pathologies. An answer might bring the concept “organisation of hypocrisy”.  
 
Box 9: Content of third part 
Chapter 7: HCPR’s governance: facing dilemmas & developing pathologies ............ 211 
1 Defining objectives, a difficult task: HCPR’s performance contract .................... 212 
2 Managing the ecosystem: A cluster stuck in organisational dilemmas? ............... 224 
Chapter 8: Which role does HCPR play in the set-up of R&D projects? .................... 246 
1 Overview of ICT & Health project leaders and their organisations ..................... 248 
2 Finding subsidies: Being friend and judge – a schizophrenic situation ................ 258 
3 Finding partners: “Las Vegas” weddings thanks to “Meetic” ............................... 273 
4 Finding ideas: Doctors can’t be find at “Meetic” events ........................................ 306 
Chapter 9: Discussion: how dilemmas drove cluster pathologies in HCPR ................ 320 
1 The identification of HCPR’s four side-effect pathologies ..................................... 323 
2 Existence beyond difficulties: an organisation of hypocrisy? ................................. 349 
3 Enriching the “management model” of cluster policy evaluations ........................ 352 
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Chapter 7:  HCPR’s governance: facing dilemmas & developing pathologies 
In this chapter we now dig into the French cluster policy through the policy-driven cluster 
called HealthCluster Paris Region (HCPR). We particularly focus on the functioning and 
doings of the policy-driven cluster organisation and the dilemmas they face. The chapter 
presents and discusses the results of our 4-month observational period in HCPR, our follow 
up interviews with HCPR employees, and all the internal and external documents that we 
used in order to understand the functioning, actions and challenges of HCPR’s governance 
during the 2nd cluster policy phase (2009-2011, prolonged to 2012). 
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1 Defining objectives, a difficult task: HCPR’s performance contract 
In this section we focus on HCPR’s performance contract to understand its set-up and 
priorities. At the beginning of the 2nd cluster policy phase, every French policy-driven cluster 
had to sign a binding performance contract with the regional and national authorities that 
finance the policy. This performance contract stipulates the policy-driven cluster’s planned 
R&D strategy as well as its animation and development strategy. In this section we show that 
defining the objectives is already a difficult task. We first present the official discourse that 
was pronounced during the performance contract signature event, then we dig deeper into the 
performance contract by looking at the exact content, finally we will discuss the power games 
that hide behind the set-up of this performance contract. In this section we will be able to start 
observing dilemmas and pathologies. 
 
1.1 The official discourse: building innovation and trust 
The performance contract signature189 symbolises the official start of the second phase of the 
cluster policy and represents an important step for every policy-driven cluster. Without 
signing a performance contract, French policy-driven clusters are theoretically not illegible to 
participate in the second cluster policy phase (2009-2012). This importance was also 
symbolised by the location HCPR chose for the official signature ceremony. The performance 
contract signature took place in the Parisian Trade Exchange building (Bourse de Commerce), 
the Parisian heart regarding trade and commerce since several centuries. 
 
HCPR chose an important historical building to sign its performance contract in front of 
journalists, government officials and policy-driven cluster members. The pictures at Figure 22 
show that the event was a very formal event with speakers sitting in a straight row facing 
several tiers of listeners. The event was not conceived to discuss the performance contract or 
exchange with the audience. During this event, the strategic governance team of HCPR 
presented its contract, its strategy and its objectives for the 2nd phase of the cluster policy 
(2009-2012), but also officially signed the performance contract in a ceremonial manner and 
in the presence of the regional and national authorities. This reinforced the binding character 
of this new contract. A cocktail followed the official signature of the contract. 
                                                 
189
 Took place on November 10th, 2009. 
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In several speeches, HCPR underlined that it positions itself as clearly anchored in the Paris 
Region (“HealthCluster Paris Region is the cluster that unites major players in the life 
sciences and healthcare sectors in the Paris Region”, HCPR promotional document, 2009) 
and that it wishes to become the highest concentration in healthcare in Europe (“The cluster 
aims at bringing together the highest concentration of expertise and healthcare resources in 
Europe”, HCPR promotional document, 2009). In order to reach this goal, HCPR focuses on 
three important cornerstones: Innovation, Partnership and Network (HCPR document, 2009). 
Emmanuel Canet (the president of HealthCluster Paris Region until 2011) further specified 
these objectives in a speech he gave at the performance signature event. He particularly 
insisted on four points that he believes will lead to the success of the HealthCluster Paris 
Region: 
- (1) Creating a cluster spirit and trust: “créer ce réseau d’hommes d’horizons 
divers, partageant un objectif commun, travaillant dans la confiance. Avec cette 
volonté d’inscrire leurs actions dans la valorisation et l’innovation. Créer cet esprit 
cluster avec des hommes qui ont le désir de travailler ensemble.” 
- (2) Decompartmentalizing the innovation ecosystem: “…décloisonner notre 
écosystème d’innovation. Faire en sorte que le pôle contribue à rapprocher les 
différents instituts/organismes de recherche pour accélèrer le transfert de la 
connaissance, le transfert des technologies dans une volonté d’innovation de 
technologie, diagnostic, thérapeutique.” 
- (3) Proposing more and faster financial aid for companies: “…mettre à disposition 
plus des ressources et des moyens. Des financements à un niveau plus élevé, en 
particulier, pour les jeunes entreprises. Pour ces entreprises, il faut renforcer le 
financement, augmenter la rapidité d’accès à ce financement, surtout pour certaines 
phases de développement” 
- (4) Increasing the number of innovative companies: “…augmenter, […], le nombre 
des entreprises innovantes, et favoriser la modernisation des grandes entreprises 
aujourd’hui dédiée à l’innovation thérapeutique.”  
 
To sum up, the main objectives of HCPR stay very general and are, typical for clusters, 
concentrated on creating a “community of people” that trust each other and share the same 
objectives in order to innovate together. Additionally, more and faster financial resources 
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should be provided to the companies to increase regional attractiveness, innovation, jobs, and 
companies.  
 
Figure 22: Performance contract signature event (November 10th, 2009) 
 
 
 
1.2 The content of the performance contract: focalisation on R&D objectives 
We now dig into the written performance contract. The written performance contract 
summarizes exactly the strategy and the different domains that the policy-driven cluster 
wishes to develop during the 2nd cluster policy phase. The objectives are split into two large 
domains: (i) technological R&D objectives (see Annex 9 for the detail) and (ii) animation & 
development objectives190 (see Annex 10 for the detail). Hereinafter, we present both domains 
and give examples how the policy-driven cluster has “operationalized” these general domains 
into concrete impact measures. We will see that the development of the R&D objectives is 
more detailed (11 pages) than the animation & development objectives (6 pages). HCPR 
exactly knows where it would like to go in research terms, but struggles more to define 
exactly which type of management should be set-up to support these research objectives.  
 
                                                 
190
 Next to the technological R&D objectives and the animation & development objectives, the performance 
contract also discusses the market objectives (medicinal products market, medical imaging market, biological 
tools market). However, the market objectives are not discussed with the same detail as the other two main 
objectives. The market objectives are for example not “operationalized” into concrete actions and outcomes. As 
we will not focus on these market objectives in our thesis, we decided not discussing them.  
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1.2.1 HCPR’s R&D objectives: a detailed description 
HCPR has structured its R&D strategy around three priorities (see Figure 23). HCPR’s three 
priorities are: translational medicine; biological tools for industrial use and bio-therapeutic 
products; and biodigital technology (bio-computing, integrating and modelling / e-health / 
brain-machine interface technology). These R&D priorities are then further operationalized 
into programmatic pillars, each programmatic pillar is then further detailed into objectives 
that are then exactly quantified in terms of challenges, concerned stakeholders, activities191, 
deliverables, deadlines, and impact. We will not detail all the objectives but just give one 
example in order to grasp the general tenor of the performance contract. 
 
For example, if we look at translational medicine priority, we can distinguish two different 
programmatic pillars that are associated to this priority: clinical research and medical 
imaging. The medical imaging programmatic pillar is then further split in three different 
objectives that HCPR would like to reach until the end of the 2nd cluster policy phase. One of 
these objectives is for example the creation of “collaborative projects to achieve fundamental 
breakthroughs in imaging and related technologies”. HCPR hopes that “these findings will 
advance the knowledge of how normal and diseased cell or tissue systems work”. For this 
objective HCPR then further details:  
- which actors should be involved in this objective. In this case the involved actors 
should be the medical imaging working group, including academics from a certain 
research institute, SMEs, large companies operating in medical imaging and 
pharmacy. This working group should be supervised from the strategic R&D 
committee with the help of HCPR’s operational team. 
- the different activities that the working group should pursue in order to reach the 
stipulated objective. The first activity is to “collect the needs of the industrial. […] in 
order to structure the programmatic pillar medical imaging and to define a “road 
map” for biomedical imaging in the Paris Region […]”, and the second activity is to 
“design and launch collaborative projects with the objective to generate a 
technological breakthrough within the framework set by the imaging action plan”. 
Finally, the performance contract also stipulates measurable deliverables for the objective. 
In this case they were threefold: (1) action plan for medical imaging, (2) regular update of the 
                                                 
191
 Not all the activities listed in the performance contract are actually done by the policy-driven cluster itself. 
For example, in one case the universities of the region solely carry the proposed activities. 
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forward looking document (3) start of first collaborative project aimed to generate a 
technological breakthrough. 
 
To sum up, the technological R&D objectives are precisely defined in the performance 
contract and constitute a strategic road map for the 2nd cluster policy phase.  
 
Figure 23: HCPR’s R&D strategy 
 
Source: Performance Contract 2009-2012, HealthCluster Paris Region 
 
1.2.2 HCPR’s animation & development objectives: a more superficial description 
Next to the technological R&D objectives, the performance contract also details the animation 
and development objectives for the 2nd policy-driven cluster phase. These objectives are now 
directly linked to HCPR’s operational team that is supposed to implement these objectives. 
The performance contract stipulates four priorities for the operational team. For every priority 
of the animation & development objectives, the performance contract details again the 
associated challenges, activities & deliverables, as well as the planned impact. However, the 
presentation of these priorities is less structured and more confuse than for the R&D priorities 
(see Annex 10 for a detailed presentation). 
 
1st priority - Creating a community of thoughts, objectives and actions: In order to reach 
this first priority, HCPR particularly underlines that it has to work on the added value of the 
cluster for its members. The added value is important to motivate local actors to participate in 
the cluster’s activities and to become a member of the cluster. In order to reach this objective, 
HCPR planned to focus on three different activities: regular exchanges between the members 
of the cluster (for example round tables, meetings on specific R&D priority themes); regular 
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information sessions organised for the members by the strategic committees; and a complete 
mapping of its members and potential members. HCPR considers that its actions were 
successful if it can show an increase of collaborative projects, an increase in members, and an 
improvement in its image.  
 
2nd priority - Being the key health actor in the Paris Region: The second priority of HCPR 
is to become the key health actor of the Paris Region and to harmonise the existent support 
structure of the region. However, at the same time, this priority also underlines that the 
financial sustainability of the cluster needs to be looked at and developed. Additionally, 
HCPR plans to work on the durability of the scientific excellence of the region by developing 
new trainings and by anticipating future needs. 
 
3rd priority - Structuring the healthcare sector in the Paris Region: The third priority 
focuses on how to structure the healthcare sector in the Paris Region. For HCPR the focus lies 
particularly on identifying who are the SMEs of the region and on understanding the concerns 
of these SMEs. This should be done by organising regular meetings with the SMEs and by 
establishing a mapping of all SMEs in the Region. Additionally, HCPR wishes to help the 
SMEs to better access private and public funding. A success indicator for HCPR is for 
example the increase of new companies and the increase in jobs offered by these companies.  
 
4th priority - Developing national and international partnerships: This last priority 
focuses on the development of national and international partnerships. HCPR assumes that if 
it wishes to succeed, it has to create partnerships with other national and international clusters. 
In order to reach this goal, HCPR for example plans to increase its participation in 
international trade fairs, increase its partnerships with other clusters and organise an important 
event in the Paris Region. All these activities should help increasing HCPR’s notoriety.  
 
To sum up, the different priorities are very large, ranging from creating jobs over establishing 
contracts with other clusters to mapping the region and organising meetings. This first focus 
on the performance contract already shows that dilemmas develop around how to actually 
reach the overall goal of fostering innovation and partnerships in the region. Passing from the 
general objective (innovation and partnership), announced by HCPR’s president during the 
performance contract signature, to concrete actions, seems to be a difficult task. The different 
objectives show that HCPR defines a large spectrum of actions to foster innovation 
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(exchanges on knowledge, helping in financing, develop trainings, develop various 
partnerships) (dilemma MD#2a). Additionally, one particularly interesting objective is that 
HCPR wishes to become the “key health actor in the Paris Region” by harmonising the 
existent support structure. However, this ambitious challenge is the first indicator of several 
structural dilemmas HCPR faces (dilemmas SD#1, SD#2, SD#3). We will still see that 
realizing such an ambitious objective is not easy in a highly urbanized location where existing 
support structures are already deeply anchored.  
 
In section 2 of this chapter we will dig deeper into these four priorities of HealthCluster Paris 
Region and discuss the dilemmas the operational team faces by implementing these ambitious 
but at the same time vague objectives. 
 
1.3 Power games behind the scene: the set-up of the contract and it’s visibility 
In this sub-section we will now focus on the power games that hide behind the set-up of the 
performance contract. In order to understand these power games, we first present HCPR’s 
organisational functioning and the different instances that exist within the policy-driven 
cluster organisation. This is necessary, in order to understand who are the authors that stand 
behind the performance contract. 
 
1.3.1 Presentation of HCPR’s governance structure: the 4-dimensional matrix system 
HealthCluster Paris Region is a not for profit association (under the French law: “loi 1901”) 
so it is composed out of three official bodies: the assembly general body (AG), the board 
of directors (CA) and the executive office (BE). All the power of the association cumulates 
in the executive office (BE) and its president. 
 
The executive office (BE) meets approximately twice a month and is composed out of the 
president, the vice-presidents, the steering committee presidents, the executive director, and a 
certain number of representatives of each of the four member panels (i.e. large companies, 
SME / young innovative companies, research institutes, regional and local authorities)192. 
                                                 
192
 In a paper we wrote during our thesis (see Annex 20) we analysed how the governance structure has an 
impact on the resources of policy-driven clusters and we conducted a typology to classify all French policy-
driven clusters into three different categories. We also analysed all Paris Region policy-driven clusters, except 
the two policy-driven clusters that were only founded in 2007 (Finance Innovation & ASTech Paris Region). 
The results showed that nearly all Paris Region policy-driven clusters (Systematic PR, HealthCluster Paris 
Region, Cap Digital and Advancity) belong to the same class, which we called “corporate class” (only Mov’éo 
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In order to prepare the executive office (BE) meetings two regular meetings take place:  
- Management committee meeting (CODIR): The management committee meetings 
have the same members as the executive office (BE) (i.e. president, the vice-
presidents, the steering committee presidents, the executive director) with one 
exception. The representatives of the four panels (i.e. large companies, SME / young 
innovative companies, research institutes, regional and local authorities) are not 
participating. 
- Operational steering committee meeting (COPIL): The operational steering 
committee meetings are composed out of the R&D steering committee president, the 
development & animation of the ecosystem steering committee president, and the 
executive director. 
 
There is one steering committee president for R&D and one steering committee president 
for development & animation of the ecosystem193. Both steering committee presidents are 
appointed by the respective thematic steering committees. The R&D steering committee has 
36 members, mainly composed out of research institutes and companies. The development & 
animation of the ecosystem steering committee has 25 members, mainly composed out of 
regional & local authorities and support agencies. These steering committee presidents are the 
strategic leaders for the respective operational teams and the spokespersons who transform the 
wishes of the members into thematic groups or activities. For example, the steering committee 
presidents, with the help of the respective operational teams, transform the performance 
contract into actions in order to create a “policy-driven cluster ecosystem”. Compared to the 
executive director, who has more a human resource responsibility over the operational 
                                                                                                                                                        
belonged to another of the three classes). In the corporate class, groups clearly dominate the supervisory board 
and the board of directors while SMEs and support entities are rather absent. The corporate class has most of the 
advantages on its side. First of all, the corporate class has considerably more budget, regardless of the origin, for 
the animation and the functioning of its policy-driven clusters. Second, it has the highest amount of FTEs 
(number of full-time equivalents). Finally, its members also receive the highest total amount of public R&D 
funding. The good results of the policy-driven clusters of the corporate class might be linked to different 
characteristics of groups: broad experience in how to obtain research funding, large pool of internal resources 
(human, financial…), large network of partners which allows forming R&D consortia in a short period of time, 
etc. The Paris Region policy-driven clusters were thus clearly belonging to the most “advantageous” policy-
driven clusters in France.  
193
 In September 2010 (when we started our fieldwork), HCPR still had three steering committees (R&D, 
Development & Ecosystem, Animation & Notoriety). Since then, the Development & Ecosystem committee 
absorbed the Animation & Notoriety committee to form a new committee called “Development and Animation 
of the Ecosystem” committee. Today, HCPR has only two committees (i.e. R&D steering committee & 
development; animation of the ecosystem steering committee) (see Figure 24 vs. Figure 25). 
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team194, the two steering committee presidents play a major role in the policy-driven cluster. 
They are responsible for the content of the policy-driven cluster’s actions.  
 
The operational team is composed out of 13 permanent full time employees195. The two 
steering committee presidents coordinate all actions with their respective operational teams 
(one operational team dedicated to R&D and one operation team dedicated to development & 
animation of the ecosystem). The operational teams themselves do not have any decision 
authority. This lack of decision authority is something that the operational teams perceive as 
very frustrating in their daily work. Just to give an example, we asked the development & 
animation of the ecosystem team several times why certain events in the medical domain were 
not figuring on the HCPR website. They told us that they are not allowed to put any type of 
information on the website before official validation, a situation that frustrates them a lot. The 
two operational teams are constantly present in the policy-driven cluster office. This is not 
necessarily the case for the steering committee presidents. During our fieldwork we were 
primarily in contact with the operational teams. 
 
The organisational structure of HCPR is complicated or as one of the members of the 
operational team said, “We are in a 4-dimensional matrix system”196. In fact, the actions of 
the operational team depend on a multitude of actors and committees, who all have a word to 
say regarding the actions of the operational team. The operational team depends for example 
on the strategic R&D committee president and its different members, on the strategic 
development & animation of the ecosystem committee president and its different members, 
on the general cluster president, and on the executive director. 
 
During our fieldwork period we were able to access two different organisational matrixes of 
HCPR. The two charts are interesting, because they represent two different views of HCPR. 
The first organisational matrix is an official chart presented during a meeting with HCPR’s 
public funding bodies in October 2010 (see Figure 24). The chart was prepared by one of the 
operational team members. The operational team considers the steering committees as a 
mirror image of their own teams.  
 
                                                 
194
 At the moment, the executive director and the development & animation of the ecosystem steering committee 
president are one and the same person. However, this was not the case when we started our fieldwork.  
195
 This includes the executive director.  
196
 “On est dans un système matriciel à 4 dimensions.” 
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This mirror image view is not the case if we look at a second organisational matrix (see 
Figure 25). The second organisational matrix is an official chart presented during an assembly 
general meeting of HCPR in December 2012. In this chart we see that the executive office 
(BE) is put in the centre of the whole policy-driven cluster. However, the committees that 
represent the members (i.e. the four hexagons that are in each corner197 and the hexagon 
representing all members) are the biggest of the chart. However, the operational team nearly 
vanishes in the chart and is much less visible than in the chart prepared by the operational 
team itself. 
 
To sum up, the organisational charts and the impression of the 4-dimensional matrix system 
announce HCPR’s leadership dilemma. Several people seem to be in charge of HCPR’s 
actions and strategy. This shows that the cluster tries to represent in an egalitarian manner 
the different members, but we will still see that this also creates a high conflict potential 
within the organisation (dilemma MD#1a). 
 
Figure 24: Official chart presented during a meeting with the public funding bodies 
 
Source: Internal Document HealthCluster Paris Region (01/10/2010) 
 
                                                 
197
 Assembly general body (AG), four member panels (4 collèges), R&D steering committee (Comité stratégique 
R&D), Development & animation of the ecosystem steering committee (Comité DevEco) 
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Figure 25: Official chart presented during an assembly general meeting 
 
Source: Internal document HealthCluster Paris Region (31/12/2012) 
 
1.3.2 The authors of the performance contract: ignoring the operational team 
We talked with two members of the operational team in order to understand the set up process 
of the performance contract: 
- The 1st operational team employee told us that the HCPR’s members (i.e. large 
companies, SMEs, research institutes, regional and local authorities) elaborated the 
performance contract in a collegial manner. The different colleges did several working 
groups and were assisted in this process by an outside consulting firm. The operational 
team was not involved. 
- The 2nd operational team employee was more critical regarding this process. The 
employee told us that the governance team does not collaborate with the operational 
team. They never see each other. The governance team established the performance 
contract without integrating the operational team. The operational team never saw the 
performance contract before it was signed and then the governance team just gave the 
performance contract to the operational team and told them: “Now make what we 
decided.” 
 
The common denominator of the two comments is that “they” elaborated the performance 
contract and that the operational team was not included, something that frustrates the 
operational team because it’s them who have to translate the performance contract into 
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actions. The operational team sees itself as a crucial element within the policy-driven cluster 
ecosystem, but whom one does not give enough decision autonomy to animate in a best 
possible manner the local ecosystem. During our investigation period the operational team 
told us at several occasions that the animation & development objectives stipulated in the 
performance contract are very confuse and that they are dubitative if these objectives will help 
building a real local ecosystem. 
 
To sum up, we see once again that HCPR’s operational team is the entity that seems to have 
the least amount of power among the different instances. However, it is this operational team 
that is responsible for animating and building the ecosystem (dilemma MD#1a). 
Additionally, the reaction of the 2nd operational team member and the general discussions we 
had with the operational team already announce a first pathology that we will find at several 
occasions: distrust. In this case it is a lack of trust between operational team and strategic 
governance. The operational team, frustrated from the little responsibility they have, stands 
in conflict and do not trust the strategic governance. The cluster seems to face the dilemma of 
listening to a range of different members and integrating their various (certainly very 
valuable) wishes, and listening to the operational team that has maybe more experience in 
managing networks of different actors. 
 
1.3.3 The (in)visibility of the performance contract: secretiveness 
The idea of the performance contract is to bring together all policy-driven cluster members 
behind one common vision that clearly stipulates the research and development objectives and 
the associated activities. This common vision should allow each member to know exactly 
where the policy-driven cluster is heading and how each member can participate in order to 
reach the goal. 
 
However, during our fieldwork period in HCPR’s physical office in the 15th district, the 
different task forces that are responsible for each of the defined objectives in the performance 
contract were “invisible”. The office of HCPR is very small with no dedicated conference 
rooms198. The meetings of the different innovation task forces for the performance contract 
                                                 
198
 HCPR moved to another building recently but during the majority of the 2nd policy phase they were in a 
building with only one small conference room. The room was very small and additionally the printer of the 
association was positioned in this conference room. Thus during meetings, employees of the association, not 
participating in a particularly meeting, regularly interrupted meetings in order to get their printings. 
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did not necessarily take place in the HCPR office but at member locations. The meetings take 
place outside the daily radar of the operational teams. 
 
Additionally, the actions of these innovation task forces are not visible on the HCPR website. 
We received the detailed performance contract only after numerous requests from an HCPR 
representative199, otherwise we would not even be aware of the details stipulated in the 
HCPR’s performance contract (i.e. the technological R&D and animation & development 
objectives). It is a closed circle of members that is aware about the detailed innovation 
objectives of the policy-driven cluster. All others have the general information that can be 
found on the website or in promotional materials. 
 
To sum up, there is secretiveness around the performance contract. This secretiveness is 
particularly interesting regarding the managing innovation dilemma (dilemma MD#2a). 
Innovation processes can be handled in a more or less open manner. The associated 
pathology that we deduct from this dilemma is again distrust. This time the lack of trust 
exists between the members of the policy-driven cluster and the wider ecosystem. The 
dilemma emerges because of the wish to protect the members and the ideas of the community 
and the wish to build a cluster where knowledge circulates freely.  
 
2 Managing the ecosystem: A cluster stuck in organisational dilemmas?  
In this section, we focus on the operationalization of a selection of HCPR’s animation & 
development objectives that were particularly important during the 2nd cluster policy phase 
(i.e. mapping the ecosystem, developing services, shifting organisational boundaries). All of 
the discussed activities are stipulated as objectives in the performance contract signed in 
November 2009 (see Annex 10). This analysis allows us to gain a deeper understanding about 
the role of the operational team to structure the local ecosystem and to foster innovation and 
collaboration among its members. Every sub-section will be structured in the same manner. 
We first present the activity realized by HCPR’s operational team and then we decorticate the 
different dilemmas and pathologies that emerge by implementing and managing these 
activities. 
 
                                                 
199
 For anonymity reason, we prefer to stay rather vague.  
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2.1 Mapping the Paris Region: who are the “clients”? 
One objective of the performance contract was to conduct an in-depth inventory of all the 
different biotechnology and health actors that are located in the Paris Region200. The result of 
this in-depth inventory should be summarized in a mapping that should then be made 
accessible for the wider public through the intranet and the extranet. The inventory and 
mapping was primarily conducted in 2010 with the help of an external consultancy firm. We 
first present the set-up and the results of the mapping and then discuss the institutional 
challenges of rendering the results visible to the ecosystem. 
 
2.1.1 The inventory: the pride of the development & animation team 
The mapping of Paris Region’s biotechnology and health sector was done in three steps: first 
counting the actors of the ecosystem, then defining the value chains, and finally positioning 
the SMEs on the identified value chains.  
 
First step: counting the actors of the ecosystem. The first step of the inventory was to count 
all actors that are situated in the Paris Region and that are active in the biotechnology and 
health sector. The perimeter of the biotechnology and health sector was defined by 
distinguishing three different perimeters (internal document 10/2010): core target, sector, and 
ecosystem. 
- The actors that are in the first perimeter of the policy-driven cluster are called “core 
target” which includes “all SMEs (less than 250 employees) involved in innovation 
and value creation in the targeted industry, having more than 50% of their activity on 
human health and a R&D activity in Ile-de-France”. 
- The second perimeter is called “sector”. Which of course includes the “core target” 
population but additionally “economic actors […] who are directly involved in the 
research, development and production of drugs, medical devices, diagnostics and 
analysis, excluding distributors and providers. These players must have over 50% of 
their activity in human health and have at least an implantation in Ile-de-France.” 
- The last perimeter is called “ecosystem” which of course includes all the actors 
already mentioned but additionally “all organizations that contribute to the 
advancement of human health, research institutions to health providers, by passing 
through business, government, the education community and financers.” 
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HCPR’s operational team, together with an external consulting firm, identified all regional 
actors that belonged to the defined ecosystem. Figure 26 shows the first result of this 
inventory. In total 2 462 entities were identified. These entities included in an ascending 
order: training institutes (32), financial or innovation support service providers (81), research 
institutes (83), companies with a related activity to human health and that can be a secondary 
market for the SMEs of the sector (191), companies with a support activity for human health 
companies (634), and finally, the largest group, care facilities for patients (1441). 
 
Figure 26: Ecosystem of the Paris Region Biotechnology and Health Sector 
 
Source: Internal document (10/2010) 
 
Second step: defining the value chain. The second step consisted in defining the exact value 
chains of the ecosystem. The cluster organisation defines a value chain as: “All consecutive 
chain elements of a process that allows transforming an idea, an invention or a concept 
(upstream of the value chain) in economic value (downstream of the value chain) leading to 
the patient. Within a value chain, several entities are positioned and interact with each other 
according to their professions, their respective skills and mutual expertises” (internal 
document 10/2010).201 A value chain consists of different chain elements (the actors of the 
ecosystem) that interact with each other in order to bring an invention to the market. HCPR 
identified a total of nine different value chains that are important for the biotechnology and 
health sector in the Paris Region (see Annex 11). These value chains include for example a 
value chain on “preventive and therapeutic vaccines” (value chain 1) and a value chain on 
“medical devices” (value chain 7). 
                                                 
201
 “Ensemble des maillons constitutifs d’un processus permettant de transformer une idée, une invention ou un 
concept (amont de la CDV) en valeur économique (aval de la CDV) aboutissant au patient. Au sein d’une chaîne 
de valeur, plusieurs structures sont positionnées et interagissent les unes avec les autres en fonction de leurs 
métiers, leurs compétences et expertises respectifs.” (internal document 10/2010) 
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Third step: positioning the SMEs on the identified value chains. In a third step the 
operational team then placed the 330 identified SMEs on the 9 value chains (see Annex 11). 
This revealed that some value chains count a considerable amount of SMEs, as for example 
the medical devices value chain (value chain 7) with 94 SMEs, while other value chains only 
count a few, as for example the gene therapy value chain (value chain 2) with only 5 SMEs. 
Each of these 9 value chains was then split up into distinctive chain links to visualize for each 
value chain the amount of companies that are close to idea generation or close to the market. 
(Annex 11 gives an example how such a representation looks like). 
 
To sum up, the final result of this inventory was a global overview of all value chains of the 
ecosystem and also the identification of the exact geographic position of each actor and value 
chain (see Annex 11). For example, this analysis showed in which domains the PR has a lot of 
SMEs (more than half of the SMEs (179 out of 330) are situated in the medical device or 
service sector) or in which domains the PR has a lot of big and intermediary companies (one 
third of large or intermediary companies are within the synthetic chemical molecule domain 
(55 out of 169) but no large or intermediary companies are in the gene and cell therapy 
domain). With the help of these mappings the operational team hoped to develop tailor-made 
services for the actors of the ecosystem.  
 
2.1.2 Invisibility of the inventory beyond the development & animation team’s office 
In 2010 the operational team put a lot of effort into establishing the anatomy of the Paris 
Region’s biotechnology & health sector. When we started the fieldwork period the 
operational team had just finished the mapping of the biotechnology & health sector, talked a 
lot about it and also displayed it on the wall of their office202. The objective of the 
development & animation team was now to create services adapted to each value chain and 
each chain position. Additionally, the operational team planned (as stipulated in the 
performance contract) to make the mapping accessible to the wider community through an 
interactive tool on the intranet and extranet. Rendering this mapping accessible had two 
objectives:  
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 The development & animation team had a separate office from the R&D team. 
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- to help everybody who is interested in PR’s biotechnology and health sector to gain a 
detailed picture of the sector. This would for example help companies to find 
appropriate partners for their collaborative research projects. 
- to help the R&D team. In case a HCPR member calls the R&D team to find a 
collaborative R&D project partner specialised in a certain domain, the R&D team 
could then use this inventory to find the best match within HCPR’s ecosystem. 
However, the mapping stayed largely invisible.  
 
2.1.2.1 External and internal (in)visibility 
The results of this mapping were officially presented to HCPR’s members during HCPR’s 
annual convention in October 2010. However, since the official presentation of the mapping 
in October 2010 and up to June 2013, the results of the mapping were never put on the 
website. The website does not mention the different value chains that were identified. Only 
somebody who knows that this inventory was done can launch a Google search on value 
chain and HCPR and then access the official presentation that was presented in October 2010, 
but nothing else. The mapping stays thus invisible to the ecosystem. 
 
However, it is not only invisible to the ecosystem but also to the R&D operational team. 
During our fieldwork observation period 2010/2011 the R&D team and the development & 
ecosystem team hardly communicated with each other. The R&D team for example did not 
really know what the development & ecosystem team was exactly doing, even though their 
offices were just some meters apart. When we interviewed somebody from the R&D team in 
October 2011, so one year after the official presentation of the value chain mapping, the R&D 
team still did not use the mapping for the partner finding process, and continued to search for 
potential partners on the Internet: 
« Là aussi il faudrait que [la collaboration entre les deux équipes au sein de HCPR] se 
fasse mais c’est toujours pas le cas. [..] Donc qu’est ce que je fais? Je vais sur le site de 
Biotech France, je vais sur internet, et je cherche par mot clé et je regarde. Quand par 
exemple quelqu’un me demande un partenaire qui fait du diagnostic, je le fais par mes 
propres moyens. » (October 2011) 
Even for us it was difficult to access the value chain mapping. We were able to access a 
written document that one gave us in the beginning of our fieldwork and the official 
presentation that was done during the Convention in October 2010. However, we never 
received the additional documents that were prepared by the external consultancy firm, even 
though we asked for it several times. There is not only an external visibility problem but also 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter seven 
 
 229
an internal visibility problem. In January 2012, an operational team member sent us the 
officall mapping (see Annex 11: Figure 53 and Figure 54). 
 
2.1.2.2 Political agendas 
We do not have an official explanation for the visibility problem as our different interview 
partners never wanted to address the problem directly. However, the main answer was 
always: “political agendas”. There were two indirect and related explanations that constantly 
popped up when addressing these difficulties: 
 
The first element that was constantly mentioned by our interview partners from the 
operational teams is that the prestigious institutes of the Paris Region all have their own 
political agenda: 
« [HealthCluster] n’a pas forcément une belle image à l’extérieur, parce qu’il y a cette 
composante politique qui est forte, mais c’est aussi très complexe. Les entités sont tellement 
différentes. La philosophie même. Il y a quand même des institutions d’excellence à Paris. 
Par exemple si tu prends le pôle Santé à Toulouse ou à Lyon, ils ont moins de difficultés 
que nous. Parce qu’à Lyon il y a certains gros Bio, mais ils ne sont pas énormes. Ils ont 
une petite Région. Ils se connaissaient tous, alors à Paris, il y a les grands hôpitaux, il y a 
les grands professeurs qui ne s’entendent pas forcement. Il y a tout ça. Il y a tout ce 
microcosme à Paris qui est compliqué, compliqué à gérer. [...] [l’institut de recheche 
médical] qui est mondialement connu pour [une certaine maladie], [l’université] aussi 
pourtant ils n’arrivent pas à s’entendre. Alors il y a des spin-offs qui sortent de tout ça 
mais les gros gros, ils ne s’entendent pas parce qu’ils tirent chacun leur couverture de leur 
côté, leur notoriété. Et ça n’existe pas dans les autres régions en France. Donc ça aussi ça 
apporte une difficulté. C’est pour ça que je dis, la composante politique est très très 
importante dans la Santé à Paris parce qu’après je ne sais pas si dans le numérique à 
Paris il y a cette composante politique forte. » (October 2011) 
The comment shows that the different actors in the Paris Region are very prestigious and well 
known but that they do not get along well together. This problem is apparently not new but 
historically deeply anchored in their behaviour and in the Region. According to our interview 
partners these problems are less frequent in policy-driven clusters outside of the capital 
region. 
 
The second element that was constantly mentioned concerns the strong basic research 
orientation of HCPR and the attached political agendas. This was another element with 
which our interview partners tried to justify the difficult and complex situation of HCPR 
compared to other policy-driven clusters. The Paris Region is a region that has excellent 
research institutes like for example the CEA, the Pierre and Marie Curie University, or 
INSERM. All of these institutions are highly respected and successful in emerging research 
domains. One HCPR manager for example told us: 
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« Nous c’est plus des chercheurs, des professeurs. Déjà ils sont dans un intellect, qui n’est 
pas du tout le même que celui des ingénieurs, qui est beaucoup plus pragmatique, qui doit 
de toute façon donner un produit, mettre quelque chose sur le marché. Il y a du business. 
[...] Alors nous, en recherche fondamentale, ce n’est pas grave si ça ne sort pas. [...] On 
fait de la recherche, on est pharmacien, on est médecin, on est clinicien. Tous ces gens là 
ils n’ont pas la même vue ou le même objectif qu’un ingénieur qui fait du logiciel, de 
l’informatique, qui est plus carré. Différents métiers, différents secteurs. » (Octobre 2011) 
HCPR’s governance seems mainly driven and motivated by basic research. In the context 
section we already saw that HCPR has a special position among the policy-driven clusters in 
the Paris Region as 50% of its members are operating in research and scientific development, 
the highest percentage of all policy-driven clusters situated in the Paris Region. Our interview 
partners confirm this strong research orientation. However, the medical domains discussed in 
HCPR’s performance contract differ to the medical domains of the majority of the companies 
actually present in the Paris Region. According to the HCPR’s value chain mapping, medical 
device (94) and service SMEs (85) are overrepresented within the HCPR’s ecosystem. 
However, even though number wise these companies are overrepresented, they are not 
particularly addressed in HCPR’s performance contract. In the technological R&D objectives 
of the performance contract the word “medical devices” (the value chain that counts most of 
the SMEs) is only mentioned once. Additionally, there is no chapter only dedicated to the 
medical service industry, the second biggest value chain. Instead, the performance contract 
discusses in detail the R&D objectives of the two smallest value chains, namely gene therapy 
(5 SMEs and no big companies) and cell therapy (8 SMEs and no big companies). These 
specialised medical firms are conducting cutting edge research and are particularly 
concentrated in the world-class bio campuses in the Paris Region (for example Genopole or 
Cancer campus), but they are not representing the majority of the companies in the ecosystem. 
The performance contract thus concentrates on cutting edge research domains but is less 
representing the majority of the local companies.  
 
To sum up, according to our interview partners, “political agendas” are at the root of why 
the mapping of the biotechnology & health sector was kept “invisible”. HCPR struggles to get 
things done because of leadership issues (members vs. operational team) (dilemma MD#1a). 
HCPR’s prestigious members have a strong word on what gets published and what does not 
get published on the website. In case the political agendas of the members are in danger, the 
work of the operational team can be blocked. These leadership struggles go hand in hand with 
the structural characteristics (dilemma SD#2c and SD#3b) of the Region. The degree of 
closeness between the local actors in a dense region such as the Paris Region seems to be 
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a particular dilemma for the operational team. The advantage of the HCPR is that it has a lot 
of prestigious universities, institutes and research parks on its territory. However, all of these 
structures already existed before the establishment of HCPR and already had a certain manner 
to function next to each other and with each other. HCPR now tries to put these different well 
established structures around one table. The operational team seems to be powerless in front 
of this political complexity. For a policy-driven cluster, having a high amount of prestigious 
institutes on its territory seems to render the task of building a policy-driven cluster more 
complicated. Even though a cluster organisation should represent the wishes of its members, 
the prestigious nature of the members and the regional specificities create also a side effect: 
the pathology of non-conformity. 
 
2.2 Developing services: torn apart between different objectives 
A second objective of the development & animation team was to develop tailor-made services 
for the companies situated in HCPR’s ecosystem. More precisely, the objective was to 
develop services for the local SMEs according to their position on the value chain mapping. 
Developing these services was a major cornerstone for the development & animation team 
during the 2nd policy phase203. Hereinafter, we present the plan and the associated services as 
well as the institutional dilemmas that emerged during the setup of this plan.  
 
2.2.1 Asking SMEs of the ecosystem to formulate their needs 
In the beginning of the 2nd policy phase, HCPR did an in-depth diagnosis of its ecosystem. 
This allowed the operational team of HCPR to set up the value chain mapping but also to get 
connected to the companies of their region. The HCPR’s operational team interviewed the 
SMEs of its ecosystem in order to understand their needs but also their expectations towards 
HCPR. The HCPR operational team asked them for the first time “What are actually your 
needs?” in order to better adapt their services:  
« Nous notre question était : « Quel sont vos besoins ? » C’était vraiment une phase 
d’écoute. [...] C’était assez nouveau […] [avant c’était eux qui venaient]. 
[...] [Maintenant] on va les rencontrer en face à face. Et on discute de « Quels sont vos 
besoins ». [...] On a interviewé 77 je pense. [...] Soit on le fait au téléphone soit en face à 
face. Ca c’est assez nouveau et intéressant. Je pense que c’est une bonne pratique. [...] 
D’aller voir les personnes et de discuter avec eux. D’échanger. [...] Il faut qu’on arrête de 
se cacher derrière la technique. » (October 2010) 
For HCPR’s operational team these interviews constituted a considerable change of 
functioning compared to the 1st cluster policy phase (2005-2008). During the 1st cluster policy 
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 Priority 3 of the animation & development objectives in the performance contract, see Annex 10. 
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phase the operational team was mainly concentrated on “finding subsidies“ for R&D projects 
and had more a passive attitude, waiting for the companies to contact HCPR. However, in the 
beginning of the second policy phase, HCPR’s operational team really started to reach out to 
their members and to become more active.  
 
HCPR’s operational team started to work on the new services plan in the beginning of 2010 
and the interviews with the SMEs took place between May and July 2010. In September 
2010, when we started our fieldwork, the operational team had already grouped the different 
wishes and needs in three domains: a social domain, an economic domain and an 
environmental domain. In the “social domain” category, the contemplated actions and 
services were concentrated on the competence development of SMEs. In the “economic 
domain”, the contemplated actions and services were concentrated on enterprise 
development and in the “environmental domain”, the contemplated actions and services were 
concentrated on innovation development. 
 
Figure 27 shows a photo that we took from a white board that was positioned in the animation 
& development team office in October 2010. This chart gives the first overview of the main 
categories they identified based on their interviews. Every domain was then further declined 
into different actions. Additionally, partners and indicators had to be defined for every 
domain. When we integrated the HCPR’s operational team, HCPR’s operational team just 
entered into the negotiation phase with a selection of regional partners. Collaborating with 
these regional partners to develop the new services was necessary, because HCPR was 
(structural and financial wise) not able to carry the planned services alone. They entered into 
negotiations204 with other regional partners in order to distribute the different tasks and 
responsibilities of the new contemplated services. 
 
In autumn 2010, the challenge of the HCPR’s operational team was thus not only to transform 
the collected “wishes” and “expectations” into concrete services, tasks, budgets, and 
indicators205, but also to find the right regional partners that could help setting up the new 
tailor-made services for the local SMEs operating in the biotechnology & health sector. Table 
39 summarizes the roadmap for the development of the new services.  
                                                 
204
 We were able to participate in these meetings. 
205
 « On raisonne avec les attentes des entreprises et [après] on doit les décliner sur des actions. Et de l’action 
on doit décliner des taches et des taches on décline des partenaires potentiels. Et après on va définir des budgets 
et des indicateurs. Ça c’est vraiment l’arbre récent des fiches d’actions » (October 2010) 
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Figure 27: Défi Biotech Santé Plan - October 2010 
 
 
Table 39: Roadmap for the development of the HCPR’s services (2010) 
Phase Period Objective 
Phase 0 Jan. – May 2010 Launch of the Défi Biotech Santé plan 
Phase 1 May – July 2010 
- Selection of the service provider / launch of the study “general diagnostic” 
(expectations and needs of the SMEs) 
- Identification of potential regional partners with whom HCPR could set up 
the Défi Biotech Santé plan 
- Benchmark of the partners 
Phase 2/3 Aug. – Sept. 2010 - Definition of the operational objectives 
- Engineering of the partners in the ecosystem 
Phase 3 Sept. – Oct. 2010 Formalisation of the partners in the ecosystem 
Phase 4 Nov. 2010 - Final writing of the action plan “Défi Biotech Santé” (Final hand in of the plan, but each step was delayed) 
 
2.2.2 Dilemmas with the implementation of the plan 
However, the implementation of the plan faced again some organisational dilemmas that 
create pathologies. 
 
2.2.2.1 Sharing responsibilities with established actors of the region 
We were able to assist at several meetings between HCPR and its regional partners (for 
example CCIP, AFNOR, Optics Valley, Polinvest, ADDVDM, UbiFrance...) in order to see if 
a common ground can be found to establish services for the health and biotech ecosystem in 
the Paris Region. One of the prerequisites to get a particular service financed from the 
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financing bodies (national and regional authorities) that were willing to subsidies HCPR’s 
new services, was that the chosen partner organisation did not already propose a similar 
service. The services thus had to be new and specifically adapted to the characteristics of 
HCPR’s ecosystem. However, during the meetings, the partner organisations often did not 
understand this point. During the meetings the potential partner organisations often repeated 
that they already propose such or such a service (for example UbiFrance for the medical 
sector). In this case, HCPR always argued that the services have to be adapted to HCPR’s 
ecosystem and thus changed, otherwise they would not get financed.  
 
To sum up, HCPR had difficulties to push forward their plan in the Paris Region because a 
multitude of support structures exist in the region which also already propose services for the 
medical sector. This puts HCPR in the delicate situation to defend its existence. First, one 
could start asking if HCPR exists because of a real intrinsic motivation or just because of a 
policy prescription (dilemmaPD#3b)? Second, a one-shop system for the medical industry 
might be desirable, but at the same time the existing support structures will not stop offering 
their traditional services. The life-cycle stage of the Paris Region cluster seems already 
well advanced (dilemma SD#1a) which makes it challenging for a new entity to establish 
itself and to regroup existing offers. Again, the policy motivations that are behind the idea of 
regrouping existing offers are certainly good, but organisations are like human beings: they do 
not voluntarily decide to die. These dilemmas produce again organisational pathologies, 
particularly a pathology of nonconformity. 
 
2.2.2.2 Representing the members or the ecosystem? 
In January 2011 the animation & development team under the responsible steering committee 
president had come up with a first final version of the plan206. As we can see in Table 40, the 
three axes were still the same (i.e. competence development of SMEs, enterprise 
development, and innovation development). Most of the associated actions are very business 
oriented as for example “help in business development”, “developing international markets”, 
“help in financing”, or “human resources planning”. The only action that was quite different 
to the other actions was “Strengthening the Innovation Potential”. 
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 The associated actions or partners to the three axes were constantly adapted between September 2010 and 
January 2011 but the main axes always stayed the same. As we observed the whole process between September 
2010 and January 2011, we could go much more into detail. However, we consider that the most important 
information for this thesis is the disappearance of the innovation development axes. The collected material 
though could be explored in another way for additional academic papers. 
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Table 40: Défi Biotech Santé Plan – January 2011 
Axe Actions 
Axe n°1 : 
Développement de 
l’entreprise 
1. Mise en relation et visibilité des PME au sein de l’écosystème 
2. Accompagner le développement commercial 
3. Développer les affaires à l’international 
4. Financement des entreprises 
Axe n°2 : 
Développement 
des compétecnes 
1. Management prévisionnelle des Ressources Humaines ( GPEC) 
2. Ingénierie juridique 
3. Normalisation et risques liés aux marchés et aux réglementations 
4. Appréhender les tendances lourdes 
Axe n°3 : Soutien 
à l’innovation 
1. Veille technologique et intelligence économique 
2. Renforcement du potentiel d’innovation  
 
The operational team defined the “strengthening the innovation potential” objective as 
follows (January 2011): “Strengthening the innovation potential of SMEs in the health sector 
by helping them to gain a better knowledge and understanding of technologies related to their 
core business.”207 This objective was a need expressed by the companies that was somehow 
different compared to the other needs. Box 11 explains the general context of this innovation 
objective and the needs that were expressed by the companies. The main need that was 
expressed by the companies concerned the lack of knowledge in other disciplines, particularly 
technology disciplines, but which are important for the advancement of their own scientific 
endeavours. The different interviewed companies expressed the need to receive help in 
accessing knowledge of other domains. 
 
Box 11: Context and expressed needs 
Comment aider les PME de la filière « SANTE »à renforcer leur potentiel d’innovation ? 
Beaucoup de technologies sont diffusantes et transverses (Electronique, logiciel,...) et les 
PME de la filière santé ne sont pas en situation de suivre leur rapide évolution sont peu 
connues des PME de la filière. La connaissance des technologies connexes au cœur de 
métier de la PME de la filière « SANTE » est un accélérateur certain de l’innovation. Il est 
nécessaire, voire indispensable pour réduire les cycles de mise sur le marché des produits 
ou des services des acteurs de la filière « Santé » 
Cet objectif pour être atteint nécessite la mise en réseau des différents pôles et clusters 
franciliens porteurs des thématiques qui peuvent servir le domaine de la santé. En effet il 
existe un terreau exceptionnel en Ile de France pour répondre à cette action. 
Il s’agit de comprendre comment l’interconnexion entre pôles et clusters, les réseaux de 
syndicats professionnels d’entreprises existants, se fait ou peut se faire, comment favoriser 
un rapprochement entre thématiques (TIC, mécatronique, Développement durable, 
robotique, design ...) et mutualiser les connaissances pour favoriser la convergence des 
technologies vers des applications santé. 
Les actions envisagées sont de nature transverse et concernent toutes les chaines de valeur 
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 “Renforcer le potentiel d’innovation des PME de la filière « SANTE » en les aidant à acquérir une meilleure 
connaissance et une meilleure compréhension des technologies connexes à leur cœur de métier.” 
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(CDV) identifiées lors de la phase de préparation du Plan Filière « Santé ». Il s’agit de 
permettre aux PME du domaine des sciences du vivant de mieux connaitre les domaines 
connexes à leurs problématiques et permettre de mieux incorporer les technologies dans 
leurs produits ou dans leurs services 
 
However, if we jump now to October 2011 when the new services plan was first presented to 
HCPR’s members (one year later compared to the photo we took in the office of the 
animation & development team) the main domains look quite differently (see Figure 28). One 
main domain has disappeared: the innovation management domain. The new official services 
plan was now heavily concentrated on actions that target the economic competences of the 
companies: strategy, financing and management, company development. Why did the plan 
change?  
 
In January / February 2011, the executive office rejected the services plan elaborated by the 
animation & development operational team and the steering committee president. The 
conflicts around this plan led to the resignation of the animation & development steering 
committee president. The newly developed plan (see Figure 28) was officially launched in 
January 2012 (see Table 41 for the roadmap of the new plan). 
 
Figure 28: Défi Biotech Santé Plan - October 2011 
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Table 41: Roadmap for the “new” Défi Biotech Santé plan (2011) 
Phase Period Objective 
Phase 5 Dec 2010 / Jan. 2011  - Resignation of the animation & development steering committee president 
Phase 6 Jan. / Feb. 2011 
- Executive office does not validate the Défi Biotech Santé plan 
- Back to the start with discussions regarding the content together with the 
different representatives of the four panels 
Phase 7 Spring 2011 - New set up of the plan, integration of new partners and new budget discussions 
Phase 8 Mai / June 2011 - Submission to the financers 
Phase 9 Oct. 2011 - Presentation of the plan during the HealthCluster Convention 
Phase 10 Jan 2012 - Official Launch 
 
What led to the rejection of the plan and the disappearance of the innovation management 
objective? The services plan was developed by the development & animation operational 
team and constantly supervised by the development & animation steering committee 
president. However, once the operational team had finalized the plan and was ready to present 
the final results to HCPR’s governance, the Steering Committee President resigned, or as 
some told us was asked to resign from its position. This incident happened end of 2010. The 
problem was that the Executive office blocked the already developed plan.  
 
The operational team based their work on the interviews they did with companies from the 
whole ecosystem. However, the opinions of the companies from the whole ecosystem 
apparently did not reflect the opinions of the companies that were integrated in the executive 
office of the policy-driven cluster: 
« On a poussé, on a poussé, on a poussé pour pouvoir présenter les dossiers et finalement 
on a commencé à ralentir en disant il faut que ça passe au BE. [...] Le 2 février [2011] on 
a fait des réunions avec les entreprises avec les PMEs et à partir de là on a pu réécrire les 
fiches. A partir de ce point là on a fait pratiquement une remise à 0. Après on a réécrit tout. 
[...] C’est le BE qui voulait mettre sa patte dedans. [...] [Le nouveau président du steering 
committee] voulait qu’on réponde à tous les désirs de tout le monde donc on n’était plus 
dans la même logique. » (October 2011) 
 
The members in the executive office considered that HCPR’s member companies need help in 
classic business assistance topics such as accessing finance, development, internationalisation, 
etc. For the members of the executive office, the innovation part was not a priority. The needs 
of the companies in the executive office were thus different to the needs of the companies that 
were interviewed by the operational team during 2010. The operational team interviewed PR 
companies of the whole biotechnology and health ecosystem and did not only focus on the 
members of HCPR:  
« Ce n’était pas [la] préoccupation [du BE]. Leur préoccupation était vraiment l’histoire 
du financement, l’histoire d’ouverture du commerce, l’histoire de se développer. [...] 
Quand tu écoutes les entreprises de l’écosystème [note d’explication : tous les PMEs dans 
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la région pas seulement les membres], ils te disent : « C’est [le soutien à l’innovation] 
qu’on veut. » Quand tu écoutes les gens de notre pôle, c’est [les autres services] qu’ils 
veulent. [...] [L’année dernière on a fait une enquête auprès les PMEs de l’écosystème], on 
a vu émerger nos fiches. Quand on retravaille là dessus avec les PMEs de notre pôle, ce 
n’est pas ça qui les a intéressé. » (October 2011) 
 
The operational team was quite frustrated, not only because they had to start from zero again, 
but also because they considered that the wishes of the whole ecosystem, and thus also 
potential new members, were no longer taken into consideration. 
 
To sum up, HCPR faces again different managerial and political dilemmas. The repeating 
question is who is in charge of this association (members vs. operational team) (dilemma 
MD#1a)? The unclear responsibilities drive again the pathology of inefficiency. The 
executive office decided now that the organisational boundary of HCPR is its members 
(dilemma PD#1b), that they are the ones who should be satisfied first, before the wider 
ecosystem. Additionally, HCPR also takes a clear stance regarding the managing innovation 
processes dilemma (dilemma MD#2a). Even though it was not that clear in the performance 
contract, the executive office now took the decision that the most important services in order 
to foster the competitiveness of its members is to help them in concrete business issues. 
However, as innovation is the cornerstone of policy-driven clusters and innovation processes 
are manifold and difficult to manage, we formulate a new pathology, the pathology of 
pragmatism and not fostering out-of-the box thinking.  
 
2.3 Developing inter-cluster collaborations: implementation difficulties 
A third important objective of HCPR’s performance contract was to start collaborating with 
other policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region to create innovation synergies between policy-
driven cluster members from different sectors208. During the first cluster policy phase (2005-
2008), HCPR particularly focused on the basic cluster services (finding partners, finding 
subsidies and labelling projects). However, the public financers obliged the policy-driven 
clusters to stipulate in their new performance contracts that they will start collaborating with 
other local policy-driven clusters in order to stimulate the innovation potential of the 
associated members. HCPR focused on the intersection between Health and ICT, and together 
with Cap Digital and Systematic, launched the ICT-Health initiative (“TIC & Santé”) to 
bridge medical entities (be it hospitals, companies, research institutes, etc) with ICT 
                                                 
208
 Priority 2 of the animation & development objectives in the performance contract, see Annex 10. 
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companies and research units. For HCPR, this ICT & Health initiative was one of the first 
major activities of the operational team during the second cluster policy phase. Additionally, 
this initiative was considerably different to the basic services HCPR proposed during the first 
cluster policy phase. Hereinafter, we will first present the characteristics of the ICT & Health 
initiative and how the operational teams of the three policy-driven clusters collaborate. In a 
second step, we turn again to the organisational dilemmas that HCPR faced when 
implementing this ICT & Health initiative. 
 
2.3.1 Characteristics of the inter-cluster collaboration and set-up difficulties 
The inter-cluster initiative was officially launched at the Pasteur Institute in January 2010 
(app. 500 participants). The executive director of HCPR introduced the initiative and then 
different actors from the medical and institutional domain hold speeches on ICT & Health. In 
the afternoon session, workshops were organised to define the main ICT & Health themes the 
initiative should focus on during the next 3 years. At the end of the day, four priority axes 
were identified: 
- Priority axis 1: Knowledge management, modelling and simulation in biology, 
pharmacy and medicine 
- Priority axis 2: Digital imaging 
- Priority axis 3: Medical devices 
- Priority axis 4: E-health and telemedicine 
 
For every priority axis a workgroup was created that met three times between February and 
April 2010 to further detail the four priority axes. Everyone of the local ICT & Health 
ecosystem was free to participate in these workgroups. The objective of these workgroups 
was to establish a detailed roadmap for every priority axis to which future collaborative R&D 
projects could apply to. In Mai 2010, the research road maps for the four priority axes were 
finalised and the objectives for the coming years presented (restitution event: app. 200 
participants). The three policy-driven clusters launched the first inter-cluster collaborative 
R&D project call in September 2010. All members of the three policy-driven clusters were 
invited to submit projects that were at the intersection of ICT & Health and that correspond to 
one of the priorities described in the research road maps. Since then, there have been several 
inter-cluster project calls. Every project call follows the same pattern: 
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1st step - Events: Every inter-cluster project call starts with an event organised jointly by the 
three policy-driven clusters. These events are generally composed out of a plenary session and 
a project set-up workshop. The typical plenary session starts with presentations done by for 
example medical professors, cluster representatives, academics, and government agencies or 
with round tables on specific relevant ICT & Health topics. Then there is most of the time 
also a presentation of already labelled or financed ICT & Health projects. The third part of 
every ICT & Health event is organised in form of workshops. For these workshops the 
operational teams of the three policy-driven clusters set up standardised power point 
templates (see Annex 12). Every actor of the region that wishes to present (i) an already 
started ICT & Health project but where one or several competences are missing, (ii) just a 
competence, or (iii) just a need209, has to inform, prior to the event, the ICT & Health policy-
driven cluster representatives of his/her intention. In case there are too many candidates the 
priority is given to project presentations (and not need or competences presentation). The 
priority is particularly given to projects that are already well advanced and which can be 
finalised within 3 months, the moment where the project has to be handed in for labelling. 
Every presenter has between 5 minutes (need, competencies) and 10 minutes (projects) for 
his/her presentation and has to stick to the provided power point templates. The whole process 
is highly formatted. 
 
2nd step - Project intention deadline: The 2nd step of the inter-cluster project call initiative is 
the project intention deadline. Two weeks after an event, the R&D project consortiums that 
are interested in submitting a project for the next subsidies call (for example FUI or 
ERDF210), have to send their project intentions211 to one centralised ICT & Health e-mail 
address212. This centralised ICT & Health submission is then directly forwarded to all three 
ICT & Health policy-driven cluster representatives. 
 
3rd step - Inter-cluster meeting, feedback to project leader, and start of labelling process: 
After the project intention deadline, the three ICT & Health policy-driven cluster 
representatives meet to examine the projects (each operational team has appointed an ICT & 
Health contact person). This committee is called CLIP (Comité de Liaison Inter Pôles). 
                                                 
209
 The need category was only introduced in one of the later project calls and did not exist in the beginning.  
210
 ERDF = European Regional Development Fund; in French: FEDER = Fonds européen de développement 
économique et régional 
211 The project intention is a summary of the project on a few pages. 
212
 Also policy-driven cluster members who have not participated in the events can send their intentions. 
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During these meetings, the ICT & Health policy-driven cluster representatives first decide 
which of the submitted projects are allowed to participate in the ICT & Health initiative, then 
dispatch the different projects, and then inform the project leaders: 
« [Pendant le] CLIP on détermine si les fiches sont plutôt HealthCluster ou Cap Digital ou 
Systematic. [...] On regarde les verrous technologiques qui sont soulevés. Parce que le truc 
le plus important dans un projet, c’est quel va être l’innovation. Où elle est l’innovation? 
C’est le médical, c’est l’application, c’est la numérisation, c’est la vidéo, c’est quoi ? 
Quand c’est considéré comme étant vraiment du ressort de la médecine, à ce moment là le 
CLIP décide [que c’est HealthCluster] qui va suivre ce dossier. [...] Après on fait un retour 
aux porteurs. On leur dit : « Voilà c’est HealthCluster qui [sera responsable pour la 
labellisation].» (Octobre 2011) 
 
At this point the project leader only gets informed that his project was granted (or not granted) 
the ICT & Health visa and with which policy-driven cluster he will start the official labelling 
process. The ICT & Health visa has mainly a political significance. According to our 
interview partners, the policy-driven clusters were somehow obliged by the national 
authorities to start developing inter-cluster initiatives during the 2nd cluster policy phase. The 
ICT & Health visa is thus an administrative stamp that proves this inter-cluster collaboration 
but it does not have any additional value:  
« En fait [...] c’est comme si les gens déposaient directement chez HealthCluster. Ils ne 
sont pas obligés de passer par TIC & Santé. En fait on a crée un visa TIC &Sante. Le visa 
TIC & Santé c’est juste pour dire que les gens rentrent bien dans les critères des trois 
pôles. [...] Ça veut dire que le projet rentre bien dans les critères qu’on a signé entre nous, 
[c’est la feuille de route]. Mais pour eux [les porteur des projets] ça n’a pas vraiment une 
valeur. [...] [Le visa vaut] rien en fin de compte» (Octobre 2011) 
 
As soon as the projects are dispatched into each of the three policy-driven clusters, the 
collaboration between the three policy-driven clusters stops. Each operational team treats the 
ICT & Health projects according to its internal scientific and labelling standards213, as if the 
inter-cluster initiative does not exist. In the beginning the policy-driven cluster organisations 
wanted to continue the collaboration also during the labelling process, but this was never put 
into action because it was considered as too complicated. Each policy-driven cluster has its 
own labelling rules. Setting up an inter-cluster labelling process would have needed new 
inter-cluster rules:  
« Au départ on voulait faire un comité R&D mixte. C’est à dire des gens de Cap Digital, 
des gens de Systematic et comme ça on analyse tous les projets TIC & Santé. Normalement 
c’est ça qui devrait se faire. En fait ce n’était jamais signé ou accordé. Les gens ont trouvé 
que : « Non, non, c’était trop compliqué. » Parce que si tu veux, nous on a un processus 
bien défini pour le label HealthCluster, Cap Digital aussi, et Systematic aussi. Donc si on 
                                                 
213
 The labelling standards are not the same in every cluster, some clusters for example only use external 
evaluators; some only internal evaluators, some have one to one meetings with the cluster actors in order to 
prepare the labelling, others have pre-examination presentations in front of a jury.  
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fait un comité mixte il aura fallu redéfinir les règles etc., et ça ils voulaient pas. Personne 
ne voulait faire cet effort. Alors au départ c’était ça. La philosophie du truc. [...] Du coup 
le CLIP il fait juste : « Tiens, c’est toi qui va faire ça, c’est toi qui va faire ça. » Et en plus 
en règle général, s’il y a 10 projets on essaie d’en faire 3 – 3 – 4. On essaie d’équilibrer. 
[...] Je trouve ça très dommageable. [...] On se dispatche [les projets]. Hop on retourne à 
la maison avec notre petit projet. Et au pôle on fait comme si c’était un truc normal. Et 
après on les revoit plus, Cap digital et [Systematic]. [...] Ils disent que ça fait double 
boulot. Ca fait double travail de se taper tous les projets. Par exemple si on a reçu 30 
lettres, ils préfèrent faire 10, 10, 10, plutôt que de se taper les 30. C’est vrai que ça fait 
beaucoup de travail en plus. Donc c’est comme ça que c’était décidé. Il faut mieux se 
diviser la tache et on le fait chacun de son côté. » (Octobre 2011) 
 
To sum up, the government authorities responsible for the cluster policy, urged policy-
driven clusters to set up inter-cluster collaborations to foster the innovation potential of 
their members (dilemma MD#1a). Diversity is particularly important for idea generation 
phase. The cluster organisations manage to join forces and to set up joint events. However, for 
the labelling process, at the moment where an intersectoral scientific knowledge would be 
necessary to choose the most promising projects, the policy-driven clusters did not manage to 
join forces. At that point, the only observation we can make is that the objective stays a 
policy prescription and is not an intrinsic motivation (dilemma PD#3b). 
 
2.3.2 MPRs conflicting relationship with the ICT & Health initiative 
In the beginning, the ICT & Health initiative was a novelty for HCPR. We started our 
fieldwork, just after the 1st project call and the cluster employees often told us about the 
successful event at the Pasteur Institute, the brainstorming workshops and this first project set 
up event. They were in a certain manner proud of these events. However, this situation 
changed rapidly. After the first project call, HCPR’s ICT & Health representative was 
attributed 4 ICT & Health projects during the CLIP meeting. However, HCPR’s internal 
labelling committee labelled none of these projects. After the second project call, HCPR’s 
ICT & Health representative was attributed 3 ICT & Health projects and HCPR’s internal 
labelling committee labelled all three projects. However, the financial authorities refused to 
subsidies all of the three projects. So after one year, none of HCPR’s ICT & Health projects 
actually got financed, even though the operational team invested a considerable amount of 
time in the initiative. Our interview partners mentioned two main blocking points: the lack in 
competence in the ICT domain and the non-relevance of ICT for HCPR’s research agenda. 
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2.3.2.1 HCPR’s lack in competence in the ICT domain 
As the initiative tries bringing together two different research domains, HCPR encountered 
difficulties to decide upon the pertinence of the submitted projects:  
« Dans le comité chez HealthCluster il y a que des scientifiques dans la biologie [et des 
médecins]. Et c’est là où il y a le problème. Parce que quand arrivent les projets TIC & 
Santé, il y a beaucoup de choses qu’on ne connaît pas. Sécurité des données, les 
algorithmes etc. Donc il y a toute une partie importante du projet qu’on ne peut pas juger 
parce qu’on n’est pas apte de juger. [...] Ils disent : « TIC & Santé encore. La télémédecine 
encore. » Nous, ce qu’on valide par contre dans ce genre de projets, c’est la validation 
clinique. Est-ce que réellement, dans le projet, ils ont mis la clinique, des médecins. Est –ce 
que ces médecins c’est bien des gens de référence, connus? Pas juste un petit labo caché 
dans un coin de la France qu’on ne connaît pas? On est là pour vraiment valider la partie 
clinique du projet. Mais après, on est complètement perdu quand le porteur de projet nous 
dit : « Non, mais moi c’est révolutionnaire. Mes algorithmes sont bien plus performants 
que les algorithmes de l’autre ». Donc nous on [...] ne sait pas juger. Donc à chaque fois 
qu’il y a un projet TIC & Santé qui arrive, c’est l’horreur parce que personne ne veut se 
prononcer. Au lieu de dire : « Je suis pour le projet » ou « Je ne le suis pas. », ils disent : 
« Je ne sais pas. Je ne suis pas compétent. » Donc on se regarde tous autour de la table : 
« So what, quoi. » (Octobre 2011) 
So even though, the policy-driven clusters are pushed to initiate collaborations between their 
different members, they were not able to collaborate on an organisational level during the 
labelling process. The lack of competence in ICT, hinders HCPR to pursue the inter-cluster 
collaboration process with full energy.  
 
2.3.2.2 Non-relevance of ICT & Health projects for HCPR’s research agenda 
We already underlined that the performance contract of HCPR particularly concentrates on 
basic research. Even though HCPR participates in the ICT & Health inter-cluster 
collaboration initiative, e-health is not stipulated as a real research priority in the performance 
contract. The e-health objective in the performance contract is even the only technological 
R&D objective that is not explained in detail (absence of a definition of concrete actors, 
activities or deliverables). For no other research objective this is the case. Additionally, HCPR 
has neither a dedicated webpage for the ICT & Health events nor a regular newsletter only 
dedicated to ICT & Health. On the contrary, Cap Digital has installed a dedicated webpage on 
the ICT & Health subject, where presentations from the last project event sessions can be 
downloaded. Additionally, Cap Digital sends out regular information e-mails that summarize 
all-important ICT & Health events that take place in the Paris Region. Even though HCPR 
collaborates with the other policy-driven clusters in the region, the ICT & Health projects are 
not the research priority of HCPR. Following comment shows that they somehow only do it to 
please the demands of the government:  
« TIC & Santé au niveau du pôle HealthCluster ce n’est pas très populaire. [...] Ce qui est 
bon, politiquement parlant, c’est de pouvoir effectivement travailler avec les deux autres 
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pôles franciliens. [...] Ca c’est bon sur le papier mais après, dans les faits, on se rend 
compte que c’est très difficile. [...] Chaque pôle a sa politique. [...] Nous, c’est plutôt 
médical à fond. Les projets pour le cancer, médicine personnalisée, donc nous, on est 
vraiment là dedans. [...] et le TIC & Santé, c’est le truc bâtard, qui fait bien sur le papier 
parce que c’est du numérique, c’est la télémédecine, c’est l’e-santé. On en parle beaucoup, 
il y aura de l’argent là dedans mais personne ne s’investit réellement, en tout cas chez 
HealthCluster, pour ça. [...] [Au niveau] des instances ca ne plait pas. Ils disent que c’est 
bien mais en fait ils ne nous donnent pas tellement de support. Chaque fois c’est un projet 
TIC & Santé au niveau du comité R&D, ils regardent ça un peu .... » (Octobre, 2011) 
HCPR’s governance seems to know where it wants to go in research terms. However, the 
policy-driven cluster also has to assure the conformity with the general cluster policy 
conditions, something they do on the paper but less with full investment. 
 
2.3.3 Conclusion: different impacts, depending on policy-driven cluster 
The underlying objective of the ICT & Health initiative was to create new synergies and new 
business opportunities between companies of different sectors in the region. This objective 
seems to be reached for members of Cap Digital. Before the start of the ICT & Health 
imitative, the members of Cap Digital were not really aware that they could find business 
opportunities in the medical and health sector. According to an operational team member of 
Cap Digital, the initiative changed their perspective:  
« L’axe de gestion de connaissance était l’axe qui se rapprochait le plus de nous au départ. 
Mais en fait on s’est aperçu qu’il y en avait plein d’autres. [...] Au début on pensait qu’on 
ne rentrait pas dans les thématiques TIC & Santé, mais après, on s’est rendu compte que 
c’est faux. [...] [Nos membres] ont compris qu’ils pourront avoir des compétences qui 
pouvaient être intéressantes dans la santé. [...] Ca on s’en est aperçu au fur et à mesure. 
[...] C’était un vrai apport. La santé au départ c’était vraiment un domaine sur lequel on 
n’allait pas. » (January 2011) 
 
For Cap Digital the ICT & Health initiative seems to have brought the planned positive 
effects. The perspective of the HCPR operational team is quite different to the Cap Digital 
team. For HCPR this event has also brought a benefit, but they perceive this benefit more 
from an administrative angle than from a business opportunity or content angle: 
« Comme les porteurs doivent être absolument des membres de HealthCluster, du coup ils 
ont du s’inscrire. Ca les a obligé de devenir adhérent. Mais il y a aussi ceux qui, 
finalement, se disent ; « Vous faites des biomarqueurs. Moi je fais des logiciels. Justement, 
je veux adhérer à votre pole pour aller dans les groupes de travail du numérique. » On a 
bénéficié de ça. Alors qu’eux [Cap Digital et Systematic] moins. Parce que finalement ceux 
qui font des médicaments des molécules [...] ils ne vont pas aller vers la vidéo. Qu’est ce 
qu’ils vont faire. Donc eux ils n’ont pas bénéficié des nouveaux adhérents d’une nouvelle 
planète. » (October 2011). 
 
HCPR experienced a member increase thanks to ICT companies that were eager to explore 
new business opportunities in the medical and health sector. However, this was not the case 
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the other way round as scientific researchers conducting basic research were not interested in 
new business opportunities and thus did not join the other policy-driven clusters. One of the 
French cluster policy objective is to reach a critical mass. This critical mass is measured by 
numbers of adherent. So from this perspective HCPR profited more from the initiative. 
However, another objective is to create jobs and business opportunities. From this perspective 
Cap Digital profited more from the initiative. 
 
To sum up, Cap Digital managed to transform a well-meant policy-description into an 
intrinsic motivation, while HCPR failed to do so (dilemma PD#3b). The reason why 
HCPR seems not to be able to easily integrate and work across different subject areas seems 
to be HCPR’s sector of activity (dilemma SD#2b). The ICT companies, pursuing more 
applied research, seem to be better equipped to find new business opportunities across 
different subject areas than medical companies that pursue basic research. This generates a 
pathology of non-conformity for HCPR.  
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Chapter 8:  Which role does HCPR play in the set-up of R&D projects? 
In this chapter we now investigate the French cluster policy from a collaborative R&D project 
point of view. We discuss the results of the structured interviews that we conducted with 
project leaders and partners participating in the ICT & Health initiative. Our objective is to 
understand how the policy-driven cluster actors create collaborative research projects and in 
which manner the policy-driven clusters help them in this endeavour. We first discuss the 
profile of our interviewed project leaders and their respective companies and then focus on 
the collaborative R&D projects that were submitted to the policy-driven clusters214. This 
allows us to discuss how the project leaders find ideas, partners and subsidies to construct 
collaborative R&D projects. A chronological order of presentation would be to start with the 
idea genesis215 of a collaborative R&D project, followed by a discussion of the partner finding 
process once the decision that a project should be done was taken, and finally by a discussion 
about how the subsidies for the project were accessed. However, the policy-driven clusters 
played their major role in the “finding subsidies” phase. In order to understand the 
relationship between policy-driven clusters and project leaders, it is thus better to start the 
discussion with the “finding subsidies” phase (see Figure 29)216. 
 
Figure 29: The R&D collaboration process and the importance of policy-driven clusters 
R&D collaboration process Importance of policy-driven cluster in this process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
214
 As already explained in the methodology part, we base our analysis on 19 cases regarding the idea and 
partner finding process and on 30 cases regarding the subsidies finding process. 
215
 By idea genesis we do not mean all the personal mental itineraries a certain project leader might have had 
prior to the formulation of the idea. By idea genesis we mean the point where the project leader decides that a 
research project could be done.  
216
 We summarized all discussed projects in a project overview table (see Table 45) at the end of this chapter. 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 247
Box 12: Content of chapter eight 
1 Overview of ICT & Health project leaders and their organisations ..................... 248 
1.1 Presentation of the project leaders’ organisations ............................................................. 248 
1.2 Presentation of the project leaders ..................................................................................... 253 
1.3 Conclusion: the particularities of the R&D project leaders ............................................... 257 
2 Finding subsidies: Being friend and judge – a schizophrenic situation ................ 258 
2.1 Policy-driven clusters: a super coach ................................................................................ 259 
2.2 Policy-driven clusters: biased judges and ambiguous objectives ...................................... 260 
2.2.1 Biased behaviour of the evaluation committee in policy-driven clusters .................. 260 
2.2.2 Decision inconsistency: labelling then not labelling .................................................. 262 
2.2.3 FUI: ambiguous objectives and complex set-up ........................................................ 263 
2.2.4 Consequence: abandoning policy-driven clusters or intensive lobbying ................... 266 
2.3 Double pressure on policy-driven clusters ........................................................................ 267 
2.3.1 Bottom-up pressure from companies: want to get labelled and financed .................. 268 
2.3.2 Top-down pressure from government: performance evaluations............................... 271 
2.4 Conclusion: the finding subsidies’ dilemmas of HCPR .................................................... 272 
3 Finding partners: “Las Vegas” weddings thanks to “Meetic” ............................... 273 
3.1 Project leaders learn but have difficulties to find certain partners .................................... 274 
3.1.1 Project leaders’ learning curve for finding partners ................................................... 275 
3.1.2 The difficulty to find medical and industrial partners ................................................ 285 
3.1.3 The difficulty to find project partners situated in the same region ............................ 289 
3.2 HCPR’s difficult role in the finding partners phase .......................................................... 293 
3.2.1 Dealing with decreasing participants at events .......................................................... 293 
3.2.2 Struggling to integrate medical and industrial partners in events .............................. 296 
3.2.3 Competing with other regional support structures ..................................................... 299 
3.3 Conclusion: the finding partners’ dilemmas of HCPR ...................................................... 304 
4 Finding ideas: Doctors can’t be find at “Meetic” events ........................................ 306 
4.1 Project leaders’ idea generation moments ......................................................................... 306 
4.1.1 Need formulation ....................................................................................................... 308 
4.1.2 Stimulated by… ......................................................................................................... 310 
4.2 Absence of HCPR in the ideas quest phase ....................................................................... 313 
4.2.1 Struggling to attract others than business-driven companies ..................................... 314 
4.2.2 Danger of fashionable innovations ............................................................................. 315 
4.3 Conclusion: the finding ideas’ dilemmas of HCPR .......................................................... 316 
 
 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 248 
1 Overview of ICT & Health project leaders and their organisations 
Before we will discuss how the project leaders find subsidies, partners and ideas, we will 
present the project leaders and their organisations. All of the interviewed project leaders have 
submitted at least one ICT & Health project to the ICT & Health inter-cluster committee. We 
first present the project leaders’ organisations and then discuss their individual profile. This is 
not only important for the reliability of our research but also for a better understanding of 
their behaviour regarding innovation processes in general and investment in the policy-driven 
clusters in particular. 
 
1.1 Presentation of the project leaders’ organisations 
We start with the presentation of the project leaders’ organisations. We particularly focus on 
the different types of organisations, their sectors of activity, their decades of foundation, the 
role of medical/health in their business portfolios, their traditions of and their drivers for 
research collaborations and finally their regional implementation (see Annex 13 for an 
overview). 
 
Type of organisation 
The majority (6 out of 10) of the project leaders belong to the SME category217. There are two 
explanations why SMEs are predominant: because they have more net equity than micro-
enterprises and because they are the “flavour of the month” for the governments. 
 
First, in order to profit from the FUI (the main subsidy associated to the French cluster 
policy), companies need the equivalent of subsidies received as net equity. For example if a 
company asks for 900 000 Euros of subsidies, the company needs at least 900 000 Euros of 
net equity. As the FUI does not finance any projects that need less than 750 000 Euros of 
subsidies, the companies participating in the FUI automatically have a certain financial 
capacity218. Even though the French productive and industrial fabric (see Annex 15 for an 
overview) is composed out of 95.44% micro-enterprises (<10 employees) and 4.41% SMEs 
(<250 employees)219, the micro-enterprises often do not have the financial capacity to be an 
                                                 
217
 We did not define any quota regarding the company category of our interviewee partners. 
218 Verbatim: « Une société avec deux - trois ingénieurs [...] où chacun met 5 000 euros dans la société, ca fait 
15 000 euros, donc ca veut dire qu’au maximum, ils peuvent avoir 15 000 euros de subvention par an, ce qui 
n’est rien. [...] Ce qui élimine beaucoup, beaucoup, beaucoup d’acteurs. » (P9) 
219
 Source: INSEE (2010) 
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official project partner. Micro-enterprises are often sub-contracted by one of the main project 
partners. Even though the sub-contractor companies might significantly participate in a 
collaborative research project, they do not figure in any official statistics. 
 
Second, in order to help SMEs develop their businesses, the government forces large 
companies and research institutes to integrate SMEs in their research projects. If a project 
consortium wants to increase a project chance to be accepted for the FUI, the project leader 
justifies that SMEs (including Medium sized firms (MFs)220) are significantly involved in the 
project, regarding the importance of their work and their economic impact. The SME does not 
have to be the project leader. However, the majority of project consortiums decide to put the 
SME at the forefront of their project, to further underpin their integration and to further 
increase the project’s chance of subsidy acceptance.221 
 
Besides interviewing six project leaders from SMEs, we also conducted one interview with 
each of the three remaining company categories: one with a micro-enterprise, one with a 
medium-sized firm, and one with a large company. Given the weak existence of micro-
enterprises (due to their weak financial capacity), medium-sized firms (due to the strong 
underrepresentation of this category on the French territory), and large companies (due to the 
avoidance to put large companies as project leaders), it was precious to be able to also 
interview project leaders from these three categories. As we will see, the micro-enterprise and 
the large company have a different behaviour regarding their policy-driven cluster implication 
than the eight remaining companies. 
 
Finally we also interviewed a project leader working for an association. This was a surprise, 
as not all types of subsidies allow another entity than a company to be the project leader (for 
example the FUI). However, before the last project submission for financing (just before the 
project was finally granted subsidies), the consortium changed the project leader and chose to 
attribute this role to a micro-enterprise. However, this also reflects the ambiguity of this role. 
In the official cluster-policy statistics the company referenced as project leader might not be 
the company that had the idea for the project. 
 
                                                 
220
 Definition of Medium-sized firms (MF) = < 5000 employees (INSEE, 2010) 
221
 Verbatims: « L’air du temps, c’est de tout miser sur les PME » (P7); « Du fait de notre positionnement 
[grande entreprise], on n’est pas nécessairement coordinateur du projet » (P1); « On n’a pas beaucoup de PME 
[dans notre projet], ça ne fait pas bien vis-à-vis des financeurs. Ils cherchent des PME. » (P10) 
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Sector of activity 
The companies either belong to the service sector or the industrial sector. However, the 
majority of the companies (7 out of 10) belong to the service sector: Four companies exercise 
“professional, scientific and technical activities” (NAF222 category M223), and three 
companies exercise “information and communication activities” (NAF category J224). All of 
these service companies try to apply their technical expertise to the medical/health domain. 
Only two of the interviewed companies, at the same time the two oldest companies (founded 
in the 1940s and 1970s), belong to the industry sector: P1 belongs to the “Electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply” sector (NAF category D225) and P8 belongs to the 
“Manufacturing industry” (NAF category C226). P8 produces, among others, devices that can 
be used in the medical/health sector, while P1 has no obvious link with the medical/health 
sector but can transfer some of its research activities to the medical/health sector in order to 
diversify its internal research efforts. 
 
Decade of foundation and Role of medical/health in business portfolio 
The decade of foundation and the role that the medical/health domain plays for the 
companies’ business portfolio varies considerably. The three youngest organisations (founded 
in the 2000s) are also the only organisations that are solely dedicated to the medical/health 
sector: the micro-enterprise, the association and one SME. The micro-enterprise and the SME 
were both incubated by two different business incubators within well-known Parisian medical 
research institutes. During the interviews, the micro-enterprise (P2) was still linked to the 
business incubator while the SME (P4) was already outside the incubator. The other 
companies were founded in the 1990s (three companies), in the 1980s (two companies), in the 
1970s (one company), and in the 1940s (one company). For three companies the 
                                                 
222
 “Nomenclature d'activités française” (NAF): French equivalent to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
in the United States.  
223
 NAF Category M: “This section includes specialised professional, scientific and technical activities. These 
activities require a high degree of training, and make specialised knowledge and skills available to users.” 
(INSEE definition, NAF 2008) 
224
 NAF Category J: “This section includes the production and distribution of information and cultural products, 
the provision of the means to transmit or distribute these products, as well as data or communications. The 
section also includes information technology activities, processing of data service activities and other 
information service activities.” (INSEE definition, NAF 2008) 
225
 NAF Category D: “This section includes the activity of providing electric power, natural gas, steam and hot 
water through a permanent infrastructure (network) of lines, mains and pipes, notably for industrial premises 
and residential housings. The dimension of the network is not decisive.” (INSEE definition, NAF 2008). 
226
 NAF Category C: “This section includes the physical or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or 
components into new products. The materials, substances, or components transformed are raw materials that 
are products of agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining or quarrying, secondary recycled raw materials as well as 
products of other manufacturing activities. Substantial alteration, renovation or reconstruction of goods is 
generally considered to be manufacturing.” (INSEE definition, NAF 2008). 
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medical/health sector represents no business field and for four companies the medical/health 
sector is one among several business fields. Three companies have no link with the 
medical/health sector. The reason why these three companies submitted a project to the 
medical/health sector without actually operating in this field is two-fold:  
- Entering the market via a subsidised project: P5 and P7 were both not operating in the 
medical/health sector prior of submitting a project to a policy-driven cluster. Both 
companies thought about entering this sector of activity and the project was in a 
certain manner the potential entry point. P5 did not manage to get its project financed 
so the organisation abandoned the medical/health sector again. P7 got its project 
financed and the organisation thinks about creating a medical/health division.  
- Research/philanthropic reasons: As already mentioned, P1 has no obvious link with 
the medical/health sector but can transfer some of its research activities to the 
medical/health sector to diversify its research effort. For the R&D project we 
contacted him for, he said that the company does this out of philanthropic reasons. 
 
Tradition of research collaborations 
We can split the companies in three different levels regarding their research collaboration 
experiences: (1) high collaborative research tradition (several national & international 
experiences); (2) medium collaborative research tradition (some national and/or international 
experiences); and (3) low collaborative research tradition (just started to enter the 
collaborative research realm). Nearly all companies (7 out of 10) have a high experience in 
collaborative research projects and accessing financing on a national (e.g. ANR, FUI, ISI – 
OSEO) as well as European (e.g. Eureka, Cost, FP7) level. The remaining three companies 
have either a medium (P2, P7) or low (P5) experience in collaborative research projects: 
- P2 has a medium experience in collaborative research projects as the company has 
only three research projects going on (whereby two of the three projects were already 
launched before the spin-off form a large company took place) and one project is just 
in the starting blocks. 
- P7 has a medium experience in collaborative research projects as the company has 
already participated in collaborative research projects but only as a project partner and 
not as a project leader. The interviewed project leader was hired by his company to 
start building and launching collaborative R&D projects where the company can 
finally figure as a project leader. 
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- P5 has a low experience in collaborative research projects, as the company has never 
participated in subsidised collaborative research projects before. The project under 
investigation was the first tentative to enter the collaborative project world. Now they 
have developed a taste for it and would like to continue. 
The interviews with these three companies (P2, P5, P7) were particularly pressures as they 
allowed us to understand that there is a considerable difference between companies that are 
already integrated within the policy-driven cluster community and the ones that only start 
integrating a policy-driven cluster community.  
 
Driver for research collaborations 
We identified three different types of drivers to participate in research collaborations: idea 
driven, business driven and research/philanthropic driven: 
- Business-driven: For the majority of companies (6 out of 10) the driver for 
participating in research collaborations is to further develop the company's services, 
technologies or products by applying them to new domains and thus to develop the 
company’s business. 
- Idea-driven: Only the association (P6) and the micro-enterprise (P2) are solely idea 
driven, meaning that they concentrate their efforts on one single mission they believe 
in. To develop this idea they need money and partners and therefore they initiate 
research collaborations. 
- Intersection between business- and idea-driven: We situate P4227 between idea driven 
and business development driven. Like the micro-enterprise (P2), P4 was also situated 
in an incubator and had one single and clear mission in the beginning of its existence. 
However, we have the impression that their technology is already well enough 
developed because they start applying it to several domains within the medical sector 
(P2 applies its technology to one single domain in the medical sector). This transition 
between idea driven and business development driven is also reflected in the fact that 
we were not able to interview the president or vice-president of the company but the 
chief technical officer. Having a chief technical officer already means that the 
company has gained a certain size and that the development of the business gets more 
and more important. 
                                                 
227
 P4 is such like the micro-enterprise and the association only operating in the medical/health sector. 
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- Research/philanthropic driven: Finally, the driver for P1, the large company, is 
completely different. P1 has clear internal research objectives to improve internal 
processes, but sometimes they try to spread their research efforts by applying their 
internal research to other domains, like for example to the medical/health sector out of 
philanthropic reasons. 
To sum up, we can say that companies (except the large company) are mostly either idea-
driven or business-driven. For the remaining analysis of our data, it is important to keep in 
mind the high experience of the companies in collaborative research projects as well as their 
mainly business driven attitudes. 
 
Regional implementation of company 
Each of the companies we interviewed submitted at least one project for labelling to the joint 
ICT & Health initiative and was then supervised by one of the three Parisian policy-driven 
clusters (HealthCluster, Cap Digital, Systematic). So it should be no surprise that 7 out of 10 
companies are implemented in the Paris Region. It seems actually more surprising that two 
organisations are not at all implemented (P6 and P8) in the Paris Region, and one company 
(P2) has only a temporary office in the Paris Region and its main activities in Lower 
Normandy. 
 
1.2 Presentation of the project leaders 
After presenting the organisations of the project leaders, we now present the project leaders 
themselves: who they are, what their objectives are and which liberty they have within their 
respective organisations (see Annex 13 for an overview). The detailed understanding of the 
organisations and the project leaders themselves, will allow us to better understand and 
discuss the services provided by policy-driven clusters in the subsequent sections. 
 
Who are they?  
All project leaders are male, have in average 22.5 (median: 20) years of work experience and 
at least a Master degree. Nearly all project leaders have an engineering degree, besides P4 
who has a PhD in Neuropharmacology and P10 who has a PhD in Geochemistry. Among the 
eight project leaders who have an engineering degree, five have a double-degree: P5 has an 
engineering and mathematic degree; P6 has an engineering degree and a PhD in Image 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 254 
Processing / Statistics; P7, P8 and P9 have an engineering and management degree. P8 also 
has a PhD in Innovation Management. 
 
What is their role in the organisation?  
Nearly all project leaders have a management position. Either they are the President/Vice-
President, or they are Innovation Director/Manager or Technical/Research Project Director of 
the organisation. Only P1 has no management position, as he is “only” a technical expert. 
However, the responsibilities of the project leaders within their organisations are quite 
similar. All are responsible for the preparation of collaborative research projects, meaning 
finding ideas, partners and subsidies. For the companies that are “idea driven” this preparation 
is concentrated to develop the company's idea. For the large company, the challenge lies in 
finding new domains to spread the internal research efforts. However, for the companies that 
are “business driven”, the majority of our companies, the challenge lies in finding new or 
existing domains to apply and further develop the company's technology, service or product: 
« J’ai un objectif stratégique qui est d’amener la société, qui n’était pas présente dans le 
secteur de la santé, à avoir une notoriété et puis une masse critique d’activité qui va 
permettre de créer une division santé. [...] Il faut juste que je ramène (...) j’ai des objectifs 
(...) en termes de levée de subventions. [...] La mission principale qui m’a été demandée, 
c’est permettre à [nom de l’entreprise] d’apparaître comme chef de file et de lever des 
subventions dans ce cadre là. » (P7) 
 
Once the collaborative project gets financed, the majority of the project leaders hand the 
projects completely over to an operational team within their respective companies. The 
interviewed project leaders mentioned several reasons why this is done. First of all, project 
leaders seem to be particularly interested in finding new ideas to apply the company’s 
knowledge but are not interested in the development part of a particular project. They 
consider that their added value lies in the detection of this idea and their capacity to bring 
together the most competent people:  
« Ça ne m’amuse plus trop de m’investir dans le détail des choses. [...] Je n’ai pas envie de 
faire le travail d’un spécialiste. Je pense que j’ai une capacité à réunir un ensemble de 
spécialités pour faire un sujet donné... Voilà. » (P10) 
« Un projet bien mené, c’est un projet où d’abord les artistes s’expriment pour créer le 
projet à partir de rien. Quand le projet obtient le financement, en général les artistes 
passent la main aux gestionnaires qui vont le faire vivre, qui vont l’exécuter. [...] Je ne suis 
pas bon dans ces choses-là. Je m’ennuie et je déprime. Mon truc, c’est les histoires 
nouvelles. [...] Mon boulot s’arrête avec la décision de financement ou de non-financement 
du projet. » (P7) 
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Once the project gets financed, the project leaders mainly retrieve from the project in order to 
create a new project. They are in a constant search for new ideas in order to create 
collaborative research projects. Within their companies, they have operational project leaders 
who then take the lead of these projects. These internal project leaders have different 
competences than the project leaders. These internal project leaders (or as one interviewee 
said the “bulldozers”) are actually the ones who work on the research project. However, they 
already have the general framework of the project, meaning the objective, the budget, the 
collaboration partners and the deadline: 
« On rédige le dossier et, une fois qu’il est financé, on peut le mettre en œuvre. Mais c’est 
d’autres compétences. C’est d’autres équipes qui vont travailler. Il y a un chef de projet 
chez [le partenaire], un chef de projet chez nous, qui se mettent en relation mais ce n’est 
plus forcément nous [les personnes qui ont monté le projet]. On suit ça de loin, mais de très 
loin, [...] pour moi c’est un dossier parmi d’autres. Donc je passe le truc à la production, 
après je ne sais même pas (…) j’ai vu les premières images de [nom d’un projet] peut-être 
un an après le début du projet, comme ça, par hasard, je voulais juste savoir où ils en 
étaient... » (P9) 
« Pour la fonction « gestion de projet », j’ai deux bulldozers chez moi. Ce sont des gens 
(...) j’arrive avec un projet, je donne ça aux bulldozers, et je dis : ‘voilà on a un cadre, 
c’est ça. Toi tu as ça à faire là-dedans’. On fait une passation. Et après, lui c’est un chef de 
projet : il organise en interne. Il a l’habitude. Il est apprécié pour sa rigueur. » (P8) 
 
Only the project leaders from the micro-enterprise (P2), one SME (P4, the second incubated 
firm) and the large company (P1) continue being significantly involved in the operational part 
of a financed project. P5 is also still involved in the operational part of projects but is 
currently conducting an internal re-organisation in order to stop its implication and to solely 
concentrate its efforts on the business development part. This handing over of the projects to 
the internal operational teams also has the consequence that the collaborative most intensive 
phase of the projects is during the project preparation phase. Once the project is financed, the 
different actors work on their exactly defined parts:  
« On s’arrange pour que les tâches soient séparées, pour ne pas qu’elles recouvrent 
vraiment des compétences, et qu’il n’y ait pas de frictions. Chacun chez soi. C’est mieux 
pour la bonne collaboration. Sinon, si chacun a des compétences sur les mêmes tâches, 
évidemment, il y a des enjeux de pouvoir. » (P9) 
« Il y a encore du travail à faire, mais ce n’est plus du tout la même chose. C’est-à-dire 
qu’on sera dans un budget donné, dans un planning donné, il faut faire des tâches 
techniques données. Il n’y a presque plus aucune incertitude. » (P7) 
 
This shows that the main subsidy associated to the policy-driven clusters is business oriented. 
Such a strong separation of tasks between project partners and the little risk of uncertainty 
would not be possible in a basic research project. The collaborative most intensive phase is 
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happening during the project set up phase, before the project gets financed. However, even 
this phase can be very short and is often done per e-mail or telephone. 
 
Which autonomy do they have within the organisation?  
In order to pursue their responsibilities, the interviewed project leaders are very free regarding 
the organisation of their daily tasks. They can go for example to conferences or seminars and 
do not need to be in the company location all the time. This is an important element regarding 
their potential active participation in policy-driven cluster events. Some of them have a 
complete autonomy and can go wherever they want in order to find ideas, partners and 
subsidies: 
« J’ai une totale liberté. Et quand je dis une ‘totale liberté’, c’est une totale liberté. C’est-
à-dire : je veux aller au Japon, je peux aller au Japon. Je veux aller (...) il y a un mois 
j’étais au MIT (...) je vais au MIT. Quand je reviens, je reviens avec deux - trois projets, 
des gens que j’ai croisé et voilà. » (P8) 
« Je suis dans les locaux un jour par semaine pour me synchroniser avec les autres 
collègues, sinon je suis un électron libre. [...] On ne peut pas faire autrement que de laisser 
les gens libres, parce que c’est trop compliqué de manager. » (P7) 
Others do not have such a high autonomy for the time being but are planning to change this 
situation in the near future. They have understood that in order to participate in this 
collaborative research realm they are not able to do both, the operational part and the 
collaborative research set-up part: 
« Je suis présent tous les jours, parce que si je ne suis pas là, ça pose des problèmes en 
interne. En termes de production. Maintenant, j’essaye de me structurer différemment. 
L’année prochaine, ce que je voudrais, c’est faire beaucoup plus du commercial, et 
beaucoup plus de marketing, et beaucoup plus de stratégie à long terme, et faire du 
lobbying. Faire connaître [nom de l’entreprise] dans les différents cercles. Ca demande du 
temps et de l’énergie. » (P5) 
Also the project leader from the large company has the liberty to go to conferences but it 
seems that the general framework within which he is operating is more regulated as he is still 
involved in the operational part of the project as well:  
« On a du temps pour faire un peu ce qu’on veut. [...] On fait plutôt des projets qui durent 
de l’ordre de trois ans [...] Et à l’intérieur des projets, les priorités sont refaites un peu 
chaque année, et puis après, on a l’année pour atteindre les objectifs, peu importent les 
moyens mis en œuvre. Donc après, ça permet de faire de la veille, d’aller à des 
conférences, d’initier des partenariats. » (P1) 
 
To conclude, the project leaders’ main responsibility is to find new ideas in order to apply the 
companies’ knowledge to new domains. The majority of the project leaders are not integrated 
in the operational part of the initiated projects. The tasks of the different projects seem to be 
exactly defined and clearly distinguished between the different project partners.  
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1.3 Conclusion: the particularities of the R&D project leaders 
If we want to analyse and discuss cluster policies, a clear understanding of project leaders and 
their companies that submit projects to the policy-driven clusters is important. The in-depth 
understanding of who they are and what they strive for allows us to better evaluate their 
relationship with the policy-driven clusters and the utility of the services they propose. Figure 
30 summarizes the most important elements of the interviewed project leaders and their 
companies. First, most project leaders are SMEs. Second, most of the project leaders’ are 
business driven, only the association and the micro-enterprise are mainly idea driven. Third, 
nearly all companies (dark grey circles) have a high experience in national and international 
collaborative research projects. Only three companies (light grey circles) have only national 
experiences. Either the projects under investigation were their first tries to enter the 
collaborative project world (P5) or they are just completing their first collaborative research 
projects (P2 and P7). 
 
Figure 30: Overview of the interviewed project leaders and their companies 
 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 258 
 
2 Finding subsidies: Being friend and judge – a schizophrenic situation 
In the second section of this chapter we now focus on the finding subsidies phase of the 
project leaders. The main subsidy program associated to policy-driven clusters is the FUI. If a 
project consortium wishes to apply for a FUI subsidy, the project consortium has to submit its 
project to a policy-driven cluster in order to obtain a policy-driven cluster label. During the 
labelling process the project leader and the policy-driven cluster are somehow obliged to be in 
contact with each other. Project leaders are our entry point to the collaborative R&D project 
level. This means that all of our interviewees were at least once in contact with a policy-
driven cluster in order to find subsidies228. However, the policy-driven clusters have an 
ambiguous position in this phase. On the one hand, the policy-driven clusters need to help the 
project consortiums to develop their projects, but on the other hand the policy-driven clusters 
also officially label them. They are thus friend and judge at the same time (see Figure 31):  
« Dans le cadre du FUI, le pôle est un passage obligatoire et ils sont bizarres parce qu’ils 
sont à la fois juge et partie. On est membre du pôle et ils doivent nous développer, mais ils 
doivent aussi nous labéliser. Ils nous accompagnent et ils nous labélisent. C’est ambigu 
comme position. » (P10) 
In this section this ambiguous judge/friend relationship of policy-driven clusters and then 
focus on the dilemmas policy-driven clusters face regarding this subsidies role. 
 
Figure 31: Policy-driven clusters: A project leader’s friend and judge 
 
 
                                                 
228
 For this phase we now have 30 cases (and not 19 cases as in the idea and partner finding phases), because we 
are entering the administrative realm.  
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2.1 Policy-driven clusters: a super coach 
One of the operational teams’ objectives is to help the project leaders with their project 
applications. Very often the project leaders already send a first draft to the policy-driven 
clusters before the official labelling takes place. The policy-driven clusters examine the 
project documents and then give recommendations on how to improve the documents so that 
the projects have a higher probability of being labelled and then financed. The policy-driven 
cluster acts like a “super coach”: 
« C’est chez Cap Digital. [Avant la soumission officielle] on présente [le projet], c’est un 
service qui est rendu. Ce n’est pas une expertise destructrice, de notation. C’est une 
expertise constructive, où on donne des conseils à la personne. La personne vient et dit : 
‘voilà, j’ai tel ou tel projet. Je voudrais adresser tel marché […] pour ça, je voudrais ça, 
ça, et ça’. Et les mecs dans la salle, il y en a une dizaine en général, dont je fais partie, 
[donnent des commentaires]. [...] Leur principale valeur ajoutée, c’est d’orienter les 
projets pour qu’ils soient plus innovants, plus éligibles […] c’est d’augmenter leur chance, 
leur taux de succès pour tous les appels à projet, tous les financements. C’est un super 
coach qui permet de dire : ‘là arrêtez, ça ne sert à rien, vous perdez votre temps, (…) là 
oublie, […] là vas-y, […] là ca ne va pas, etc. » (P9)229 
Besides giving comments regarding the content of the project, the “super coach” also helps 
the project leaders to find the right subsidy agency for their projects. Something that is highly 
appreciated by the project leaders: 
« [Cap Digital] nous aide vraiment pour tous les projets. Pour savoir où est-ce qu’on 
trouve du financement. Comment on avance, etc. [...] Parce qu’ils sont très au point de tout 
ce qui se passe d’un point de vue financement, et donc eux ils peuvent nous orienter un peu 
sur le meilleur financement pour nous. [...] Je trouve ça très efficace. Ils sont très, très bien 
documentés. [...] Ils ont très, très bien conseillé sur ces problèmes-là, sur le temps, quand il 
faut présenter les FUIs, etc.. Ca, c’est une grande aide. » (P6) 
« Par exemple, [il y a un projet que] j’ai soumis à l’appel au grand emprunt, et puis le boss 
de Cap Digital m’appelle et me dit : « Tu l’as déposé mais on n’est pas éligible, dépose-le 
en FUI. » Je lui dis : « oui mais il reste 4 jours ». Il dit : « Oui, mais bon ». J’ai bossé nuit 
et jour pour retravailler le projet. [...] Effectivement, il n’était pas du tout éligible à l’appel 
à projet [grand emprunt]. Si je ne l’avais pas déposé au FUI, il serait tombé à l’eau. Mais 
parce qu’il m’a appelé, il a senti le truc, il m’a dit : ‘dépose le au FUI’. Je n’étais pas 
forcément au courant qu’il y avait un FUI au même moment, donc le rôle du conseil du 
coach fait qu’il a apporté à la société 700 000 euros de subventions. Donc, c’est beaucoup. 
Et elle est là, la valeur ajoutée. » (P9)230 
Policy-driven clusters play an important role for the project leaders in this exchange and 
advice phase. However, not all project leaders have used these services and some submit their 
projects directly for labelling to the policy-driven cluster without a pre-labelling examination. 
During the subsidies finding phase, the policy-driven cluster can thus be a “friend” of the 
project leader, because the policy-driven cluster helps in improving the quality of the project, 
                                                 
229
 Verbatim: « On a fait une première réunion avant la présentation [officielle]. On nous a dit : ‘il y a ça, ça, 
ça qu’il faut améliorer’. OK, on l’a fait. » (P5) 
230
 Verbatim: « Ils aident pour les projets. [...] Ils essayent [...] de nous orienter. Ca, c’est très bien. Ils ont un 
support administratif qui est très bien. » (P5) 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 260 
or in orienting the project leader towards the right funding windows. However, the problems 
emerge when the project leaders start being judged by the policy-driven clusters.  
 
2.2 Policy-driven clusters: biased judges and ambiguous objectives 
Policy-driven clusters are responsible for labelling projects. This label is necessary, in order 
to become eligible to apply for the FUI or, until end of 2012, to have a financial pop-up for 
ANR projects. This labelling process can either be an oral presentation as in the case of 
Systematic or HCPR, or just a written submission of the projects in the case of Cap Digital. 
Generally these presentations are very standardized. The presentation at Systematic is for 
example very short231. In 5 minutes the project leader has to present its project with 2 slides 
and has to answer some questions. In case the project is right away labelled and financed, no 
problems emerge, but this is nearly never the case. Our data show that it is very seldom that a 
FUI project gets financed after a first submission (see Table 45 at the end of the chapter): 
« C’est très, très rare que, quand on a soumis un projet à un FUI, il soit reçu le premier 
coup. En général, les gens le re-soumissionnent en retravaillant un peu le projet et en 
changeant peut-être un partenaire du consortium. » (P9) 
When a project gets rejected at the policy-driven cluster level, there is a widespread opinion 
among project leaders that it is not the quality of their projects that is at cause but political 
reasons. These impressions might be true or not true but they have an impact on the trust a 
project leader has in the policy-driven cluster and the willingness of a project leader to 
participate in the policy-driven clusters’ activities. 
 
2.2.1 Biased behaviour of the evaluation committee in policy-driven clusters 
In case a project leader’s project was rejected, a common opinion among project leaders is 
that the evaluators are impartial and political reasons are at play for labelling or not labelling 
projects at the policy-driven cluster level. Project leaders get particularly angry if they 
recognise one of the evaluators as having himself/herself an on-going project on a similar 
subject. They assume that this evaluator does not want to finance another project that might 
enter in competition with his plans:  
« Après, on a eu une autre personne qui nous a posé la question : « Mais est-ce que vous 
vous êtes posé la question vis-à-vis de l’autorité de la sécurité sanitaire »… Pfft… non, 
non, non… on ne s’est pas posé la question…cette personne faisait partie du jury… 
Morts !…[...] Quand je fais la réunion à InVS, à l’institut de veille sanitaire à Saint-
Quentin-en-Yvelines, j’ai eu cette personne en face de moi. Il est venu présenter son projet. 
En fait, quand on a une personne dans son jury qui a présenté un projet aussi [...], qui était 
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porteur d’un projet R&D, donc on se dit : ‘OK, les dés sont pipés, il y a un lobbying, il y a 
du copinage, c’est bon, on arrête tout’ [...] Ils n’auraient jamais dû le mettre dans le jury ; 
on ne peut pas être juge et partie. » (P5) 
« J’ai appris que le [spécialiste du domaine technologique du projet], le seul qui était là, 
c’est quelqu’un qui fait également la [technologie] et il n’a pas forcement intérêt de nous 
voir arriver là-dessus. C’est quelqu’un que j’apprécie énormément par ailleurs, mais il a 
jugé le projet, et il ne l’a pas forcement mis en avant. (P8) » 
 
Another cause of frustration among project leaders is when the evaluation committee 
criticises a project because a certain company, specialist, etc. is not integrated in the 
consortium. When the evaluation committee criticises the project because an industrial 
partner is missing, the project leaders understand the utility behind it, even though it seems 
very difficult for them to find industrials. However, when the criticism turns around why a 
specific partner is missing, the project leaders have the impression that political reasons are at 
play and that they have to integrate this actor, otherwise their project will never get financed: 
« Ils étaient une demi-douzaine pour soutenir le projet lors de l’audition. Les membres du 
projet se sont retrouvés face à une trentaine de médecins, tous de l’ AP-HP. Ils ont fait un 
certain nombre de commentaires, si je continue : « On ne comprend pas pourquoi l’AP-HP 
n’est pas présent dans ce projet. Pourquoi ils ne dirigent pas ce projet ? » Ainsi de suite... 
[...] Donc il y a des partenaires qui ont des visions hégémonistes, qui cherchent à tout 
contrôler, et ce n’est pas propre à la médecine. La médecine, c’est caractéristique, surtout 
en région parisienne (…) mais [on trouve la même chose dans] le transport. » (P3)232 
« On nous a dit :‘on vous finance ce projet là, mais vous mettez cette société dans le 
consortium, sinon c’est non’. [...] Le financeur, la DGCIS, a des intérêts. Ils avaient 
beaucoup financé cette entreprise et ils voulaient qu’elle continue. Elle a fait faillite quand 
même. Ils voulaient capitaliser sur leur investissement. Donc ils continuent à le perfuser, 
c’est-à-dire mettre de l’argent, en l’imposant à des consortiums dont ils savaient qu’ils 
allaient les financer. Pour qu’elle continue à reçevoir de l’argent. » (P9) 
At the end of the day, project leaders have the impression that it does not count if one has a 
good project or a bad project, but one just needs to “know” somebody in the evaluation 
committee: 
« Tous les membres du groupe thématique [nom] de Systematic ont un autre projet sur à 
peu près la même thématique. Et donc, forcement, quand c’est les membres du groupe 
thématique [nom] qui évaluent le projet... [...] Grosso modo, le problème n’est pas d’avoir 
un bon projet ou un mauvais projet, c’est qu’il faut avoir des gens qui le portent parmi les 
évaluateurs. [...] Grosso modo, on arrive en concurrence des projets du [institution] et on 
se fait éliminer pour des raisons politiques. » (P1) 
 
All these little incidents leave the project leaders in the impression that the policy-driven 
clusters are biased and that lobbying is necessary in order to get the project labelled. This 
impression is further increased because they already heard that with lobbying at the executive 
office level, one could change the decisions taken by the evaluation committee. For 
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example, one project leader has heard some rumours that a rejected project was finally 
labelled thanks to lobbying: 
« Ils avaient éliminé les deux, et finalement, apparemment avec du lobbying, [nom d’un 
projet] était re-labelisé tardivement par Systematic... C’est les infos que j’ai eues. » (P1) 
A project leader who is himself heavily integrated in one of the Parisian policy-driven 
clusters, confirmed that such a behaviour might actually happen: 
« Après, il peut y avoir des arbitrages politiques parce qu’il y a un grand groupe qui a ses 
relations politiques. Donc on fait passer le projet, mais ça c’est autre chose. [...] Il y a une 
grille de notation. Et ensuite il y a un bureau, qui lui est plus politique chez [pôle, not 
Systematic as in case P1] qui peut aller repêcher des projets qui ont été mal notés pour des 
raisons ultra-politiques, genre : ‘c’est soutenu par le gouvernement’, genre : ‘on sait que 
la boite est en difficulté mais elle veut créer de l’emploi, on a vu la personne avant, on va 
l’aider’, etc. Donc ils remontent les notes. C’est rare qu’ils les baissent, sauf si, dans le 
comité exécutif, une personne connaît vraiment bien le sujet, et dit qu’ils n’ont pas compris. 
» (P9) 
 
2.2.2 Decision inconsistency: labelling then not labelling 
Another point of frustration among project leaders is “decision inconsistency” at the policy-
driven cluster level. If a project was labelled but gets rejected by the FUI, a project leader can 
simply start again at the beginning of the process, meaning submitting the project for labelling 
at a policy-driven cluster and subsequently submitting the project for financing at the 
financial authorities’ level. Three outcomes are possible for the second submission: 
- 1st Case: Receiving cluster label AND subsidies 
- 2nd Case: Receiving cluster label BUT NOT Subsides 
- 3rd Case: Being rejected for cluster label and thus subsidies 
 
In case the project gets labelled this time and financed afterwards, no problem exists and the 
cluster actor is happy (1st case). However, this is not always the case. As the 2nd case shows it 
is possible that the policy-driven cluster labels the project once again but the financial 
authorities refuse the subsidies again. This is a frustrating situation for the policy-driven 
cluster but particularly for the project consortium. Additionally, it undermines the policy-
driven cluster’s utility in this process. However, the worst case for a project consortium is if a 
project was already labelled by a certain policy-driven cluster in a previous round but refused 
for financing, and then when the project leader decides to resubmit the project once again, the 
project is not labelled anymore (3rd case). The reason why a policy-driven cluster might label 
a project once and then not anymore is because one of the performance indicators of a policy-
driven cluster is the ratio between labelled projects and financed projects. In case a cluster 
organisation feels that a project is not getting financed, it might then refuse the label out of 
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“self-interest”. However, the project leaders do not necessarily have this information. They 
only see that the project content was evaluated as interesting and good once by the policy-
driven cluster but then, at the second submission, this was not the case anymore. This creates 
a high frustration among the project leaders:  
« On va le rater au FUI [troisième soumission]. Pourquoi, parce qu’on a trois pôles et le 
troisième pôle ne veux plus le labéliser. Il y a Systematic qui a refusé de le labéliser alors 
qu’il l’a labélisé deux fois avant. Et c’est là où je dis qu’il y a un truc qui ne va pas dans 
ces pôles. » (P8) 
« Dans les labellisations, ce qui était un peu étrange, c’est que le projet était labellisé par 
HealthCluster pour l’ANR TecSan mais refusé ensuite pour le FUI. Et les raisons du refus 
n’étaient pas mentionnées lors de la première soumission. » (P1) 
 
P8 handled his frustration by submitting the project to another Parisian cluster and by turning 
the back to the policy-driven cluster that refused to label the project a second time. The new 
policy-driven cluster then labelled the project and the project was finally financed by the FUI. 
However, P1 abandoned the project out of great frustration: 
« Maintenant, à titre personnel, j’ai plutôt mal vécu l’expérience. Donc en fait, s’il n’y a pas 
une demande forte de la hiérarchie, qui va s’impliquer sur un plan politique dans la 
labellisation du projet, je considère que c’est perdre mon temps. [...] Ca prend beaucoup de 
temps pour un résultat qui n’est pas très intéressant. Sachant qu’on a déjà des projets 
européens, FP7 ou ANR qui sont plus intéressants. » (P1) 
P1 is now completely rejecting the FUI and is convinced that without a strong lobbying in 
place, the projects are not able to get labelled at the policy-driven cluster level. For whom this 
invest is not worth the outcome and he prefers turning to other types of subsidies where a 
policy-driven cluster label is not necessary. 
 
2.2.3 FUI: ambiguous objectives and complex set-up 
The last two points that we just discussed (behaviour of the evaluation committee and 
decision inconsistency) where both directly related to the policy-driven clusters. However, 
policy-driven clusters are also impacted by decisions and situations that lay beyond their 
perimeter: namely the ambiguous objectives of the FUI itself. Even though the FUI is not the 
only subsidy linked to policy-driven clusters, it is the only one that can exclusively be 
accessed through policy-driven clusters and additionally the government often justifies the 
usefulness of the cluster policy with successful R&D projects financed by the FUI program. 
In the head of the project leaders, the FUI program is thus intimately coupled with policy-
driven clusters. Consequently, having a bad experience with FUI subsidies, can lead project 
leaders to reject policy-driven clusters all together. The following example perfectly 
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summarizes how a project leader was so frustrated from the FUI that he completely refused to 
apply for the FUI again and to pass through policy-driven clusters: 
« Le truc ficelé. On travaille dessus pendant 18 mois. [...] On monte un projet, mais c’était 
un chef d’œuvre. OK. 3 labellisations. [Pôle 1], [Pôle 2] et encore une autre labellisation. 
[...] Tout passe devant les experts. Le projet : ‘génial’. Favorable. « Super, vraiment vous 
avez fait un bon boulot ». Pour moi, c’était acquis. On monte même une filiale de deux 
personnes, une petite boite que j’ai créée [...] parce qu’on sentait le truc important et là : 
projet non financé ! Et là, je ne comprends pas. Donc le mec du [pôle 1] m’appelle, le 
directeur, il me dit : « Oui mais votre problème est que votre projet supprime de l’emploi. 
[note : c’était une recherche sur l’automatisation] » Je dis : « Quoi ? Attendez, mais ce n’est 
pas possible. » « Ah oui, mais à la DGCIS ils ont eu des ordres. Tous les projets qui 
bouffent de l’emploi... » Je dis : « Mais attendez, on l’a adressé sur un axe stratégique. » 
« Je suis désolé, on peut rien faire, c’est politique, on refuse le projet. » Ahh ! Je peux vous 
dire quand vous êtes une PME, quand vous avez bossé 18 mois là-dessus, vous dites : 
« Mais qu’est ce que c’est ces appels à projet ? » Voilà, donc du coup j’ai dit : ‘FUI, plus 
jamais’. Et donc j’ai boudé le FUI. [...] Moi ça m’a tellement énervé quand j’étais 
interviewé par des journalistes, je dis : ‘voilà on fait de l’ANR, le FUI n’est pas 
intéressant’. Jusqu’au moment où les pôles, ça les a un peu énervé, puis il y a le pôle 
[nom], la directrice est venue me voir, elle me dit : « Pourquoi vous dites ça ? » Je lui dis : 
‘voilà la situation’. Depuis on s’entend très bien, mais j’étais refroidi par ca. Et quand on 
ne connaît pas et c’est le premier projet, ça fait mal. [...] Ca reste toujours assez politique 
le FUI, parce que c’est la DGCIS qui tranche. » (P8) 
The example shows that even though a policy-driven cluster labels a project and thinks that 
the project has a great potential, the final decision lies beyond its responsibility. However, the 
refuse to finance the project on the national level has a negative impact on the policy-driven 
cluster. P8 decided to turn to other subsidies sources (for example ANR, European Programs) 
and boycotted the FUI and policy-driven clusters because he considers that it is too political.  
 
The example shows that policy-driven clusters are intimately linked to the FUI program. 
Additionally, the example also shows that policy-driven clusters indirectly suffer from the 
FUI’s ambiguous objectives. Theoretically, the objective of the cluster policy is to promote 
innovation. This is also anchored in the heads of the project leaders. When project leaders 
first apply to the FUI, and thus to policy-driven clusters, they often concentrate on the 
innovation part of their projects. However, little by little they realise that what seems to count 
more is the business and job creation part of their projects. For example the project P8 was 
refused because the innovation would have destroyed existing employment. Following 
comments also show, that the “policy-driven cluster / FUI” objectives are not very clear for 
the project leaders: 
« Je pense qu’ils veulent tout et son contraire. C’est ça le problème. Ce qu’ils veulent 
fondamentalement, c’est que les projets FUI arrivent à créer des emplois au niveau 
régional, mais en se basant sur l’innovation et en faisant en sorte que l’innovation ne 
vienne pas trop des académiques. En limitant quand même l’impact des académiques, 
parce qu’ils veulent qu’il y ait une aide plus importante sur le tissu industriel. C’est là où 
on ne sait pas si c’est réaliste ou pas. [...] On a un ratio [entre PME, académique et grands 
groupes] à respecter [mais] qui est quand même assez dur à respecter, surtout si on veut 
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faire de l’innovation. Si je veux faire beaucoup d’innovation, j’ai besoin de beaucoup de 
contribution des académiques. Ils veulent à la fois un projet innovant et que les 
académiques contribuent peu. Ca, c’est le déconneur. » (P10) 
« Le FUI, c’est hyper-compliqué à avoir, c’est un des plus dur. Pourquoi, parce que ce 
n’est pas sur un campus scientifique, c’est sur un business model et une opportunité de 
marché. [...] On a eu Monsieur X qui venait du ministère de l’industrie qui nous a très bien 
fait sentir qu’il fallait orienter notre projet à l’export avec des modèles économiques 
viables et surtout avec de la création d’emploi. [...] « Mais attendez ! On fait de la R&D ». 
[...] [En analysant d’autres projets] OK, il n’y a pas de R&D et ils reprennent les technos 
sur l’étagère. Ca existe, ils les réadaptent. Ils ont le modèle économique qui tient la route. 
OK nous on a proposé de la R&D. [...] Le problème du FUI? Ce n’est pas fait pour faire de 
R&D. [...] Le FUI c’est un modèle économique. C’est de l’innovation technologique, mais 
avec des retombés économiques très rapides. Donc nous, on s’est trompé. » (P5) 
 
The project leaders seem thus to be confused between the policy-driven clusters’ R&D 
objectives and FUI’s strong job creation and business orientation. Additionally, the project 
leaders suffer from the impreciseness of the persons that hide between the FUI. The FUI is a 
common fund of different ministers and different national and regional authorities. The set-up 
is thus quite complex. This creates a confusion regarding the objectives and preferences of all 
these entities and thus a blurriness regarding the points to address in the application form:  
« Quand vous présentez le projet aux financiers, vous avez un représentant de chaque 
département, et puis vous avez des représentants d’OSEO, et puis une personne du pôle ou 
des pôles, donc vous ne savez pas qui c’est. On ne sait pas qui ils sont, ce qu’ils veulent, ce 
qui les intéresse. On vous demande de faire une présentation stéréotypée, qui ne répond 
probablement pas aux questions qu’ils se posent. C’est ça que j’aimerais savoir. C’est 
d’avoir une meilleure sensation des questions qu’ils se posent. Ceci dit, les financeurs sont 
tellement disparates (…) peut-être il y a un problème de cohérence dans la notion même du 
FUI » (P10) 
This blurriness is particularly strong when looking at ICT & Health projects. The project 
leader does not know if he should focus on the medical part to satisfy HealthCluster, the 
technological part to satisfy Systematic, or the financial part to satisfy the financial 
authorities: 
« Par exemple, pour le projet [P10c], on a rédigé un document à l’attention de Médicen. 
Dans le projet précédent [P10b], j’ai essayé de faire quelque chose homogène pour 
Médicen et pour les financeurs. Dans [le projet P10c], les choses ont un peu changé mais 
je n’étais pas averti. On a du faire une présentation pour Médicen, orientée sur un template 
Médicen, orientée sur les préoccupations médicales, pour une labellisation Médicen avec 
un point de vue très particulier qui était assez loin d’en couvrir les intérêts technologiques, 
par exemple de l’OSEO, et les intérêts des financeurs. Ensuite, on a du faire une 
présentation Systematic. Systematic s’est posé des questions dans des termes 
complètements différents. C’est-à-dire [...] ils se posaient des questions sur la qualité des 
réseaux qu’on allait utiliser, etc. » (P10) 
This blurriness of responsibilities that hide behind the FUI also challenges already financed 
projects. When the project is a success, national and regional financers want to reap the glory. 
However, the project leaders need to assure that all financial entities that participated in 
financing the project, be it on the national or regional level, get the same attention:  
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« Là, il y aura une conférence de presse dans dix jours [...] en gros au niveau politique, ils 
veulent justifier l’existence des pôles par un certain nombre de projets, dont celui là, parce 
qu’aujourd’hui (…) d’après ce que j’ai compris, l’opposition critique les pôles de 
compétitivité en disant que ça coûte cher etc., et ils veulent garder sous la pédale des 
projets comme ça pour dire : « Attendez, regardez les emplois ». Le problème qu’on a, 
c’est : ‘OK les pôles sont crées par l’Etat qui est de droite, mais nous, nos financeurs pour 
près de 2 millions d’euros, c’est le conseil régional de [région], qui est de gauche’. Donc 
nous, on leur a dit clairement : ‘on refuse de participer si vous n’intégrez pas [région]’. 
Parce que je vous ai dit : tout ce qu’on veut, c’est faire avancer la machine. La politique, 
bon, même si on a des idées, on ne veut pas rentrer là-dedans. » (P8) 
However, this blurriness is particularly associated the FUI and not to other subsidies sources:  
« Prenons le projet européen. [...] Ils ont un call qui est clair. [...] On demande de 
développer une instrumentation, un outil pour une problématique de santé et de prouver 
que le travail effectué va être bénéfique pour l’entreprise. On nous demande que ça. C’est 
clair. On a un message clair. On a un cadre clair. Après, on est bon ou pas bon. C’est 
autre chose, mais au moins on a un contexte qui est parfaitement clair. Le FUI pour moi, 
avec le support des pôles, c’est schizophrénique. Je ne sais jamais ce qu’il faut dire. 
[...] On finit par tordre le projet. Ce n’est plus un projet. [...] Le programme ISI d’OSEO. 
Ils ont une problématique qui est claire. Vous y allez. Vous mettez toute votre énergie sur 
l’axe industrielle. [...] L’ANR est très claire aussi. » (P10) 
For P10, the complex set-up of the fund (multiple funding parties) and the link to the policy-
driven clusters (specific objectives as well) renders FUI projects highly complex. At the end, 
P10 underlines that one nearly does not recognize the project anymore because one has to 
twist it in all senses so that it corresponds to all the different demands. For P10 this renders 
the FUI fund together with the policy-driven clusters schizophrenic. 
 
2.2.4 Consequence: abandoning policy-driven clusters or intensive lobbying 
The negative impressions a project leader receives from the labelling process and the FUI can 
push him/her to stop getting involved in policy-driven clusters or the FUI. However, another 
observed behaviour is that the project leader starts an intensive lobbying process. Getting a 
project financed is the main objective for a collaborative research consortium. As most of the 
project leaders consider the FUI to be very political233, lobbying is the logical consequence. 
Two levels of lobbying can be distinguished: on the policy-driven cluster level (responsible 
for the labelling of projects); and on the financial authorities level (responsible for the 
granting of the subsidies) and its wider influence sphere. 
 
Lobbying on the policy-driven cluster level: On the policy-driven cluster level, the lobbying 
passes through, for example, participating at the different meetings, calling the policy-driven 
cluster or proposing to actively participate in the policy-driven cluster (e.g. as an expert). The 
objective is to get known among the “fauna and flora” of the policy-driven cluster: 
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 Verbatim: « Le FUI, je connaissais en mal. Parce que pour moi, c’était - et c’est toujours - très politique. » 
(P8) 
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« Après c’est énormément de lobbying. Si vous n’êtes pas connu, si vous ne prenez pas 
votre téléphone pour appeler les pôles, pour vous faire connaître des pôles, vous n’êtes pas 
connu. [...] Mon expérience maintenant, c’est qu’il faut être très, très proche des pôles. Il 
faut aller aux réunions des pôles, il faut aller voir qui est la faune et la flore des pôles de 
compétitivité. Pour se faire connaître, parce que c’est très simple. C’est du réseau, si vous 
êtes connu, on va essayer de vous aider plus que si vous êtes inconnu, parce que quand 
vous déposez, on ne sait pas qui c’est. C’est comme ça. » (P5)234 
The policy-driven cluster environment is strongly associated to a lobbying realm. In order to 
get a project labelled the project consortium chooses the partner that has the highest 
experience of lobbying and is well integrated in a policy-driven cluster. This has the 
consequence that the same project leaders seem to be at the forefront of policy-driven cluster 
activities: business-driven SMEs that are free electrons with a lot of lobbying potential.  
 
Lobbying on the financial authorities level and its wider influence sphere: In case a policy-
driven cluster did not label a project, we also observe that a well-connected project leader 
might directly talk with the national authorities in order to put pressure on the cluster:  
« La DGCIS, je les ai vus la semaine dernière [pour un autre projet FUI qui vient de se 
terminer] et je leur ai fait part des projets que j’avais sur [projet P8d]. Je leur dis : « Il y a 
un truc que je ne comprends pas. Là on a monté un projet [P8d]. A priori ça va créer 20 
emplois. Systematic ne nous a pas labélisé. Minealogic ne veut pas le labéliser parce que 
ça ne crée pas assez d’activité autour de Grenoble. » Je dis : « Je ne comprends pas. Il y a 
un projet qui va créer de l’emploi et puis vous ne le labellisez pas. Vous n’êtes pas 
cohérent. Et surtout Systematic l’a déjà labellisé deux fois avant. » Le mec de la DGCIS 
était quand même assez mal dans ses baskets. Il dit : « Ah bon. ». Je dis : « Oui, oui. » Et il 
me dit : « Ecoutez, on va regarder. » Donc, c’était la semaine dernière. Donc là, c’est en 
train de passer à un très haut niveau. [...] Le problème est que la DGCIS n’a pas de 
pouvoir sur les pôles. Par contre, elle a des pouvoirs sur d’autres organes. Donc ils 
essayent d’aider les projets pour les faire labéliser. » (P8) 
Or talk with other well-connected personalities in the public sphere that can then put pressure 
on the policy-driven clusters:  
« Le directeur du CNR Santé235 nous aide. Là sur le projet [P8d] il est parti faire du 
lobbying. Parce que je lui ai dit : « Là on ne comprend pas. Il y a des gens intéressés, qui 
sont prêts à acheter derrière, etc. Nous on paye 1 000 euros par an au CNR Santé. On est 
rentré dedans. Il faut que vous fassiez quelque chose là. » Donc il a dit : « Je m’en occupe. 
Je vais essayer de voir comment. » Après si ça ne marche pas, ce n’est pas grave. » (P8) 
Lobbying is thus a crucial part of the policy-driven cluster realm.  
 
2.3 Double pressure on policy-driven clusters 
Policy-driven clusters are responsible for helping the companies to access subsidies but at the 
same time they have to label the projects. This has a considerable impact on policy-driven 
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 Verbatim: « C’est un peu notre faute aussi. Il y a [quelqu’un de l’entreprise] qui est au groupe thématique 
[nom] de Systematic. Il aura pu plus se bouger les fesses sur le plan politique aussi, hein ! » (P1) 
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 We will discuss in the next section the difference between CNR Santé and a cluster organisation. 
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clusters. To summarize, two types of stakeholders put pressure on policy-driven clusters: 
companies (bottom up pressure) as well as the government (top-down pressure). 
 
2.3.1 Bottom-up pressure from companies: want to get labelled and financed 
French policy-driven clusters have a double role in the subsidies finding phase: (1) first, a 
service role, what we call a friendship relationship with the project leader and (2) second, an 
examination role, what we call a judge relationship with the project leader. In both areas, the 
different French policy-driven clusters are in competition. For the business-driven project 
leaders that can easily apply their knowledge to several industries and sectors, cluster 
organisations are highly exchangeable as all of these comments illustratively show:  
« Les pôles de compétitivité sont en compétition entre eux. » (P9) 
« Surtout, je connais beaucoup de pôles. Je suis dans Cap Digital, mais aussi dans 
Systematic, plus ou moins. Je suis un proposant chez Images & Réseaux. Je suis enregistré 
chez eux, j’ai fait aussi du Mov’eo. Mov’eo, on a abandonné, on est plus dans Advancity. 
[...] On est vraiment implémenté dans tous les paysages, une grosse partie du paysage 
national et européen »236 (P3) 
« J’ai quand même une assez bonne connaissance des 71 pôles français. Je connais à peu 
près bien… 29. » (P8) 
 
Service role (friend). The Paris Region is a region that counts seven policy-driven clusters on 
its territory. In order to get the full amount of subsidies, the project leaders absolutely need to 
get their projects labelled from a local policy-driven cluster. To increase their labelling 
chances, they wisely chose which policy-driven cluster organisation to contact. The examples 
hereinafter will particularly display the competition that exists between Cap Digital, 
HealthCluster and Systematic as the project leaders we interviewed participated in the “ICT & 
Health” initiative that is animated by these three clusters237. The competition between the 
policy-driven clusters starts when project leaders first need advices regarding their projects. 
Most of the interviewed project leaders were in contact with all three Parisian policy-driven 
clusters (Cap Digital, HealthCluster and Systematic). They acquired a certain image of all 
three policy-driven clusters:  
« Je pense que les pôles sont organisés tous de façon différente. Et Systematic, Cap Digital 
et Médicen ne tournent pas du tout de la même manière. [...] Là, par exemple, on s’est 
inscrit à Cap Digital. On a une relation qui est beaucoup plus ... Cap Digital, quand 
j’envoie un message, j’ai une réponse à 11h du soir et des réponses à 6 h du matin. Jamais 
plus de 2h de décalage, entre le message et sa réponse. [...] [HealthCluster] ce n’est pas la 
                                                 
236
 Note: Cap Digital, HealthCluster and Systematic are situated in the Paris Region. Image & Réseaux is 
situated in Brittany. Mov’eo is situated in the Upper Normandy. The company (P3) is situated in the Paris 
Region.  
237
 Another example of such an inter-cluster collaboration in the Paris Region would be the “ICT & Sustainable 
city” initiative, proposed by Cap Digital, Advancity and Systematic.  
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même efficacité. HealthCluster a la réputation d’un pôle qui n’est pas bien mis en place et 
ce n’est pas seulement une réputation. » (P10) 
« Pour l’instant, je dirai qu’on est plus en relation avec [noms de cluster managers] chez 
Cap Digital que chez HealthCluster. Ca ne veut pas dire que ça ne peut pas se développer 
dans l’avenir. [...] Il y a moins de choses organisées chez HealthCluster. J’ai 
l’impression. » (P6) 
« Systematic, je ne le sens pas bien. Je ne le sens pas bien. [...] J’ai plus d’affinités vers 
Cap Digital et eux aussi. C’est bizarre, parce qu’on matche bien. Donc j’irai plus 
facilement sur les présentations de Cap Digital, que sur Systematic. Alors je me trompe 
peut-être. [...] D’un point de vue humain, Cap Digital est quand même beaucoup plus 
proche de ses dépositaires. On sent qu’il y a une proximité. [Noms de cluster managers] 
ont cette inquiétude et cette volonté de faire avancer leur pôle. Systematic…pfff… n’étant 
pas connu…pfff… voilà… je n’étais pas connu, donc ce n’est pas les mêmes relations. 
[...] Cap Digital, on commence à se connaître. Je suis allé les voir l’année dernière pour 
leur re-présenter [le projet P5a]. Parce que on l’a déposé chez Systematic mais on a après 
essayé de le déposer aussi chez Cap Digital. Ils nous ont reçus. La différence était là. 
L’autre, c’était au téléphone, là ils m’ont reçu. J’étais chez eux. Le cadre s’y prête. Ils ont 
essayé de comprendre, de décortiquer. » (P5) 
 
The examples show that the project leaders actively choose where they would like to become 
a member. Most project leaders point directly to Cap Digital as having the best services. The 
first reflex would be to say that they are all ICT companies and naturally turn to Cap Digital. 
However the interpretation has to be more subtle than this:  
- First, it is true that P5 is a typical ICT service company and thus is clearly more 
attracted by a policy-driven cluster like Cap Digital than by HCPR. Additionally, P5 
never had a project labelled by HCPR. However, theoretically P5 could be member of 
Systematic and Cap Digital but has a better “feeling” with Cap Digital than 
Systematic. One important element that is often mentioned as a difference between 
Cap Digital and Systematic is that Cap Digital is receiving everybody personally and 
not only by phone as Systematic does. It just seems a small point, but might be one of 
the reasons that make a real difference for the project leaders.  
- Second, P6 is the association solely specialised in medical issues and having even a 
president that is a doctor himself. His project P6a was labelled by HCPR and Cap 
Digital and then financed by an “Investing for the Future” Program. HealthCluster is 
mentioning this project on its web site as a success for HCPR. As HCPR labelled the 
project, it will also count in their performance statistic. However, also P6 is more 
turning to Cap Digital than HealthCluster because the service, in order to find 
financing, is perceived to be better than at HCPR. Additionally, according to the 
project leader, Cap Digital seems to organise more events than HCPR. 
- Third, P10 is the organisation that has two business fields whereby one is solely 
specialised in medical issues. For a long time, the president of the company has 
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offered services to French doctors so he knows very well this universe. Additionally, 
all of his collaborative research projects are situated at the intersection between ICT 
and Health and he always has a strong hospital component in his projects. HCPR, 
Systematic and Cap Digital labelled one of his projects and the project also figures as 
a success story on HCPR’s web site. However, also this heavily health oriented 
company is more attracted by the services of Cap Digital than by the services of 
HCPR. 
 
On the one hand, it seems that Cap Digital is more oriented and open towards SMEs. Cap 
Digital seems to better understand SMEs’ needs and grants a greater participation role to this 
type of enterprise structure. This is not the case for HCPR:  
« Il y a des pôles où c’est difficile quand on est une PME pour pouvoir jouer, de trouver sa 
place. Il y en a un où c’est très facile, par exemple : Cap Digital, Image et Réseaux. C’est 
de gros intervenants, mais ils laissent à la PME la possibilité de jouer son rôle. Et après il 
y a d’autres où c’est très, très difficile. Médecine et transport, c’est très difficile » (P3) 
On the other hand, Cap Digital has the advantage to be a service and technology policy-driven 
cluster, compared to HCPR that is a specialised policy-driven cluster. In technology policy-
driven clusters like Cap Digital, companies can concentrate on one type of technology and 
then apply it to other sectors238. 
 
Examination role (judge). As we just saw there exists a competition between the policy-
driven clusters regarding their services. This competition continues when we look at their 
labelling role. The project leaders turn to the policy-driven clusters they judge as most 
trustworthy, as following comments show:  
« [Pour la deuxième soumission] Je n’avais pas confiance au groupe thématique [nom] de 
Systematic, donc j’ai soumis le projet également dans un autre pôle. [note : 
HealthCluster] » (P1, 1st submission Systematic, 2nd submission Systematic & 
HealthCluster, 3rd submission HealthCluster) 
« Nous ne sommes pas membres de HealthCluster. Théoriquement, je devrais l’être mais on 
a eu des aventures [...] Parce que, au premier d’appel d’offre, on a été aidé pour le monter 
par un chargé de mission et un expert de HealthCluster et au moment de la labellisation, la 
labellisation s’est passée sous la forme d’une audition, ça s’est très mal passé, ça c’est très 
mal passé. Tout le monde était étonné. Personne n’a compris la réaction du jury lors de 
cette audition, sachant que le projet était poussé par le bureau de HealthCluster. [...] 
Maintenant, on le soumet uniquement à Cap Digital. On ne passe plus via HealthCluster. 
[...] Il y a d’autres pôles médicaux. Je sais qu’il y en a un sur le cancer à Toulouse. On 
                                                 
238
 Verbatim: « Cap Digital, je pense que c’est plus simple pour moi parce que c’est la techno pure. On met du 
contenu. » (P5) 
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peut agir. On peut être amené à agir dans des propositions qui sont gérées par d’autres 
pôles. » (P3, 1st submission HealthCluster, 2nd and 3rd submission Cap Digital)239 
The policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region are in labelling competition with each other 
particularly. Project leaders, in case they had a negative experience with a certain evaluation 
committee in a policy-driven cluster, decide to turn to another policy-driven cluster in the 
Region. Of course, this is again only possible if the project is an interdisciplinary project. 
Additionally, it is important to mention that project leaders often wait to pay their 
membership fee until the project is financed:  
[Question : S’il est adhérent chez Cap Digital ou Systematic ?] « Non, pas encore. 
J’attends d’avoir un projet pour adhérer, payer mon abonnement. » (P5) 
« On utilise les pôles d’une manière abusive et intensive parce qu’on a payé, ou pas, une 
cotisation au pôle. Mais en général, on ne l’a pas payée, on ne la paye pas au départ, on 
est labellisé quand même, et si le projet passe, on paye. On paye après coup, globalement. 
[...] Il y a des grandes entreprises qui ne sont pas OK pour payer d’abord, mais qui sont 
prêtes à payer après. Comme c’est les grandes entreprises, des grands comptes, etc., on 
leur dit OK. » (P9) 
However, this waiting to pay the membership fee is again an illustrative example that shows 
that a policy-driven cluster’s role seems to be reduced to the subsidies finding phase and 
omits the role a policy-driven cluster could play in other phases. Additionally, this puts a 
certain pressure on the policy-driven cluster that in fine is not even controlled by the policy-
driven clusters themselves. 
 
2.3.2 Top-down pressure from government: performance evaluations 
Additionally to this bottom-up pressure, the policy-driven clusters also experience a top-down 
pressure from the government regarding their performances. The project leaders themselves 
are aware of this issue and play this fact to their advantage. They know that the clusters are 
evaluated on their transformation rate of projects (labelled vs. financed projects) and that the 
clusters are fighting against each other to get the best possible projects:  
« Pour moi, les pôles ce sont des organismes qui doivent vivre aussi. Donc il y a un 
écosystème qu’ils sont obligés de maintenir pour avoir - je dirais - leur existence à eux. 
Parce qu’on l’a bien vu, les pôles se battent pour récupérer des projets : « Non, vous 
devriez soumettre chez nous. » [...] Ils sont devenus une administration qui a besoin que les 
gens déposent des projets pour pouvoir démontrer que : « Regardez ! On a eu 50 projets 
déposées, il y a 10 chez nous qui étaient retenus. » Il y a peut-être deux qui ont été 
sponsorisés, voilà ça marche. [...] C’est un peu, ça qu’on ressent. [...] C’est une 
administration comme une autre. On le sent. Ca se sent. On nous dit de déposer des 
projets. Voilà. « Déposez, déposez, déposez, donnez nous des projets. » Voilà on dépose des 
projets. On le sent. Ce n’est pas dit. Ce n’est pas direct. On voit bien. [...] C’est des 
organismes qui étaient mis en place. Ils doivent rendre compte. Parce que : à quoi sert de 
mettre en place des pôles de compétitivité s’il n’y a pas de résultat ? » (P5) 
                                                 
239
 Verbatim: [Note : Labellisation était refusée chez Systematic] « Non mais Systematic, on l’a oublié. On l’a 
arrêté. Donc finalement, on est allé à Cap Digital. » (P8, 1st and 2nd submission Systematic, 3rd submission Cap 
Digital) 
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Another project-leader, who is in the executive office of a policy-driven cluster, also 
mentioned this top down pressure. The policy-driven clusters know that they are in 
competition to each other and that they have to anticipate the number of projects that can 
potentially get financed, to keep their transformation rate high:  
« [Les pôles] ont un intérêt qui n’est pas forcement celui des entreprises. Ils doivent 
exister, ils doivent se financer. [Nom du pôle] reçoit un certain nombre de projets, on 
labélise certains, et on regarde l’efficacité du pôle de compétitivité en étudiant le ratio : 
combien de projets étaient labellisés et combien ont été financés. Ce que [nom du pôle] est 
en train de faire en ce moment, c’est de travailler sur sa propre évaluation d’efficacité, 
d’accompagnement des projets. Comme je participe au conseil d’administration, c’est 
difficile en fait. Leur intérêt est de ne pas trop en labéliser, c’est d’être qualitatif et pas que 
quantitatif. Pas trop de projets. […] la DGCIS a seulement une certaine somme d’argent à 
dispenser. [...] Donc ils sont toujours en train d’essayer de savoir où ils mettent le curseur. 
[...] En fonction du nombre de projets qu’eux vont estimer possibles. Ils savent combien la 
DGCIS va financer de projets. S’ils savent que la DGCIS va financer 30 projets cette 
année, [...] qu’eux présentent 100 projets, ils savent que ce n’est pas bon. Maintenant s’ils 
n’en présentent que 5, ils savent qu’ils pourront financer plus, pour avoir un taux plus 
élevé. C’est une question de ne pas se disperser, en fonction de son temps et sa crédibilité. 
Vu que les pôles sont en compétition entre eux, ils ont ce taux de succès. » (P9) 
The policy-driven clusters are thus put in competition by companies (for services and 
labelling) but also by the government. On the one hand, for not labelling too much projects, 
but on the other hand lobbying forces might also intervene when they were too strict. Policy-
driven clusters are thus in a constant balancing act between different objectives and demands. 
 
2.4 Conclusion: the finding subsidies’ dilemmas of HCPR 
The French policy-driven clusters are structured around R&D project subsides (direct 
subsidies). The objective of financing R&D projects in policy-driven clusters is to create a 
strong network of actors that innovate together. However, this good subsidy intention 
(dilemma PD#2a) also generates a side effect: the pathology of distrust. Policy-driven 
clusters, at least the one we were able to observe in the Paris Region, are torn apart between 
their friend role (services) and their judge role (examination) which, according to a project 
leader, generates a “schizophrenic situation”. This ambiguous situation creates a lot of 
lobbying activities in and around the policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region and negative 
experiences can push potential cluster members away from the policy-driven clusters. The 
main direct subsidy type associated to the policy-driven clusters is business oriented. This 
fact, together with the associated distrust pathology, also lays the ground to push the 
innovation process of the policy-driven cluster (dilemma MD#2a) in a certain direction: 
towards development. Additionally, the subsidies question and the competition that we 
observe between the different policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region also raise the 
question of the best organisational boundary (dilemma PD#1b). The Paris Region counts 7 
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cluster organisations. For the time being every cluster organisation is specialised in a certain 
sector, but our data show that interdisciplinary project leaders go there, were they think they 
get the best services and where they will get their project financed. 
 
3 Finding partners: “Las Vegas” weddings thanks to “Meetic” 
In this section we now focus on how and where the project leaders meet their project partners. 
We started every interview with a very open question: “Please tell me about the genesis of the 
[name of project] collaboration project? Tell me about the initiation of the project: how did 
everything begin?”. At a later point in the interview we asked the project leaders to tell us 
how they met every single project partner240. However, three important methodology points 
need to be kept in mind: 
- First, being a project leader does not always mean to be the one who initiated the 
project and who had the idea for the project. The consequence is that the project 
leader is not always the one who started contacting all remaining project partners. We 
think that the problem is worth mentioning in case somebody wishes to make a 
quantitative analysis on the subject in the future. However, the project leader is most 
of the time the only or the most important contact point with the policy-driven 
cluster.241  
- Second, even if the project leader was also the one who initiated the project this does 
not mean that he knows all the project partners personally. Very often a project has 
a hard core of two or three partners and then this hard core contacts all the remaining 
partners. In general, the project leaders trust their partners that they will chose 
competent partners. In the end, the project leader, though he is at the source of the 
project idea, has sometimes never met all the project partners personally242. The 
contact is for example only established by e-mail243 or by telephone244. 
                                                 
240
 HCPR gave us an exhaustive list of all project partners for each of the ten initially selected collaborative 
research projects, so we were able to precisely insist on the different partners. The investigated projects have 
between 3 and 11 project partners each. In total, the interviewed project leaders mentioned approximately the 
names of 65 project partners and how they have (more or less) entered into a relationship with them. 
241
 In total we discussed 19 project ideas with the 10 interviewed project leaders. For 12 projects the project 
leader was also the one who had the idea for the collaborative project, in 7 cases the idea came from somebody 
else. 
242
 Verbatim: « Il y a des gens dans mes projets que je n’ai jamais vus. [...] [Par exemple dans ce projet, il y a 
une université] que je ne connais pas du tout. Ce sont des gens que je n’ai jamais rencontrés. » (P7) 
243
 Verbatim: « On a eu le FUI, [le partenaire a] pour 300 000 ou 400 000 euros de subventions ; pourtant je 
ne les ai jamais rencontrés. Tout par e-mail. » (P9) 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 274 
- Third, the project leaders create collaborative research collaborations not only with 
people they rarely know but also extremely fast. One project leader described the 
consortium construction as a Las Vegas wedding (« Au lieu de se marier un peu, c’est 
Las Vegas. On trouve quelqu’un dans la rue, on va se marier en un quart d’heure. » 
(P9)). And another project leader underlined that there is no time to create a real 
consortium (« La difficulté sur les consortiums, ce que on n’a pas le temps d’un créer 
un vrai. » (P5)). On the one hand, this might show that they trust each other and 
believe that nobody will put its reputation at peril because the community is not that 
big at the end. On the other hand, this also shows that the research collaborations are 
business oriented. 
 
To sum up, if somebody is solely interested in collaborative research projects financed by the 
FUI then it is inevitable to talk with all project partners in order to have an in-depth 
understanding of the consortium. However, we were not solely interested in collaborative 
research projects but interested in the general influence of policy-driven clusters on 
partnership creation between local actors. For this analysis, the project leader view is an 
inevitable angle, as he is often the most active policy-driven cluster participant and also 
chosen out of this “political” reason by the other project members. We will not discuss every 
single project consortium separately in this thesis. This could be the object of a separate paper 
(in Annex 14 we give two visual schemata examples of the relationships between project 
partners. We hope this helps to get a more concrete idea of the just explained.) 
 
3.1 Project leaders learn but have difficulties to find certain partners 
In this first sub-section, we discuss the diversity of options project leaders use in order to get 
in contact with other companies. A learning curve can be observed, as a difference exists 
between project leaders that are new to the collaborative research community and project 
leaders that are already integrated. Additionally, we focus on two major types of difficulties 
for project leaders: (1) the difficulty of finding doctors and industrials, (2) the difficulty of 
finding project partners that are situated in the same geographical region.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
244
 Verbatims: « De toute façon, pour le montage du projet, c’était essentiellement par e-mail et puis par 
téléphone. » (P1); « Quelque fois, je ne les vois pas du tout [les partenaires]. Par exemple, la boîte [nom] je ne 
l’ai jamais vue. Le projet se monte par téléphone. (P10) 
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3.1.1 Project leaders’ learning curve for finding partners 
Project leaders can be split in two categories: Those who are new to the research community, 
and those who are already integrated. Among the interviewed project partners only the micro-
enterprise, the medium-sized firm and one SME were quite new in the collaborative research 
universe. This was also reflected in their comments regarding the policy-driven cluster 
ecosystem. For the SME it was clear that in order to be able to participate in this universe they 
first have to “enter” this world but once they have entered this world they will know with 
whom to work. The following comment shows very illustrative, the effort a company has to 
make in order to get accepted by the collaborative research community: 
« On a toujours voulu travailler dans le domaine des FUI ou des ANR. Des projets de 
recherche. On s’est dit avec mes deux responsables techniques : il faut qu’on y aille. C’est 
une source de valeur importante en termes de développement des compétences, du réseau. 
Et on sait très bien qu’une fois qu’on est rentré là dedans, on y est. Il faut toujours rentrer. 
C’est du réseau, c’est du lobbying avant tout. Il faut faire cet effort pour se faire connaître 
[...] il faut être présent, il faut se faire connaître. Il faut aller voir les gens, il faut discuter, 
parce que si on n’est pas là, on ne vient pas vous chercher. [...] [Maintenant] j’ai appris le 
microcosme des pôles de compétitivité, comment ça marche, avec qui travailler. [...] Parce 
que ça marche à travers le réseau. C’est très difficile [...] si on n’est pas adoubé, si on ne 
fait pas partie du cercle de connaissances. » (P5, SME) 
The medium-sized firm had a similar discourse as the SME, namely that one has to use the 
proposed workshops “the tribune” to speak to the community, to show that one exists. Once 
this is done, and the others know the company, one only has to maintain the positive 
relationship with the community. One has to cultivate the contacts like any type of 
relationship: 
« Les workshops [TIC & Santé] n’ont pas donné lieu à des résultats concrets identifiables 
comme tels, mais ça a quand même participé à l’idée que [nous sommes] une société qui 
arrive en visibilité, qui a la volonté de se placer dans l’écosystème de la santé [...] Les 
workshops e-santé ont été les premières tribunes où j’ai pu m’exprimer devant la place, 
devant des partenaires potentiels, devant des pôles de compétitivité pour affirmer cette 
volonté [...] mais maintenant, je n’en ai plus besoin. C’est-à-dire maintenant, pour le 
monde de la santé, ça y est, je suis dans le radar. Peut-être, c’est un premier run 
intéressant pour des gens qui ne sont pas du tout connus encore, mais une fois qu’on est 
repéré dans les radars de chacun de trois pôles parisiens, bon, on n’a plus besoin de faire 
ces étapes préalables. Elles ont jouées leur rôle, et c’est transposable aux prochains appels 
à projet. Une fois qu’on est connu, on est connu. Ce n’est pas lié à un appel à projet, c’est 
une occasion à se faire connaître, puis après on est connu. Après, il faut l’entretenir. C’est 
comme des relations personnelles ou amicales. Il faut entretenir l’amitié. Il faut revoir les 
gens périodiquement. Il faut dire « coucou, on est là » pour ne pas qu’on nous oublie. Mais 
l’essentiel du travail était fait. Donc juste avant les appels à projets, il faut dire « Hop, on 
est là. Il y a peut-être ça qui nous intéresse, pensez à nous si vous voyez un partenaire qui 
sera en recherche de telle ou telle compétence. » (P7, medium-sized firm) 
However, the micro-enterprise that also participated at an ICT & Health plenary session did 
not understand the utility of such a workshop and was even very frustrated from the 
organisation of this day. The micro-enterprise simply does not have the capacity to do more 
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than one project at the time and does not see the necessity to participate in such types of 
events:  
« Chacun venait présenter son projet, mais à partir du moment où les gens ont déjà un 
projet, ils ne vont pas se manifester vers d’autres projets a priori, sauf si ils sont gros, sauf 
pour les grosses sociétés. Mais pour être bien on ne peut pas courir 36 projets en 
parallèle. » (P2) 
 
The medium-sized firm and the SME (P5) are business driven and their objective is to get 
accepted and known in the collaborative research world in order to find regularly new 
business and research partners. However, once they are known they prefer investing their 
limited time somewhere else. The micro-enterprise is still idea driven with one strong 
objective and limited human capacity. Therefore finding lots of business and research partners 
is not in their interest. The ICT & Health events were useful to get to know each other, but 
once one knows the community and community know the company, the added value of these 
events decreases245.  
 
We summarized the integration of project leaders in the collaborative research community in 
Figure 32. The integration of partners that are not yet integrated in the collaborative research 
community often starts by what we call “event fishing”. By “event fishing” we mean that 
potential project leaders participate in events (for example organised by a policy-driven 
cluster) in order to present the company’s competences or the company’s ideas for attracting 
new partners. However, the gathering of partners around one idea for project leaders that are 
already integrated in the collaborative research world seems to function very differently as we 
will see hereinafter. 
 
Figure 32: Integration of project leaders in the collaborative research community  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
245
 Verbatim: « Ces formules là sont très intéressantes, surtout lorsqu’on ne connaît pas les gens, quand on a 
peu de contacts. [...] C’est un moyen efficace, surtout pour faire rentrer des nouveaux proposants, de nouveaux 
partenaires. » (P3) 
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3.1.1.1 Project partners, colleagues, and acquaintances (1st step) 
The interviewed project leaders who have an idea for a project and who are already well 
integrated in the collaborative research world do not start building their consortium by going 
to events. They know how the administrative process of collaborative research projects works 
and so they do not necessarily need to have a more experienced partner in their consortium. 
First, they start by mobilising their own, their colleagues and main project partner’s 
acquaintances: 
« On a eu un noyau dur qui se connaissait au démarrage du projet. Après, il y a toujours 
un partenaire qui connaît d’autres partenaires. [...] On a réfléchi à comment monter le 
projet, qui savait faire quoi, et quelle compétence manquait. Et puis, à travers les différents 
contacts, on a augmenté le consortium. [...] Il y avait une certaine confiance, dans la 
mesure où c’était des partenaires de partenaires. » (P1) 
« Comme nous on connaissait des partenaires au [centre de recherche], on les appelle : 
« Vous voulez participer ? » « Oui. » » (P8)246 
Among this core contacts we would like to point out two specific sub-categories. First, the 
integrated project leaders have already participated in collaborative research projects. They 
seem to stay close with these project partners and strongly mobilise all the partners they have 
met in these projects247. This shows the general utility of collaborative R&D projects and goes 
in the direction that direct subsidies are useful to create a strong network of potential 
innovation partners. Second, another category of partners worth mentioning is the category 
formed by the spin-offs of universities. Several projects had a university spin-off among their 
collaboration partners248. 
 
3.1.1.2 Telephone “fishing” (2nd step) 
Once these core contacts are “explored”, the project leader starts with its “telephone fishing” 
phase to find for example a missing competence. By telephone fishing we mean that nobody 
within the core knows the right person so the project leader starts calling people he knows in 
order to get the names of other people, and so on, until he finds the right partner: 
« Je les ai trouvés par le biais des personnes qui connaissent [nom] qui connaissent [autre 
nom] ... c’est la chaîne. On prend son téléphone, et puis on part à la pêche. On tombe sur 
                                                 
246
 Verbatims: « On a eu la chance [...] d’avoir un [...] ingénieur [dans notre entreprise], qui connaît très, très 
bien [ce professeur qui est] [...] patron d’un laboratoire [dans une Ecole]. » (P5); « Ca fait assez longtemps 
qu’on se connaît. Moi je [la ] connais très bien [...] parce qu’elle a fait ses recherches à [la même université que 
moi]. J’ai une relation forte avec elle. » (P6) 
247
 Verbatims: « Dans un projet précédent [...] c’est là qu’on a fait connaissance avec ces gens-là » (P7); 
« C’est les gens avec qui on développe ça. [...] Donc on est ensemble dans le projet européen [...] et donc je les 
ai impliqués dans le projet FUI. » (P10) 
248
 Verbatims: « [Cette PME] est issue [d’une université], qui est un des [nos] partenaires [avec qui on 
travaille]. Ils travaillent en famille, en fait. » (P9); « [Cette PME] est une petite entreprise [...] qui est une spin-
off [d’une université]. C’est une spin-off d’un partenaire académique. » (P7); « [Cette PME], c’est un 
essaimage d’étudiants [d’un de nos partenaires académiques] ». (P1) 
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quelqu’un qui vous dit qu’il n’est pas concerné, mais qui connaît un tel qui peut être 
intéressé, etc. » (P7) 
« Qu’est-ce que je fais pour ça ? J’ai passé un coup de téléphone [à une association] et ils 
m’ont orienté plutôt sur [une autre technologie] [...]. Donc j’ai pris mon téléphone à 
nouveau et j’ai appelé une équipe [d’un centre de recherche]. [...] Je ne le connaissais pas 
mais son nom m’était donné par [l’association]. Et je leur ai proposé de monter un projet. 
[...] et il me dit OK. [...] Donc je n’ai pas de problème [à contacter des gens]. Je regarde 
de qui j’ai besoin et je prends mon téléphone et j’appelle. [...] Je passe des coups de fil à 
tous les gens que je connais pour savoir s’ils connaissaient quelqu’un dans mon domaine. » 
(P10) 
However, in order to be able to start telephone fishing, the project leader has to be deeply 
integrated in the community with a full address book by his/her side:  
« Maintenant, j’ai un carnet d’adresse assez important dans [ce] domaine [...] Par exemple 
[mon patron] m’appelle il me dit « Il faut que tu me trouves des spécialistes ». Deux heures 
après il avait les trois types en Europe qui sont spécialistes de la problématique, parce que 
j’appelle le CEA. Le CEA me dit : ‘tu appelles un tel de ma part’ et voilà. » (P8) 
 
The telephone fishing can also happen by calling a policy-driven cluster. Two interviewed 
project leaders found a partner for one of their research projects by simply calling (or even e-
mailing) the policy-driven cluster and by asking for a specific competence that was missing in 
their consortium: 
« [PME], je les ai intégrés en un week-end. J’ai commencé les échanges de mail le 
vendredi soir et le lundi matin, c’était bon. Vendredi après-midi, j’ai envoyé un e-mail à 
[...] Cap Digital : « Tu n’as pas un partenaire qui fait de la [technologie] ? ». Donc, leur 
valeur ajoutée est là. Lui, il a son énorme fichier dans sa tête, ‘clac clac’. [...] « Vous 
connaissez quelqu’un ? J’ai besoin de telle compétence. Est-ce que vous connaissez 
quelqu’un, qui a des fonds propres suffisants et qui a les critères d’éligibilité ? Ca ne peut 
pas être n’importe qui. » Et le pôle de compétitivité m’a mis en relation avec eux. » (P9b) 
« Là, typiquement, c’est HealthCluster qui m’a trouvé [nom du partenaire]. C’est-à-dire 
que j’ai fait une demande à HealthCluster : « Voilà, j’ai des solutions techniques et je 
monte un projet qui peut avoir des applications dans le domaine de [maladie]. C’est un 
monde que je ne connais pas, je compte sur vous pour me proposer des partenaires. » Là, 
ils ont joué un super rôle qui est : dans leurs annuaires d’adhérents, de faire une 
recherche, de lancer un appel, un peu à droite et à gauche, pour trouver des gens à qui ça 
pourrait plaire de participer à un tel projet, et c’est eux qui m’ont proposé [une PME] 
[...] Ils m’ont proposé [cette PME] en premier contact. Ils se proposaient de continuer la 
démarche et puis, très rapidement, j’ai pris contact avec [la PME], le courant est si bien 
passé que je n’ai pas cherché à trouver quelqu’un d’autre. » (P7a) 
In both cases the policy-driven cluster was very helpful for the project leaders in order to 
integrate an additional project partner. The policy-driven cluster was used like a help line. The 
advantage of “telephone fishing” is that it does not take a lot of time, something most of the 
project leaders appreciate, even though most of the time they are free to go wherever they 
want. However, these examples show that once these project leaders are established in a 
research community they do not have any problems to find the right people by staying in their 
offices and just using their telephone.  
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3.1.1.3 Event “fishing” (3rd step) 
Project leaders can also use what we call “event fishing”. “Event fishing” can be split into 
active and passive event fishing. 
 
Active event fishing is practiced when there is a need to find (a) key project partner(s) nobody 
in the consortium knows. During our interviews we observed two cases of active event fishing 
where the company needed to find a particular doctor and two cases of active event fishing 
where a university needed to find companies. (Additionally we assisted in official events 
organised by HCPR (see Figure 33 and Figure 34). Figure 33 shows particularly well the 
“speed dating” atmosphere that can preveail during such events.) 
 
In the first case of active event fishing, where a company needs to find a doctor, the project 
leader first contacted doctors he knew in order to identify the name of the best specialist in the 
medical domain he was interested in. He then looked up when this doctor gave his next 
conference speech and went to this conference. According to the project leader, he slipped in 
his “pilgrim clothes” and tracked down the doctor:  
« Deux médecins [me donnent le nom d’une spécialiste de la maladie dans un hôpital à 
Paris] [...] : « Elle est professeur. C’est cette femme-là qu’il faut dans le projet. » Donc 
moi, je prends mon habit de pèlerin. Je vais à une conférence de médecins où elle était, et à 
la fin, je viens avec un petit schéma, je lui dis : « Voilà, on a imaginé ça. » [...] Elle me dit : 
« Ah oui, c’est une bonne idée ». Je dis : « Mais vous pourriez participer ? » Elle me dit : 
« Oui, venez me voir. » Je vais la voir. [...] Je lui explique. Elle me dit : « Ah oui, c’est 
génial votre truc » [...] Donc elle participe au projet. » (P8d, project financed by FUI) 
The second case of active event fishing, where a company needed to find a doctor, is similar 
to the first case. However, this time the company is less integrated in the research community 
than the company in the first cited case. Instead of contacting doctors to get the right name, 
this company did a paid market research study. The market research study identified a list of 
key opinion leaders that operate in the medical domain they were interested in. Once they 
were in possession of these names, the cluster actor also participated at a conference where 
the doctor they were most interested in gave a speech: 
« On a fait réaliser en amont [...] une enquête, une étude de marché complète par un 
cabinet spécialisé, qui a permis de dégager une liste de key opinion leaders qui étaient 
pour la plupart interviewés par ce cabinet. [...] Donc on connaît, on avait déjà un 
feedback, on savait qui était intéressé potentiellement, qui souhaitait vraiment disposer 
d’un tel intérêt supplémentaire, qui se posait de vraies questions intéressantes aussi. 
[...] On a eu un nid de noms. Notamment il y avait le nom [de ce] professeur qui 
apparaissait dans les interviewés [...] On est rentré en contact avec lui. [...] C’était un de 
mes collègues qui a fait la prospection. Il l’avait rencontré au cours d’une journée. » (P2a, 
project financed by FUI) 
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In this first case, where a university needed to find a company, the university was looking for 
a certain technical competences but did not know the companies that were operating in this 
domain. The university first identified the trade fairs of the needed technology, and then went 
to one of these specialised trade fairs in order to identify and contact the right company: 
« Comment on a connu [le project leader] ? Il y a deux salons, des grands salons de [la 
technologie qu’on cherchait] en France. [...] Ils ont lieu chaque année. Et à cette occasion, 
[...] on est allé rencontrer les industriels du secteur, et on s’est rendu compte qu’il y a deux 
grands industriels en France qui s’occupaient de ce domaine là [...]. [L’entreprise qu’on a 
sélectionnée] et une autre. [...] Voilà, donc on a noué des contacts avec [l’entreprise du 
project leader] qu’on a trouvé très sympathique et du coup on les a recontacté pour 
pouvoir déposer un premier projet, et ça a fonctionné. » (interview with university Partner 
of P9a & P9b project, idea : university, P9a project financed by a special project call, P9b 
project financed by FUI) 
In the second case, the university needed a certain number of companies for its research 
project and presented its project idea at a policy-driven cluster event249 (ICT & Health plenary 
session). The university that was at the source of the project idea was looking for companies 
to launch its research project. A project leader listened to the presentation, was interested in 
the idea and then approached the university professor who presented the project idea. 
However, this case is the only case of the four active event “fishing” cases that was not 
financed. According to a policy-driven cluster manager, with whom we talked about this 
project, the project partners were not homogenous enough250. In the case where a university 
does not really know whom to contact and just presents its idea, it seems more difficult to 
create a homogenous project.  
 
To sum up, we observe that when a person needs to approach a completely different world (a 
company the medical world or a university the corporate world), the person who had the idea 
for the project prefers seeing and convincing the missing key partner(s) in person than by 
phone. In the two cases where the company needed to find a doctor they both identified first 
the name of the best doctor in the domain in France (either by a market study or by talking 
with acquaintances), and then the project leader actively looked for an event where the doctor 
gave a talk. Once this event is identified the project leader goes to this event to talk with the 
doctor in person about the project. Universities seem to function in a similar manner in case 
                                                 
249
 Verbatim: « Lors de la réunion en septembre, c’était en séance plénière, l’objectif était de présenter l’idée 
du projet et ensuite, donc, il y a eu un break et pendant ce break il était possible, pour les gens qui étaient 
intéressés par la proposition, d’aller voir les proposants et de leur faire part de son intérêt. [...] C’était [un] 
professeur [...] qui a présenté et donc ça correspondait aux intérêts qu’on avait, et donc, comme d’autres, je suis 
allé voir [ce] professeur [...] et j’ai expliqué ce qu’on faisait. Et je disais que ce projet pouvait nous intéresser. » 
(P3a) 
250
 Verbatim: « C’était un peu des briques mais pas une vraie homogénéité entre les partenaires. » (October 
2011) 
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they do not know the right companies. In the first case, the university identified the most 
important trade fairs and then went there. In the second case, the university presented its 
project idea at a policy-driven cluster event. However, this more “open” version, meaning just 
presenting the project idea at a policy-driven cluster event (vs. identifying the key actors of 
the searched technology / competence) seems to create less homogenous consortiums.  
 
Besides active event fishing, we also observe “passive event fishing”. Passive event fishing is 
practiced when the company is presenting its competencies without having a concrete project 
idea. These competence presentations are a standard presentation type during policy-driven 
cluster project set up events. The company hopes that somebody in the room needs its 
competencies and will contact it. Passive event fishing is particularly practiced by companies 
that are new to a certain research community (as already discussed). However, we also 
sometimes observe that an established company is looking for new project opportunities but 
does not have a particular project idea. The company then just presents once again the 
competences of its company to the research community. 
 
Figure 33: One-to-one business meetings during HealthCluster Convention 
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Figure 34: France-Sweden networking event workshop 
 
3.1.1.4 Maintaining relations (4th step) 
Finally, all project leaders try to maintain their various relations by active partnership 
management. Either by participating regular at all types of events or by accepting certain 
responsibilities like for example teaching or being in committees: 
- by participating in general events: Project leaders participate in all kinds of events 
that are organised (e.g. OSEO, ANR, Eureka, FP7, Usine Nouvelle, etc.). However, as 
it is important for them to maintain a good relationship with a lot of different types of 
communities, the policy-driven cluster communities only represent one of several 
communities they need to maintain. Project leaders wish to maintain a close 
relationship with a lot of different communities in order to stay on the “collaborative 
research radars” of all of these communities. Participating in a lot of different events 
allows them to multiply their collaborative research project chances (as we already 
know, most of the companies are business oriented). The policy-driven cluster 
organisations are thus in competition with all these other important communities. 
- by accepting teaching responsibilities: Besides participating in general events project 
leaders also try to maintain their relations with universities by accepting teaching 
responsibilities. When they are setting up new collaborative research projects these 
teaching “connections” allow them to have a privileged access to the academic world. 
Additionally, it is well seen by the academic world when a professional is investing 
time and effort in education. This increases the legitimity of the company and the 
academic world seems keener to talk with the company251. 
                                                 
251
 Verbatims: « Je les connaissais parce que j’ai enseigné à l’école là-bas [...] Là encore, je le connais [parce 
que] j’enseigne aussi à [cette université]. [...] Donc le fait d’enseigner me donne une certaine légitimité. Les 
gens me respectent et me valorisent parce que je suis un industriel qui prend une partie de son temps libre pour 
enseigner. Donc je donne. Et ça, quand vous êtes avec des labos du CNRS ... il y a quand même une éthique 
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- by accepting responsibilities in committees: Project leaders also try to accept 
responsibilities in committees. For example they accept being the industrial expert in a 
scientific committee, or they accept being the representative of an association. These 
efforts give the project leaders access to communities they would otherwise not easily 
access. Additionally, the integration in these committees gives them a competitive 
advantage compared to persons who do not accept these types of responsibilities252.  
- by participating in national competitions: Companies also try to participate in 
national competitions. We observed for example one relation that was created by the 
visibility of the project leader thanks to a national competition that made a small 
company visible to a larger community. From a public policy point of view, 
attributing prices to the important actors of the local ecosystem seems to be important 
to keep in mind.253 
 
3.1.1.5 King of community (5th step) 
Finally, a project leader can also be what we call a “king of community”. By “king of 
community” we mean that the project leader does not have to look actively for research 
project partners. The project leader is already that well integrated in the research community 
that the community heavily turns to this type of company, or as one project leader said: 
“Somewhen we were known”254. The big industrial partners are automatically in this category. 
However, SMEs that are already in the community for a long time can also reach the “king of 
                                                                                                                                                        
fondamentale du don. [...] Le fait de donner autant d’enseignement fait que j’ai des liens beaucoup plus faciles 
avec les labos. Pourquoi ? Parce que tous les labos sont associés à des écoles donc quand j’enseigne à 
[l’université 1] il y a [le labo 1] derrière, quand j’enseigne à [l’université 2] j’ai [le labo 2] derrière, quand 
j’enseigne à [l’université 3] j’ai le [le labo 3] derrière, quand j’enseigne à [l’université 4] j’ai le [le labo 4] 
derrière, etc. » (P8); « De toute façon, je donne aussi des cours à l’ISEP. [...] [J’ai discuté] avec le nouveau 
[responsable d’option] pas longtemps avant que je monte le projet, donc, du coup, comme on avait des objectifs 
communs et qu’ils ont fait des choses dans [le domaine] qui nous intéresse, on les a associés. [...] C’était ça qui 
a fait qu’ils ont rejoint le projet. » (P1) 
252
 Verbatims: « Je suis d’ailleurs [dans un groupe thématique] au conseil scientifique du CNRS. [...] [La 
dernière fois, j’étais juste en train de monter un consortium], j’avais une réunion au CNRS. A cette réunion, je 
rencontre [un académique]. Donc on rentre ensemble dans le train [...] et à ce moment, on prend un verre au 
bar. C’est là où je [commence à lui parler du projet]. [...] Il me dit : « Nous, on a le spécialiste là-dessus. » » 
(P8); « Alors les hôpitaux évidemment [...] je les connais beaucoup moins à l’étranger mais je commence à les 
connaître parce que je participe pas mal à des réunions internationales. Par exemple, moi, je suis représentant 
de la France pour [une association], c’est-à-dire là on se trouve avec 18 ou 20 pays qui se réunissent depuis 4 
ans régulièrement. » (P10) 
253
 Verbatim: « [Cette PME] est rentré en contact avec nous parce qu’ils ont [...] découvert notre nom lorsque 
nous avons été lauréat du concours « création d'entreprises de technologies innovantes » réalisé par le ministère 
de la recherche. Il y a une certaine publicité qui se fait autour. [...] puis lorsqu’on a monté le projet [P2a], on 
s’est dit qu’il faudra quelqu’un qui connait un petit peu les choses et qui travaille dans le domaine de la e-santé, 
et donc on a vu que [cette PME] se positionnait dans ce domaine, donc naturellement, on les a recontactés. » 
(P2) 
254
 Verbatim: « A un moment, j’étais connu. Donc ils parlaient de moi. Donc les gens venaient me voir : « Le 
mec du pôle m’a parlé de vous. Ca serait intéressant qu’on se voie. » Donc, je n’ai jamais refusé. » (P8) 
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community” status. During the weeks that precede a project call deadline, their telephone 
does not stop ringing. One project leader compares it to “Meetic” (a partner finding platform):  
« Quand il y a des appels à projet [dans notre domaine], on a répondu à 8 appels, on a eu 
4 projets financés, mais on a dû avoir 20 sollicitations à peu près. 20 personnes qui ont 
dit : « Est-ce que vous voulez faire partie de notre consortium ? » Si vous êtes sur un site 
de rencontre, vous avez aussi plein de sollicitations, vous choisissez. Chez nous c’est 
pareil. Et vous en sélectionnez plusieurs parce que vous allez prendre un verre avec lui, 
avec lui, avec lui (…) et vous allez voir un peu, initier, laisser tomber, et puis bon, c’est des 
mariages, c’est pareil. Tout le monde appelle tout le monde. C’est comme sur Meetic. C’est 
le même mécanisme en fait, d’intérêt, dans un but commun, la mise en relation est assez 
similaire, sauf que ce n’est pas que à deux, c’est à plusieurs ! » (P9) 
 
3.1.1.6 Summary 
To sum up, the interviewed project leaders that were new to the collaborative research 
community used the policy-driven cluster services to enter the community. However, once 
they are established in the community, the policy-driven clusters’ utility in finding project 
partners is strongly reduced. Project leaders then start by looking at their personal and project 
partner acquaintances, then maybe call a policy-driven cluster, and finally participate in an 
event to either actively search for a key partner or passively propose their competencies. 
Project leaders seem to prefer contacting key partners, particularly from the academic and 
medical domain, personally and not over the phone. These key partners often belong to a 
world they are not familiar with and so the challenge lies in finding events where the key 
partners participate (all kinds of events). Finally all project leaders actively maintain a strong 
relationship with a lot of different communities to multiple their chances to access 
collaborative research projects. Project leaders can also reach the status of “king of 
community”, meaning that before project call deadlines, they are heavily solicited and do not 
need to search actively for project partners. 
 
Figure 35 summarizes our results for project leaders that are not yet integrated in the 
collaborative research community and Figure 36 summarizes the result for project leaders that 
are integrated in the collaborative research community. 
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Figure 35: Not integrated project leaders: Finding partners for projects  
 
 
Figure 36: Integrated project leaders: Finding partners for projects  
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 The difficulty to find medical and industrial partners 
There are two types of partners that are important for every collaborative ICT & Health 
project: medical partners and industrials. However, with both partners it is extremely difficult 
to get in contact for project leaders. 
 
3.1.2.1 Medical partners 
As we are studying a policy-driven cluster operating in the medical sector, we consider 
important to particularly focus on the medical partners. They are not from the same universe 
as the business driven SMEs and thus have some important particularities. Besides the view 
of the 10 project leaders on the medical world, we were also able to collect the views of two 
doctors and two academic partners. 
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We start by summarizing the three most important barriers that seem to exist between the 
corporate world and the medical world: 
- Doctors are highly occupied (1st barrier). The first important observation is that 
doctors are highly occupied due to their “place bound” and intensive activities in the 
hospitals. This stands in very strong contrast to the “free electron” attitude of the 
business driven project leaders. As already mentioned, the main objective of the 
project leaders is to set-up collaborative research projects, but doctors also have their 
“daily work” to do and are not only concentrated in setting up collaborative business 
projects: 
« Le souci est de trouver des trous dans leurs agendas, c’est leur problème majeur. C’est la 
course contre le temps. La difficulté quand on prépare un projet avec eux, c’est - comme on 
dit en français - c’est souvent « à l’arrache ». Donc c’est toujours à la dernière minute, 
parce que bon, ils sont extrêmement sollicités. » (P2) 
The challenge for the project leaders is thus not only to find the doctors (as already 
discussed) but also to find enough time to sufficiently exchange with the doctors 
regarding their research projects.  
- Medical / health projects often have an uncertain business plan (2nd barrier). The 
second important point concerns the business plan on that health/medical projects can 
build on. Several project leaders mentioned the difficulties they have in finding a 
viable business model for this sector255. Project leaders, as soon as they enter the 
medical world, have difficulties in finding a business model that allows them to be 
eligible for the FUI (closer to the market than fundamental research) and that in the 
end will allow to generate enough business for the company.  
- Health sector has a corporatist attitude (3rd barrier). The third and last point we 
would like to mention is the impression that the medical sector has a corporatist 
attitude. In order to be able to do a collaborative research project, it is not only enough 
to enter the medical world, but also to collaborate with the “right” professor, who is 
the specialist of the domain. This seems to be a difficult challenge for a lot of 
companies: 
« En plus, le monde médical est un monde quand même très corporatiste où il faut mieux 
avoir un médecin dans la boucle. Un vrai médecin diplômé de médecine. [...] Dans le 
monde de l’AP-HP, le monde hospitalier, ou dans le monde de médecins libéraux, si vous 
n’êtes pas parrainé par un médecin - en plus n’ayant pas une grosse notoriété - vous ne 
passez pas. C’est très (…) par cooptation. Il faut que vous soyez recommandé par 
quelqu’un qui soit lui-même un médecin, une sommité médicale. Sinon, on ne vous ouvre 
pas la porte. » (P7) 
                                                 
255
 Verbatim: « C’est très difficile d’avoir un business plan sur la partie télémédecine pure. » (P6) 
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To sum up, all three barriers seem to render the direct interaction between companies and 
doctors very difficult and also the initiation of medical/health collaborative research projects. 
Besides these barriers, we have found five types of “brokers” that exists between the medical 
and corporate world: (i) being in a medical incubator256, (ii) the collaboration on a previous 
project, (iii) through the contacts of a large company, (iv) through an event, or (v) through a 
university. As these interaction moments are also important in the finding ideas phase, we 
discuss it in the finding ideas section. At that point, we just underline that most of the time the 
contact between companies and hospitals seems to be established via a university and less via 
the policy-driven clusters. The hospital is in contact with a university and the university then 
contacts the companies. Hospitals seem not to contact companies directly257. This might also 
be explained by the fact that the AP-HP (a French hospital network), often has laboratories 
that are integrated in universities and thus it kind of seems naturally for the hospitals to 
contact their university partners first258. 
 
3.1.2.2 Industrial partners 
Besides the medical world, another world that seems to be very difficult to access for SMEs 
(including MEs and MFs) is the “industrial” world. The service sector companies, even 
though they have a lot of business ideas, do not find enough appropriate industrial partners to 
set up their projects. The FUI and thus the policy-driven clusters privilege subsidising and 
attributing a label to projects where an industrial company participates. Policy-driven clusters 
know that these are the projects that have the best chances to get financed by the FUI. As the 
performance of policy-driven clusters is evaluated regarding their transformation rate (ratio 
between labelled projects and financed projects) policy-driven clusters are particular vigilant 
on this point before labelling a project. However, this also means that good ideas might fall in 
the trap because an industrial is missing. This was for example the case for P5. P5 presented 
his project to a policy-driven cluster but was criticized for not having an industrial integrated 
                                                 
256
 Verbatim: « On a surtout deux collègues qui sont pratiquement le ¾ de leur temps [dans les locaux de 
l’incubateur] ce qui permet de recueillir des informations auprès des [médecins] mais aussi de mener à bien les 
expériences.» (P2) 
257
 Verbatims: « [L’université] a eu des infos de l’hôpital [nom de l’hôpital]. Ils se sont rencontrés, puis 
[l’université] a cherché des gens pour apporter une réponse. » (P5); « [L’Université] était sollicitée par des 
Médecins du CHU [...] pour essayer de monter un projet. » (P9); « [L’Hôpital] est en relation directe avec 
[l’Université]. [...] C’était le professeur [de l’Université] qui nous a présenté l’idée. » (P3); « [Quand j’ai 
travaillé] dans les locaux de l’école Polytechnique [à une époque antérieure] [...] c’est à ce moment là que des 
médecins sont venu me voir, pour voir ce qu’on faisait » (P10) 
258
 Verbatim: « AP-HP [...] [a] souvent des laboratoires mixtes où ils ont une partie clinique et une partie 
recherche. Donc assez naturellement, ils ont déjà des relations avec des universités. Ils sont déjà affiliés à une 
université » (P10) 
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in his project. P5 tried to find an industrial, but did not manage to do so and finally abandoned 
the project259. The next time P5 submitted a project he was vigilant to integrate an industrial 
right from the start and the project was immediately labelled: 
« Ça aide d’avoir un gros industriel derrière. Ça donne du poids. Il y a le côté ‘le projet’ 
(…) mais aussi les industriels qui sont derrière. [...] Pour le deuxième FUI, on a eu le 
label. Mais [nom de l’industriel] est derrière. On le sent. C’est l’intégrateur final. » (P5) 
Also P6 had a similar experience as P5. The policy-driven cluster first refused to label P6’s 
project260. As soon as P6 found an industrial partner, he resubmitted the project. The project 
was immediately labelled and financed. Having an industrial in the project consortium is a 
real boost and functions as a quality stamp in the eyes of the policy-driven cluster.  
 
The few existing industrial partners, particularly the large ones, are extremely solicited for 
project collaborations. The FUI subsidy requires that the projects have a strong business 
component (even though this is not always 100% clear for project leaders, cf. finding 
subsidies section). The first consequence is that industrials do not see any real use for 
participating in the policy-driven cluster events, as the companies approach them anyhow. 
They thus just wait for the ideas: 
« Disons que comme on est un industriel, on est plus demandé que ce qu’on peut répondre, 
donc c’est plutôt : ‘faire un choix parmi les propositions qu’on a, que à moi d’être proactif 
à monter des projets’ [...] On a plus de propositions que de la ressource qu’on peut mettre 
dedans, et à la fin il faut faire des choix. » (P1) 
« Indépendamment du projet lui même, [les industriels sont] extrêmement sollicités. Je 
m’en suis rendu compte parce que, dès qu’on a su qu’on était dans un projet avec [un 
industriel], je ne vous raconte pas le nombre d’entreprises qui sont venues frapper à la 
porte. A toutes les portes. » (P10) 
 
The over solicitation of the industrial sector has the dangerous consequence that the 
industrials get more and more saturated and withdraw from participating in any additional 
projects. They have the impression to finance projects that should actually be financed by the 
State:  
« [Cet industriel] est énormément sollicité pour ce genre de projet. De partout. [Donc, 
l’industriel] ne voit pas pourquoi, pour quelle raison, il répond plus à un appel à projet 
qu’à un autre. Il y en a tellement. Ca représente in fine des volumes d’investissement de 
plusieurs dizaines de millions pour eux. Donc [l’industriel] dit : ‘ Stop. On arrête tout. On 
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 Verbatim: « On a dit : « Si on s’arrête sur la capacité du réseau, on ne fera rien ». Ils ont dit : « Oui mais 
vous devrez avoir un grand intégrateur, un opérateur ». « Oui, on a essayé d’avoir [1er industriel] ou [2ème 
industriel]. Ils n’ont pas voulu. J’ai demandé à [un 3ème industriel] [mais il] n’était pas intéressé. » » (P5) 
260
 Verbatim: « Les industriels, là on cherche. On est en pleine recherche justement, d’essayer d’attirer un gros 
industriel dans notre projet. Je suis un peu en contact avec [industriel 1] et [industriel 2]. Je suis en train 
effectivement de les tenter, de les amener un peu sur notre projet. Pour voir comment on peut développer les 
choses industriellement. » (P6) 
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ne participe à aucun projet. Ce n’est pas à nous de financer la recherche pour l’Etat. ‘ » 
(P10) 
 
However, even if the SME has found a big industrial company for its project, the problems 
continue. From a legal point of view, the big industrials do not accept the pre-agreements that 
have to be signed under the FUI subsidies rule. They only accept their own contracts but the 
set-up of these contracts are generally complicated and take a considerable amount of time. 
Too long for the short time period of the project calls. SMEs have thus difficulties dealing 
with this legal rigidity of industrials: 
« Pour le FUI [avec le grand industriel] on a eu un gros souci. C’est qu’on a dû mettre un 
pré-accord de consortium mais on n’a pas pu en faire parce que les juristes [de grand 
industriel] ne veulent pas s’engager n’importe comment. [...] La difficulté, c’est que les 
grands groupes industriels ont une armada de juristes qui travaillent sur les contrats. Or 
nous, il faut qu’en trois mois, on ait pondu le truc. Et ça ne marche pas, ça ne marche pas. 
Les grands groupes ne veulent pas s’engager. Les juristes ont lu le pré-accord de 
consortium. Ils ont dit : « D’accord, ce que vous avez écrit ça n’engage à rien. En plus, ça 
ne sert à rien les pré-accords de consortium. Ca n’existe pas. Légalement, ça ne sert à rien. 
[...] De toute façon, si on met quelque chose en place ça sera [avec notre] contrat ». (P5) 
For the SMEs, this situation represents a big risk, but if they wish to work with an industrial 
and get a project subsidised, they have to take this risk.  
 
To sum up, as soon as an industrial partner pushes the project the project gets most of the 
time financed. This is related to the fact that the public authorities consider that the chances of 
viability (in economic terms: job creation, industrialisation) of a project are higher when a big 
industrial partner takes part in a project. However, on the other hand it seems quite difficult to 
first get in contact with big industrials, and second to get collaborative projects going. The 
internal structure of industrials (importance of contracts) does not allow the industrials to 
engage easily with other partners.  
 
3.1.3 The difficulty to find project partners situated in the same region 
The government decided to attribute an R&D zone to every policy-driven cluster. Being 
situated in a certain R&D zone brings advantages regarding FUI subsidies. Let’s look at our 
data to understand how the collaborative research projects deal with this rule: 
- In the majority of our cases, the partners of the observed collaborative research 
projects are not concentrated in one and the same region. From 19 observed projects, 
only 4 consortiums have all partners within the same French region, while 15 
consortiums have partners in at least two different French regions. 
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- In case the SMEs were situated in different regions, the project leaders submitted their 
projects for labelling to several policy-driven clusters. This means also to policy-
driven clusters that are maybe not implemented in the territory of the project leader. 
- This is done261 so that all SMEs that participate in the consortium will be eligible to 
the full amount of subsidies. (45 % of subsidies if the SME is in a R&D zone of a 
cluster that has labelled the project, 30% otherwise) 
However, this complicated quest to assure the full subsidies amount for all project partners is 
heavily criticised by the project leaders. They clearly distinguish between the advantages of 
being occasionally close to each other and the administrative burden of the policy-driven 
cluster R&D zone rule. 
 
3.1.3.1 Being implemented in the same region is not important 
As already explained, the majority project leaders are all extremely integrated in the 
collaborative research realm, on a national as well as on an international level. For these 
companies, collaborating over long distances is in itself no problem. This is nearly the 
unanimous opinion of all actors we have interviewed. Companies seem to look for the best 
partners and it is rather incomprehensible for them to understand why they should only chose 
local actors for their collaborative research projects: 
« Par exemple, [un de nos partenaires] est dans la région de Montpellier. On avait besoin 
de leur compétence. Ils sont uniques en France à apporter ça. Ils sont presque uniques au 
monde, donc on a été les chercher là où ils étaient, il n’y a pas de problème. Pour eux, 
c’est un petit handicap parce que ça les finance à 30% au lieu de 45%, en tant que PME. » 
(P7) 
« Non, [la proximité géographique] n’a pas d’importance. Pour une société comme [nous], 
non. On est à l’international, la plus grande partie de notre chiffre, on le fait à 
l’international. On fait peu de choses en France. A peine la moitié de notre chiffre d’affaire 
en Europe. Donc la distance n’a pas réellement une importance. Elle a un intérêt politique. 
De structuration de l’industrie mais pour une société comme [nous], ça n’a pas 
d’importance. » (P3) 
 
For the project leaders, focusing only on the regional territory is foremost a political reason. 
The FUI, once again, tends to discourage some project leaders to participate in policy-driven 
clusters. Additionally to the complicated institutional set up (labelling, financing) and the 
ambiguous objectives, also the regional constraints seem to have an impact on project leaders’ 
perception of policy-driven clusters:  
« Le problème est qu’on soumet un projet dans un cadre qui est très régional. [...] J’ai 
essayé de jouer le jeu, de comprendre comment fonctionne le FUI, de savoir si c’était un 
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 We will see that there are also plenty of “political” reasons (according to the cluster actors) to submit a 
project to several cluster organisations. 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 291
bon outil ou pas, mais sur le fond, ce n’est pas terrible parce que vous êtes obligé d’avoir 
un maximum de partenaire régionaux, ce n’est pas toujours là où vous avez les meilleurs 
partenaires » (P10) 
« Après, sur la géographie, j’ai un peu du mal aussi. C’est de dire : ‘sur un projet, il faut 
que les partenaires soient tous dans la même zone géographique’. On envisageait un co-
label avec un autre pôle, mais déjà, au sein d’un pôle, c’est politique [pour faire labéliser 
son projet] (…) Après, entre pôles, ça l’est encore plus. » (P1) 
« Si je veux que [notre partenaire] soit financé, il faut qu’on trouve un pôle. Ensuite, pour 
[un autre partenaire], il nous faut un autre pôle local, et après il faut un pôle... Alors la 
notion de « territoire » dans les pôles, moi c’est un truc que je n’ai jamais compris. »(P8) 
 
Some project leaders, nevertheless motivated to get financed by the FUI, try to circumvent the 
rules and to get as many labels as possible. However, this means a higher administrative 
effort for the companies themselves but also for the policy-driven clusters. Following 
example illustrates nicely the administrative burden to get one single project labelled that has 
project partners spread out over several regions. Every policy-driven cluster has specific rules 
and specific standards. The project leader needs to reformulate and adapt its project 
application to the standards of each policy-driven cluster he needs a label from. Additionally, 
he has to travel throughout France to present the projects in the different policy-driven 
clusters:  
« Donc avec Systematic, j’ai eu un entretien téléphonique. Ils me demandent d’envoyer une 
présentation. J’envoie la présentation que j’avais faite pour l’ANR [soumission précédente 
qui n’était pas acceptée]. « Ah non monsieur, ça ne va pas, vous n’êtes pas au format de 
Systematic ». Je mets au format. Le projet se fait blackboulé par Systematic. Je dis : « Ok, 
on n’est pas labellisé ». Là je vais voir Cap Digital, recommandé par [un partenaire]. Je 
vais les voir [...] Ils me disent : « Très bien. Il faut que vous me remettiez le dossier dans 15 
jours. » Je dis : « Oui mais le dépôt est seulement dans... » « Ah oui, mais nous il faut 
qu’on ait le dossier dès qu’on le labelise ». Là, on a 15 jours. Il faut qu’on re-rédige. OK. 
Donc eux, ils veulent un dossier. On travaille dans la PME pour faire le dossier. Après, 
Minealogic. Minealogic veut un dossier mais qui est différent au niveau du format des 
autres, parce qu’eux, ils veulent la valorisation en premier, lalala...etc. Donc on re-rédige 
un truc. Images et Réseaux, alors eux, c’était facile parce que comme on leur a présenté le 
dossier pour l’ANR, c’était le même format. [...] Donc vous voyez le boulot qui est derrière. 
Et ça, eux, ils ne se rendent pas compte. Eux, ils disent : ‘mais oui c’est normal’. Alors 
après, il y a certains pôles où il faut passer des oraux. Et donc Minealogic voulait me faire 
passer un oral à Grenoble. J’ai dit : « Mais vous n’êtes pas bien. Je suis déjà allé une fois 
à Systematic. Je suis allé les rencontrer. Je suis allé à Cap Digital à Paris. Je suis allé à 
Images et Réseaux. Deux oraux Images et Réseaux. Un premier en pré-comité scientifique, 
un deuxième en comité scientifique la semaine dernière. Voilà. « Ca, c’est la pratique. » 
(Project P8d, financed by FUI) 
 
The project leaders that are new to the collaborative research realm mentioned that choosing 
actors from the same region is important for them but out of political reasons, in order to get 
the project financed, and not out of practical reasons. The verbatims show that they want to 
get accepted in this new community and thus comply with the game: 
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« Je choisis national, de préférence régional, parce que les financeurs aiment bien 
concentrer les efforts financiers. Il est quand même bien vu que ça ne soit pas dans les 
quatre coins de la France. [...] Pour donner d’avantage de chance au projet, il faut quand 
même mieux rester territorial. [...] Mais bien sûr, ça n’empêche pas de la chercher. Si la 
spécialité n’est pas présente sur le territoire, de la chercher ailleurs. » (P7) 
 
3.1.3.2 Being occasionally close is important 
However, being occasionally close to each other is important for the project leaders because 
they have the impression that they cannot exchange all types of information over the phone. 
This closeness is particularly important during the idea finding phase, but also during the 
project collaboration phase. Project leaders, though they use new communication technologies 
to talk with each other, seem to privilege physical meetings to discuss important topics. They 
need to see each other because information is better shared during face-to-face meetings: 
« Pour nous, le face-à-face est indispensable quasiment au départ. La communication par 
téléphone est très bien pour juste un premier contact. En plus, je pense que pour des gens 
qui sont dans le médical, c’est extrêmement important. Ils sont beaucoup plus sensibles aux 
aspects humains que nous on pourrait l’être. » (P2) 
« C’est plus simple de se voir, de physiquement se voir, de discuter ensemble, que de tout 
faire au téléphone. Au téléphone, on arrive à faire beaucoup de choses, mais quelque fois, 
voir des gens physiquement, c’est mieux. » (P5) 
« On a une réunion là, en décembre. On va essayer de faire venir le plus de monde 
possible. C’est important parce qu’il y a des choses qui se disent plus facilement ou qui 
émergent plus facilement autour des documents. » (P6) 
 
Additionally, project leaders point out that new communication technologies still do not work 
properly and they are too small to invest in well-equipped videoconference rooms: 
« On fait des réunions sur Skype ou sur Google, mais les liaisons sont quand même 
vraiment très pauvres. Il y a souvent des échos ou des trucs comme ça. Donc pour la 
compréhension, pour partager des documents etc., on sent que la technologie existe, la 
technologie est là, mais les canaux de circulation ne sont pas encore assez gros pour qu’on 
puisse vraiment faire des choses propres. Et nous, on n’est pas assez gros pour faire 
réellement une salle de téléconférence. » (P6) 
« Il faut les moyens, il faut être équipé [avec une salle de vidéoconférence], tout le monde 
ne l’est pas. » (P5) 
 
We have to keep in mind that project leaders are extremely mobile. If they need to go to 
another region or country for a collaborative research project meeting or for an event, they go. 
Their position in the company allows them to do this. However, locations well connected to 
other cities are privileged:  
« Alors, ce qui est sûr, c’est que dans un projet, le fait d’avoir des acteurs qui ne sont pas 
très loin, c’est important. C’est clair. Là, en ce moment, j’ai des projets avec Clermont-
Ferrand, les raisons pour lesquelles je freine, c’est parce que c’est trop loin. On pourra 
raconter ce qu’on veut, les visioconférences, etc. mais quand c’est près, à une heure 
comme Nantes ou deux heures comme Paris, c’est quand même franchement 
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pratique. [...] Mais par exemple pour [un autre projet], on avait mis une entreprise qui est 
à Montpellier. On fait attention, mais ce n’est pas déterminant. » (P8) 
The cluster actor is based in Rennes so coming to Nantes or Paris with the train is no problem. 
However going from Rennes to Clermont-Ferrand lasts approximately 7 hours262 and going 
from Rennes to Montpellier lasts approximately 6 hours and 30 minutes263. However, this is a 
public infrastructure problem of certain cities because a company based in Paris would 
probably not say the same. For a company based in Paris going to Clermont-Ferrand or 
Montpellier only lasts approximately 3 hours 30 minutes because direct train connections 
exist. So being at a geographical well-connected hub opens a lot of collaboration and event 
participation opportunities. For project leaders, being in a well-connected hub is more 
important than collaborating with local actors. 
 
3.2 HCPR’s difficult role in the finding partners phase 
The role of HCPR and other policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region is complex. First of all 
they have to deal with the fact that project leaders get more and more integrated in the 
collaborative research realm, and thus participate less and less in the proposed events. On the 
other hand, they seem to struggle themselves to attract key actors such as medical or industrial 
partners. Finally, policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region are intensively competing with 
other support structures and thus tend to be put in competition to each other and are 
sometimes reduced to the FUI.  
 
3.2.1 Dealing with decreasing participants at events 
In the beginning of this section we saw that project leaders that are integrated in the research 
community do not necessarily participate at events, only when they are new, need a special 
partner (for example medical partner) or want to maintain relations. The data we collected on 
the ICT & Health initiative (jointly organised by Systematic, Cap Digital and HCPR) show a 
similar result but from the policy-driven cluster perspective. The cluster managers try to 
constantly change the format of their events to maintain a certain attendance rate. This is a 
real challenge for policy-driven clusters, as one of their performance indicators is the number 
of participants in their events.  
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 approximate 7 hours between Rennes and Clermont-Ferrand (4 hours 23 minutes from Rennes to Lyon, 10 
minutes waiting time, 2 hours 25 minutes from Lyon to Clermont-Ferrand) 
263
 approximate 6 hours 30 minutes between Rennes and Montpellier (2 hours 12 minutes from Rennes to Paris, 
52 minutes waiting time, 3 hours 27 minutes from Paris to Montpellier) 
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As already explained, every inter-cluster ICT & Health project call starts with an event 
composed out of a plenary session and a project set-up workshop. The ICT & Health events 
took place in engineering universities (2 events), in government agencies (2 events), on the 
site of an industrial (1 event), or in a medical location (1 event) (see Table 42). We will not 
discuss once again how a typical plenary and project set-up workshop looks like (for an 
explanation see Chapter 7 / Section 2.3.1) but focus directly on the main problem: the 
diminishing participant rate.  
 
Table 42: ICT & Health inter-cluster plenary sessions and project set-up workshops 
 Date Location Type of location 
# of 
participants  
# of workshop 
presentations 
Authorized 
workshop 
presentations 
#1 09/2010 (one day) EFREI 
Engineering 
University 200 40 
Projects & 
Competencies 
#2 02/2011 (one day) Orange Labs Industrial 100 12 Projects 
#3 06/2011 (half day) 
Agence de 
Développement 
du Val-de-Marne 
Government 
Agency 100 8 Projects 
#4 01/2012 (half day) ENSIIE 
Engineering 
University n.a. n.a. 
Projects & 
Competencies 
#5 09/2012 (one day) 
Institut du 
Cerveau et de la 
Moelle épinière 
(ICM) à l’Hôpital 
de la Pitié 
Salpêtrière 
Research 
Institute of a 
Hospital 
n.a. n.a. 
Projects & 
Competencies 
& Needs 
#6 01/2013 (half day) 
Hémicycle du 
Conseil régional 
d’Ile-de France 
Government 
Agency n.a. n.a. 
Projects & 
Competencies 
& Needs 
 
In order to deal with the diminishing participant rate, policy-driven cluster managers have to 
constantly “innovate” and propose new “formulas” to attract companies situated in the Paris 
Region. If we look at the ICT & Health events, we can see that they were not organised in the 
same manner since the beginning (see Table 42). The first two events lasted the whole day 
(morning and afternoon). However, from the third event onwards the ICT & Health cluster 
representatives decided to reduce the events to half a day (besides #5). 
 
After our discussion on how project leaders behave once they are integrated in the 
collaborative research community, it is no surprise to see that the ICT & Health events are 
highly frequented in the beginning but then the participation rate drops drastically. In the 
beginning the ICT & Health community was still very “young” and did not know each other. 
Therefore, a lot of cluster members participated and presented their projects or their 
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competences. However, from the second event onwards the number of participants and 
presentations dropped substantially (200 participants in first event, only 100 participants in 
second event; 40 presentations in first event, only 12 presentations in second event). Due to 
the success of the first event, the policy-driven cluster representatives did not really anticipate 
this drop and also planned a one-day event for the second edition. However, from the second 
event onwards they knew that the events became “less interesting”:  
« Les gens commencent à s’essouffler. [...] Au premier workshop à Pasteur, il y avait 
beaucoup de monde, c’était quelque chose nouveau. Ca excitait beaucoup les gens et au fur 
et à mesure on se rendu compte qu’il y avait moins de gens intéressés. C’est la formule qui 
est peut-être moins adhérente, excitante. Parce que c’est moins nouveau. Les gens se 
lâchent. Il faut peut-être trouver une autre formule. (Octobre 2011) 
The natural reaction was to reduce the #3 event to half a day.  
 
Additionally, between session #1 and session #4, cluster members had only the choice 
between two different types of presentation during the workshop. First, cluster members were 
able to present projects that they wished to submit to the next project call264. In these projects 
a certain competence was still missing and so the presentation served to find an additional 
project partner with a certain competence. However, the idea generation phase to the project 
was already over. Second, cluster actors were also able to present their competences (without 
an associated project). This is particularly useful in case a certain company is not known in a 
community but loses its interest as soon as the community knows each other. From the event 
two onwards, the workshop presentations only concentrated on projects and no longer on 
competences. However, in the fourth event the ICT & Health representatives re-introduced 
the competencies presentations. 
 
The real change took place in the 5th event. Until the edition #5, the events took place in 
engineering schools, government agencies or on the site of an industrial with limited 
participation of medical professionals. However, the fifth event took place in a research 
institute situated in a hospital. Besides the location, three other elements changed as well: (i) 
the length of the event, (ii) the content of the event, and (iii) another type of presentation was 
added to the workshop. First of all the event was again prolonged to cover a whole day 
instead of half a day. The reason for this is the content of the event. A new element was 
introduced in order to attract again more cluster actors. The morning of the Session #5 was in 
the same format as the previous editions, but the afternoon was organised around three 
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 for example FUI or FEDER 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 296 
workshops that were animated by doctors and academics. Finally, the third change that took 
place was the introduction of a “need” presentation that allowed for example medical or 
association representatives to express their needs as well. This need category was also 
authorized in the #6 session, but nobody proposed any needs265. 
 
To sum up, two points seem important to keep in mind. First, the cluster representatives have 
not found the ideal formula for their cluster events. They are confronted with the fact that the 
participation rate, particularly after the first event, drops substantially. This is consistent with 
our data collected from the project leaders. In order to keep the event going and to continue to 
attract participants, they have to constantly introduce new elements. 
 
3.2.2 Struggling to integrate medical and industrial partners in events 
One major difficulty for project leaders is to find medical and industrial partners for their 
collaborative research projects. However, medical and industrial partners are quite absent 
from ICT & Health events. Integrating these actors is a big challenge also for policy-driven 
cluster managers.  
 
The problem that clinical representatives and industrials are not participating in the ICT & 
Health events was already visible during the preparation workshops that took place to prepare 
the ICT & Health research roadmap266. Both key actors were highly absent in the four 
different working groups: 
- For example in the workshop focusing on “digital imaging”, key actors (like clinical 
representatives and big industrial groups) who are considered particularly important in 
order to advance on the topic, were absent. Even though the participants of this 
workshop underlined this problem267 the industrials and clinical staff were also absent 
during the second workshop. One the one hand, this was a real problem for the 
companies because they did not know the needs and visions of the medical world is 
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 We do not know if there is a link, but our hypothesis is that their exists a link between the venue of location 
(outside or inside the medical realm) and the absence or presence of the need category. 
266
 We did not participate in these workshops between February and April 2010, but HCPR allowed us to access 
the minutes of the first two workshops of all four groups (in total eight minutes). An external consulting firm 
animated all workshops and it was also in the office building of this external-consulting firm that all the 
workshops took place.  
267
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « Pour la définition de la feuille de route en imagerie numérique, il 
sera indispensable d’inclure dans le groupe : (i) des représentants du monde Clinique qui apporteront la vision 
des besoins et leurs évolutions attendues, et qui seront aussi les testeurs et utilisateurs des futures solutions 
innovantes mises au point, (ii) des grands industriels (intégrateurs technologiques, imagerie biomédicale, 
industriels pharmaceutiques). » 
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meant to use the new devices in the future. This pushed the participating actors to 
think about alternatives. In order to compensate the fact that the key actors were not 
participating, they proposed to finance their new solutions by themselves and to 
present them in a second step to the industrials. They also proposed that they will 
continue working on project ideas for the ICT & Health initiative and that they will 
submit them for validation to clinical representatives in a second step268.  
- Also the “medical devices” workshops were too one sided regarding their participants. 
The majority of participants were technicians of the sector. However, this was a 
problem for this workgroup as the health professionals that should use these devices 
were absent269 and the medical staff who was meant to talk about their needs was 
absent as well270. Again, also for this workgroup, the situation did not improve during 
the second workshop. Also during the second workshop no medical practitioners were 
participating in the workshop, only SMEs and academics. The conclusion of this 
workshop was that they would stay within their community (SMEs, institutional and 
academics) in order to develop new break-through innovations and to generate 
business afterwards.271 
- The workshop focusing on “E-health and Telemedicine” was the biggest workshop 
group. The majority of the persons participating in the first workshop were industrials 
of the ICT sector, some academics and institutional representatives as for example 
from the Ministry of Health or the regional chamber of commerce. However, neither a 
representative of HCPR nor medical practitioners were present in the workshop. This 
lead to the same conclusion as for the medical devices axe, namely that the ones that 
should use the new innovations were absent272. The absence of the medical staff posed 
again a real problem for this workshop. The participants clearly underlined that if one 
                                                 
268
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « Question sur la représentativité du groupe liée à l’absence de grands 
comptes, à une exception près, et de représentants du monde médical : l’hypothèse de travail du groupe sera de 
rechercher des solutions et de les financer (nouvelle génération de stratégies et produits) pour, dans un second 
temps, approcher les grands comptes le cas échéant. La présence de professionnels de santé ne permettra pas 
nécessairement d’atteindre l’objectif final du groupe de travail, à savoir la définition d’un ou plusieurs projets 
structurants pour cet axe, mais sera recherchée pour valider des concepts acceptables par les professionnels de 
la santé. » 
269
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « l’axe est par définition multidisciplinaire et les usages sont portés 
par des groupes non représentés (professionnels de santé...) » 
270
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « En effet il est ressorti un fort besoin d’identification des besoins par 
des acteurs non présents mais en même temps la nécessité d’anticiper le futur et d’être imaginatif  Création du 
besoin, identification des innovations de rupture. » 
271
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « L’hypothèse de travail du groupe sera de rechercher entre PME, 
institutionnels et chercheurs des innovations de rupture en vue de générer et de favoriser des projets business. » 
272
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « l’axe est par définition multidisciplinaire et les usages sont portés 
par des groupes non représentés (professionnels de santé...). » 
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wishes to innovate in certain domains, medical staff has to be present273. During the 
second workshop a representative of HealthCluster Paris Region and from a hospital 
participated in the meeting, and presented their respective positions on the topic. Even 
though HealthCluster did not participate in the first workshop organised under the e-
health and telemedicine axe, HealthCluster underlined that e-health is a priority274 for 
HealthCluster. Additionally the hospital, represented by a doctor, presented the 
hospitals own telemedicine projects.  
- Finally, in the workshop focusing on “knowledge management, modelling and 
simulation” the majority of the participants were from the Biology and Health sector 
(particularly IT oriented), the others were from the ICT sector. However, two 
important key players were missing: academics and industrials. In order for the IT 
specialist to be useful they would have needed the input from the academics and 
industrials working from a scientific point of view on these research domains275.  
 
In the beginning of the ICT & Health initiative it was already very visible that a big challenge 
for the policy-driven clusters is to integrate the medical and industrial key-players. This also 
continued when the official project set up events started. The representative of one policy-
driven cluster told us that during the #1 ICT & Health event, in September 2010, clinical 
representatives were particularly absent as well. However, the policy-driven clusters tried to 
improve this situation for the #2 event that took place in February 2011. They decided to 
invite clinicians to talk about their needs:  
« Il y avait beaucoup qui ont dit qu’il n’y avait pas assez de cliniciens. Des gens qui 
pouvaient dire on a besoin de ça. Donc, [pour la deuxième plénière] on va faire venir des 
gens de la clinique qui vont nous dire : « Voilà, on est médecin, on est chef de laboratoire 
ou chef d’un hôpital, on aura besoin de ça pour avancer. » On a un manque, est-ce que 
vous pouvez répondre à ce manque? [...] On va essayer de nous améliorer pour répondre à 
cette attente cette fois-ci. Après il y aura d’autres choses, d’autres questions, on va essayer 
de répondre chaque fois, à ce que veulent les gens. On est aussi au service des gens [...] 
c’est à eux de nous donner leurs envies, leurs idées, on essaye d’y répondre au maximum. » 
(January, 2011) 
                                                 
273
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « Si on souhaite impliquer les opérationnels il manque alors des 
représentants du corps médical, de l’assistance, de la prévoyance, de l’administration (conseil généraux, 
mairies, gouvernement) et des services à la personne. Selon certains, si on veut innover, la présence des 
représentants du corps médical sur certains projets est requise.» 
274
 HCPR document, internal minutes: particularly « informations et systèmes d’informations centrés sur le 
patient pour favoriser la médecine translationnelle, c'est-à- dire notamment les échanges de données patient 
entre la clinique et la recherche. » 
275
 HCPR document, internal minutes: « Si la validation des hypothèses formulées à l’aide des modèles fait 
partie du périmètre de notre action alors il faudra passer de la biologie « sèche » à la biologie « humide », mais 
dans ce cas se pose la représentativité des contributeurs présents (industriels ou académiques).» 
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According to the information of one of the policy-driven cluster representatives276 (in January 
2011) the participants in the ICT & Health events were approximately 80% from the ICT 
domain and 20% from the health domain.  
 
The discussion just confirmed what we already saw in our data in the finding partners section: 
industrials and medical partners do not easily participate in events organised by policy-driven 
clusters. However, one interesting observation is that in the event #5 more clinical 
representatives took place. The event #5 was also the only event situated in a medical location 
(see Table 42). As doctors are highly occupied, moving the location to a research institute of a 
hospital might have helped in the endeavour of attracting medical partners.  
 
To sum up, we have already seen that one of the barriers between doctors and companies is 
the fact that doctors are highly occupied and more place-bound in their hospitals than the 
business driven project leaders. Additional hospitals have a long tradition in turning towards 
universities and maybe less in turning towards the corporate world. HCPR somehow struggles 
to break out of this situation and to connect the doctors with the business driven project 
leaders situated in the Paris Region; to connect the “place bound electrons” with the “free 
electrons”. None of the new services developed by HCPR seems to address this structural 
problem.  
 
3.2.3 Competing with other regional support structures 
At this point we wish to recall that our fieldwork is situated in the Paris Region. The Paris 
Region is the economic “headquarter” of France and thus the Region proposes a high variety 
of organised events, a high variety of local associations and of course all ministries are 
implemented in this Region. Therefore our results might be only representative for Regions 
that have a similar regional density. We already saw that the main driver of the project leaders 
is “business”. Therefore, the project leaders have the tendency to participate in a lot of 
different events to increase their possibilities to generate new businesses for their company. 
Their objective is to create a buzz around them in order to become “known” in the 
community. For this, they use a multitude of different services:  
« Il y a une redondance. Il y a tout un ensemble d’outils [...] alors pour les gens comme 
moi, c’est d’une richesse énorme. Parce que moi j’en profite à 100%. [...Pour me 
retrouver...] j’ai cartographié. [...] Je me suis dit : « Ah lui il fait quoi ? Il appartient à 
                                                 
276
 Every cluster organisation appointed one ICT & Health representative among their operational teams; we 
interviewed all three representatives in 2010 and the HCPR representative once again in 2011. 
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qui ? » C’est comme ça que [dans ma région] j’ai compté 66 organismes. [...] En gros il y 
a les outils des régions et il y a les outils de l’Etat [...] donc nous on joue avec tout le 
monde. » (P8) 
« Moi si je veux exister, il faut que je sois connu. Il faut que tout le monde sache que 
j’existe. Que je fasse du bruit. [...] Il n’y a pas photo. Il faut faire cet effort pour se faire 
connaître. » (P5) 
« On regarde un peu ce qui se passe dans les différents éléments qui sont organisés dans le 
Biotech. Même dans l’électronique quand on a besoin d’un partenaire électronique, on 
regarde qui intervient, qui participe… » (P2) 
 
For example somebody who is interested in ICT & Health had a vaste choice of events end of 
Jannuary beginning of February 2011 in the Paris Region: on the 1st of Feburary the Ministry 
of the Economy, Finance and Industry invited to a ICT & Health event, on the 4th of February 
Cap Digital, Systematic and HCPR invited to a ICT & Health event, and on the the 8th and 9th 
of February FormaticSanté and Tlécom ParisTech invited to a Tic & Health event. For the 
regional actors this choice is great, however organisations like policy-driven clusters who are 
evaluated according to their participation rate, this vaste choice constitutes also a threat and 
the operational team members that we interviewed were not very happy that so many parallel 
events take place at the same time as they organise an ICT & Health event.  
 
Hereinafter, we will now give a non-exhaustive list of the different “bricks” that our 
interviewed cluster actors use and considered important to mention during the interviews. The 
following list is meant to reposition the Parisian policy-driven clusters in a broader context: 
- French Ministries. Besides participating in the information events of the cluster 
organisations the project leaders also heavily participate in the events organised 
directly by the ministries.277 
- Other French regional or national platforms. Besides the information sessions 
organised by the ministries, project leaders also participate in a lot of other regional or 
national platforms (for example CNR santé, OSEO, ANR, CRITT, ARI, etc.)278. All 
                                                 
277
 Verbatims: « Là ce matin j’étais au ministère de l’industrie pour, en fait, essayer de voir qui fait quoi. 
Quelles sont les tendances etc. » (P8); « Il y a quelque chose qui était organisé la semaine dernière par le 
ministère de la santé. » (P6); « Il y a la liste de diffusion de Patrick Schouller : c’est un titulaire qui est au 
ministère des finances. En fait, c’est un service du ministère des finances. Grosso modo, ils aident les 
entreprises. » (P1) 
278
 Verbatims: « Plutôt d’utiliser TIC & Santé des pôles, j’utilise beaucoup le CNR santé. [...] C’est un organe 
d’Etat. [Le directeur] est un ancien chef d’entreprise. Il a une mission de l’Etat de faire émerger des entreprises 
dans le domaine du médicale en France. » (P8); « Il y a OSEO qui fait souvent des meetings. [...] On y va. Voilà 
c’est intéressant. [...] OSEO, j’essaie d’y aller une fois par an. » (P5); « Il y a des journées ANR. On va à des 
journées ANR pour voir un petit peu les projets passés. On discute avec des gens et donc s’il y a des sujets 
d’intérêt commun on garde des cartes de visite et on les contacte plus tard. Là c’est plus informel dans ces 
journées. C’est une fois par an. [...] Les gens discutent entre eux. » (P3); « Je sais quand le CRITT Santé 
Bretagne fait un truc. » (P8); « Le colloque ingénierie numérique qui était à l’initiative du Conseil Economique, 
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these public institutions organise events that help project leaders to access ideas, 
partners and subsidies.  
- European Union workshops and networks. The cluster actors also participate in 
European union workshops or platforms: for example Eureka workshops or the COST 
network279. The European Union initiatives are often perceived as very effective to 
bring people together around one topic because they allow a very good mix between 
coffee breaks and poster sessions and little presentations. A lot of time is allocated to 
exchange: 
« Récemment, j’étais à un workshop [Eureka] sur les projets européens en Irlande. J’ai 
trouvé que l’organisation avait vraiment facilité la mise en relation. [...] Ca s’est passé sur 
deux jours. Avec une première journée extrêmement officielle, des intervenants de haut 
niveau etc., de niveau décisionnel assez élevé. Et le soir il y avait un dîner avec des tables 
rondes de 8 personnes. Il y avait très peu de présentations mais énormément de coffee 
breaks avec des présentations de posters. C’était très interactif. En fait, d’avoir plutôt des 
démonstrations, des posters, des pauses cafés assez longues, un dîner....c’est comme ça que 
se créent des liens. Et les gens discutent. J’ai rencontré des gens que je n’ai jamais pu 
rencontrer ailleurs.» (P2) 
- Specialised trade fairs. Specialised trade fairs and their associated associations are 
another important dispositive for the project leaders280. Specialised trade fairs have the 
advantage that all important key players (be it industrials or academics) participate in 
these events, something a policy-driven cluster might maybe never be able to do. 
These specialised trade fairs are the annual meetings of a certain sector or technology. 
During these events a lot of discussions are taking place and new projects are created:  
« Il y a des salons dans mon métier. Il y a [salon 1] et il y a aussi [salon 2]. [Derrière le 
salon 2 il y a une association] dont on fait partie. Ces événements sont des moments dans 
l’année où on peut se rencontrer et on mélange des industriels et des académiques. Donc 
c’est là où c’est important de faire connaissance. C’est là où on tisse des liens. On vient 
discuter et là on tisse des liens et à partir de là, quand on a tissé des liens, c’est plus facile 
de rencontrer des gens. Et d’essayer de proposer des projets. [...] Vous pouvez présenter 
vos travaux de recherche. On présente nos enterprises, nos projets. [...] Ce sont de grandes 
assemblées générales. [...] Tout le monde est là. Tout le monde du marché de la 
                                                                                                                                                        
Social et Environnemental. Il y a des grands colloques comme ça. C’est toujours intéressant d’aller les voir, 
d’aller discuter avec eux. [...] Il y a toutes les grandes sociétés qui viennent, qui présentent. Il faut toujours 
essayer de venir là pour voir des gens. » (P5); « Il y a [...] la ARI, les agences régionales de l’innovation. » (P8) 
279
 Verbatim: « Je travaille dans 2 projets COST. [...] En fait ces projets COST européens visent à développer 
des réseaux. [...] Grosso modo le COST finance des réunions entre les spécialistes d’un secteur pour proposer 
des pistes innovantes de recherche collaborative et de développement. [...] Pour participer au groupe de travail, 
il faut faire valoir ses compétences et sa légitimité. Ca doit être validé d’abord à l’échelle française. Il faut que 
vous fassiez la preuve que vous pouvez représenter la France parce que vous représentez un pays pour un 
domaine et vous avez droit à deux représentants par domaine. [...] c’est un mécanisme de réseautage qui n’est 
pas neutre. [...] Ca permet de développer un réseau. [...] C’est des gens d’une spécialité. Les pôles, c’est 
beaucoup plus large. Il n’y a pas de réunion technique. [...] Par exemple une de chose qui va résulter de COST : 
On va écrire un bouquin ensemble sur la [type de télémédecine] en disant voilà ce qu’elle est aujourd’hui. Voilà 
l’avenir. » (P10) 
280
 Verbatim: « Après c’est des relations qui se font durant des salons [plutôt des salons santé]. Moi j’ai 
rencontré, il y a pas si longtemps que ça, des gens sur un salon ici. Ils sont venus du Canada. [...] On va 
commencer à créer des choses. » (P6) 
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[technologie] est là. Donc les académiques, les industriels, donc on se rencontre tous. On 
se juge, on voit ce qui est fait. Mais c’est à ce moment là qu’on peut discuter : « Ah en fait 
on pourra faire ci, on pourra faire ça. », « Tiens je fais ci, je fais ça. », « D’accord. », « Ah 
bon tu sais faire ça ? » C’est là où on se connaît, où on crée des liens. [...] C’est différent 
[des pôles]. (P5) 
- Conferences. Project leaders attend several types of conferences organised by 
different platforms (for example “Usine nouvelle”) or directly by doctors.281 
- Associations. Project leaders are members of policy-driven clusters but also of many 
other types of organisations and specialised associations (for example: telemedical 
society, Opticsvalley, etc.282). 
 
- Research networks. Another important element is the maintenance of a close 
relationship with the research sector. Having a close relationship with laboratories and 
universities opens doors and generates a lot of ideas. Project leaders invest time and 
effort to get in contact and maintain links with universities283.  
- Alumni networks. Project leaders use alumni networks to particularly access the large 
companies284. 
- “Project set up” days. Finally, project set up events that are organised by different 
kinds of institutions (policy-driven clusters, FP7 project calls) are also important 
venues to find partners. However, they are perceived as less “intimate” and more 
“formal”285 than other types of workshops. During these project set-up days, content is 
less discussed. During this set up days one is particularly interested in finding a 
missing partner. It is like Meetic: « Ces évènements [pôles] c’est « meetic.com ». Il y a 
                                                 
281
 Verbatim: « Il y a d’autres colloques qui sont fait par Usine nouvelle. » (P5); « Je vais à une conférence des 
médecins [pour rencontrer des médecins]. » (P8) 
282
 Verbatims: « Il y avait la société de la télémédecine [nom] qui fait des choses » (P6); « Il y a des groupes de 
contacts qui font suivre les événements intéressants. Notamment, il y a un groupe, c’est l’Association des 
Réservistes du Chiffre et de la Sécurité de l'Information. Là, sur toutes les thématiques sécurité - télécom, il y a 
pas mal des choses. » (P1) 
283
 Verbatim: « Je passe 150 jours de l’année à être dans les labos. » (P8); « C’est énormément la recherche 
qui lead des choses. Sur la recherche, [nom d’un partenaire très proche] fait des programmes de recherche 
communs avec McGill. C’est surtout travers ça qu’on monte des choses. [...] La recherche ouvre vraiment 
énormément de chose. La recherche et la recherche appliquée. » (P6) 
284
 Verbatim: « Je connais forcement des gens à cause de mon appartenance, d’ancien de Telecom. On se revoit 
souvent. Il y a un club des entrepreneurs de Telecom dans le quel je fais partie. Je rencontre des gens là-dedans. 
[...] On se croise souvent. [...] Beaucoup sont chez Orange, SFR... assez peu chez Bouygues. » (P6)  
285
 Verbatim: « Il y a des choses plus formelles. Les organisateurs présentent les appels d’offre. Il y a une partie 
de ces journées qui est réservée, soit pour des propositions, soit pour présenter l’expertise des candidats pour 
cibler une participation à une proposition. [...] Par exemple FP7 avec les Info Days [ou TIC & Santé]. Les 
clusters Eureka font pareils une fois par an, ils ont des journées montage. [...] Eureka consacre une demi 
journée à une journée pour laisser le temps aux proposants et candidats de participer, de constituer leur 
consortium et d’ébaucher leur proposition. [...] Il y a une fiche projet, un résumé qui est présenté, qui est 
maintenu en ligne pendant un certain temps. Le temps que le consortium puisse se compléter. Puis il y a des 
dates pour les remises des propositions. Et en général c’est le coordinateur du projet qui anime la rédaction. » 
(P3) 
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certains qui proposent. Je propose ça. Et il y a d’autres qui cherchent. Donc voilà, 
c’est tout. (P9). 
 
Project leaders are extremely mobile and participate in a lot of different events. All of these 
events are in a certain manner the “competitors” of the policy-driven clusters. For most of the 
SMEs this high integration in a lot of different events is possible because their company 
structure allows it and because their objective is per se to create collaborative research 
projects. However, there are two types of companies that do not participate in these event 
marathons: the micro-enterprise and the large company. The large company does not need to 
participate in all these events. They have more project demands than they can accept. The 
microenterprise is not able to participate in this marathon because they do not have the human 
capacity to do it:  
« On est extrêmement sollicité par des tas de séminaires, conférences, forums etc. et il y en 
a beaucoup trop. [...] On est un peu en saturation [...] Si on voulait on pourrait [...] 
pratiquement tous les jours [...] participer à un forum à Paris, à Lyon, à Grenoble, à 
Toulouse, à Caen, partout en Europe. Donc à la fin ça fait beaucoup et je pense qu’il y a 
trop. Mais maintenant je n’ai pas la solution pour que tout le monde se refocalise un peu 
sur les choses importantes. [...] Il y a énormément de choses qui se passent et à la fin c’est 
un peu trop. [...] Entre nous, il faut quand même faire avancer notre projet. Un vrai projet, 
on ne peut pas seulement en discuter. » (P2) 
 
Finally, the last point that is important to mention is the judge/friend role that somehow sticks 
to the policy-driven clusters, particularly to Systematic and HealthCluster and less to Cap 
Digital. In this sub-section we have seen that the policy-driven clusters are in direct 
competition with other support structures. This is particularly intense in Regions such as the 
Paris Region where plenty of events and institutions exist. The project leaders are looking for 
“friends” that help them to develop their businesses. For one project leader, this seems for 
example more the case in associations such as Optics Valley who invite him personally to 
participate in specific events, than in policy-driven clusters: 
[Dans Optics Valley] je trouve un bénéfice plus clair [que dans les pôles]. Ces gens là au 
moins ils organisent des rencontres. Là par exemple je vais à une rencontre de chefs 
d’entreprises et peut-être on dîne derrière. [...] On nous invite on dit : ‘voilà comment 
interagir avec la presse’. Presse scientifique et technique. C’est quand même des choses 
concrètes et intéressantes. [...] Il y a des conférences sur les technologies. [...] Dans les 
études qui étaient présentées je me suis aperçu que la technologie que j’avais choisi 
lourdement, c’est actuellement la technologie qui se développe le plus. [...] C’est des 
choses concrètes. [...] Regardez [sur leur site] vous verrez qu’il y a un très beau reportage 
[sur nous]. On fait partie de trois PME, et ci et ca. Pour nous c’est quand même important 
parce que ça a un impact auprès de nos clients. » (P10) 
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To sum up, for policy-driven clusters it is not only difficult to keep a stable attendance rate, 
to attract key actors (medical staff and industrials), but it seems also quite difficult to compete 
against all the other “competitors” that are situated in the Paris Region. In the performance 
contract HCPR wrote that a challenge for the second cluster policy phase is to show the local 
ecosystem the added value of HCPR. In Chapter 7 we already underlined that the partners 
with whom HCPR negotiated its services had difficulties to understand which new services 
they should develop. Additionally, when we look now at the data from our interviewed 
project partners, we see that they are highly volatile and participate in a large range of 
activities. HCPR’s performance contract objective to become the “key health actor” of the 
region and to structure under one header all the existing support structures seems to be a quite 
difficult endeavour. In such a tensely-populated region that counts an increasingly high 
number of support structures, it is quite difficult to establish a policy-driven cluster’s “raison 
d’être”, particularly when the sector was already structured before the policy was 
implemented.  
 
3.3 Conclusion: the finding partners’ dilemmas of HCPR 
One of the objectives of policy-driven clusters is to organise events so that the local 
ecosystem can get to know each other and start collaborating. This is expected from the 
government (dilemma MD#1a and MD#1b). However, our data has shown that project 
leaders learn and that they use the events organised by the policy-driven clusters particularly 
in the beginning when they are new to the community. Once they are established in the 
community, the policy-driven clusters’ utility in finding project partners is strongly reduced, 
particularly in the Paris Region (dilemma MD#3b) where plenty of events are constantly 
organised by different support structures. 
 
The question is thus how collaboration should be fostered (dilemma MD#3a) in policy-
driven clusters. In the beginning, when a community does not know each other, organising 
temporary spaces is important but then, project leaders rely on people and might only call the 
policy-driven clusters to get necessary contacts. However, they will not regularly participate 
in the policy-driven cluster “Meetic” events. The project consortiums are formed very fast, 
like “Las Vegas” weddings, so they only need somebody that knows the right person and that 
can put them together efficiently via phone or e-mail. So even though the government expects 
from policy-driven clusters to organise events, little by little policy-driven clusters realize 
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that they have to constantly innovate and change the format of these events, otherwise 
nobody participate. The question is if organising events, just for the sake of organising 
events to be conform to cluster policy evaluations (dilemma MD#1a – who is in charge? 
and MD#1b – administrative straightjacket), is really necessary and if this does not foster 
the pathology of inefficiency?  
 
However, there is one key actor that is particularly difficult to integrate in ICT & Health 
events: doctors. Doctors belong to a world the project leaders are not familiar with and so the 
challenge lies in finding events (all kinds of events) where these key partners participate. It is 
particularly important for the project leaders to meet the doctors in person, so physical 
spaces are important to exchange with these key actors (dilemma MD#3a). However, 
HCPR, at least for the ICT & Health events, seems to have underestimated this challenge as 
doctors were highly absent and the cluster managers had difficulties to motivate them to 
attend. 
 
The Paris Region is a very dense region with a high number of competing events. In the 
performance contract, HCPR wrote that a challenge for the second cluster policy phase is to 
show the local ecosystem the added value of HCPR and to become the “key health actor” of 
the region. Opening the doors to the “doctor” world, might be such an added value and 
competitive advantage but this also raises the question for whom a policy-driven cluster is 
working: for its members who might know the “doctor” world or for the wider ecosystem 
who might not know the doctor world (dilemma PD#1b). Fostering collaboration is a 
difficult endeavour and for the time being HCPR seems to be trapped in the pathology of 
pragmatism, organising the same type of events as their competitors (dilemma MD#3a), 
which are though not in the same sector of activity (dilemma SD#2b). During our 
observation period in HCPR’s operational team, one of the team members told us that one of 
the new “innovation services” might be to organise hospital visits for member organisations. 
However, the “innovation services” were finally cancelled to concentrate on more pragmatic 
services like accessing financing, strategy, etc. which corresponds more to the needs of the 
members. 
 
Finally, the last point to underline is the difficulty to access industrial partners. As soon as an 
industrial partner pushes a project, the project gets most of the time financed. This is related 
to the fact that the public authorities consider that the chances of viability of a project are 
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higher when a big industrial partner takes part in a project. However, on the other hand it 
seems quite difficult to first get in contact with big industrials, and second to get collaborative 
projects going. The internal structure of industrials (importance of contracts) does not allow 
the industrials to engage easily with other partners. The SMEs and the big industrials are 
uneven partners (dilemma MD#3b).  
 
4 Finding ideas: Doctors can’t be find at “Meetic” events 
In this section we first discuss the idea generation moments for collaborative R&D projects 
submitted for financing to one of the three Parisian policy-driven clusters. Second, we will 
discuss the absence of HCPR in this idea quest phase as none of the analysed projects can 
directly be linked to HCPR activities. 
 
4.1 Project leaders’ idea generation moments 
We identified five different reasons that explain the emergence of a project idea. Ideas for 
collaborative research projects are either created out of a specific need or out of a stimulating 
situation (see Table 43 and Table 44). On the one hand, a company (A) or a university / 
hospital / health research center (B) can formulate the need to start a collaborative research 
project in order to improve a certain internal service / product / technology or to create 
something new. On the other hand, a certain stimulating situation can also generate a 
collaborative research project that was not initially expected by the actor. We identified three 
different stimulating situations:  
- Interaction between doctor and company (C): thanks to a “serendipitous” interaction 
between a doctor and a company a project emerges. The need to do the project, prior 
to the interaction, was neither formulated by the doctor nor by the company. We will 
see that this interaction is only considered as “serendipitous” at the first glance and 
that certain repeating patterns can be identified.  
- Public project call (D): thanks to a public project call, found by the project leader 
either by an active or passive search, or  
- Previous collaborative research project (E): thanks to the work on another 
collaborative research project that opened further exploitations of the same initial idea.  
 
Approximately half of the 19 project ideas were created out of a certain “need” while the 
other half was created thanks to a “stimulating” situation. From a public policy point of view, 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter eight 
 
 307
the cases C and D are particularly interesting because they are stimulated (D) or theoretically 
able to be stimulated (C) by a public policy intervention. Hereinafter, we discuss and illustrate 
all five reasons to launch a collaborative research project in more detail. 
 
Table 43: Idea to launch a collaborative research project 
 
 
Table 44: Number of cases per project idea type 
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4.1.1 Need formulation 
One type of idea generation for a project is the need formulated by a university, hospital or 
health research centre286. For example the hospital expresses a certain need and then 
launches the process in order to get the collaborative research project going. In one of our 
observations, it was the hospital that for example had a certain problem and then invited 
academics and companies to the hospital. One university was then appointed to set up the 
project.  
 
Another possibility of idea generation is that the company itself formulates the need for the 
project. The first case shows how a successful collaborative R&D project emerged. 
Successful, because the project created a lot of jobs and consequently the project is often 
mentioned in order to justify the general cluster policy. However as we will see in this 
example, the policy-driven cluster was not integrated in the idea-finding phase. The project 
was “only” financed by a subsidy (FUI) linked to policy-driven clusters. In this case, a large 
company contacted a SME with a concrete project idea. The company and the SME 
previously met during a working group meeting of the CNRS (National Scientific Research 
Council): 
« Un jour, j’ai un appel : « Bonjour, je travaille chez [Big Industrial]. J’ai entendu votre 
nom par un de nos doctorants qui était dans une réunion avec vous. Voilà, on sait ce que 
vous faites. On aimerait [équiper des hôpitaux] ». Déjà si vous voulez, si vous avez vu 
notre site, on est les ‘durs’ de l’industrie…mais j’ai saisi la balle au bond. J’ai dit : « Ok, 
très bien, si vous voulez, on peut se voir. » Donc je vais le voir le surlendemain. [...] Il me 
dit : « Voilà, j’aimerais placer [un certain équipement dans les hôpitaux], j’ai pensé à 
votre solution. Je pense qu’on peut faire quelque chose ». Et moi du tac au tac, je lui dis : 
« Oui voilà, suite à votre contact téléphonique, j’ai griffonné un truc ». « Ah oui, c’est ça 
qu’il me faut, faites-moi une offre ». Et donc je lui fais une offre, le surlendemain. [...] « Ah 
oui, c’est génial, je vous passe cette commande ». Si vous voulez [...] d’habitude on 
négocie. Là, cash. [...] En septembre, on livre le prototype. [...] Là, ils disent : « C’est 
super. Il faut qu’on fasse quelque chose de plus important. [...] Ils font venir 7 chirurgiens. 
Comme ils font toujours. En médecine on appelle ça des Labs. C’est les tests. Et les 
chirurgiens disent : « Mais c’est vraiment une innovation disruptive. Vraiment il faut aller 
plus loin. » On identifie à ce moment là trois points durs : problème de précision, problème 
de répétabilité, et problème lié à l’hygiène. Bon, on discute de ça en réunion. Comme moi 
je faisais des projets collaboratifs, j’ai leur ai dit qu’on pourrait faire un projet 
collaboratif. » (P8c, project financed by FUI) 
This illustrative example shows that it was the large company that had the idea, contacts the 
right SME and then brings together the necessary doctors. Two important observations after 
this first example: 
                                                 
286
 Verbatims: « L’idée originale de ce projet, elle vient de [health research center]. » (P4a, project not financed 
by FUI); « [Nom de l’hôpital] s’est dit qu’on pourra faire des choses.» (P5a, project not financed by FUI); 
« [L’Université] était sollicitée par des Médecins du CHU pour essayer de monter un projet. » (P9b, project 
financed by FUI); « L’assistance publique voulait monter un [projet]. » (P10c, project financed by FUI) 
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- First, the role of the policy-driven cluster is reduced to subsidies finding and the 
administrative part of the research project. 
- Second, the large company was successful in motivating the doctors to look at the 
device, to identify the main problems of the device and to further specify the points of 
amelioration. The interaction between the doctors and the companies was crucial in 
order to define the exact content of the research project. 
 
The second case shows that it seems important for SMEs to stay in regular contact with their 
big industrial clients. The SME we interviewed decided to present a new internal project to an 
established client. After this presentation the client proposes the SME to participate in a 
collaborative research project. It is the pro-active attitude of the SME that allows the SME to 
participate in a new collaborative research project. However, it was an internal need of the big 
industrial that initiated the project. The first project was an ANR project. However, the 
consortium then also proposed the same project, more oriented business, to the FUI. For the 
FUI project, our interviewee was the project leader. Once again, the policy-driven cluster has 
not played an active role in the initiation of this project. The policy-driven cluster is once 
again reduced to a “subsidies finding” function: 
« [Big Industrial] est un de nos clients depuis très longtemps et en mai cette année, je suis 
allé les voir. [...] On leur a présenté un petit peu ce qu’on fait nous. [...] On a conçu un 
petit produit en R&D sur tablette, que je suis allé leur présenter. [...] Ils ont dit : « Votre 
produit nous intéresse, sauf que l’idée est limitée et on veut le faire évoluer. » J’ai dit : 
« Vous nous payez un budget, et je le fais, pas de problème. » Ils ont dit : « On est un peu 
ric-rac, par contre on pourra faire un projet R&D, parce qu’on a d’autres idées. » Ils ont 
eu une réflexion assez poussée sur leur futur système et comment mettre des outils dans 
leur futur système et donc ils ont déjà contacté le [partenaire 1], le [partenaire 2], le 
[partenaire 3], le [partenaire 4]. Ils nous ont dit : « Nous, ça nous intéresse, si ça vous 
intéresse, on vous met dedans. » [...] Je dis : « Pas de problème. » » (P5b, project financed 
by ANR and the industrial part of this project (P5c) by the FUI) 
 
In both cases we have seen that the SME has produced a little prototype that then interests the 
big industrial to pursue the journey further. Additionally, both examples illustrate that the 
projects are primarily associated to the cluster policy because they went through a labelling 
process (thus through an evaluation process) but not because they went through an idea 
generation process at the policy-driven cluster level. The subsequent examples confirm this 
tendency.  
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4.1.2 Stimulated by… 
New cluster projects are formulated because of certain needs but also because of certain 
stimulations as the following examples will show. 
 
4.1.2.1 …an interaction between a doctor and a company 
As the majority of our projects are projects situated in the ICT & Health domain it is no 
surprise that several projects were stimulated through an interaction between these two 
worlds. In this section it is a fruitful direct interaction between doctors and companies that 
created a collaborative research project. The big difference between a need formulation 
(either by a company (B) or by a hospital / health research centre (A)) and the “serendipitous” 
discussion between a doctor and a company is that in the latter neither of the two entities has 
thought about it before. The doctor has not hoped that “something” could improve his/her 
problem and the company has not thought about that their business could potentially help (in 
one way or another) the doctors. 4 out of our 19 cases fell into this category and all of these 
projects were also financed (the only category were all projects were also financed). The 
difficulties of having these two worlds interact and of bringing both parties together are 
multisided. However, we think that this category could be one of the most important 
categories for policy-driven clusters and public policy interventions. However, it was quite a 
surprise that the policy-driven clusters themselves stimulated none of these interactions. We 
were able to distinguish three different boundary objects between these the corporate and 
medical world:  
 
Project: The first possibility is that a doctor and a company already work together on another 
project and during the work on this project they find out that they could do something else 
together: 
« Ca, c’est une rencontre entre [le médecin] et puis nous. J’ai rencontré [le médecin] 
quand on était en train de créer un autre projet. [...] On a commencé à réfléchir là-dessus 
ensemble. » (P6b, project financed by « Investing for the future » program) 
« [Ce] troisième projet est un dérivé [...] ça, on a appris ‘en marchant’. On apprend des 
bouches des médecins avec qui on travaille dans les projets collaboratifs. C’est ça qui est 
formidable dans les projets collaboratifs, c’est qu’on rencontre des gens qui vous 
apprennent énormément de choses dans des métiers qui ne sont pas les vôtres. C’est très 
enrichissant comme métier. Les médecins, en les faisant parler, on s’aperçoit qu’il y a ce 
besoin-là qui peut représenter beaucoup d’argent pour la France. » (P7b, project financed 
by « Investing for the future » program) 
Particularly the last comment shows that the company highly appreciates to be that close to 
doctors as it allows the project leader to generate new ideas. This intensive interaction was 
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able to get started thanks to a collaborative research project subsidised by the state. However, 
again, the idea generation for this project had nothing to do with the policy-driven cluster.  
 
Event: The second possibility is that a third party invites the doctor and the company to an 
event and during this event they find out that they could work together: 
« C’est une manifestation qui était organisée [...] par une organisation [...] qui s’appelle la 
MEITO, par un monsieur qui s’appelle François287. François me connaît bien parce qu’on 
avait travaillé l’année d’avant sur un projet. François me dit : « On est en train de lancer, 
dans le cadre du mouvement national, un groupe TIC & Santé. On aimerait bien que tu 
viennes ». Quand je dis que je suis libre [de faire ce que je veux], je suis libre, mais je fais 
gaffe quand même. C’est-à-dire : je ne vais pas à des trucs trop hors champ. Et il 
m’appelle, et il me dit : « Il faut que tu viennes. Il y a le CEA. ». Et je dis : « Ecoute 
François. C’est un centre de [maladie]. Je ne vais pas passer ma journée à Orléans. Ca 
fait quand même un peu ‘touriste’. » Et il dit : « Non. Viens, viens. Tu verras. Viens. ». Bon 
voilà. J’y vais, donc. Normalement, a priori, s’il ne m’avait pas poussé, je n’y serai pas 
allé. J’y vais. En effet, c’était une journée assez touristique parce qu’à midi on va au bord 
de la mer. A Orléans. Et on était à table, 15 personnes, et je me trouve en face d’un 
médecin. [Le médecin parle de son problème à l’hôpital]. Alors déclic : mais ça, c’est une 
bonne idée ! » (P8d, project financed by FUI). 
This is a domain where we could have expected a policy-driven cluster to be the initiator of 
the encounter, but this was not the case. The association that invited the company and the 
doctor is called MEITO. The MEITO is an association founded in 1984 to stimulate the 
electronic, informatics and telecommunication sector in the west of France. The MEITO 
organises events, distributes information, conducts industry specific studies, or proposes help 
in the setup of projects. Another interesting element is that the MEITO has personally 
contacted the SME to convince it to participate in the event that was not anywhere near the 
company’s business field. The SME trusted the MEITO and participated in the event.  
 
Business relation: The third possibility is that a doctor and a company know each other 
because they interact regularly regarding a certain service the company proposes to the 
doctors. However, at some point the company questions the apparent reality. This situation 
can only happen if a company does not simply fulfil the immediate need of the doctors but 
tries to understand the underlying problems of the doctors: 
« C’étaient des médecins que je ne connaissais pas, qui me connaissaient plus ou moins 
parce qu’on est quand même présent [à cause de son autre activité commerciale]. Ils sont 
venus me voir avec des boîtes de lames et je leur ai demandé : « Pourquoi vous venez me 
demander de numériser ces lames ? [...] Donc ils m’ont expliqué [le problème]. Je me suis 
dit : « Dit comme ca, c’est intéressant ». Parce qu’en général les radiologues, ça sont des 
disciplines (…) chacun prétend être capable de prendre en charge tout de son côté. 
Quelqu’un qui a l’honnêteté de venir me voir en disant : « Voilà, on coince. On a besoin 
d’aller dans un autre domaine, - qui n’est pas le leur - pour mieux interpréter ce qu’on fait 
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 Name changed 
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dans le notre... » Je me dis : c’est le bon fil. Donc c’est pour ça que j’ai entamé la 
réflexion. » (P10a, project financed by ANR). 
 
To sum up, the close interaction between companies and doctors seems to have a high idea 
generation potential, be it through projects, events or business relations.  
 
4.1.2.2 …a public project call 
Another possibility of idea generation is that the company is stimulated by a public project 
call either by an active search for a public project call or by a passive stimulation of a project 
call.  
 
Active search: A company can search actively for a public project call because the company 
wants for example to enter into a certain business domain. However, as we can see in the 
following comment, project leaders might just follow the research directions given by public 
authorities, without looking for new cutting edge ideas: 
« Ca commence par un travail de prospection où j’essaie de découvrir des besoins et des 
appétences. C’est-à-dire : vis-à-vis des guichets qui sont des organismes financeurs, 
j’essaie de voir quelles sont les thématiques qui sont dans leur stratégie, car chaque 
financeur a ses propres objectifs en termes de choix de dossier. Donc il faut rassembler, il 
faut commencer par rassembler, faire un état de lieux et rassembler de l’information... 
Mais les attentes changent d’année en année. [...] C’est-à-dire : avant de trouver l’histoire, 
il faut déjà se renseigner quelles sont les attentes, parce que ça ne sert à rien de trouver 
une histoire qui ne correspond pas à ce que les gens vont vouloir. Donc il y a déjà un 
problème de mise à jour par rapport aux attentes des financeurs. » (P7a, project financed 
by FUI) 
The cluster actor is only looking for ideas that are entering in the “official” direction. This is a 
reality we were particularly able to observe in the “e-health” project calls, suddenly all the 
companies in the domain were proposing approximately the same types of projects (at the 
moment of our interviews the topic was particularly turning around cloud services). 
 
Passive stimulation. On the other hand, a company might be stimulated passively by a public 
project call. This means the company has already thought about doing something in a 
particularly domain but never took the final step: 
« Le président à l’époque - il venait d’être élu - dit : [...] « Il faut qu’on [soit] les plus 
efficaces de l’Europe à la fin de mon quinquennat [dans ce domaine] ». « Ah », je dis : 
« Bien, enfin on va pouvoir faire quelque chose dans [ce domaine]. » Donc je regroupe un 
consortium hyper-costaud. » (P8a, project not financed by FUI). 
A project call can thus remotivate a company to finally take action and to invest time in an 
idea it was already thinking about in the past.  
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4.1.2.3 …a previous collaborative research project 
Finally, it is also possible that a new collaborative research project is created in extension of 
an already existing project. This is in a certain manner the “easiest” one as the intrinsic idea 
stays the same as well as most of the partners: 
« En travaillant sur le projet [P5b], on s’est dit : voilà, c’est bizarre, il y a une grosse 
partie qui est quand même orientée marché, qu’on pourra déployer en FUI. [...] On laisse 
tomber le côté scientifique du projet [P5b]. » (P5c, project financed by FUI) 
« J’ai repris presque les mêmes personnes que dans [projet P10a]. Le projet [P10b] est un 
projet à vocation principalement industrielle. J’ai mis dans la balance le côté matériel. » 
(P10b, project not financed by FUI) 
Both examples show that a more research-oriented project (in both cases financed by the 
ANR) can then be transformed in a more development project (in both cases financed by the 
FUI). This also means that in several cases the real investigation starting point (from an 
innovation point of view) might actually be the ANR project and not the FUI project. In order 
to obtain ANR subsidies, the research consortium is not obliged to pass through the labelling 
process of the policy-driven clusters. However, before 2013, projects that were labelled and 
then submitted for ANR subsidies received an additional financial pop-up288, but the label was 
not an obligation for the application.289 
 
4.2 Absence of HCPR in the ideas quest phase 
In the majority of idea finding cases a medical entity was involved. In 6 cases the need was 
formulated by a university, hospital or health research centre (3 financed and 3 not financed) 
and in 4 cases the idea emerged thanks to a fruitful interaction between a doctor and a 
company (4 financed and 0 not financed). We see that in the medical domain the interaction 
with the clinical staff seems extremely important in order to get projects financed. However, 
we already discussed in the partner finding section that the medical representatives are highly 
absent in the events and very difficult to grasp for the business driven companies that wish to 
launch new products. Additionally we have seen that the “innovation” services were cancelled 
by the executive office and replaced by more business oriented help for the members of 
HCPR. For the members of HCPR who wish to conduct research in a specific medical 
domain, this might be understandable. However, as the discussed examples show, for the 
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 Before 2012, the financial pop-ups for labelled projects submitted to ANR were: (i) no pop-up if subsidy was 
< 50 000 €, (ii) 6% of the subsidy amount if the granted subsidy was situated between 50 000 € and 200 000 € ; 
(iii) 12 000 € if subsidy was > 200 000 
289
  Since 2013, the ANR does no longer grant financial pop-ups for policy-driven cluster labels. In case a project 
consortium decides to go through the policy-driven cluster labelling process and a project gets a policy-driven 
cluster label, the ANR will now only “take into account” this information. 
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general ecosystem, the contact between medical staff and other companies seems very 
important. However, HCPR is completely absent from this domain. Two critical points 
emerge: On the one hand the strong business and subsidies orientation of HCPR and how it 
seems to keep away the clinical staff and on the other hand the danger of fashionable 
innovations. 
 
4.2.1 Struggling to attract others than business-driven companies  
We observe that the policy-driven cluster members that are most active in as well as attracted 
by the policy-driven clusters are business driven SMEs and not for example academics, large 
groups, micro-enterprises or doctors. However, it is them who most of the time had the idea 
for a new collaborative R&D project (and not the business-driven SMEs). The policy-driven 
clusters primarily gather companies that are somehow distant from the initial project idea. Or 
as one project leader said, SMEs are only the “midwives” who help the ones with the ideas to 
get their “babies” born290. 
 
The most active in the policy-driven clusters we investigated are the business oriented SMEs 
that also have enough time to lobby for the project among the right decision makers. This 
might also be the reason why according to P9 (highly integrated in the cluster community, has 
already been project leader of several FUI projects) most of the technologies and products 
“die” after the end of the project in case they are not pushed by an academic or other entity 
that really wants the project to “live”: 
« Les consortiums, c’est un peu des mariages forcés. C’est comme à l’époque il y a deux 
cents ans. [...] L’amour dans tout ça n’existait pas. Donc par intérêt, à l’époque politique 
et maintenant financier, on crée des consortiums. [...] Donc là, on a des mariages qui 
durent un certain temps. En général 3 ans. Ca va. C’est un mariage à durée déterminé. Le 
divorce est déjà inscrit dans le contrat du mariage dès le départ. C’est pratique. Et en fait 
les gens se marient, ils font un bébé, le projet. [...] On leur donne de l’argent pour élever le 
bébé. Et après le bébé il meurt parce qu’en général c’est assez rare que le bébé vive après. 
[...] Ca a fait vivre chaque personne pendant un certain temps. Ca aura quand même 
renforcé leur expérience. [...] Quand je dis « meurt », il ne fait pas une bonne carrière en 
fait. Dans le cadre des projets, ca ne fonctionne que si c’est le bébé d’un des membres du 
consortium qui veut vraiment faire du business, qui veut vraiment le développer. » (P9) 
We will not start a discussion if the State money was spent wisely or not. Even subsidising 
companies with unsuccessful projects might be better for a Nation than having these 
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 Verbatim: « Quand c’est un laboratoire qui cherche des membres de consortium, ce n’est pas un effet 
d’aubaine. Parce qu’il y a une vraie recherche. Parce que c’est la recherche appliquée, pour qu’il y ait des 
retombées financières de leurs travaux. En fait, avec les laboratoires c’est facile de collaborer parce que c’est 
des gens rigoureux. Les projets, c’est leurs bébés en général. Nous on est facilitateurs. On permet la naissance 
du bébé mais on est plutôt la sage-femme qui permet au bébé de sortir. Mais ce n’est pas notre bébé. [...] Les 
soumissions sont de meilleure qualité quand le consortium contient un laboratoire. » (P9) 
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companies go bankrupt where the project members do not gain any additional experience at 
all. However, we have to ask if the general cluster framework (be it the subsidies rules or the 
types of events) is adapted to generate new ideas. For the time being, our investigation shows 
that a certain population of companies is particularly attracted by the policy-driven clusters, 
where accessing subsidies seems the primary objective:  
« Dans le cadre des projets d’innovation, en fait, on se retrouve obligé, pour avoir accès à 
l’argent public, de créer des consortiums. [...] A la base, on veut juste de l’argent. On ne 
veut pas être plus compétitif, on veut avoir de l’argent. [...] Sauf qu’en fait au départ, elles 
s'en foutent de travailler ensemble. Normalement ça les embête. [...] La R&D sert à 
financer nos dépenses courantes. [...] C’est d’abord : ‘on veut faire de l’argent’ et après, 
‘comment on va faire en sorte que ça soit le plus sexy possible pour l’Etat pour qu’il donne 
cet argent ?’ » (P9) 
« Comment financer la R&D sur fonds propres de toutes les boîtes ? Mais non, c’est 
l’envers. Toutes les sociétés vont présenter un ANR ou un FUI pour aller chercher de 
l’argent. Il faut le savoir, c’est un dispositif où on va chercher de l’argent pour faire un peu 
de R&D, mais surtout : on va chercher de l’argent ! Il faut le savoir. » (P5) 
« On fait de l’innovation pour créer de la valeur, et moi je ne suis pas sûre que tous les 
gens qui participent aux projets soient là pour créer de la valeur. Je pense qu’il y en a 
beaucoup qui sont là pour capter de la subvention. » (P8) 
 
Our analysis has shown that none of the ideas for the investigated projects was generated 
thanks to a policy-driven cluster. One reason might be the strong link between subsidies and 
policy-driven clusters. 
 
4.2.2 Danger of fashionable innovations 
Policy-driven clusters are heavily involved in the subsidies finding phase of their members. 
National and regional innovation financing authorities use policy-driven clusters to pre-select 
collaborative research projects but also to inform the different policy-driven cluster members 
about the “topics”, “initiatives” or “special calls” of the moment. Financing authorities exploit 
policy-driven clusters to find the right research consortiums that can bring answers to current 
national challenges. During our interview phase, a lot of ICT & Health projects turned around 
“cloud services”, one year later ICT & Health projects particularly turned around the “silver 
economy”. The policy-driven clusters, know that the chance of a project to be financed 
increases if it covers one of the “fashionable topics” of the moment:  
« Il faut avoir un vrai bon sujet, des vrais bons partenaires. Mais même avec un bon projet 
et des bons partenaires, non, après il faut aussi être dans l’air du temps. » (P2) 
« Je pense qu’il faut être capable de leur raconter une histoire, et si vous avez une histoire 
qui est dans l’air du temps, qui dans la problématique dans l’air du temps... » (P10) 
« Des sujets qui semblent être dans l’air du temps. [...] C’est-à-dire l’ensemble du process 
qui consiste à, avant de trouver l’histoire, de déjà se renseigner : ‘quelles sont les 
attentes ?’, parce que ça sert à rien de trouver une histoire qui ne correspond pas à ce que 
les gens vont vouloir. » (P7) 
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A fashionable innovation project can of course create innovation. However, the close 
relationship between “fashionable topics” and policy-driven clusters might also bear risks. 
The risk of a general innovation lock-in around certain subjects and pushing all cluster actors 
to work cannibalize resources on the same topics. 
 
4.3 Conclusion: the finding ideas’ dilemmas of HCPR 
When we started our thesis we were particularly interested in how a policy-driven cluster 
helps its members to generate new ideas or to find new R&D partners. However, our data 
show that none of the 19 investigated project ideas (and therefore the 30 administrative 
projects) can be particularly linked to one of the policy-driven clusters. Additionally, for only 
4 projects a cluster organisation helped finding project partners. Most of the interactions 
between project leaders and policy-driven clusters took place during the finding subsidies 
phase but not through events organised by one of the policy-driven clusters. 
 
One of the main dilemmas that emerge after this analysis is what type of innovation process 
HCPR wishes to foster (dilemma MD#2a) and which type of collaboration possibilities 
should be installed to allow this interaction to happen (dilemma MD#3a)? The interaction 
between doctors and companies is very important and all of the projects that were born out of 
a need formulation from a doctor were also financed. However, for the project leaders we 
interviewed, the ICT & Health events were somehow not able to generate this fruitful 
interaction. The “Meetic” format of the organised events doesn’t seem to be adapted to 
involve the doctors, and keep the “free electrons” on the ball. We could also question if the 
direct subsidies that are linked to the policy-driven clusters hinder a free development of ideas 
(dilemma PD#2a). The pathology that emerges is again of pragmatic nature as the current 
offer doesn’t seem to be adapted to the type of the actors (dilemma SD#2b). 
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Table 45: Overview of cases 
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Table 45: Overview of cases (cont.) 
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Table 45: Overview of cases (cont.) 
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Chapter 9:  Discussion: how dilemmas drove cluster pathologies in HCPR 
The thesis that we defend in this document is that implementing cluster policies produce 
organisational dilemmas (political, managerial and structural dilemmas) that, in turn, generate 
side-effect pathologies. Figure 37 summarizes the problem statement and the research 
questions of the thesis, as well as the links that exist between them.  
 
Figure 37: Problem statement and research questions 
 
 
As seen in the first section of this thesis, our systematic literature review has allowed us 
already to identify a certain amount of dilemmas that policy-driven clusters face and that 
drive pathologies (see Figure 38) 
 
Figure 38: Studying dilemmas that drive side-effect pathologies in policy-driven clusters 
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In this final chapter, we will discuss the pathologies that we identified for HCPR and the 
dilemmas that are at the source of these side-effect pathologies. There is evidence of four 
side-effect pathologies that are particularly present in the HCPR case: “inefficiency”, which is 
mainly driven by leadership dilemmas; “distrust” mainly driven by subsidies dilemmas; “non-
conformity” mainly driven by structural dilemmas; and finally “pragmatism” mainly driven 
by dilemmas on how to manage innovation and collaboration. Additionally, we will argue 
that, besides all of these pathologies and the recurrence of rather poor evaluations HCPR 
received from official evaluators as well as academics (CMI & BCG, 2008; Erdyn, et al., 
2012), and also independent researchers (Bonnafous-Boucher & Saussois, 2010), HCPR 
continues to exist as an organization. An empirical phenomenon that we explain thanks to a 
concept developed by N. Brunsson (1989) and that is called “the organization of hypocrisy”. 
Finally, we discuss how the knowledge of these four side-effect pathologies and the 
associated dilemmas can help to improve cluster policy implementation and evaluations. 
 
However, before we start discussing the different dilemmas that drove cluster pathologies in 
HCPR we have to underline once again that HCPR is a “special case” among French policy-
driven clusters. There are plenty of French policy-driven clusters that are perceived well and 
obtain great results as for example Minalogic (Retour, 2009b; Therme, 2008), AgriMip (de 
Rochambeau, Veronese, & Roché, 2008), I-Trans and Mer PACA (Bidan & Dherment-Férère, 
2009), Lyonbiopole (Retour, 2009a) or Cosmetic Valley (Chabault, 2008). For our purpose, 
the study of pathologies, HCPR is though an extraordinary case because it allows in a perfect 
manner to study potential policy-driven cluster pathologies with a magnifying glass. The risks 
associated with implementing policy-driven clusters are amplified within HCPR, which 
allows having a close-up of potential pathologies. This needs to be kept in mind.  
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1 The identification of HCPR’s four side-effect pathologies 
In this first section of our discussion, we will now discuss the answers to our first two 
research questions:  
- RQ 1: What are the organisational dilemmas that can be observed in the 
implementation of the French cluster policy (the case of HCPR)?  
- RQ 2: To which extend do these organisational dilemmas generate side-effect 
pathologies?  
 
Chapter 7 and 8 allowed us to observe several pathologies that are driven by organisational 
dilemmas. Through the triangulation of different observed situations, we can distinguish four 
main pathologies, each driven by various dilemmas that HCPR faces. The four main 
pathologies are: pathology of inefficiency, pathology of distrust, pathology of nonconformity, 
and pathology of pragmatism. 
 
1.1 A pathology of inefficiency 
We first summarize the “pathology of inefficiency” results of our fieldwork and then discuss 
the results in the light of the literature. 
 
1.1.1 Results: Leadership dilemma contribute to cluster inefficiency 
A main driver for HCPR’s inefficiency is the dilemma that no clear leader exists in the 
association (who is in charge within HCPR? - dilemma MD#1a). On the one hand, HCPR 
tries to take into consideration the different opinions of its members and to have an egalitarian 
approach in the decision making process, but on the other hand the decision process is slow 
and the operational team has no authority to advance at its rhythm and with its animation 
priorities. According to an operational team member HCPR’s structure is like a “4-
dimensional matrix”, as too many different entities claim to be in charge of the direction that 
the policy-driven cluster should take (for example executive office, operational team, steering 
committees, etc.). 
 
This complex leadership situation was for example visible in our data through: the complex 
organisational set-up (see Figure 39) for the a visual summary organisational set-up of 
HCPR); the political agendas that hindered the mapping publication; the cooperation and 
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knowledge exchange problems between the animation & development team and the R&D 
team; or the conflicts between the executive office and the operational team regarding the 
content of the proposed services. This last conflict finally lead to the abandoning of some 
services because the executive office wanted the members to be represented in these services 
and not the wider ecosystem as wished by the operational team (the organisational 
boundary is not clear - dilemma PD#1b). A recurrent theme is thus an operational team that 
goes in one direction, and an executive office that goes in another direction, consuming a 
considerable amount of time and resources. 
 
No clear leader also exists among the different policy-driven clusters that try to set up inter-
cluster collaboration projects (who is in charge among the different regional policy-driven 
clusters? - dilemma MD#1a). As we have seen, the government has motivated the different 
regional policy-driven clusters to set up inter-cluster collaboration initiatives to foster inter-
disciplinary innovations. The three regional policy-driven clusters only manage to cooperate 
during the event-planning phase but do not manage to cooperate during the project evaluation 
phase. Homogenizing the different evaluation and labelling rules would have been too time 
consuming. However, this lead to the situation that HCPR was not able to judge the value of 
the submitted projects because their knowledge on ICT is limited, which again creates a form 
of inefficiency. This also raises the question of the best organisational boundaries for policy-
driven clusters (thematic vs. regional entity? - dilemma PD#1b). 
 
However, these leadership issues are not only visible within HCPR, and among policy-driven 
clusters of the Region, but also between HCPR and the government (who is in charge 
between HCPR and the government? - dilemma MD#1a). The government imposed on the 
policy-driven clusters to launch inter-cluster collaboration initiatives during the 2nd policy 
phase to foster diversity and thus innovation. Even though HCPR submitted itself to the rules, 
integrated an inter-cluster collaboration objective in its performance contract and started to 
collaborate with Cap Digital and Systematic, the ICT & Health events were never a research 
priority for the executive office. The e-health objective of HCPR’s performance contract was 
for example the only technological R&D objective that was not explained in detail (absence 
of a definition of concrete actors, activities or deliverables) and the HCPR’s evaluation team 
had considerable difficulties to judge ICT & Health projects. While Cap Digital managed to 
transform a well-meant policy-description into an intrinsic motivation, HCPR failed to do so 
(intrinsic motivation vs. policy description - dilemma PD#3b). This policy description thus 
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generated inefficiency for HCPR (not for Cap Digital) because HCPR’s resources were not 
used according to the priorities of the association.  
 
Another element that the government expects from policy-driven clusters is to organise events 
so that the local ecosystem can get to know each other and start collaborating. However, our 
data has shown that project leaders learn and that they use the events organised by the policy-
driven clusters particularly in the beginning when they are new to the community. Once they 
are established in the policy-driven cluster community, the utility of policy-driven cluster 
events (or “Meetic” events) for finding project partners is strongly reduced. Companies then 
know the community and can call their acquaintances or use “telephone fishing” to set-up 
their collaborative R&D projects. They only need somebody that knows the right person and 
that can put them together efficiently via phone or e-mail. The collaborative R&D projects are 
constructed like “Las Vegas” weddings, so an in-depth knowledge of the project partners is 
not necessary. The project leaders prefer participating in a wide range of different events and 
communities to be “on the radar” of a maximum of people. This result might be tempered by 
the specificities of the HCPR case, a cluster that is particularly related to the Paris Region, 
where plenty of events are constantly organised by different support structures (degree of 
urbanisation - dilemma SD#3b). So even though the government expects from policy-driven 
clusters to constantly organise events, little by little the investigated policy-driven clusters 
realized that they have to constantly innovate and change the format of events otherwise 
nobody participates, particularly in the Paris Region. The question is thus if organising 
events, just for the sake of organising events to comply with the government’s policy 
expectations is really necessary, or if this just fosters inefficiency? (who is in charge 
between HCPR and the government? - dilemma MD#1a; learning capacity vs. 
administrative straightjacket - dilemma MD#1b). 
 
Finally, French cluster policy leadership issues are not only visible within HCPR, among 
regional policy-driven clusters, between HCPR and the government, but also among the 
different ministries (who is in charge among the different ministries? - dilemma MD#1a). 
In the context section, we discussed the set-up process of the French cluster policy and we 
have seen that conflicting opinions exist between the different ministries (research, industry, 
and regional development) regarding the objectives of the policy (industrial excellence vs. 
regional development – dilemma PD#3a), but also between the different regional authorities 
regarding the geographical boundaries of the policy-driven clusters (geographical boundary 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter nine 
 326
- dilemma PD#1a). The cluster policy set-up already created several dilemmas that pushed 
the policy to be somehow blurry and ill-defined, as well as situated on geographical entities 
that might not be the most efficient ones. 
 
Figure 39: Zoom on the multiple actors of HCPR governance level 
 
 
1.1.2 Discussion: No civic entrepreneur, no external challenge, unitary country 
The French cluster policy, and HCPR in particular, is situated at the intersection of different 
objectives and wishes that impact HCPR’s effective functioning. Leadership issues emerge 
within HCPR, among regional policy-driven clusters, between HCPR and the government, 
and among the different ministries regarding the content of the cluster policy. All of these 
leadership issues create inefficiency. The literature underlines that leadership issues for 
policy-driven clusters are frequent, as the implementation of cluster policies is very complex. 
All involved actors have their “own raison d’être, culture, and spatial scale of operation” 
(MacNeill & Steiner, 2010, p. 444). In order to overcome this complex situation, the literature 
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recommends to appoint one driving cluster force, or civic entrepreneur (Lundequist & Power, 
2002). However, this is not the case in HCPR. HCPR has several leaders for example a 
president, a managing director, steering committee presidents, one operational team but also a 
highly involved national and regional government. All of these actors wish to pull the policy-
driven cluster in a different direction. HCPR does not have one “civic entrepreneur” that 
clearly decides upon the direction that should be taken and that is then implemented. 
 
The literature shows that the policy-driven clusters in for example Styria (Austria) (MacNeill 
& Steiner, 2010) or Bavaria (Germany) (S. Menu, 2012) managed to appoint one driving 
cluster force, but that this was not the case in policy-driven clusters in Brittany (France) (S. 
Menu, 2012) and in the West Midlands (UK) (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008). Our results of the 
analysis of a policy-driven cluster in the Paris Region (France) point thus in the same 
direction as the results of Menu (2012) and Burfitt & Macneill (2008). Menu (2012) and 
Burfitt & Macneill (2008) both concluded that leadership of the policy-driven clusters they 
analysed is weak because of the limited autonomy national governments give to the policy-
driven clusters. Menu (2012) for example criticizes that everything depends on a central 
authority. Menu (2012) recommends thus regional umbrella structures such as in Bavaria to 
overcome the central guidelines and to adapt the policy better to the regional circumstances. 
In the case of HCPR, the creation of a regional umbrella structure for the Paris Region could 
have contributed to solve several leadership problems as well:  
- First, a regional policy-driven cluster umbrella structure would have solved the ICT & 
Health problem and the difficulty to establish a common evaluation team. 
- Second, a regional policy-driven cluster umbrella structure might also be more alerted 
to the specificity of the Paris Region, particularly regarding the high amount of 
initiatives and events that are organised in the region. The Paris Region policy-driven 
clusters struggle to keep a high participation rate in their events because too many 
different events take place at the same time. We even question the usefulness of 
organising even more events instead of trying to make the already existing ones more 
visible. 
- Third, a regional policy-driven cluster umbrella structure would have also helped to 
solve the conflict between the operational team and the executive team regarding who 
should profit from the services developed by HCPR: the members or the regional 
ecosystem.  
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The central guidelines keep HCPR also in a so-called “administrative straightjacket” 
(Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). In the case of HCPR this “administrative straightjacket” is 
particularly visible through the performance contract and the obligation to start inter-cluster 
collaboration projects, even though HCPR shows little interest in e-health. Ebbekink & 
Lagendijk (2013) recommend to have a “collective strategy-building” attitute in order to 
break out of this “administrative straightjacket” and to establish “an on-going, informal 
strategic dialogue between “all” cluster stakeholders” which will collectively allow to learn 
and create action (2013, p. 738). Also MacNeill & Steiner (2010) recommend a “‘post-
modern’ participative management style” to efficiently manage policy-driven clusters. 
However, this seems quite utopian and difficult to realize in a policy system like France, that 
is traditionally organised in a centralist manner and where many different stakeholders (from 
national to regional level) are involved. 
 
This raises the question of the role of a country’s political system291 on the leadership style of 
policy-driven clusters, and if it is possible to establish a “participative management style” 
system for policy-driven clusters where the national government is highly involved. The 
interesting fact is that, Menu (2012) and Burfitt & Macneill (2008) both conducted their 
research in centralist countries (France and UK respectively) and concluded that the regional 
policy-driven cluster has “limited autonomy with regard to national government” (Burfitt, et 
al., 2007, p. 1288). However, the analyses of policy-driven clusters in Bavaria (Germany) (S. 
Menu, 2012) and Styria (Austria) (MacNeill & Steiner, 2010) do not show this pathology; 
both countries are federal countries. In unitary countries “central government is still a 
significant source of funding for regional development” (OECD, 2010, p. 20)) and thus the 
decision centre and distance between the central state organ and the actual policy-driven 
clusters in the regions is longer. Cluster policies, that per se try to foster locally and regionally 
anchored networks, seem to be particularly pulled apart between regional and national 
objectives when implemented in unitary countries. Also Salazar & Holbrook (2007) and 
Cammett (2007) underline that differences between unitary and federal countries exists and 
that policies should be adopted accordingly. However, to our knowledge, no targeted research 
exists on the exact challenges of implementing cluster policies in unitary countries compared 
to federal countries. The inefficiency of HCPR cannot be exclusively explained because of the 
fact that it is situated in a unitary country; otherwise Cap Digital would show the same 
                                                 
291
 see following report for a discussion of regional policies in different OECD countries (OECD, 2010) 
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negative results, which is not the case. It is actually the combination of different leadership 
issues. We have identified four different leadership conflicts that exist in policy-driven 
clusters and cluster policies more generally and that generate inefficiency: 
 
1.1.2.1 Leadership dilemma within the cluster’s governance structure 
There exists a leadership issue within HCPR’s governance structure, we explained this 
leadership issue with the absence of a clear “civic entrepreneur”, as defined by Lundequist & 
Power (2002). This leadership issue is a particular strong problem for HCPR and is also 
visible in the high turnover of HCPR’s presidents and CEOs (see Annex 17). One explanation 
why HCPR has difficulties to decide upon a “civic entrepreneur” is the absence of a real 
external “challenger”. Our interviews have shown that the operational team is struggling with 
all the “political agendas” of the highly prestigious research institutes and companies that are 
situated in the Region. All these entities know that they are situated in one of the most 
dynamic regions of the world and that they are doing excellent research in the medical 
domain. They already existed before HCPR was founded and they will also continue to exist 
in case HCPR dies one day. An external challenger that holds all these entities together and 
that creates “shared vision” (Himmelman, 2002) is missing. Both regional role models of the 
1980s had an external challenger they wanted to surpass: for Silicon Valley the external 
challenger was Route 128 (Saxenian, 1994) and for Emilia-Romagna the external challenger 
was the First Italy (Capecchi, 1990). From an organizational theory point of view the 
“readiness” of organizational members is very important (Armenakis, et al., 1993). Readiness 
is defined as “the cognitive precursor to the behaviours of either resistance to, or support for, 
a change effort” (Armenakis, et al., 1993, pp. 681-682). In a policy-driven cluster context, 
such as in most organisational contexts, policy-driven cluster managers often need to 
influence their organizational members’ “beliefs, attitudes, and intentions regarding the 
extent to which changes are needed and the organization’s capacity to successfully make 
those changes” (Armenakis, et al., 1993, p. 681). Applied to the Emilia-Romagna Region, we 
could say that the ruling parties have successfully managed to influence the population’s 
readiness. However, we found no evidence that this is the case for HCPR and it might 
actually be never the case. To this extent, a civic entrepreneur might thus stay absent.  
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1.1.2.2 Leadership dilemma among regional policy-driven clusters 
We explained this leadership issue with the absence of a regional umbrella organisations as 
also already advocated by Menu (2012) for the Brittany region. This would also go in the 
direction of abandoning maybe cluster policies all together and to focus on an 
“agglomeration policy” as advocated by Nathan & Overman (2013, p. 397). 
 
1.1.2.3 Leadership dilemma between the cluster and the national government 
We think that this is a leadership issue that is particularly present in unitary countries that try 
to implement cluster policies (Burfitt, et al., 2007; S. Menu, 2012), but literature on this topic 
is nearly completely absent and further research is necessary. In the context chapter we asked 
the question if the French cluster policy is more a top-down or a bottom-up initiative 
(Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005). Some argue that the French policy-driven clusters are 
bottom-up clusters (Fontagné, et al., 2013; Lallemand, 2013), others argue that they are top-
down clusters (Berthinier-Poncet, 2012; Gallié, et al., 2013b). The question seems to be more 
complicated than that, particularly in a unitary country where leadership issues exists between 
the policy-driven cluster and the national government. Even if regional actors started the 
initiative (so theoretically a bottom-up initiative), the leadership challenges between the 
policy-driven cluster and the national government continue to exist. A bottom-up cluster in a 
federal country does not have the same challenges as a bottom-up cluster in a unitary country. 
 
1.1.2.4 Leadership dilemma among the different ministries 
Several authors already discussed that leadership issues in cluster policies emerge because 
several different ministries try to pull the policy in their direction (Sternberg, et al., 2010; T. 
Weil & Fen Chong, 2008; Younès, 2011). However, even though the general cluster policy 
might be vaguely defined in the beginning and the objectives blurry, this does not seem to 
impact the policy-driven cluster itself. The analysis of HCPR has shown that this leadership 
issue at the ministry level is somehow too distant to have a direct impact on the policy-driven 
cluster. Moreover, the cluster organization has anyhow to “re-intepret” the general objectives 
in concrete and enunciable management objectives. 
 
1.1.3 Summary 
Leadership issues in policy-driven clusters drive inefficiency. We identified four sources of 
leadership dilemmas that drive inefficiency in HCPR: leadership dilemmas within the policy-
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driven cluster’s governance structure, among regional policy-driven clusters, between the 
policy-driven cluster and the national government, and finally among the different ministries 
(which though has the least direct impact on HCPR). The leadership dilemma within HCPR’s 
governance structure is particularly visible and impact’s its performance. No “civic 
entrepreneur” exists that holds the cluster together and that has identified an external 
challenge to overcome. On the one hand HCPR wishes to be egalitarian by finding consensus 
among its very “political” members, on the other hand this situation paralyses all decision 
processes. 
 
1.2 A pathology of distrust 
We first summarize the “pathology of distrust” results of our fieldwork and then discuss the 
results in the light of the literature. 
 
1.2.1 Results: Subsidies dilemma (also) drives cluster distrust 
A main driver of distrust between HCPR and its members is the dilemma of the subsidies 
type (direct vs. indirect subsidies – dilemma PD#2a). The French policy-driven clusters are 
structured around R&D project subsides (direct subsidies) and the policy-driven clusters are 
responsible for labelling the best projects that can then, in a second step, be submitted to a 
national financing fund. The policy-driven cluster only has a labelling authority and no 
subsidising authority. Through financing R&D projects in policy-driven clusters, the 
government wishes to create a strong local network of actors who know each other and who 
innovate together. The positive impact of collaborative R&D projects has been shown in our 
data: project leaders often find new ideas thanks to partners they have met in collaborative 
R&D projects. However, this good intention also generates a side effect: distrust between 
HCPR and its members. HCPR seems to be torn apart between its role to be a friend for the 
project leaders (who helps the project leaders with the R&D project set-up) and its role to be a 
judge for the submitted R&D projects. According to the project leaders, this friend/judge role 
generates a schizophrenic situation.  
 
In Figure 40 we tried to schematize the different conflict zones that are generated because of 
this subsidies dilemma: 
- The zone between the project consortium and the scientific committee, because the 
project leader considers that the scientific committee is biased, and that it only pushes 
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for its own private objectives, refuses projects that might come into their way and is 
not giving all the projects the same chance. 
- The zone between the project consortium and the operational team, because the project 
leader does not understand the negative outcome of the labelling process. This creates 
frustration among the operational team and the project consortium. On the governance 
level we have seen that policy-driven cluster managers have difficulties in managing 
the negative and aggressive feedback they receive from project leaders once their 
projects were rejected. 
- The zone between the scientific committee and the executive committee, because the 
executive committee considers that the project has to be labelled and so outruns the 
decisions previously taken by the scientific committee. In the end, project leaders 
think that lobbying can overrule the “objective” decisions taken by the evaluation 
committee, which creates frustration among those that are not yet highly integrated in 
the policy-driven cluster community.  
- The zone between the subsidies level and the project consortium, because the project 
leader does not understand why his/her project was praised by HCPR but was then 
refused on the national level. 
- Finally, the zone between the national level and the policy-driven cluster, because no 
clear explanations are given to HCPR as to why a project was eventually refused. 
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Figure 40: Trust is challenged when looking at the collaborative R&D project level 
 
 
Our examples have shown that if a project is rejected and does not receive a cluster label, this 
rejection can highly frustrate the project leader (but also HCPR’s operational team) and push 
the project leader away from the policy-driven cluster. In other words, our data show that the 
project leader may have the tendency to turn away from HCPR and contact another policy-
driven clusters in the region or stop passing through policy-driven clusters at all, privileging 
other sources of subsidies not related to policy-driven clusters. Additionally, delegating one 
part of the direct subsidies’ decision to the policy-driven clusters also generates a lot of 
lobbying activities in and around policy-driven clusters. These lobbying activities are critical 
seen by some project leaders, because they think that too much effort is needed to submit a 
project to the policy-driven clusters. This reluctance is intensified because of rumours that for 
example thanks to lobbying an executive office retrospectively “labels” a project that was not 
labelled initially. The direct subsidies thus create lobbying behaviour which intensifies the 
distrust that a project leader might have regarding a policy-driven cluster. The consequence is 
reluctance to get integrated in the policy-driven cluster community. 
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1.2.2 Discussion: Theoretical “trust facilitator” struggles with trust issues 
A considerable amount of literature exists that investigates and underlines the importance of 
trust among different actors (e.g. between companies, between companies and universities) 
located in clusters (Cooke, 1996; Cooke & Wills, 1999; MacKinnon, et al., 2004; McEvily & 
Zaheer, 2004; Mesquita, 2007; Murphy, 2006; Ottati, 1994). A multitude of definitions exists 
for trust. We will refer to Sabel’s (Charles F Sabel, 1993, p. 1133) definition that is often used 
in the cluster context (Cooke, 1996). According to Sabel (1993, p. 1133), trust is “the mutual 
confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit the other’s vulnerability”. The cluster 
literature emphasises that trust is a crucial element that needs to be created and fostered to 
improve the knowledge exchange processes between the local actors and to increase the local 
actor’s innovation capacity. However, trust is not only difficult to conceptualise but also 
difficult to create in “economic space” (Murphy, 2006). A particular role is thus always given 
to the organisations and managers that are animating the policy-driven clusters. For example, 
Mesquita (2007) discusses the important role of “trust facilitators” that need to create bridges 
between normally competing local actors. Also Cooke (1996) or Colletti (2010) allocate a 
central role to the skills of these cluster or network managers in order to create a “relational 
glue” (Powell, 1998; Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005) between the local actors. The cluster 
literature focuses on the conflict zone that may exist between economic actors situated in the 
cluster and the role cluster managers can play to help smoothing this relationship (see Figure 
41 for a visual representation of the above situation).  
 
During HCPR’s performance contract signature event, HCPR’s president announced in his 
speech that one of HCPR’s objectives during the second policy phase would be to “create a 
cluster spirit and trust between its actors”. This discourse uses the official cluster vocabulary 
also found in the literature. Officially HCPR sees itself as a “trust facilitator”, as defined by 
Mesquita (2007), for the health and medical actors of the Paris Region. However, our 
observations show that the “trust facilitator” role is challenged. Instead of “just” facilitating 
trust within the region, the policy-driven cluster managers of HCPR struggle themselves with 
trust issues (see Figure 41). 
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Figure 41: Focus of the cluster literature regarding trust and literature gap 
Cluster literature’s focus regarding trust Cluster literature’s gap regarding trust 
 
 
But what triggers this pathology? The objective of cluster policies is to transform 
agglomerations into functioning clusters and to find incentives that go in this direction 
(Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006; Mans, et al., 2008; Schmiedeberg, 2010). In some countries (for 
example France and Japan) one popular method to foster the clustering process between local 
actors is the use of direct R&D subsidies (Gallié, et al., 2013b; Kitagawa, 2005; Nishimura & 
Okamuro, 2011b). At some point the French government was in front of this subsidies 
dilemma: putting most of the money into direct subsidies or indirect subsidies. The choice of 
the French government was to mainly focus on direct subsidies. 
 
The current literature that deals with subsidies and policy-driven clusters focus on two side-
effect pathologies: complexity of the support structure driving inefficiency, and risk aversion 
of the government driving pragmatic behaviour. The literature generally focuses on criticising 
the complexity of the support structure or the “bureaucratic” nature support structures can 
build up and which compromises the dynamism of the regional endeavour (Burfitt & 
Macneill, 2008; Enright, 2003; Erdyn, et al., 2012; Guisard, et al., 2010; Lallemand, 2013). 
We identified one study that goes a little bit further than just discussing the complexity of the 
cluster policy support system. Nishimura & Okamuro (2011b) conducted a study on Japanese 
cluster policies and they identified that direct subsidies (i.e. support for R&D consortia, R&D 
subsidies) might lead to less success than the indirect help (i.e. networking/coordination 
supports) provided by the government. They mainly argue that direct subsidies in cluster 
policies lead governments to adopt a risk aversion attitude, mainly financing projects that are 
already born for success and ignoring the more challenging and thus maybe more radical 
innovation projects. Our fieldwork allows observing in detail and very close to the ground 
which type of effects these direct subsidies generate on HCPR. We first discuss our data in 
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relation to the two side-effect pathologies related to subsidies and already identified in the 
literature: complexity and risk aversion. Finally, we turn to the additional side-effect 
pathology that we identified: “distrust”. 
 
1.2.2.1 Subsidies dilemma drives inefficiency (complexity of support structure) 
Complexity of the support-structure is often criticised to be a bureaucratic burden for policy-
driven clusters (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Enright, 2003), which drives inefficiency. On the 
one hand, our interviewed project leaders are generally real specialists in how to obtain and 
apply for European and French subsidies. They seem not to be frightened by the high number 
of support structures. It is their daily job to win subsidies calls for their respective companies 
and they value the large variety of support structures that exist in the Paris Region. This 
empirical result goes along with the arguments of Fixari & Pallez (2014) that complexity 
always depends on the eye of the beholder. The subsidies system for an outsider seems 
difficult, but an insider finds its way along and is happy that such a variety exists. However, 
on the other hand, the project leaders do heavily criticise the complicated nature of the R&D 
zones attached to the policy-driven cluster subsidy (the FUI). These R&D zones create 
inefficiency. The benefits for companies to build networks with non-local companies are 
intensively discussed in the literature (Cumbers, et al., 2003; Huggins & Johnston, 2009; 
Mans, et al., 2008; Martinez, et al., 2012; McDonald, et al., 2007; Nishimura & Okamuro, 
2011a). However, another body of cluster literature treats the advantages of face-to-face 
interactions within territories (Gertler, 1995, 2003; Lawson & Lorenz, 1999; Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999; Storper, 1995; Storper & Venables, 2004). The underlying assumption is 
that through face-to-face interactions, people can more easily transfer tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1991; Polanyi, 1966). The direct subsidies implemented by the French government 
try to generate face-to-face contact within a defined territory, but again the good intention 
creates administrative burdens for the companies for whom collaborating only with local 
actors does not make any sense. 
During our interviews, project leaders underlined that indeed face-to-face contact is important 
in order to get a project going, but it is not necessary that all project partners are located in the 
same region. Project consortiums do not look for the nearest company to build up a project 
but look for the most competent national or international company. This result goes along 
with the results of other authors (Rallet & Torre, 2005; Torre, 2008), that already underlined 
that different types of proximity exists and that permanent geographical proximity is not the 
only type of proximity that counts. We also identified that project leaders are like free 
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electrons in their respective organisations, so it is very easy for them to go to a variety of 
“temporary clusters”, as defined by Maskell et al. (2006), to identify new project partners. 
Geographically bound R&D subsidies though create a strong administrative burden for 
project leaders as they try to get the project labelled by several policy-driven clusters in case 
the project partners are spread out over the whole territory. Since our fieldwork period, the 
French national authorities have granted policy-driven clusters the possibility to extend their 
R&D zones. However, this only means that the geographical boundary dilemma continues to 
persist, only on another scale. The dilemma of the geographical boundary of a policy-driven 
cluster is not solved by this measure. To overcome this “subsidy” and related “geographical” 
problem, a proper agglomeration policy, as advocated by Nathan & Overman (2013), which 
would be independent from financial R&D subsidies, could appear as a better solution. 
 
1.2.2.2 Subsidies dilemma favour low-risk projects (risk-aversion of cluster org.) 
Nishimura & Okamuro (2011b) criticised that direct subsides in policy driven clusters might 
lead to less success than the indirect help a government can provide by financing policy-
driven cluster support structures. They mainly argue that direct subsidies in cluster policies 
lead governments to adopt a risk aversion attitude, mainly financing projects that are born for 
success. Our results also point in this direction. The Parisian policy-driven clusters are in 
competition to each other, one indicator used to compare the quality of their work is their 
transformation rate (labelled projects to financed projects). We have seen as well that it can 
happen that a policy-driven cluster labels a project but then, during a second submission, does 
not label the project again. Even though the project idea might appear good, the knowledge 
that the national authorities will not finance a project prevents the cluster organisation to label 
it. This raises the question if new radical innovations are able to emerge in policy-driven 
clusters that face a direct subsidies dilemma. For the government, the advantage of integrating 
the cluster organisations in the labelling process is to have the experts of a certain field 
already reunited, but the disadvantage of this process is that the ones that evaluate and label 
the projects, are themselves evaluated by the state. One project leader perfectly summarized 
the dilemma: “Policy-driven clusters are organisms that have to live as well”. 
 
1.2.2.3 Subsidies dilemma drives distrust (policy-driven cluster involved in subsidies) 
Our fieldwork also shows that there exists a third side-effect pathology regarding direct 
subsidies: distrust. Even though the complexity issue and the risk-aversion issue is treated in 
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the cluster policy literature, to our knowledge the distrust issue is not yet fully discussed. One 
reason might be that it is a specifically French problem, and in the other countries the cluster 
policies are not directly involved in the labelling process of projects. However, this distrust 
issue was a central theme in our case study that needs more attention. As already said in the 
beginning of this sub-section, the cluster literature traditionally underlines the importance of 
trust so that a cluster can develop successfully, be it a spontaneous or policy-driven cluster 
(Cooke, 1996; Cooke & Wills, 1999; MacKinnon, et al., 2004; McEvily & Zaheer, 2004; 
Mesquita, 2007; Murphy, 2006; Ottati, 1994). However, the focus of this literature 
particularly lies on the problem of creating trust between the cluster actors and not on trust 
problems among those who should actually be the “trust facilitators”. Our explorative case 
study has shown that several types of conflict zones can emerge in policy-driven clusters (see 
Figure 40 that graphically schematize these conflict zones) because of the direct subsidies 
labelling decision attached to the policy-driven cluster. These conflict zones create trust issues 
within the cluster organisation but also between the cluster organisation and the project 
consortiums and the wider cluster community. This has a negative impact on the development 
of the policy-driven cluster. Creating “relational glue” (Powell, 1998; Smith-Doerr & 
Powell, 2005) in some policy-driven clusters, such as in our case study, seems particularly 
challenging. However “mutual confidence” (Charles F Sabel, 1993, p. 1133) is important in 
order to foster innovation. Not only the cluster literature underlines that trust is important for 
a cluster to develop (Cooke, 1996; Cooke & Wills, 1999; MacKinnon, et al., 2004; McEvily 
& Zaheer, 2004; Mesquita, 2007; Murphy, 2006; Ottati, 1994), also the innovation 
management literature underlines the importance of trust and positive group climate for 
creativity and research endeavours (Amabile, 1996, 1998; Bland & Ruffin, 1992; Chawla & 
Singh, 1998; La Porte, 1965; Ryan & Hurley, 2007). Fostering innovation and being a judge 
at the same time seems to be a difficult endeavour, at least for HCPR. 
We have to recall at this point, that processes leading to innovation are multi-fold. The 
management literature distinguishes different types of processes that lead to innovation: 
creativity, research, development and design (Swann, 2009). In order to generate 
breakthrough innovations all processes are important, but different environments have to be 
created for each of these processes. The literature for example distinguishes that an evaluation 
culture or monetary rewards are contra-productive in the creativity process (Amabile, 1996, 
1998) but important in the development process (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995; Ernst, 2002). 
A recent study on French policy-driven clusters investigated the role of policy-driven clusters 
in the knowledge identification, acquisition and utilisation phase (Bocquet & Mothe, 2010). 
Third part: Empirical case study - results and discussion – Chapter nine 
 
 339 
Even though Bocquet & Mothe (2010) do not directly address the role of labelling and direct 
subsidies for this endeavour, they do underline that the better performing policy-driven cluster 
under review is a policy-driven cluster that creates incentives, particularly non-financial 
incentives, for their members to interact. 
The HCPR seems to be focus mainly on the labelling part without creating other incentives to 
participate in the cluster community for knowledge exchange. Our fieldwork shows that these 
direct subsidies impact the trust relationship between the R&D consortiums and the 
theoretical “trust facilitators”. The project leaders use the services of HCPR particularly 
during the subsidies finding phase and less during the partner finding or idea finding phases. 
During the subsidies finding phase HCPR plays a crucial role as it helps the actors to 
formalize their R&D projects and to find the best corresponding subsidies. However, at some 
point the project leaders submit their projects for labelling to HCPR. This submission creates 
a “schizophrenic” situation, because HCPR passes from “being a friend to being a judge”. In 
case the final result (be it on the labelling level or the subsidies level) of this submission is 
negative, distrust emerges. 
 
1.2.3 Summary 
Governments have to decide how to subsidies policy-driven clusters. They can either 
privilege indirect subsidies or direct subsidies. In our case study direct subsidies are the main 
modus operandi. Regional bound direct subsidies have the advantage that they “force” 
regional actors to get to know each other. However, direct subsidies also create negative side-
effect pathologies. For the time being HCPR struggles to create other types of incentives to 
participate in its ecosystem to counterbalance the negative side effects that are associated to 
direct subsidies. Direct subsidies create several pathologies like inefficiency due to the 
complexity of the support structure or low risk projects due to the risk-aversion of the policy-
driven cluster (or the government). But direct subsidies also create distrust. This is a side 
effect that can particularly impact the knowledge exchange capacity, the theoretically heart of 
every policy-driven cluster, particularly if the modus operandi mainly focuses on direct 
subsidies.  
 
1.3 A pathology of pragmatism 
We first summarize the “pathology of pragmatism” results of our fieldwork and then discuss 
the results in the light of the literature. 
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1.3.1 Results: Dilemma on innovation&collaboration management drives pragmatism 
Project leaders are extremely active in a variety of different research communities, not only 
the policy-driven cluster community but also in other communities. Their objective is to 
maintain good relations with all of these communities. Once they are known they only 
participate occasionally in events to stay on the radar of the policy-driven cluster and the 
companies. The result of this is a diminishing number of participants in policy-driven cluster 
events. This was illustrated through the ICT & Health events. In case the policy-driven cluster 
managers do not constantly innovate the concept of the event, the participation number drops. 
 
There are two types of partners that project leaders are very keen on meeting: industrials and 
doctors. Both parties are necessary for ICT & Health projects, but extremely difficult to get in 
contact with. Industrials are the “king of community” and extremely solicited, they don’t need 
to participate in these events, but also doctors are quite difficult to grasp. The ICT & Health 
workshops have shown that doctors would have been needed to develop new project ideas, 
but they were absent. Also the interviews with our project leaders confirmed the fact that 
doctors are difficult to grasp and that project leaders have to be really inventive in order to 
track them down. Events were they participate are extremely important. The reasons why 
doctors are absent of policy-driven cluster events seem different than for industrials. 
 
First of all doctors are highly occupied and often place bound in their hospitals. This stays in 
strong contrast to the project leaders who are “free agents” that can easily participate in a 
range of events. Additionally, historically doctors seem to have a privileged relationship with 
universities and not directly with companies. Finally, once they are in contact with a project 
leader for a new project, they leave the subsidies lobbying part to the project leaders. As the 
ICT & Health events are somehow associated to this lobbying domain doctors seem to stay 
out of these events. 
 
However, two cases showed that this tendency might be turned around. Each time it was 
when the companies went to the hospitals. In one case it was the clinicians who invited the 
universities and companies to the hospital (without a policy-driven cluster involved) and in 
the other case it was one ICT & Health event organised by the three Parisian clusters that 
moved for one occasion to a Research Institute of a Hospital. The event in the research 
institute of a hospital considerably increased the participation of clinicians as well. This 
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exchange with the clinicians seems particularly important in the idea generation phase. 
Projects that were created out of this interaction seem particularly promising. However, for 
the time being HCPR seems to have difficulties to integrate doctors.  
 
The different priorities in the performance contract are large, ranging from generating jobs 
over establishing contracts with other policy-driven clusters to mapping the region and 
organising meetings. This first impression of the performance contract already shows that 
dilemmas develop around how to actually reach the overall goal of fostering competitiveness 
in the region. Passing from the objectives like innovation and becoming the “highest 
concentration of expertise and healthcare resources in Europe”, announced by HCPR’s 
president during the performance contract signature, to concrete actions, that make this vision 
come true, seems to be a difficult task. In the performance contract, HCPR defines a large 
spectrum of actions, for example exchanges on knowledge, helping in financing, develop 
trainings, develop various partnerships. However, at the moment HCPR developed its new 
services, the executive office took the pragmatic decision that the most important for its 
members is to help them in concrete business issues (for example help in human resources, 
business development, financing, etc.), something that is of course advantageous for business 
development (de Géry, et al., 2013) or training (De Géry, 2010). The wish of the wider 
ecosystem to have also innovation services, for example hospital visits or other inter-sectoral 
cooperations, was rejected.  
 
However, as innovation per se is the cornerstone of policy-driven clusters, the access to 
doctors difficult but a the same time the value of doctor interactions big, this raises the 
question if this pragmatism, which is certainly profitable for HCPR, is not hindering the 
development of the whole ecosystem292. (recently though (after our fieldwork), HCPR 
introduced Biomarker workshops to start improving the interaction with clinical staff). 
 
One of the main dilemmas that emerge after this analysis is what type of innovation process 
HCPR wishes to foster (which stage of innovation? - dilemma MD#2a) and which type of 
collaboration possibilities should be installed to allow this interaction to happen (how to 
foster collaboration - dilemma MD#3a)? The interviewed project leaders, the ICT & Health 
                                                 
292
 Our data show that none of the 19 investigated project ideas (and therefore the 30 administrative projects) can 
be particularly linked to one of the policy-driven clusters. Additionally, for only 4 projects a cluster organisation 
helped finding project partners. Most of the interactions between project leaders and policy-driven clusters took 
place during the finding subsidies phase but not through events organised by one of the policy-driven clusters. 
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events were somehow not able to generate this fruitful interaction. The “Meetic” format of the 
organised events seems to be unadapted to involve the doctors, and keep the “free agents” on 
the ball. Doctors belong to a world the project leaders are not familiar with and so the 
challenge lies in finding events (all kinds of events) where these key partners participate. It is 
particularly important for the project leaders to meet the doctors in person, so physical spaces 
are important to exchange with these key actors. However, HCPR, at least for the ICT & 
Health events, seems to have underestimated this challenge as doctors were highly absent and 
the cluster managers had difficulties to motivate them to attend. Additionally, we could ask if 
the lobbying activities and direct subsidies that are linked to the policy-driven clusters hinder 
a free development of ideas and attract only business driven SMEs instead of idea driven 
actors.  
 
The Paris Region is a very dense region with a high number of competing events. In the 
performance contract, HCPR wrote that a challenge for the second cluster policy phase is to 
show the local ecosystem the added value of HCPR. Opening the doors to the “doctor” world, 
might be seen as a source of added value and competitive advantage, but it also inevitably 
raises the following question: for whom a policy-driven cluster is working? Is it mainly for its 
members who might know the “doctor” world, or rather for the wider ecosystem who might 
not know the doctor world (organisational boundary – dilemma PD#1b)? Fostering 
collaboration is a difficult endeavour and for the time being HCPR seems to be draped in the 
pathology of pragmatism, focusing on the needs of its members and staying in a business-
oriented approach. This fact, together with the associated distrust pathology, also lays the 
ground to push the innovation process of the policy-driven cluster in a certain direction: 
towards development and away from creativity.  
 
The project leaders seem to be particularly attracted by the subsidies function of the policy-
driven cluster and less by finding new ideas. Our data showed that the idea generation process 
has always taken place outside HCPR’s boundary. HCPR’s operational team seems to be 
strongly business oriented and mainly focuses on the development and commercialisation 
process of innovation. This strong focus on the development process is visible through 
different observations: 
- The main subsidy associated to the policy-driven clusters is the FUI. The FUI is 
concentrated on the development phase of innovation. 
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- The types of events HCPR organises are situated at a very advanced stage of the 
project consortium formation process. At the ICT & Health events the project 
consortium presents its project with the objective to attract maybe one additional 
missing project partner or to just lobby for its project. However, the idea finding 
process is already over.  
- During these events, ICT & Health managers privilege projects that are already well 
formulated, set-up and which have the potential to be submitted for labelling and 
financing in a very short period of time. 
- The tasks of the different project consortium partners are well separated. The project 
leader does not necessarily know all the partners personally. Sometimes he has only 
talked by phone with a partner and all project consortium partners do not know each 
other. The project consortium is not a close group of people that tries to develop a 
ground-breaking innovation together. Once the project is financed, each project 
partner works on its defined task.  
- The collaborative research projects need to integrate an industrial partner even though 
this seems quite difficult to do. 
- HCPR has not further pursued services concentrated on innovation management but 
privileges economic development services for its members.  
 
1.3.2 Discussion: Doctors, a specie difficult to meet? 
The events and services that we were able to observe at HCPR are more oriented towards the 
development phase of innovation (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995; Ernst, 2002) than the 
creativity phase of innovation (Amabile, 1996; Amabile, et al., 1996). While this is of course 
an acceptable decision, several cluster policy authors underline the risk of clusters to lock 
themselves in into a certain innovation path (Agogué, 2012; Eklinder-Frick, et al., 2012; 
Hermans, et al., 2012; Visser, 2009). This leads to diminishing returns in the longue run 
(Visser, 2009). Some authors thus argue that the creativity of the members has to be 
stimulated actively (Agogué, 2012; Lefebvre, 2013) by dedicated workshops to motivate 
members to think out of the box. However, HCPR does little to organise dedicated innovation 
workshops and the proposed services were cancelled. 
 
Additionally, a variety of “boundary objects” can foster knowledge exchange and potential 
collaborations between different partners: for example people (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 1998; 
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Lester & Piore, 2006; McEvily & Zaheer, 2004) or physical meeting places (Allen, 1977; 
Allen & Henn, 2007; Morris, 2002; Nonaka & Konno, 1998). In policy-driven clusters this 
role is particularly incarnated by the policy-driven cluster managers (Bellandi & Caloffi, 
2010a), by organised temporary clusters (Guisard, et al., 2010; Lefebvre, 2013; Maskell, et 
al., 2006) and sometimes also by permanent locations (Le Barzic & Distinguin, 2010). Our 
case study showed that particularly policy-driven cluster managers (the operational team) and 
to a far lesser extent temporary clusters (e.g. ICT & Health events) play a role in HCPR’s 
ecosystem. However, no permanent location exists where cluster members can freely meet. 
As we have seen, HCPR’s office was even that small, that no proper conference room existed, 
which lead to the externalisation of many meetings to scattered member locations. HCPR 
counts on its policy-driven cluster managers and temporary clusters to get their actors of their 
ecosystem connected. However, for the time being HCPR seems to have difficulties to 
integrate doctors, who are quite place bound in hospitals. Our hypothesis is that the current 
event format is not adapted to the needs of the clinicians. This would also mean that for the 
time being the HCPR has not yet been able to be the perfect translator (J. S. Brown & Duguid, 
1998) between the company and the medical world.  
 
Finally, our data has shown Project leaders that wish to participate in the policy-driven cluster 
research community go through different phases (see Figure 42). When the project leaders are 
new to the community, they actively participate in different events, or so called temporary 
clusters (Maskell, et al., 2006), organised by the policy-driven cluster. However, in parallel, 
they also participate in a range of other events (e.g. events organised by the ministries, other 
associations, etc.). Already Cooke (1996) underlined that a lively ecosystem is necessary for 
regional innovation system to prosper, however for HCPR, that wishes to establish itself in 
the region as the key actor of the health care sector, this lively ecosystem also represents a 
danger. The policy-driven cluster events and parallel events allow the project leaders to get to 
know the different communities. However, this changes, once they know the community and 
the community knows them. Once this happens, the project leaders prefer contacting their 
acquaintances or the policy-driven cluster managers by phone instead of participating in 
events. This also confirms the research stream on proximity and that permanent geographical 
proximity is not the only type of proximity that counts (Rallet & Torre, 2005; Torre, 2008).  
 
Our data has also shown that most of the projects need several rounds of presentations and 
lobbying, labelling submissions and subsidies submissions before getting finally financed. 
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During this itinerary, national but also international competitors that have enough financial 
capacity, can easily get started to develop the newly proposed ideas. A fear expressed by 
several project leaders. Guisard et al (2010) underline that one big problem of policy-driven 
clusters is the fear of speaking freely and share information during meetings. However, this 
problem seems to be even amplified, once the idea is finally formalised and starts the 
labelling and submission process.  
 
Figure 42: R&D consortium construction process 
 
 
1.3.3 Summary 
In this sub-section we have looked at the pathology of pragmatism. For the time being, HCPR 
proposes very pragmatic animation services mainly concentrated on fostering the business 
aspects of its members. However this raises the question if other opportunities (such as the 
links with doctors which are currently little explored) or potential dangers (such as the 
regional innovation lock-in) are not important to keep in mind and a purely pragmatic focus 
might be dangerous as well.  
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1.4 A pathology of nonconformity 
We first summarize the “pathology of nonconformity” results of our fieldwork and then 
discuss the results in the light of the literature. 
 
1.4.1 Results: Structural dilemmas drive cluster nonconformity 
HCPR has the advantage (and disadvantage) to be situated in the Paris Region, a highly dense 
urban agglomeration (degree of urbanisation - dilemma SD#3b). On the one hand, the 
region has the highest concentration of hospitals in Europe and world-class research 
universities, institutes, and research parks. On the other hand, the region was already highly 
structured and dynamic before the cluster policy was launched. The degree of closeness but 
also potential hostilities between the local actors are already deeply anchored in the Region’s 
DNA (degree of closeness between regional actors - dilemma SD#2c). Additionally, also 
HCPR’s DNA is different compared to other policy-driven clusters of the region. HCPR is 
more radical innovation oriented compared to Cap Digital or Systematic that are more 
incremental innovation oriented (type and sector of activity of policy-driven cluster actors 
– dilemma SD#2b). This puts HCPR in a difficult position, regarding the added value it can 
bring to its members based on what is expected from it under a standardised cluster policy. 
There are two main structural dilemmas: the Region’s DNA and HCPR’s DNA.  
 
Region’s DNA (degree of urbanisation - dilemma SD#3b; degree of closeness between 
regional actors - dilemma SD#2c). The dilemma emerges between what is theoretically 
expected from a French policy-driven cluster and the local reality the policy-driven cluster is 
facing: on the one hand regarding the already existing support structures, and on the other 
hand regarding the already existing relationships between the members of the ecosystem. 
- Existing support structure. HCPR announced in its performance contract that it 
wishes to become the “key health actor in the Paris Region” by harmonising the 
existing support structure. Somehow one could say that HCPR takes its cluster role at 
heart and wishes to become the central organ of the local ecosystem. During our 
observation period in HCPR we participated in the negotiations HCPR had with other 
support structures of the region to develop new services tailor-made for the medical 
sector. However, HCPR had difficulties to push forward its ideas because multitudes 
of support structures exist in the region that also already propose services for the 
medical sector. This puts HCPR in the delicate situation to defend its existence but at 
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the same time comply with the policy demands. A one-shop system for the medical 
industry might be desirable, but at the same time the existing support structures will 
not stop offering their services. The life-cycle stage of the Paris Region cluster seems 
already well advanced which makes it challenging for a new entity to establish itself 
and to regroup existing offers. Again, the policy motivations that are behind the idea 
of regrouping existing offers are certainly good, but organisations are like human 
beings: they do not voluntarily decide to die. Pursuing such an ambitious objective is 
difficult in a highly urbanized location where existing support structures are deeply 
anchored. 
- Existing relationships between the members of the ecosystem. Another important 
element concerns the already existing degree of closeness between the local actors at 
the start of the cluster policy. The operational team seems to face a particular 
challenge in a dense Region such as the Paris Region with a lot of prestigious 
institutions that at the same time have a lot of “political” diverging objectives. This 
was particularly visible during our observation period in the policy-driven cluster: 
how the operational team talked about all the different personalities of the ecosystem, 
but also how there was a constant battle about what should actually be done (see 
mapping discussion or services). All of the prestigious structures already existed 
before the establishment of HCPR and already had a certain manner to function next 
to each other and with each other. The operational team of HCPR now tries to put 
these different well-established structures around one table. The operational team 
seems to be powerless in front of this political complexity. Even though a cluster 
organisation should represent the wishes of its members, the prestigious nature of the 
members and the regional specificities create considerable side effects. 
 
HCPR’s DNA (type and sector of activity of policy-driven cluster actors – dilemma 
SD#2b). Besides these structural challenges of bringing members and other support structures 
around one table, HCPR is less interested, compared to Cap Digital for example, in working 
across thematic boarders (for example less interested in ICT & Health, not interested in 
proposing new inter-cluster innovation services). This seems to be related to HCPR’s sector 
of activity. Cap Digital managed to transform a well-meant policy-description into an intrinsic 
motivation, while HCPR failed to do so. The ICT companies, pursuing more applied research, 
seem to be better equipped to find new business opportunities across thematic boundaries than 
medical companies that pursue basic research. 
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1.4.2 Discussion: The challenge of trying to be conform to national cluster policy rules 
A large range of studies underline that cluster policies should be adapted to the local culture 
and circumstances (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; Hospers, 2005; G.-J. Hospers & S. 
Beugelsdijk, 2002; Martinez, et al., 2012; Santisteban, 2006). However, even though the 
policy-driven cluster literature discusses this topic in a constant manner, multiple case studies 
on policy-driven clusters show that governments continue to use a best practice approach (G.-
J. Hospers, et al., 2009), believing in a universal “cluster credo” (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 
2013) without taking the local circumstances into account. Also in our case study, the difficult 
nature of HCPR’s local structure has not been taken into account prior the launch of the 
policy, be it the prestigious institutes or the already existing medical support structure. There 
was no prior assessment, as for example recommended by Hospers & Beugelsdijk (2002), to 
analyse the existing structure of the medical and health sector of the Paris Region, to 
understand the exact needs and challenges of the local actors, and then to adapt the policy 
accordingly. Starting a policy-driven cluster without really understanding the local structure 
bears several risks as some studies have already shown. Eklinder-Frick et al (2014, p. 10) for 
example observed that “despite the aim and effort to generate innovation, the network failed 
to do so” because the social structure of the local network has not been analysed enough in 
the beginning which hinders innovation initiatives to be correctly implemented. Also 
Ciravagna (2012), analysing Costa Rican ICT clusters, have shown that deeply rooted 
hostilities existed between local universities and the local private sector. They concluded that 
without addressing and talking about these “social obstacles”, any kind of proposed help fails 
to carry its fruits (Ciravegna, 2012). 
 
HCPR was the lowest rated policy-driven cluster in the Paris Region, during the first (2008) 
and second (2012) cluster policy evaluation (CMI & BCG, 2008; Erdyn, et al., 2012). This 
means that HCPR, since the beginning, is the policy-driven cluster of the Paris Region that 
has most of the problems with complying with the national cluster policy objectives. One 
possible reason of HCPR’s bad performance might be related to the nonconformity to the 
regional DNA, as just discussed. Another reason of HCPR’s bad performance might be 
related to its type of actors and sector of activity. According to the literature, policy-driven 
clusters with a more analytical approach (radical innovation) for example need another type 
of support structure than policy-driven clusters with a more synthetic approach (incremental 
innovation) (Asheim & Gertler, 2005; Coletti, 2010). If we look at the Paris Region clusters 
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and particularly the ICT & Health policy-driven clusters, HCPR’s ecosystem is much 
different to the other policy-driven clusters. 50% of HCPR’s members are scientific research 
and development companies (NAF 72). No other policy-driven cluster in the Paris region has 
such a high percentage of NAF 72 members. HCPR has to find a common ground with 
companies, hospitals and researchers and tries to do basic research, something that seems 
more difficult to do than Cap Digital, that is very SME and incremental innovation centred. 
HCPR is also different compared to nearly all other French policy-driven clusters operating in 
the biotechnology / health sector (the average among the medical clusters, excluding Lyon 
Biopôle and HealthCluster, is 35%). However, there is one exception: Lyon Biopôle. Lyon 
Biopôle has even more NAF 72 companies as members (58%) and was rated as an excellent 
performing cluster during the 2012 evaluation (Erdyn, et al., 2012). In a future study it would 
thus be highly interesting to compare HCPR and Lyon Biopôle to get a deeper insight in how 
Lyon Biopôle manages this basic research endeavour under the common cluster policy in 
order to have such an excellent performance compared to HCPR.  
 
1.4.3 Summary 
According to the national cluster policy evaluations, HCPR’s performance compared to other 
policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region is bad. However, our hypothesis is that this 
pathology of nonconformity could be solved by more closely looking at the region’s DNA, be 
it the conflicts or closeness of actors of the region or the already existing support structures. 
In a certain manner, HCPR needs to find its added value with the local reality. This added 
value might lie at places it has not thought about yet, as for example opining the doors of the 
doctors to the wider ecosystem of the region.  
 
2 Existence beyond difficulties: an organisation of hypocrisy? 
When looking at the pitfalls experienced by HCPR, the multitude of organisational dilemmas 
and pathologies it faces, one could legitimately wonder why – and how - this organization 
still exists today. In fact, not only was HCPR quite poorly evaluated during the first and 
second official cluster evaluation compared to the other policy-driven clusters of the Paris 
Region (CMI & BCG, 2008; Erdyn, et al., 2012), but also independent researchers judged 
HCPR’s organisational quality as being much lower than in the Systematic cluster 
(Bonnafous-Boucher & Saussois, 2010). Finally, our results also show that HCPR faces 
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important pathologies such as inefficiency, distrust, non-conformity and pragmatism. In other 
words, HCPR seems to struggle to get going since now nearly 10 years. 
 
However, instead of stopping this “hypocrisy”, the French State continues financing HCPR. 
One theoretical concept that could be helpful in order to explain this phenomenon is the 
concept of “organization of hypocrisy” (Brunsson, 2002 (1989), 2007). Hypocrisy at a first 
glance has a negative connotation, but for Brunsson (2002 (1989), p. xi) an organisational 
theorist, hypocrisy is “a solution rather than a problem”, particularly in political 
organizations. Political organisations, compared to action organisations, are organisations that 
are situated in environments where diverging opinions and values prevail. 
 
Brunsson (2002 (1989)) identified that political organisations use three types of instruments 
for “winning legitimacy and support from the environment”: talk, decisions and actions 
(products) (Brunsson, 2002 (1989), p. 27). When we look at action organizations, the three 
different instruments are consistent and in harmony with each other. Talks and decisions lead 
to certain actions, which then lead to an outcome (product). However, when looking at 
political organizations, the reality seems to be different and the three instruments “talk, 
decisions and actions” are not connected with each other in a logical manner: “hypocrisy is a 
fundamental type of behaviour in the political organization: to talk in a way that satisfies one 
demand, to decide in a way that satisfies another, and to supply products in a way that 
satisfies a third” (Brunsson, 2002 (1989), p. 27). HCPR and the French cluster policy more 
general can be interpreted with Brunsson’s concept (see Table 46).  
 
The French government evaluated for the first time all policy-driven clusters and their 
performances in 2008 (CMI & BCG, 2008) and then a second time in 2012 (Erdyn, et al., 
2012). This was done to justify the high investment and to take the necessary actions, 
theoretical to stop the policy, if needed. The decision was thus taken that the government 
ordered an evaluation. However, the actions were somehow not in coherence with the 
announced talk. The decision to extend the policy was already taken before the cluster 
evaluation was published (Gallié, et al., 2012). 
 
Only after a two years period, some clusters were delabelled. For HCPR, a delabelling seems 
though nearly impossible. In both cluster evaluations HCPR was rated the lowest policy-
driven cluster in the Paris Region, but besides alerts, no consequences have followed. 
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Somehow, it seems impossible to stop financing HCPR. Our hypothesis is the following: 
objectively, there is a high concentration of medical actors in the PR, a cluster exists and has a 
political value for the Paris region location. HCPR from a traditional geographical point of 
view can be considered as a cluster. The density of hospitals in the Paris Region is the highest 
in Europe293 and additionally one of the most renowned medical universities and research 
institutes are situated in the region. According to the typology of Markusen (1996), HCPR 
might have the greatest resemblance with the state-anchored industrial districts, where the 
local hospitals and universities are the core of the cluster. Having a medical cluster in the 
Paris Region brings international prestige and even though evaluations are conducted, and the 
policy-driven cluster functions badly, a delabelling might not be possible from a political 
point of view. This is different for policy-driven clusters that have been delabelled and that 
were situated in less prestigious regions and treating less prestigious sectors.  
 
Besides this general reflection on HCPR’s existence, we can also observe a more content 
“talk-decision-action” incoherence when digging into HCPR’s functioning. The official 
cluster discourse is that innovation has to be created. We not only see it at the political level 
when the policy is defined, but also in the language and discourse employed by HCPR’s 
president. On a political level, the decision is thus taken to launch policy-driven clusters to 
foster innovation and a collaborative R&D project subsidy system is put in place. However, if 
we look at the concrete actions that are proposed by the policy-driven clusters we realise that 
little help is provided in actually fostering innovation. The policy-driven cluster focuses more 
on business services and feels the pressure to create jobs in the region. So besides the omni-
present discourse that “innovation” has to be fostered in policy-driven clusters, the real 
actions on the ground are much more business oriented (see for example the services 
proposed) than innovation oriented.  
 
We think, that discussing HCPR’s existence and content in the light of Brunsson’s (2002 
(1989)) “organization of hypocrisies” concept is particularly valuable to put things in a 
broader context. This allows thinking “out of the box” and to not miss-interpret hastily certain 
incomprehension why organisations continue to exist that look very instable. Such as Fixari & 
Pallez (2014) who argue that the complexity of the system needs to be looked at from 
different angles, we also think that the incomprehension that we observed at HCPR have to be 
                                                 
293
 Source: http://www.paris-region.com/decouvrir-lile-de-france/des-filieres-economiques-dexcellence/sante-et-
sciences-du-vivant (01/09/2014) 
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analysed from different angles. Even though the cluster is evaluated badly, having a labelled 
cluster appears to be crucial for the Paris Region. Due to the highly systemic nature of policy-
driven clusters, their might always be levels of conflict and diverging opinions, but at the end 
somehow this organisation of hypocrisy continue to function and to work because some 
people do take advantage of its existence.  
 
Table 46: Interpretation of results in the spirit of Brunsson: talk, decision and actions 
 Talk Decision Actions Interpretation 
Cluster policy 
evaluations 
Public 
authorities 
announce to 
evaluate all 
policy-driven 
clusters and 
their 
performance, 
to justify the 
high 
investment and 
take the 
necessary 
actions if 
needed 
Public authorities 
ask private/public 
organisations to 
conduct a national 
evaluation of all 
policy-driven 
clusters 
No: 
- The decision to 
continue the policy 
was already taken 
before the cluster 
evaluation was 
published. 
- Critics regarding the 
organisation of 
HCPR, etc. but no 
consequences 
(already twice) 
It seems impossible to stop 
financing HCPR because 
objectively, there is a high 
concentration of medical 
actors in the PR, a cluster 
exists and has a political 
value for the Paris region 
location  
Cluster 
objective: 
Innovation vs. 
Business 
Policy-driven 
clusters will 
foster 
innovation 
Launch of a 
policy-driven 
cluster call, set up 
of policy-driven 
clusters, financing 
of collaborative 
R&D projects  
No/(Yes):  
Project ideas are 
created outside of 
HCPR’s realm, 
HCPR focuses on 
business services and 
not innovation 
services per se 
Even though innovation is 
always put forward as the 
main raison d’être other 
more pragmatic elements 
seem more important: the 
business support and job 
creation. 
 
3 Enriching the “management model” of cluster policy evaluations 
In this last section of our discussion we will now “close the loop” of our research and address 
our last research question: “How can the knowledge of these pathologies benefit to cluster 
policy (implementation and evaluation)?” (RQ3).  
 
Governments invest a substantial amount of money (Boekholt & Thuriaux, 1999; Cooke, 
2002; Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005) to create clusters. Due to the high amount of 
money that governments spend for cluster policies, and the need to justify the use of such 
public funds (Desautels, 1997), we currently witness a multiplication of policy-driven cluster 
evaluation reports. All countries face the same challenges regarding evaluations: the systemic 
nature of clusters and its multiple actors involved make clusters an extremely difficult object 
to evaluate. Reflections on cluster or regional innovation policy evaluations (Arthurs, et al., 
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2009; Bellandi & Caloffi, 2010b; Learmonth, et al., 2003; Russo & Rossi, 2009; 
Schmiedeberg, 2010) are still in the fledgling stages and governments still have to develop 
precise measurements and frameworks (Diez, 2001). Bellandi and Caloffi (2010a, p. 70) 
summarize very well the particularity of cluster evaluations, which need a “careful 
combination of the languages and tools of different study fields: the evaluation of public 
policies and the analysis of innovation and development processes.”  
 
Although cluster policies differ from country to country (OECD, 2005, 2007, 2009), cluster 
evaluations generally have the objective to improve, reorient, or justify the policy and the 
invested money (Diez, 2001; Jakoby, 2006; Shapira & Kuhlmann, 2003). Beyond these 
general objectives, evaluators face challenges in designing the evaluation itself. In fact, as 
there is no available and general “recipe” for a solid cluster policy evaluation, governments 
and evaluators have to choose among a large variety of evaluation design parameters and 
performance criteria. In two of our published articles we exactly address this issue by 
focusing on the design of policy-driven cluster evaluations and their usage. 
 
In our first article we analysed in detail the first French cluster policy evaluation conducted in 
2008 (Gallié, et al., 2012) (see Annex 18). We first developed an evaluation analysis 
framework (see Figure 43) (that we then further specified in Gallié et al. (2014, p. 106)) 
which allowed us to look in a structured manner on all the important components to 
understand the nature and the scope of the evaluation. This policy-driven cluster analysis 
framework is composed out of three components: Objects of evaluation and causality schema, 
approach and methodology, and effects and uses. Particularly, through the analysis of how the 
results of the evaluation are used, we show that the first French cluster policy evaluation takes 
part of a progressive construction of doctrine on what a cluster is and how it should be 
managed. Even though the direct impact of the evaluation on the reconfiguration of the policy 
was relatively small, we can however make the hypotheses that the evaluation process in itself 
has matured certain ideas, particularly the objectives of the policy, which are generally very 
vague in the beginning (Benzerafa, Garcin, Gibert, & Gueugnon, 2011)294. Additionally, the 
                                                 
294
 Wolman (1981, p. 436) explains this vagueness problem regarding the objectives as follows: “policy agendas 
usually reflect the mobilization of political demands rather than a rational process of evaluating needs, values, 
and objectives” and therefore rhetoric is frequently “substituted for adequate conceptualization, resulting in 
vagueness and lack of direction.” The advantage of this vagueness is that the policy can easily be changed and 
adapted without major political discussions, but this flexibility also implies a major disadvantage, namely that no 
clear evaluation criteria are defined at the beginning of the policy life cycle. Due to this vagueness of definition, 
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evaluation had an impact on the policy-driven clusters and the government by generating a 
reflective process. Following the policy-driven cluster evaluation the missions of the clusters 
were enlarged and the lack of a clear strategy triggered the government to set up individual 
cluster performance contracts during the second policy phase. The first French cluster policy 
evaluation is thus closer to the “in the action” approach than the “of the action” approach 
(Chanut, 2009). The evaluation process in itself becomes one part of the steering device for 
the policy-driven clusters. We can conclude that the evaluation process is somehow de-
sacralised and becomes just a device amongst others.  
 
Figure 43: The three components of a policy-driven cluster evaluation  
 
Source: English translation of the figure we developed in Gallié et al. (2014, p. 106) 
 
In our second article we compared the French cluster policy evaluation with three other 
European cluster policy evaluations (in Germany, Austria and Belgium) (Gallié, et al., 2014) 
(see Annex 19). This was particularly important because we were able to put the French 
results in a more European context to find evaluation communalities and differences. The 
major question we asked in this second article was if it is possible to identify one or several 
cluster policy evaluation models, which might eventually spare governments, or other cluster 
policy sponsors, to “reinvent” a new evaluation device each time (Gallié, et al., 2014). In the 
end we were able to identify two different evaluation model archetypes: an “economist” 
model (Germany) and a “management” model (France and Austria)295, which can again be 
related to the general notions “of the action” evaluation and “in the action” evaluation 
(Chanut, 2009):  
- The “economist” model, primarily uses an ex post assessment of the policy in terms 
of its economic impacts. For that the evaluation relied on quantitative and comparative 
                                                                                                                                                        
policy might alter considerably between the implementation of the policy and the end of the policy making it 
difficult for evaluators to set the “right” indicators and references. 
295
 Belgium was used a hybrid model.  
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approaches. The results of this type of evaluation, in appearance at least, have greater 
“objectification” (Gallié, et al., 2014).  
- The "management" model, emphasizes the assisting role of evaluation in the piloting 
process of policy-driven clusters. Therefore, this model seeks to qualify on-going 
interim results and explore patterns of causality on which the policy is based to test 
and possibly redirect the policy. This type of approach, without neglecting the interest 
of quantitative indicators, is based on qualitative methods and goes "into the black 
box" of the functioning of the policy-driven clusters. The independence of the 
evaluation process is not specifically sought; the “actionable” character of the 
evaluation is privileged often in close proximity to decision-makers. (Gallié, et al., 
2014) 
 
Even though the “management” model is more oriented towards actionable knowledge, both 
models have the virtue to oblige the evaluator to look at the problem of what is actually 
evaluated, which object. One major problem of every evaluation is what Sölvell (2008) calls 
the “ruler problem” or Hertting & Vedung (2012) call the “evaluative merit criteria”. Every 
evaluation should at some point translate the policy objectives in criteria that measure the 
benefit, merit, value or quality of the policy under appraisal. Evaluators can refer in their 
evaluations to criteria measured at different moments of the policy life cycle. Ideally every 
evaluation should be carried out in view of cluster policy criteria that were clearly defined and 
measured already at the beginning of the policy life cycle. In reality though ex ante 
evaluations are seldom conducted and most policies are solely evaluated by ex post 
evaluations that do not dispose of criteria that are comparable to similar criteria measured 
before or at the implementation stage of the policy. The main difficulty of ex post evaluations 
is thus already to define what the evaluators should actually evaluate or the “object” of 
evaluation. 
 
In Figure 44, based on the works of BIPE (2007) and Sölvell (2008) we summarized the 
different evaluation objects. The evaluation either concentrates on the cluster itself (white 
rectangles) or the evaluation can concentrate on the global effectiveness of the cluster policy 
or the inherited characteristics of each clusters (light grey rectangles). Finally the cluster 
evaluation can also focus on exogenous factors such as fiscal, legal or social environment 
(dark grey rectangle). The schema also shows the distinction that can be made between 
evaluating the cluster policy (light grey rectangle on the left side) or the cluster in itself (white 
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rectangles). While the first also needs the evaluation of the second, the second can also be 
evaluated independently. Additionally, when we only focus on the cluster itself (white 
rectangles) we can distinguish three different objects to evaluate (from the bottom to the top): 
The impact of the clusters on their territories or on the involved actors, the actions and 
intermediary results of the clusters, or finally the effectiveness of the cluster organization in 
terms of resources, governance and management. Additionally, all these objects are not 
independent from each other. The different objects are generally related through a causality 
schema on which the policy is based. 
 
Each of the different objects has different types of indicators. An evaluation can for example 
focus on the impact of clusters on their territories or on their members (level 1 in Figure 44). 
The chosen indicators are thus economic indicators such as turnover, job creation, size of 
business, new company formation, etc. An evaluation can also focus on the action and 
intermediary results of clusters with the assumption that these evaluation criteria are reliable 
intermediary results to evaluate the later impact. These intermediary results are for example 
number of projects, the amount of funding dedicated to R&D projects, number of patents, 
number of networking events, participation rates of members in collective activities, etc. 
(level 2 in Figure 44). Finally, an evaluation can also focus on the effectiveness of the cluster 
organization by evaluating its organizational structure, the quality of its strategy, skill and 
competence of cluster managers, animation budget, etc. (level 3 in Figure 44).  
 
The literature dealing with cluster policy evaluations underlines the need to combine different 
approaches and methodologies to better grasp the systemic and multi-dimensional nature of 
the object evaluated (Diez, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2003), but also to improve or to develop new 
indicators “that would enable innovation activities and policies to be evaluated” in a better 
way (Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, Voigt, Gutiérrez-Gracia, & Jiménez-Saez, 2007, p. 1157). There 
are several articles focusing on the exact methodologies and measurement issues of policy 
driven clusters (Colgan & Baker, 2003; Learmonth, et al., 2003; Schmiedeberg, 2010). 
However, all these articles have the tendency to focus on level 1 and level 2 indicators but not 
on how one could conduct a structured analysis of level 3, the effectiveness of the cluster 
organisation (and indirectly the effectiveness of its implementation). In this thesis we tried to 
fill this gap by proposing a new manner to think about the effectiveness of the cluster 
organisation, in line with the recent urge of some scholars to start studying cluster policies as 
a policy challenge (Burfitt, et al., 2007; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). In Figure 45 we 
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schematically show on which level we situate our thesis and propose an evaluation framework 
to improve level 3 object evaluations. We argue that implementing cluster policies produce 
organisational dilemmas that generate side-effect pathologies. In order to help governments 
and policy-driven cluster organisations to make more deliberate decisions we have to start 
observing the policy-driven clusters’ pathologies (e.g. distrust, inefficiency, etc.). This will 
then lead us to the associated dilemmas that are at the source of these pathologies. A dilemma 
always implies two or more options, by knowing which dilemma has driven a certain 
pathology we can then re-evaluate if another choice is better or if we just have to “cure” the 
pathology. Knowing its source is though necessary to start its treatment. We thus urge cluster 
policy scholars to pass from studying the “anatomy of clusters” (Porter, 1998c) to studying 
the “pathology of clusters”. 
 
Figure 44: The different objects of a cluster evaluation 
 
Source: English translation of the figure we developed in Gallié et al. (2014, p. 93) 
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Figure 45: Proposition of an evaluation framework to improve level 3 object evaluations 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
At the end of this doctoral work on the implementation of cluster policy and the related 
organisational dilemmas and pathologies that it generates within policy-driven clusters, it 
appears possible to synthesize its main results and to detail its contributions, at theoretical, 
methodological as well as empirical levels (section 1). Our work comprises necessarily a 
certain number of limitations, especially those related to the single case study methodology 
that was used and the empirical setting of the HCPR case (section 2). Finally, we conclude on 
the perspectives for further research that this thesis opens (section 3).  
 
1 Theoretical, methodological and managerial contributions 
In the introduction of the thesis, we have highlighted the particular place that policy-driven 
clusters occupy in today’s policy realm to foster innovation and competitiveness. We have 
also underlined the numerous difficulties, critics and crises that these organisations are 
currently facing. Some authors criticise for example the best practice attitude (Hospers, 2005), 
others the closed system view (Shearmur, 2011a) or the increasing relevance gap between 
academics and practitioners (Kiese & Wrobel, 2011). In regard to the profound transformation 
of the empirical landscape of the cluster research field (shifting away from economic objects 
towards political and organisational objects), the rise of organisational and managerial issues 
appears today as a major set of challenges that these “organisations” face (Burfitt & Macneill, 
2008). This new turn in cluster research has founded an important stream of new academic 
research, dedicated to the study of managerial practices (Lefebvre, 2013), of implementation 
practices (Burfitt, et al., 2007) and cluster policy evaluation (Gallié, et al., 2014). The main 
thesis developed in this doctoral work is that implementing cluster policies tends to produce 
organisational dilemmas at cluster level that generate side-effect pathologies. In Chapter 9 we 
have addressed each of our three research questions, hereinafter we will now highlight our 
contributions.   
 
1.1 Theoretical contributions 
During the 1990s, Porter (1998c, p. 78) scrutinized in detail a multitude of “healthy regions” 
in the United States, established mappings of these healthy regions, and called it the 
“anatomy” of clusters governments could strive for. In this thesis, we have shown that it is 
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necessary to pass from studying the “anatomy of clusters” to studying the “pathology of 
clusters” to help practitioners with their operational challenges to create “healthy regions”. 
We have defined “pathology” in a cluster setting as the visible managerial symptoms that 
policy-driven clusters may endure. We have demonstrated how some of these pathologies are 
directly generated by “organizational dilemmas”, i.e. a set of decisions and choices for which 
there is no “one best choice”. By privileging one direction over another in such dilemmas, 
side-effect pathologies can emerge. The challenge in cluster policy study is to pinpoint these 
side-effect pathologies and their associated dilemmas in order to improve cluster policy 
implementation and to better adapt the cluster policy to the local settings.  
 
Important theoretical contribution was made to the cluster policy literature (Burfitt & 
Macneill, 2008; Champenois, 2012; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; Engel, et al., 2013; Ketels, 
2013; S. Menu, 2012; Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011a, 2011b; Swords, 2013; Younès, 2012) 
especially with the establishment of a taxonomy of cluster policy dilemmas based on a 
systematic literature review (Denyer & Neely, 2004; Pittaway, et al., 2004; Tranfield, et al., 
2003). We grouped the identified organisational dilemmas in three main categories (political 
dilemmas, managerial dilemmas and structural dilemmas) and established a framework (see 
Figure 46). For every type of dilemma category we then identified a certain set of sub-
dilemmas (see Figure 47).  
 
Figure 46: A framework for the study of pathology in policy-driven clusters  
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Figure 47: Reminder of the different dilemmas developed in the literature review 
 
 
 
 
Another theoretical contribution to the cluster policy literature is the study an empricial 
cluster policy case and additionally of a “pathological” case, the HCPR case, that represents 
an extreme case (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006) in the cluster landscape. First, it was 
underlined that “few empirical studies with micro data have been conducted […] on the 
effects of cluster policies” (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011b, p. 715), our research tries to 
contribute to this gap. Second, during our empirical fieldwork, we were able to study a 
policy-driven cluster that consecutively received a low performance evaluation, from national 
cluster policy evaluators (CMI & BCG, 2008; Erdyn, et al., 2012) but also from academics 
(Bonnafous-Boucher & Saussois, 2010). HCPR is thus an ideal policy-driven cluster to show 
the academic community a pathologic case. This pathologic case allows, in a Popperian 
falsification tradition, to look at a “black swan” and to start a new critical reflection process 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228; Popper, 1959) on how a policy-driven cluster works. Even though 
there are numerous policy-driven clusters in France that seem to encounter much less 
difficulties (the “white swans”) (see for example (Bidan & Dherment-Férère, 2009; Chabault, 
2008; Retour, 2009b; Therme, 2008)), the knowledge we gained from our extreme case study 
will help rethinking how a policy-driven cluster works, can be better implemented and 
evaluated. It is the studies of “black swans” that are particularly important to get new 
scientific conversations going (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
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A third theoretical contribution is the establishment, based on our empirical observation, of a 
first list of pathologies that are mainly driven by certain dilemmas. The identified pathologies 
and associated dilemmas, discussed in detail in Chapter 9, are summarized in Figure 48: 
- “Inefficiency” pathology: A first major pathology that we observed in HCPR is 
inefficiency. We identified four sources of leadership dilemmas that drive inefficiency 
in HCPR: leadership dilemmas within the policy-driven cluster’s governance 
structure, among regional policy-driven clusters, between the policy-driven cluster and 
the national government, and finally among the different ministries (which though has 
the least direct impact on HCPR). Additionally, no “civic entrepreneur” exists that 
holds the cluster together and that has identified an external challenge to overcome. 
On the one hand HCPR wishes to be egalitarian by finding consensus among its very 
“political” members, on the other hand this situation paralyses all decision processes. 
- “Distrust” pathology: Governments have to decide how to subsidies policy-driven 
clusters (direct subsidies vs. indirect subsidies). In our case study direct subsidies are 
the main modus operandi. Regional bound direct subsidies have the advantage that 
they “force” regional actors to get to know each other. However, direct subsidies also 
create negative side-effect pathologies. Our empirical case has shown that direct 
subsidies create several pathologies like inefficiency due to the complexity of the 
support structure (R&D zones) or low risk projects due to the risk-aversion of the 
policy-driven cluster (evaluated on transformation rate: labelled vs. financed projects). 
Additionally, direct subsidies also create distrust. This is a side effect that can 
particularly impact the knowledge exchange capacity, the theoretically heart of every 
policy-driven cluster. 
- “Nonconformity”: According to the national cluster policy evaluations, HCPR’s 
performance compared to other policy-driven clusters in the Paris Region is bad. 
However, our hypothesis is that there exists pathology of nonconformity problem. 
This could be solved by more closely looking at the region’s DNA, be it the conflicts 
or closeness of actors of the region (strong political actors that have difficulties to 
collaborate with each other) or the already existing support structures (highly dense 
region with already plenty of existing support structures). In a certain manner, HCPR 
needs to find its added value with the local reality. 
- “Pragmatism”: For the time being, HCPR proposes very pragmatic animation 
services mainly concentrated on fostering the business aspects of its members. 
However this raises the question if other opportunities (such as the links with doctors 
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which are currently little explored) or potential dangers (such as the regional 
innovation lock-in) are not important to keep in mind as well and if a pure pragmatic 
focus might be dangerous. 
 
Figure 48: Summary of identified pathologies driven by associated dilemmas 
 
 
Finally, we wish to highlight once again the fact that the empirical setting in this doctoral 
dissertation drove us to study in depth a “policy-driven cluster”. These policy-driven clusters 
are of course very different in their purpose and functioning compared to “spontaneous 
clusters” (Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2006). 
 
1.2 Methodological contributions 
Along with previous research that demonstrated the entanglement of different actors (T. Weil 
& Fen Chong, 2009) as well as competing strategic objectives (Brachert, et al., 2011; Kiese & 
Wrobel, 2011; Sellar, et al., 2011; Steinle, et al., 2007) our thesis has shown that policy-
driven clusters are indeed highly “multilevel”, “entangled” and “systemic” organisational 
objects. Such a complexity is a consequence of the cluster policy itself that aims at gathering 
different actors (companies, research labs, universities, political institutions…) with various 
objectives. However, the fact that these objects are complex does not necessarily mean that 
some “confusion” must prevail. Our study has shown that a research methodology and design 
simultaneously pointed at different levels (cluster policy, policy-driven cluster organisation, 
policy-driven cluster members) could allow to “dis-entangle” the analysis to in fine address 
cross-level organisational dilemmas (political, managerial and structural). One has to first 
thoroughly decompose the general view and identify the different pathologies before it is 
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possible to go “up-stream” again (towards the dilemma) and give sense to the whole. This 
endeavour is indeed ambitious and difficult, but it was one of the main objectives of this 
thesis.  
 
Additionally, we also want to underline that the systematic literature review (SLR) 
methodology (Denyer & Neely, 2004; Pittaway, et al., 2004; Tranfield, et al., 2003) that was 
used in this thesis is a powerful tool for framing the literature of a nascent field, like for 
example the challenges associated to cluster policy implementation. The SLR methodology 
was only recently adapted from the medical realm to the management realm (Mulrow, 1994; 
Thorpe, et al., 2005) and for the time being it is particularly used in the entrepreneurship field. 
As policy implementation needs a very inter-disciplinary view (Schofield, 2001), the SLR 
constitutes a great possibility to dig into several domains that already treat the topic in a 
dispersed manner to then synthesize the main issues.  
 
1.3 Managerial contributions 
Our first managerial contribution lies in the cluster policy evaluation field (Colgan & Baker, 
2003; Gallié, et al., 2012; Gallié, et al., 2014; Learmonth, et al., 2003; Schmiedeberg, 2010). 
In the beginning of our thesis we started working with the cluster policy evaluation data that 
was used during the first French cluster policy evaluation in 2008 (see Annex 8 and (Gallié, et 
al., 2013b) or (A. Glaser, et al., 2012)). The collected indicators were for example: the 
“transformation rate” (labelled projects vs. financed projects), diversity of R&D project 
teams, number of members and their diversity, diversity of the supervisor board, budget of the 
cluster organisation, etc. These indicators try to measure the actions and intermediary results 
(level 2 in Figure 45) but also cluster organisation effectiveness (level 1 in Figure 45) (Gallié, 
et al., 2014). 
 
Our research has shown that also other types of indicators need to be taken into account if one 
wishes to improve the organisational effectiveness and to take an “in the action” evaluation 
approach (Chanut, 2009) that tries helping policy-driven clusters identifying their specific 
inherent pathologies that need to be addressed and overcome. Ideally, it would seem 
necessary to propose additional indicators that particularly focus on identifying pathologies 
(such as number of leadership conflicts, types of leadership conflicts, number of trust issues, 
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types of trust issues, etc.) to then help the evaluated policy-driven clusters to overcome certain 
dilemmas that might be very different in each policy-driven cluster setting.  
 
However, the “new public management” approach, less state and more performance 
management, increasingly used in OECD member states, and also in France, goes more in the 
direction of “enhancing control and ‘upwards accountability’” instead of “promoting 
learning and improvement” (Sanderson, 2001, p. 297). During our fieldwork we saw that 
HCPR is reluctant about sharing too much information and at the same time suffering from 
the review system in place. The cluster policy-evaluation was not seen as a learning procedure 
but as a performance evaluation procedure. However, in order to achieve “Best Value” of an 
evaluation, the underlying culture needs be changed (Sanderson, 2001, p. 297). In order to 
improve the functioning of policy-driven clusters, governments need to take into account 
organisational learning and avoid “accountability myopia” (Ebrahim, 2005). All the more as 
we have already seen that organisational learning is possible in policy-driven clusters 
(Lundequist & Power, 2002; Sotarauta, 2012; T. Weil & Fen Chong, 2009). Such as MacNeill 
& Steiner (2010), who analysed policy-driven clusters in Austria, we also think that a more 
“‘post-modern’ participative management style” (Gibney, et al., 2009) is necessary in order 
for policy-driven clusters to reap their full potential. However, one question that remains is in 
which manner such a participative management style is possible in a centralised country like 
France where the policy-driven cluster policy is steered from the national level and the 
distance to the local policy-driven clusters is longue. 
 
Our second managerial contribution lies in the cluster policy implementation field (Burfitt, et 
al., 2007; Foray, et al., 2011; Nauwelaers, 2001). We have seen that the implementation of 
policy-driven cluster generates a range of organisational dilemmas that policy-driven cluster 
managers and governments have to face. In this doctoral thesis we tried to summarize the 
different implementation dilemmas that will help the ones who implement policy-driven 
clusters to structure their reflections in a more systematic manner. This will also help to 
overcome the current best practice focus of governments (Hospers, 2005), and increase the 
adaptability of cluster policies to the national characteristics and local circumstances. 
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2 Limitations 
Like most research, this doctoral dissertation counts several limitations.  
 
First, we have not done a 360° investigation of HCPR, the policy-driven cluster under review. 
In order to improve our results, it would be necessary to also interview the state and local 
government, the funding partners, the regional development agency, the strategic governance 
of the policy-driven cluster, etc. The problem with policy-driven clusters is that they are a 
very systemic object and thus difficult to analyse by one research alone in a limited period of 
time. For the time being we have “only” observed the view of the project leaders that 
submitted projects to the ICT & Health imitative and their partners (for example doctors and 
academics), the view from two other policy-driven clusters in the region, the view from 
HCPR’s operational team, the view form one of HCPR’s steering committee presidents, the 
view from official evaluations and other analysis that were already done on HCPR. This is a 
first start to get an overview of pathologies and associated dilemmas of a policy-driven 
cluster. However, further investigations are necessary to test the already obtained results 
among other stakeholders. 
 
Second, we had the great opportunity to analyse a difficult case because it allowed a 
Popperian falsification process to get started (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Popper, 1959) (for example 
that cluster policies automatically create trust among actors). We deeply believe that finding 
and analysing “black swans” is an extremely important element of research. However, 
digging and trying to analyse “black swans” and extreme cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 
2006) can also go along with methodological difficulties. First of all the access to data is hard 
because political issues prevent a proper investigation to take place. Actors that were already 
evaluated badly by official cluster evaluations fear about their own legitimization when they 
open the door to researchers. Even though, it was extremely difficult to get access to certain 
data and some data were either never send to us or only send to us “secretly” or one year after 
we first asked for them. Additionally, a difficult access to data also means more time that is 
needed to investigate the study object. This leads to a second methodological difficulty, 
namely that we only had the time to do one single case study in one region. It would now be 
necessary to study pathologies and dilemmas in other policy-driven clusters, for example in a 
“white swan” and in another “black swan” setting.  
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Finally, mature research fields have already established constructs and measures on which 
they heavily rely (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). However, cluster policy research and the 
study of its implementation challenges is new (Burfitt & Macneill, 2008; Ebbekink & 
Lagendijk, 2013). In nascent research endeavours few formal measures exist and evidence of 
construct still needs to be established (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Our theoretical 
framework was only developed after our fieldwork took place because it was the fieldwork 
that allowed us to see the existent literature in another way. Our theoretical framework is thus 
also part of our results. However, this also bears the high risk that the theoretical framework 
is not stable yet and that further research is necessary to confront and test it in other settings.  
 
3 Research perspectives 
There are also some interrogations that remain open at the end of this thesis, which allows 
defining avenues and opportunities for further research. 
 
First, as Swords (2013) developed, we think that a massive amount of research exists on 
clusters but that, in a paradoxical manner, we know little about how to actually implement 
cluster policies on the field. We therefore need to start studying cluster policies as a policy 
challenge (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013) and establish new avenues of research that allow 
addressing these difficulties. In this doctoral thesis we started this new endeavour by 
proposing to see policy-driven cluster challenges as pathologies that are driven by dilemmas. 
We proposed to identify pathologies, the problems that are encountered and talked about on 
the field, to then go “upstream” to relate them to a set of specific dilemmas. In our case for 
example the observed inefficiencies were strongly related to the difficult leadership issue that 
existed in the policy-driven cluster, but also between the policy-driven clusters of the region, 
and between the policy-driven cluster and the national government. The analysis in terms of 
organisational dilemmas and related pathologies seems powerful not only to identify the 
sources of clusters’ managerial difficulties, but also to enlighten possible solutions (or cures). 
It would be necessary, through other case studies, to evaluate the efficiency of classic 
remedies that are currently used to build policy-driven clusters and to identify new remedies 
that target the pathogen factor. Furthermore, starting with the pathologies and then going 
upstream allows overcoming the difficulty to study such a systemic object called “cluster”. 
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Second, analysing pathologies and dilemmas also allows to outbreak from the intensive study 
of innovation and collaboration topics in the cluster literature and to focus on new important 
issues that need to be addressed with the same intensity. We thus advocate, in a 
“Krugmanian” manner (Krugman, 1991 (1993), p. 54), to be aware of the current 
“‘megatrends’ style of thought[s]” and to embrace the whole range of challenges that policy 
driven clusters face. For example: 
- Which type of subsidies should be used to build policy-driven clusters? Direct vs. 
indirect subsidies? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each type in order to 
create a “cluster spirit”? 
- Which type of organisational boundary should be drawn around a policy-driven 
cluster? Regional boundary, thematic boundary, national boundary, etc.? What is the 
ideal organisational size for an effective functioning? 
- Which type of set up according to which region? Regions with a plenty of existing 
support structures and events might need another type of policy-driven cluster help 
than regions that are weakly structured? 
- What differences exist between the implementation of policy-driven clusters in unitary 
countries and in federal countries? Does the distance between local policy-driven 
clusters and national authorities cause additional challenges? 
 
Third, new avenues of research need also be started in the cluster policy evaluation field. The 
classical cluster evaluations heavily concentrate on impact assessment, be it on the territory or 
on the local actors, by using for example econometric methods, I/O-analysis, or Network 
analysis (Schmiedeberg, 2010). However, the managerialisation of clusters also raises the 
question of how to evaluate intermediary results and organisational efficiency (Gallié, et al., 
2014). Evaluating these intermediary results and organisational efficiency needs further 
research. Focusing on pathologies and dilemmas could be a new approach to further develop 
an “in the action” evaluation approach (Chanut, 2009). 
 
To sum up, we hope that more scholars in the cluster and cluster policy field will start shifting 
from studying the “anatomy of clusters” to studying the “pathology of clusters”. We believe 
that this will further contribute to closing the relevance gap that is currently observed in the 
cluster literature and assist practitioners in considering their actions from a renewed 
perspective. 
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ANNEX 1: AMERICAN’S COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 
The Box 14 and Box 15 display some excerpts from discourses of Ronald Reagan regarding 
the American “Commission on Industrial Competitiveness” which was installed in 1983. 
These excerpts are particularly interesting because they reflect very well the increasing strive 
for competitiveness during the 1980s and the fear of the nations to fall behind in the global 
competition race. At the same time they also reflect a certain different stance compared to the 
European counterpart.  
 
Box 14: President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness (Executive Order 12428) 
June 28, 1983 
 
“By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and 
in order to establish, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 
U.S.C. App. I), an advisory committee on industrial competitiveness, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
 
Section 1. Establishment. (a) There is established the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness. 
The Commission shall be composed of no more than twentyfive members appointed or designated by the 
President. These members shall have particular knowledge and expertise concerning the technological factors 
affecting the ability of United States firms to meet international competition at home and abroad. Members 
appointed from the private sector shall represent elements of industry, commerce, and labor most affected by 
high technology, or academic institutions prominent in the field of high technology. 
 
(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the Commission. 
Sec. 2. Functions. The Commission shall review means of increasing the long-term competitiveness of United 
States industries at home and abroad, with particular emphasis on high technology, and provide appropriate 
advice to the President, through the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade, and the Department of 
Commerce. 
[…] 
 
RONALD REAGAN 
The White House, June 28, 1983.” 
 
Source: Ronald Reagan: "Executive Order 12428 - President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness," 
June 28, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41529 (accessed 15/05/2014) 
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Box 15: Establishment of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness 
August 4, 1983 
“On June 28 I signed an Executive order establishing a Commission on Industrial Competitiveness. I charged 
the Commission with advising me and my administration on ways to strengthen the competitiveness of U.S. 
industry. 
 
This nation's greatest competitive advantage in the past were ideas that helped America grow. We need to put 
the power of ideas to use again, for the good of our future. America needs her best minds to create 
technologies that will enhance America's economic leadership in the 1980's. To sustain high rates of real 
economic growth, we must continue to create new "miracles" of high technology—miracles both for 
innovation and for modernization of the major areas of our economy in manufacturing, agriculture, and 
services. 
 
The Commission members I am appointing today are distinguished leaders from large and small businesses, 
from labor, and from academia. They are ideally suited to lead us in a national dialog—a discussion of the 
kinds of actions required by the public and private sectors to make U.S. industries more competitive in 
domestic and foreign markets. The Commission will be chaired by John A. Young, president of the Hewlett-
Packard Co. 
 
The Commission will focus its attention on government and private sector actions, specifically: 
- Identifying the problems and opportunities for the private sector to transform new knowledge and 
innovations into commercial products, services, and manufacturing processes. 
- Recommending policy changes at all levels of government to improve the private sector's ability to compete 
in the international marketplace and to maintain and create opportunities for American workers. 
 
The Commission will report to me and work closely with the Department of Commerce, the Office of Policy 
Development, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. 
 
The increasingly rapid pace of technological advancement assures us that our economy will change constantly 
in the future. New developments in information processing, biology, and materials science are spawning 
sunrise industries. They are improving our quality of life and standard of living in ways few could have 
foreseen. These technologies are transforming all sectors of our economy and even our lifestyles. Not only can 
information processing capabilities improve the way farmers manage their livestock, provide the “brains” in 
a flexible manufacturing system, and keep track of the paper flow in an office; they will also change the way 
we live. 
 
Now some believe that the Government should try to read these trends to determine which products, services, 
and industries have a place in our future and which do not. They would have government planners divert 
resources away from traditional industries and channel them into new fields. But the history of progress in 
America proves that millions of individuals making decisions in their own legitimate self-interest cannot be 
outperformed by any bureaucratic planners. 
 
Government's legitimate role is not to dictate detailed plans or solutions to problems for particular companies 
or industries. No, government serves us best by protecting and maintaining the marketplace, by ensuring that 
the rules of free and fair trade, both at home and abroad, are properly observed, and by safeguarding the 
freedoms of individual participants. 
[…]” 
 
Source: Ronald Reagan: “Statement on Establishment of the President's Commission on Industrial 
Competitiveness”, August 4, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41678 (accessed 15/05/2014) 
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ANNEX 2: FIRST APPEARANCES OF THE WORD “POLICY” IN ACADEMIC 
LITERATURE 
 
Table 47 lists for each policy when it was first mentioned in the literature. The date 
corresponds to the first mention of the policy in the title, abstract or keyword of an article 
referenced in the academic article database Scopus. This implies that the policy might have 
already been discussed in the corpus of a text296. 
 
Table 47: Genealogy of “policy” appearances in academic research 
Year of first 
appearance Type of policy Reference 
1947 Science Policy Study Group - Washington Association of Scientists. (1947). Toward 
a National Science Policy? Science, 106(2756), 385-387. 
1953 Research Policy Kidd, C. V. (1953). Research Planning and Research Policy Scientists and Administrators. Science, 118(3058), 147-152. 
1967 Regional Policy Fisher, J. L. (1967). Reflections on the formulation of regional policy. Papers in Regional Science, 18(1), 67-74. 
1971 Industrial Policy Balassa, B. (1971). Industrial policies in Taiwan and Korea. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 106(1), 55-77. 
1972 Technology Policy 
Dobrov, G. M., & Smirnov, L. P. (1972). Forecasting as a means for 
scientific and technological policy control. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 4(1), 5-18. 
1973 Structural Policy Kern, H. (1973). The need for a policy of regionalisation. Intereconomics, 8(3), 91-94. 
1975 Innovation Policy 
Uhlmann, L. (1975). Innovation in industry: a discussion of the state-
of-art and the results of innovation research in german-speaking 
countries. Research Policy, 4(3), 312-327.  
1999 Cluster policy  
Altenburg, T., & Meyer-Stamer, J. (1999). How to promote clusters: 
policy experiences from Latin America. World development, 27(9), 
1693-1713. 
 
 
 
                                                 
296
 Date: 01/04/13; Database: Scopus; Search Criteria: Search for "[x] policy" OR "[x] policies" in “Article Title, 
Abstract, Keywords“; [x] = Science, Research, Regional, Structural, Industrial, Technology, Innovation or 
Cluster; Data Range: “all years to present”; Document Type: Article; Subject Areas: “Social Sciences & 
Humanities” AND “Physical Sciences” 
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ANNEX 3: EUROPEAN UNION’S VIEW ON “COMPETITIVENESS” 
 
The following two boxes are excerpts of documents regarding the European Union stands 
towards competitiveness and the economic challenges ahead. Box 16 contains an excerpt of a 
European Commission White Paper on competitiveness published in 1993. Box 17 contains 
an excerpt of the European Lisbon Strategy decided upon in 2000.  
 
Box 16: European Commission on growth, competitiveness and employment in 1993 
1993: The following excerpt contains the opening words of the European Commission’s White Paper 
entitled “Growth, competitiveness, employment. The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century”: 
 
“This White Paper sets out to foster debate and to assist decision-making - at decentralized national of 
Community level - so as to lay the foundations for sustainable development of the European economies, 
thereby enabling them to withstand international competition while creating the millions of jobs that are 
needed.  
 
We are convinced that the European economies have a future. Looking at the traditional bases of property and 
competitiveness, Europe has preserved its chances. It possesses assets which it has only to exploit - assets 
such as its abundant non-physical capital (education, skills, capacity for innovation, traditions), the 
availability of financial capital and highly efficient banking institutions, the soundness of its social model, and 
the virtues of cooperation between the two sides of industry. 
 
Given the scale of the needs that have to be met, both in the European Union and elsewhere in the world, 
recovery must be achieved by developing work and employment and not by endorsing basically Malthusian 
solutions. Yes, we can create jobs, and we must do so if we want to safeguard the future - the future of our 
children, who must be able to find hope and motivation in the prospect of participating in economic and social 
activity and of being involved in the society in which they live, and the future of our social protection systems, 
which are threatened in the short term by inadequate growth and in the long term by the deterioration in the 
ratio of the people in jobs to those not in employment.  
 
In other words, we are faced with the immense responsibility, while remaining faithful to the ideals which 
have come to characterize and represent Europe, of finding a new synthesis of the aims pursued by society 
(work as a factor of social integration, equality of opportunity) and the requirements of the economy 
(competitiveness and job creation). […]” (Commission of the European Communities, 1993, p. 3) 
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Box 17: European Lisbon Strategy 2000 
The following passage is an excerpt of the “European Council” presidency conclusion, held on the 23rd 
and 24th March 2000 
 
“A STRATEGIC GOAL FOR THE NEXT DECADE 
The new challenge 
1. The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a 
new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people's lives and require a 
radical transformation of the European economy. The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent 
with its values and concepts of society and also with a view to the forthcoming enlargement. 
 
2. The rapid and accelerating pace of change means it is urgent for the Union to act now to harness the full 
benefits of the opportunities presented. Hence the need for the Union to set a clear strategic goal and agree a 
challenging programme for building knowledge infrastructures, enhancing innovation and economic reform, 
and modernising social welfare and education systems. 
[…] 
 
The way forward 
5. The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion. Achieving this goal requires an overall strategy aimed at: 
- preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies for the information 
society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and 
innovation and by completing the internal market; 
- modernising the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion; 
- sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable growth prospects by applying an appropriate 
macro-economic policy mix.” 
(Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, accessed 15/05/2014) 
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ANNEX 4: LIST OF FRENCH MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY 
 
Table 48 lists the titles of all French industrial ministers since the beginning of the 5th 
Republic (since 1958). The list displays the slow diseaperance of the word industry in the title 
of the French minister who is ment to be responsible for the French industry.  
 
Table 48: French Ministers of Industry since the beginning of the 5th Republic 
Start Title 
01/1959 Ministre de l'industrie et du Commerce 
11/1959 Ministre de l'industrie 
06/1969 Ministre du Développement industriel et scientifique 
02/1974 Ministre de l’industrie, du commerce et de l’artisanat 
05/1974 Ministre de l’industrie et de la Recherche 
03/1977 Ministre de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat  
04/1978 Ministre de l’industrie 
03/1983 Ministre de l’industrie et de la recherche 
07/1984 Ministre du Redéploiement industriel et du Commerce extérieur 
03/1986 Ministre de l’Industrie, des Postes et Télécommunications et du Tourisme 
05/1988 Ministre de l’industrie, du commerce extérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire 
06/1988 Ministre de l’industrie et de l’aménagement du territoire 
05/1991 Ministre d’État, ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et du budget 
04/1992 Ministre de l’industrie et du Commerce extérieur 
03/1993 Ministre de l’industrie, des postes et télécommunications et du commerce extérieur 
05/1995 Ministre de l’industrie 
11/1995 Ministre de l’industrie, de la Poste et des Télécommunications 
06/1997 Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie 
03/2004 Ministre d'État, ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 
06/2005 Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 
05/2007 Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Emploi 
11/2010 Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 
05/2012 Ministre du Redressement productif 
04/2014 Ministre de l'Économie, du Redressement productif et du Numérique 
Own compilation, source: http://www.gouvernement.fr/institutions/les-gouvernements-de-la-ve-republique# & 
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_ministres_français_de_l'Industrie (accessed 9/6/2014) 
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ANNEX 5: FOCUS ON FRENCH “LOCAL PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS” (SPL) 
The main dispositive that preceded the competitiveness cluster policy was the “local 
productive systems” (“systèmes productifs locaux” or SPL) initiative. This initiative, 
launched in 1998, was the first large-scale cluster-planning project in France. The initiative 
mainly covered only two policy areas: regional policy and industrial enterprise policy but not 
science & technology policy (Fen Chong, 2009). The SPL policy was initiated according to 
the already explained French tradition: by the national government via an open call for 
tender.297 The different SPL projects were rather heterogeneous (Vibert & Dupont, 2008). 
Chaubault (2009), summarizes that they are either (1) structured around traditional and craft 
based companies to foster complementarities (like industrial districts (Becattini, 1989)); or (2) 
structured around the scientific competences of the local actors thus technology oriented (like 
clusters (Porter, 1998c)), or (3) structured around big companies which had externalised their 
activities to local actors (like hub-and-spoke districts (Markusen, 1996)), or (4) just emerging 
around an external animator to start stimulating collaboration between the local actors. The 
SPL initiative launched a dynamic and allowed the actors to meet, to get to know each other 
and start working together (Carluer, 2006). However, not a lot of technology-oriented clusters 
emerged (Pommier & Boilève, 2002), as the slected SPLs were more oriented towards the 
local development of SMEs (Duranton, et al., 2008). Additionally, the major industrial 
locations of the French territory were not applying for the official State label and so the 
collaboration between the most performing industrials and researchers stayed weak. In 2004, 
some of these SPLs were the incubators of today’s French competitiveness clusters. However, 
it would be inaccurate to believe that these competitiveness clusters are only a continuity of 
the SPLs. The competitiveness clusters marked in reality a new departure in relation to the 
SPLs, and signal an unprecedented political era of French territory development. Despite their 
definitions, which might look similar, the local productive systems and competitiveness 
clusters differ in a certain number of elements (Perrat, 2007): 
- Profile of the companies: the SPLs are predominantly based on the development of 
cooperation between SMEs, whereas the competitiveness clusters are predominantly 
based on large companies (Ernst & Young, 2005); 
- Relation to innovation: in the SPLs, the aim is to obtain an increasing yield related to a 
sectorial specialisation, whereas in the competitiveness cluster, the aim is to produce - 
in a recurrent way - new products (Gaffard, 2005); 
- Relation to space: the SPLs are based on proximity, whereas the competitiveness 
clusters have the vocation to go beyond the regional space to participate in the 
globalised market. This tendency could even increase with the rapprochement and 
collaboration of some competitiveness clusters; 
- Relation to time: if the SPLs aim a middle- and long-term development, the 
competitiveness clusters work within a project temporality; 
- Relation to employment: in the SPLs, the logic is to hire employees with local roots, 
whereas these considerations on social relations are still very weak in the 
competiveness clusters. 
                                                 
297
 The French government labelled the first projects in 1999 (124 applicants / 60 selections) and due to the great 
success immediately launched a second tender to label an additional 36 projects in 2000 (79 applicants) (Vibert 
& Dupont, 2008). Even though the first two calls for tender were the biggest ones, every year some additional 
SPLs were added (Vibert & Dupont, 2008). In 2008 the SPLs were evaluated and the evaluation report (Vibert & 
Dupont, 2008) stipulates that in the period between 1999 and 2007, 161 projects were labelled and the global 
budget accounted for 5.7 million Euros. However, from these 161 labelled SPLs only around hundred are still 
active because some stopped the project or were transformed into “competitiveness clusters” or other initiatives.  
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ANNEX 6: E-MAIL TEMPLATE FOR CONTACTING PROJECT LEADERS 
 
 
Betreff: Demande d'entretien : projet […] 
 
Bonjour […], 
 
Je me permets de vous contacter au sujet de votre projet collaboratif […] que vous avez soumis pour 
labellisation chez […HealthCluster/Cap Digital/Systematic…] l’année dernière. J’aimerais, si bien sûr vous 
avez un moment à me consacrer, pouvoir m’entretenir avec vous. 
 
Je mène actuellement une recherche de doctorat en gestion à l’ESCP Europe et à l’Observatoire des Pôles de 
Compétitivité (OPC) de Mines ParisTech. Mes recherches portent plus particulièrement sur la manière dont 
les pôles soutiennent (ou ne soutiennent pas) les projets collaboratifs de R&D menés par les entreprises. Dans 
le cadre de cette recherche, je serai très intéressée d’avoir votre analyse sur les workshops TIC & Santé 
organisés par HealthCluster, Cap Digital et Systematic l’année dernière et sur le soutien que vous avez reçu en 
amont, avant de soumettre votre projet […] à la labellisation. 
 
Cet entretien me permettrait de mieux comprendre les modalités et dispositifs de soutien des pôles, mais aussi 
leurs limites pour les projets d’innovation des entreprises. Cet entretien, effectué indépendamment de 
[…HealthCluster/Cap Digital/Systematic…], restera bien sûr anonyme. 
 
Dans l’espoir que vous répondrez favorablement à ma demande d’entretien, je suis à votre disposition pour 
une interview dans les prochaines semaines. Je reste aussi à votre disposition pour tout renseignement 
complémentaire. 
 
Merci beaucoup par avance pour votre aide dans mes recherches, 
 
Bien cordialement, 
Anna Glaser 
____________________________________ 
 
Anna GLASER 
 
Doctorante / PhD candidate 
ESCP Europe (anna.glaser@escpeurope.eu) 
Mines ParisTech (anna.glaser@mines-paristech.fr) 
 
www.observatoirepc.org 
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ANNEX 7: GENERAL INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWING PROJECT 
LEADERS 
 
 
Introduction: 
- Tell me about you, your professional background. 
- I would like to talk with you about the […name…] project. Could you tell me, in very simple words, 
what was the objective of the project? What is your companies responsibility / role in this project? 
What importance does this project have for your company? 
Project: 
- More particularly, please tell me about the genesis of the collaboration project? The story how 
everything began? (Who came up with the idea of the project?) 
- How did you first meet your project partners? (Maybe without knowing you will collaborate with 
them one day, where, when, introduced / not introduced) 
- Who initiated the idea to collaborate (Have you looked for potential partners or been approached by a 
partner?) 
- With whom of these partners do you think you will do another project in the future?  
- What is your experience in collaborative R&D projects? 
Cluster membership: 
- How do the policy-driven clusters help you? Which importance do they have for you? When do you 
contact them? 
General: 
- Please tell me about the integration of your company in your sector’s community? (participation in 
associations, meetings, conferences, etc.) 
- Do you discuss your projects publicly during these activities? Why/Why not? 
- What is the work culture within your company? (Are you allowed to participate in conferences, 
meetings during your work-time or is it something you have to do after work?) 
- Do you prefer collaborating with actors, which are situated within the Paris region? Why? / Why not?  
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ANNEX 8: CRITERIA OF THE FRENCH CLUSTER EVALUATION 
Box 18 summarizes a range of key indicators that were collected by the evaluators in 2008 to 
evaluate the performance of the different policy-driven clusters situated in France.  
 
Box 18: Selection of key criteria used for the French cluster evaluation in 2008 
 
I. Indicators regarding the “transformation rate” of R&D projects (from planned to financed): 
I.1. How many projects were submitted to the cluster for examination? 
I.2. How many projects were submitted to the cluster for labelling? 
I.3. How many projects were labelled by the cluster? 
I.4. How many projects were submitted to financers?  
I.5. How many projects were financed?  
I.6. How much money was generated? 
I.6.1. How much money was generated for ‘SME < 250’, ‘SME > 250’, ‘Large firm > 2000’, or ‘Research and/or 
Training Institutes’? 
 
II. Indicators regarding the diversity and the leadership of R&D project teams: 
II.1. How many ‘Young Innovative Companies’, ‘SME < 250’, ‘SME > 250’, ‘Large firm > 2000’, or ‘Research and/or 
Training Institutes’ have been project leaders of collaborative R&D projects? 
II.2. How many ‘Young Innovative Companies’, ‘SME < 250’, ‘SME > 250’, ‘Large firm > 2000’, or ‘Research and/or 
Training Institutes’ participated in collaborative R&D projects? 
II.3. How many ‘new project partners’ (i.e. they have never been in a cluster project before) participated in collaborative 
R&D projects? 
II.3.1. Who (i.e. SME < 250, SME > 250) are the new project partners? 
 
III. Indicators regarding the general diversity of the cluster 
III.1. How many cluster members does the cluster count? 
III.1.1. Who (i.e ‘SME < 250’, ‘SME > 250’, ‘Large firm > 2000’, or ‘Research and/or Training Institutes’) are these 
cluster members? 
 
IV. Indicators regarding the leadership/supervision of the cluster 
IV.1. How many cluster members are in the management board of the cluster? 
IV.1.1. Who (i.e ‘SME < 250’, ‘SME > 250’, ‘Large firm > 2000’, or ‘Research and/or Training Institutes’) are 
these cluster members? 
IV.2. How many cluster members are in the supervisory board of the cluster? 
IV.2.1. Who (i.e ‘SME < 250’, ‘SME > 250’, ‘Large firm > 2000’, or ‘Research and/or Training Institutes’) are 
these cluster members? 
IV.3. How many cluster members are in the labelling committee of the cluster? 
IV.3.1. Who (i.e ‘SME < 250’, ‘SME > 250’, ‘Large firm > 2000’, or ‘Research and/or Training Institutes’) are 
these cluster members? 
 
V. Indicators regarding the management of the cluster (operational team) 
V.1. How many full time equivalents are working for the cluster? 
V.2. What is the time repartition between following tasks: 
V.2.1. Help in the detection, planning and supervision of R&D projects 
V.2.2. Communication, promotion, recruitment of members 
V.2.3. Cluster life (committees, meetings, seminars, etc.) 
V.2.4. Internationalisation 
V.2.5. Administrative tasks 
V.2.6. Other 
 
VI. Indicators regarding the budget of the cluster organisation 
VI.1. How much money does the cluster organisation have? 
VI.1.1. Who (i.e. the State, national agencies, the Region, regional agencies, other local authorities, cluster 
members, Research and/or Training Institutes’) provided the money?  
VI.1.2. For what was the money spent? 
VI.1.2.1. Employee salaries 
VI.1.2.2. Functioning (rent, furniture, etc.) 
VI.1.2.3. Specific actions (communication campaign, international visibility, etc.) 
VI.1.2.4. Specific survey or expertise (market research, set up of intranet, etc.) 
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ANNEX 9: HCPR’S TECHNOLOGICAL R&D OBJECTIVES 
 
 
Priorité 1 : Médecine translationnelle 
- Axe programmatique 1 : recherche clinique 
o Objectif 1 : Contribuer à développer et/ou à créer au moins cinq centres d’excellence de médecine translationnelle 
(CEMT) en trois ans 
o Objectif 2 - Faire émerger des projets collaboratifs ou des projets de plates-formes innovantes susceptibles de 
contribuer au développement ou au rayonnement de ces CEMT. 
o Objectif 3 - Mettre en place une formation pour les chercheurs, le personnel médical et paramédical en charge des 
projets et du développement de ces CEMT. 
- Axe programmatique 2 : l’imagerie 
o Objectif 1 - Structurer, assurer la visibilité des forces de l’imagerie en Ile-de-France et organiser leur accessibilité 
au bénéfice de la médecine translationnelle. 
o Objectif 2 - Susciter des projets collaboratifs pour réaliser des percées technologiques fondamentales dans 
l’imagerie et les technologies associées. Ces découvertes feront progresser la connaissance du fonctionnement des 
systèmes cellulaires ou tissulaires, sains et pathologiques. 
o Objectif 3 - Développer de nouvelles applications d’imagerie biomédicale pour le diagnostic, le pronostic et les 
applications thérapeutiques (dont les biothérapies) et le guidage thérapeutique. 
 
Priorité 2 : Les outils biologiques 
- Axe programmatique 1 : les bio-marqueurs 
o Objectif 1 – Favoriser l’émergence d’une filière bio-marqueurs susceptible d’établir une continuité entre recherche 
fondamentale et pratique médicale ainsi que de renforcer fortement la coopération entre sociétés de biotechnologie 
et laboratoires pharmaceutiques. 
- Axe programmatique 2 : les modèles 
o Objectif 1- Fédérer les acteurs du pôle pour réaliser et valider des modèles cellulaires ou animaux représentatifs de 
la physiologie et de la pathologie humaine ainsi que de la diversité et variabilité des populations humaines, 
jusqu’à la mise en place d’une production systématique et largement diffusée de modèles cellulaires de 
toxicologie, puis de pathologie. 
o Objectif 2 - Industrialiser la production des modèles et faciliter leur accès en ancrant l’expertise et la compétence 
dans le territoire. 
o Objectif 3 - Renforcer les approches de chimie-biologie, en particulier en biologie structurale, afin de mieux 
modéliser les cibles d'intérêt et d’accélérer la découverte de candidats médicaments. 
- Axe programmatique 3 : les produits à visée bio-thérapeutique 
o Objectif 1 - Concevoir de nouvelles approches technologiques pour les biothérapies innovantes et contribuer à 
faire émerger, (c’est-à-dire à apporter une preuve de concept clinique chez l’homme) au moins l’une des nouvelles 
approches thérapeutiques innovantes en Ile-de- France. Les technologies liées à la formulation et à la vectorisation 
sont parties intégrantes de cet objectif. 
o Objectif 2 - Structurer l’industrialisation de la technologie des cellules souches et favoriser la validation de leur 
potentiel thérapeutique. L’objectif est que les cellules souches deviennent de véritables objets industriels ainsi que 
des candidats greffons en surmontant les principaux écueils sur lesquels ont buté les approches antérieures 
o Objectif 3- Créer des formations diplômantes en biothérapies innovantes et bio-ingénierie. 
 
Priorité 3 : Les objectifs technologiques du bio-numérique : bioinformatique, intégration et modélisation des 
connaissances biologiques et médicales, interface cerveau/machine, e-santé 
- Axe programmatique 1 : bioinformatique et biologie integrative 
o Objectif 1 – Recenser et accroitre la compétitivité de l’ensemble des forces académiques et industrielles dans le 
domaine de la biologie intégrative 
o Objectif 2 - Développer les formations en biologie intégrative et susciter des formations à l’informatique de 
recherche en médecine translationnelle. 
o Objectif 3 - Créer des modèles prédictifs in silico en biologie, médecine et en biopharmacie (toxicologie 
prédictive, ADME, PK, PD.....). 
- Axes programmatiques en émergence : interface cerveau-machine et e-sante 
o « task force e-santé » regroupant les quatre pôles de Paris Région (Cap Digital, Advancity, System@tic et 
HealthCluster) 
o groupe de réflexion sur les interfaces Cerveau machine permettant d'en définir les enjeux technologiques et les 
défis industriels et de faire émerger les priorités stratégiques et les projets dans ce domaine. 
 Source: Performance Contract 2009-2011, HealthCluster Paris Region (extract) 
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ANNEX 10: HCPR’S ANIMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 
 
The following tables (Table 49 to Table 52) summarize the four priorities of HealthCluster 
Paris Region for the 2nd cluster phase (2009 to 2011, and then extended to 2012). These 
priorities were part of the performance contract HCPR signed with the State and the regional 
authorities. 
 
Table 49: Priority 1: Creating a community of thoughts, objectives and actions 
 Challenges Activities (& Deliverables) Impact 
Objective
- Valeur ajoutée du pôle 
pour ses membres. 
 
- Développer 
l’écosystème du pôle et 
les filières qui s’y 
rattachent. 
 
- Créer une communauté 
exemplaire qui donne 
envie d’adhérer au pôle, 
renforcer la connaissance 
réciproque des membres, 
consolider lesprit 
d‟appartenance et 
favoriser les initiatives 
communes. 
Action 1 : etats de lieux complet 
- Identifier les données à collecter et les outils et 
cartographie des membres du pôle. 
- Elaborer la cartographie des acteurs franciliens 
concernés par les priorités stratégiques du pôle / 
cartographie interactive complète des compétences 
disponibles sur l’intranet et extranet. 
 
Action 2 : échanges réguliers entres les acteurs du pôle 
- Organiser des tables rondes / rencontres sur des 
thématiques ciblées sur chacune des priorités du pôle / 
Lancement d’appel à projets / « n » projets soumis et 
labellisés 
 
Action 3 : information régulière des membres 
- Mettre en place une nouvelle gouvernance. 
- Organiser des réunions régulières entre les 
responsables des comités stratégiques et le délégué 
général / animation des comités stratégiques 
- Animer les collèges (par les vice-présidents). 
- Augmentation du 
nombre de projets 
collaboratifs. 
 
- Renforcement de 
la vie du cluster et 
de l'image de 
HealthCluster. 
 
- Augmentation du 
nombre 
d'adhérents. 
Source : Performance Contract 2009-2011, HealthCluster Paris Region (extraits) 
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Table 50: Priority 2: Being the key health actor in the Paris Region 
 Challenges Activities (& Deliverables) Impact 
Objectif 1 :  
Développer les 
ressources 
financières du 
pôle. 
Assurer la pérennité 
financière du pôle. 
Action 1 : maintenir des relations régulières 
avec les financeurs publics. 
- Signature annuelle des conventions avec les 
financeurs publics  
 
Action 2 & 3 : diversifier les ressources 
financières nécessaires au pôle et lancer une 
réflexion et identifier les actions permettant de 
développer les ressources propres du pôle. 
Conforter l’existence du 
pôle HealthCluster, 
réalisation de ses 
objectifs 
Objectif 2 : 
Proposer aux 
partenaires 
publics du pôle 
des initiatives 
et des actions 
pertinentes, en 
cohérence avec 
ses priorités 
stratégiques et 
développer les 
partenariats 
régionaux. 
Harmonisation et 
coordination des 
structures du secteur de 
la santé en IdF. Effet 
cluster. 
Action 1 : proposer des actions et des choix 
dans le cadre des projets d’aménagement du 
territoire et des documents d’orientation 
technique et économique locale, régionale 
(CPER). 
- Contribution à la réflexion sur la place des 
sciences de la vie et de la santé sur le campus 
Saclay. 
 
Action 2 : développer des partenariats entre 
membres du pôle et avec d’autres acteurs de la 
Région, dont les pôles de compétitivité 
- Réunions périodiques entre les responsables 
des incubateurs et des parcs biotechnologiques 
- signature d’un accord de partenariat avec 
System@tic, Advancity et Cap Digital. 
- signature d’un accord de partenariat avec 
d’autres pôles. 
Contribution à la 
structuration territoriale 
de la Région et du 
secteur santé francilien 
en renforçant les sites 
qui peuvent acquérir ou 
augmenter leur visibilité 
internationale. 
Objective 3 : 
Développer les 
formations et 
les 
enseignements 
qui répondent 
aux besoins 
actuels et 
futurs des 
entreprises et 
des organismes 
de recherche et 
renforcer 
l’attractivité 
des universités 
- Attractivité de la 
région IdF. 
 
- Pérennité de 
l’excellence scientifique 
et médicale de l’IdF. 
 
- Développement des 
échanges scientifiques. 
Action 1 : créer un groupe de travail pour 
identifier et anticiper les besoins en 
compétences des entreprises et des laboratoires 
en matière d’enseignement supérieur et de 
formation continue pour que les universités et 
les Ecoles puissent mettre en place les 
nouveaux enseignements et cursus adaptés. 
- Rapport sur les besoins exprimés en 
formation  
  
Action 2 : labelliser et favoriser des formations 
ou des modalités de formation dans les 
domaines de la médecine translationnelle, des 
biotechnologies et de la bio-informatique 
répondant aux critères définis par le pôle . 
 
Action 3 : favoriser la mise en place de stages, 
la réalisation de formations mixtes ou 
l’utilisation de plates-formes technologiques 
pour les formations et participer ainsi à 
l’attractivité des universités et des écoles. 
- Accès facilité des 
étudiants aux lieux 
d’excellence, de haute 
technicité (plates-
formes), ainsi qu’aux 
centres industriels dans 
le cadre normal de leur 
cursus ; 
 
- Capacité de concevoir 
et de mettre en place des 
formations nouvelles 
nécessaires aux métiers 
de demain comme la 
mise en place des 
filières d’enseignements 
pluridisciplinaires. 
 
- Attractivité renforcée 
des établissements qui 
dispensent des 
formations et des 
enseignements dans les 
sciences de la vie et de 
la santé. 
Source : Performance Contract 2009-2011, HealthCluster Paris Region (extraits) 
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Table 51: Priority 3: Structuring the healthcare sector in the Paris Region 
 Challenges Activities (& Deliverables) Impact 
Objectif 1 : 
Organiser la 
structuration des 
PME santé de la 
région en filières, 
par offre 
technologique ou 
par finalité 
thérapeutique, dans 
le cadre du plan 
filière Ile-de-
France 
Le renforcement 
du tissu des PME 
santé en Ile-de-
France est 
indispensable 
pour développer 
l’emploi et 
accroître 
l’attractivité de la 
Région. 
Action 1 : établir une typologie des PME (offre, 
besoin, domaine d‟activité) à partir de la cartographie 
établie dans la Priorité 1. 
- Cartographie complète des filières PME dans le 
cadre de la cartographie des membres 
 
Action 2 : organiser des visites et des entretiens 
réguliers avec les PME. 
 
Action 3 : prospecter activement le tissu des biotechs 
et des PME de la Région dont les activités s’inscrivent 
dans les axes prioritaires des thématiques ou en soutien 
technologiques pour qu’elles bénéficient de la 
dynamique du Pôle. 
 
Action 4 : établir le plan filière PME biotechnologies 
en Ile-de-France. 
(pas renseigné 
dans le contrat de 
performance) 
Objectif 2 : 
Optimiser l’accès 
des PME aux 
financements privés 
et publics 
(régionaux, 
nationaux, 
européens) et 
favoriser le 
développement de 
leur activité (R&D 
et chiffre 
d’affaires) 
Le pôle doit créer 
les conditions 
favorables à la 
pérennité et au 
développement 
des PME/JEI 
existantes et à la 
naissance de 
nouvelles 
entreprises. 
Action 1 : travailler à améliorer la compréhension de la 
diversité auprès d’une base large d’investisseurs pour 
adapter les financements à chaque type de société et à 
un stade de maturation défini 
 
Action 2 : faciliter l’accès au fonds d’investissement 
dédié aux biotechnologies (...), à l’investissement 
privé, aux marchés de capitaux, et à une offre 
diversifiée de financement ; (...) le développement des 
partenariats avec les grands acteurs industriels, (...) la 
connaissance des sociétés de service, notamment les 
prestataires de R&D contribuant à l’offre 
technologique de la région. 
 
Action 3 : soutenir le développement du chiffre 
d’affaires des PME et réduire leurs coûts de 
fonctionnement par le soutien de la "première 
commande" des jeunes sociétés innovantes en liaison 
avec les incubateurs du pôle ; par une action proactive 
du pôle auprès des PME et des grands groupes ; par le 
rapprochement de PME complémentaires pour passer 
de l’offre technologique individuelle à la construction 
de solutions intégrées innovantes qui répondent aux 
attentes des grands comptes ; par la mise en place de 
structures mutualisées qui prennent en compte les 
compétences spécifiques des PME. 
 
Action 4 : faciliter l'identification et l'accès des PME 
innovantes aux programmes européens, en utilisant la 
base de données qui sera constituée par le pôle ou en 
s’appuyant sur les structures d’accompagnement 
régionales et nationales 
 
- Création d’un club des investisseurs. 
- Collaboration à organiser avec le pôle de 
compétitivité Innovation Finance 
- Constitution d’un premier consortium pour répondre 
à un appel à projets européen & Participer aux grands 
projets européens  
- Renforcement 
du tissu des PME 
santé en Ile-de-
France. 
 
- Augmentation 
du nombre 
d’emplois. 
Source: Performance Contract 2009-2011, HealthCluster Paris Region (extraits) 
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Table 52: Priority 4: Development of national and international partnerships 
 Challenges Activities (& Deliverables) Impact 
Objectif 
La réussite du pôle 
repose sur sa notoriété 
et sur sa capacité à 
susciter des partenariats 
en son sein, ainsi 
qu‟avec des pôles 
partenaires nationaux et 
internationaux 
complémentaires. 
Action 1 : développer le pôle et accroître la 
dynamique du pôle au travers des partenariats 
avec les clusters bio-santé nationaux (autres que 
les franciliens) et internationaux complémentaires 
pour donner aux membres accès à des ressources 
et opportunités non disponibles en Ile-de-France. 
- établissement d’une stratégie 
communication/notoriété et d’un plan de 
communication. 
- signature d’au moins deux accords avec des 
pôles nationaux et internationaux. 
 
Action 2 : promouvoir le pôle et ses membres (i) 
l’offre technologique et académique du pôle ; (ii) 
ses spécificités et ses actions emblématiques pour 
attirer et accueillir des investisseurs 
ou des laboratoires R&D de grands groupes 
internationaux ; (iii) ses acteurs, notamment, les 
PME, qui seront soutenues à travers des actions 
ciblées ou collectives, dans leur prospection 
internationale ou lors de leur participation à des 
grands événements professionnels dans le monde. 
- Mise en œuvre des actions en particulier la 
présence aux manifestations internationales (par 
exemple : Salon BioMed Israel, Salon 
EuroBioLille, Bio Japan et mission collective en 
Corée) 
- organisation d’un événement fédérateur 
HealthCluster 
- organisation du premier grand événement 
récurrent et de dimension 
internationale, en Ile-de-France, pour valoriser 
les forces du pôle au niveau mondial et asseoir sa 
légitimité dans le domaine. 
Notoriété et 
attractivité de 
HealthCluster et 
de son 
écosystème. 
Source: Performance Contract 2009-2011, HealthCluster Paris Region (extraits) 
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ANNEX 11: HCPR’S VALUE CHAIN MAPPINGS 
Figure 49 to Figure 54 present the different cluster mapping results of HCPR’s operational 
team.  
 
Figure 49: The value chain (CDV) of the biotechnology & health sector in the PR 
 
Source: Internal document (10/2010) 
 
Figure 50: Number of SMEs in every value chain 
 
Source: Internal document (10/2010) 
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Figure 51: Focus on the value chain of medical imagery companies 
 
Source: Internal document (10/2010) 
 
Figure 52: Comparison between SMEs and Large groups 
 
Source: internal document of HCPR (10/2010) 
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Figure 53: All value chains of the biotechnology and health sector in the Paris Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: internal 
document of 
HCPR (10/2010) 
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Figure 54: Cartography of the biotechnology and health sector of the Paris Region  
Source: internal document of HCPR (01/2012) 
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ANNEX 12: PROJECT, COMPETENCES & NEEDS PRESENTATION TEMPLATES 
 
Figure 55 and Figure 56 show the different presentation templates that have to be used during 
ICT & Health events.  
 
Figure 55: Project presentation template 
1st slide 
 
2nd slide 
 
3rd slide  
 
Source: Cap Digital Website (04/2013) 
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Figure 56: Competences and need presentation template 
 1st slide 2nd slide 
Competences 
presentation 
 
 
Need 
presentation 
 
 
Source: Cap Digital Website (04/2013) 
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ANNEX 13: CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECT LEADERS & THEIR 
ORGANISATIONS  
Table 53 & Table 54: overview of the interviewed project leaders and their organsiations.  
Table 53: Characteristics of the investigated cluster actors 
# Gend
er 
Education Professi
onal 
experien
ce (app.) 
Job Title Interviewee's 
responsibility in 
company 
Once a project 
gets financed... 
Free 
electro
ns / 
Libert
y 
P1 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
10 years Technical 
Expert 
- Finding domains to 
spread the internal 
research efforts 
- Preparation of projects 
Still involved in 
the operational 
part 
low 
P2 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
30 years Founder 
& Vice-
President 
- Finding money & partners 
to develop the company's 
idea 
- Preparation of projects 
Still involved in 
the operational 
part 
high 
P3 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
35 years Research 
Projects 
Director 
- Finding domains to apply 
and further develop the 
company's technology 
- Preparation of projects 
Handover to 
operational team 
within company 
middle 
P4 Male - PhD in 
Neuropharm
acology 
20 years Chief 
Technical 
Officer 
- Finding domains to apply 
and further develop the 
company's technology 
- Preparation of projects 
Handover to 
operational team 
within company 
but still close 
supervision 
low 
P5 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
- Mathematic 
Degree 
15 years Innovatio
n 
Director 
- Finding domains to apply 
and further develop the 
company's 
services/technology 
- Preparation of projects 
Still involved in 
the operational 
part 
(but will soon 
stop it) 
low 
(but 
soon 
more) 
P6 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
- PhD in 
Image 
Processing / 
Statistics 
20 years Business 
Develop
ment & 
Vice-
President 
- Finding money & partners 
to develop the 
association's idea 
- Preparation of projects 
Handover to 
operational team 
within 
association 
high 
P7 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
- MBA 
- Patent Law 
Degree 
25 years Innovatio
n & 
Intellectu
al 
Property 
Director  
- Finding domains to apply 
and further develop the 
company's 
services/technology 
- Preparation of projects 
Handover to 
operational team 
within company 
high 
P8 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
- PhD in 
Innovation 
Management 
15 years Innovatio
n 
Manager 
- Finding domains to apply 
and further develop the 
company's product 
- Preparation of projects 
Handover to 
operational team 
within company 
high 
P9 Male - 
Engineering 
Degree 
- MBA 
20 years Chief 
Innovatio
n Officer 
- Finding domains to apply 
and further develop the 
company's technology 
- Preparation of projects 
Handover to 
operational team 
within company 
middle 
P1
0 
Male - PhD in 
Geochemistr
y 
35 years Founder 
& 
President 
- Finding domains to apply 
and further develop the 
company's technology 
- Preparation of projects 
Handover to 
operational team 
within company 
high 
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Table 54: Characteristics of the cluster actors’ organisations 
# Orga
nisati
on 
Type 
Code NAF 2008 
Level 1 
Decad
e of 
Found
ation & 
implem
entatio
n 
Role of 
medical/health: 
"The medical/health 
sector is [.....] of the 
company (or 
association)" 
Collaborat
ive 
Research 
Tradition 
Examples of 
subsidies 
(received or 
applied for) 
Company's 
driver for 
participating 
in 
collaborative 
projects 
P1 Large 
comp
any 
Electricity, gas, 
steam and air 
conditioning 
supply (NAF: D) 
1940s, 
in Paris 
Region 
no business field 
(a very small number 
of projects contain a 
health part, 
philanthropy reasons) 
High 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
FP7, ANR, FUI, 
industry specific 
private programs 
Spreading 
research effort 
P2 Micro
-
enter
prise  
Professional, 
scientific and 
technical 
activities (NAF: 
M) 
2000s, 
not in 
Paris 
Region 
the only business 
field 
Medium 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
ANR, FUI, Eureka 
(Just tries to get its 
first projects 
financed) 
Idea (raison 
d’être of the 
company) 
P3 SME Professional, 
scientific and 
technical 
activities (NAF: 
M) 
1980s, 
Paris 
Region 
one of several 
business fields 
High 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
FP7, Eureka, ANR, 
FUI, PREDIT 
Business 
development 
P4 SME Professional, 
scientific and 
technical 
activities (NAF: 
M) 
2000s, 
Paris 
Region 
the only business 
field 
High 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
FUI, ISI - OSEO, 
"Investing for the 
Future" Program, 
FP7  
Between idea 
(raison d’être 
of the 
company) & 
Business 
development 
P5 SME Information and 
communication 
(NAF: J) 
1980s, 
Paris 
Region 
no business field 
(project under 
investigation was the 
first try to enter the 
health sector; try was 
not successful, thus 
abandoned) 
Low 
(National) 
ANR, FUI 
(Started with the 
project under 
investigation) 
Business 
development 
P6 Asso
ciatio
n 
n.a. 2000s, 
not in 
Paris 
Region 
the only business 
field 
High 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
FP7, ANR, FUI, 
"Investing for the 
Future" Program 
Idea (raison 
d’être of the 
association) 
P7 Medi
um-
sized 
firm  
Information and 
communication 
(NAF: J) 
1990s, 
Paris 
Region 
no business field (yet) 
(project under 
investigation was the 
first try to enter the 
health sector; try was 
successful) 
Medium 
(National) 
ANR, FUI, "Investing 
for the Future" 
Program, ISI - 
OSEO 
(Plans to get also 
European funding) 
Business 
development 
P8 SME Manufacturing 
industry (NAF: 
C) 
1970s, 
not in 
Paris 
Region 
one of several 
business fields 
(but very new, since 
2009) 
High 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
FP7, ANR, FUI, 
Feder, Regional 
subsidies, OSEO 
Business 
development 
P9 SME Professional, 
scientific and 
technical 
activities (NAF: 
M) 
1990s, 
Paris 
Region 
one of several 
business fields 
High 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
FUI, ANR, "Investing 
for the Future" 
Program, Regional 
subsidies, FP7 
Business 
development 
P10 SME Information and 
communication 
(NAF: J) 
1990s, 
Paris 
Region 
one of two business 
fields 
High 
(National & 
Internation
al) 
FP7, FUI, ANR, ISI - 
OSEO, COST 
Business 
development 
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ANNEX 14: FINDING PARTNERS IN COLLABORATIVE R&D PROJECTS 
Figure 57 and Figure 58 give two visual schemata examples of the relationships between 
project partners. We hope this helps to get a more concrete idea of how collaborative R&D 
projects, that are submitted to policy-driven clusters can look like. 
Figure 57: Project P1a networks of actors 
 
In Project P1a, the project leader (called cluster actor) is a large company that had the idea for the project. The project leader 
started the project by contacting the three core partners (in green), two universities and a public health research centre. He 
knows University 1 because he teaches there and university 2 and the health research centre are historical contacts of the 
company. All the necessary SMEs were then associated by these core entities. For example: Company 1 is a spin-off of 
university 2. Company 2 is working with university 2 on another project. A colleague of him knew the necessary associations. 
Figure 58: Project P5a network of actors 
 
In Project P5a, the project leader (called cluster actor) is a SME that did not have the idea for the project. The idea was 
formulated by the hospital that contacted the university and then the university contacted all the remaining partners. The 
project leader knew the university thanks to an employee who knows well the professor of the university. 
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ANNEX 15: FRENCH PRODUCTIVE AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 
 
The French national institute of economic and statistical information (INSEE) divides the 
French productive and industrial structure into four enterprise categories (see Table 55): 
Micro-enterprises (ME), Small and medium enterprises (SME), Medium-sized firms (MF), 
and large companies. Nearly all companies belong either to the micro-enterprise (95.44%) or 
SME (4.41%) category. Only 0.16% of all companies belong to the medium-sized (0.15%) or 
large company (0.01%) category. 
 
Table 55: Definition and overview of French enterprise categories 
 Definition Percentage 
(Number) 
 Employees Annual Sales  Balance sheet 
total 
2010 
Micro-enterprises (ME) <10 ≤ 2 million € ≤ 2 million € 95.44% 
(2 941 117) 
Small and medium 
enterprises (SME) 
<250 ≤ 50 million € ≤ 43 million € 4.41% 
(135 823) 
Medium-sized firms (MF)  <5000 ≤ 1500 million € ≤ 2000 million € 0.15% 
(4 623) 
Large companies (LC) ≥5000  > 1500 million € > 2000 million € 0.01% 
(229) 
Source: INSEE (2010)298 
 
                                                 
298
 Definition of categories: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=ip1321 (12/05/2013) 
Number of companies 2010: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ESANE033 
(12/05/2013) 
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ANNEX 16: DESIGN THINKING EXPLAINED IN A NUTSHELL 
 
Design thinking (T. Brown, 2009; T. Brown & Katz, 2011) has recently become an important 
element when talking about innovation. The core idea of design thinking is converting need 
into want through observation. Brown & Katz (2011, p. 382) argue that the design approach 
to innovation passes through insight, “one of the key sources of design thinking”. They 
further explain: “the only way we can get to know [everyday people] is to seek them out 
where they live, work, and play. Accordingly, almost every project we undertake involves an 
intensive period of observation. We watch what people do (and do not do) and listen to what 
they say (and do not say).” However, such as Verganti (2011), Brown & Katz (2011) draw a 
clear line between observing consumers vs. exchanging with consumers (as for example 
advocated by the open innovation approach (Chesbrough, 2003)), as they believe that the 
latter does not necessarily lead to anything really new as consumers do not know what they 
really need. It is the designer’s responsibility to detect the new needs. The modus operandi of 
design thinking also gets clear through this statement: “in contrast to our academic 
colleagues, we are not trying to generate new knowledge, test a theory, or validate a scientific 
hypothesis. The mission of design thinking is to translate observations into insights, and 
insights into the products and services that will improve lives” (T. Brown & Katz, 2011, p. 
382). Due to the relative young age of integrating design thinking into the innovation process, 
literature is still very scarce. The most important elements of design thinking are (T. Brown, 
2009, pp. 68-69): divergent and convergent phases during the design thinking process299 and 
certain mental capabilities of the design thinkers (i.e. being both analytical and synthetic)300. 
Additionally, the design thinking process moves through three spaces: inspiration space, 
ideation space and implementation space301.  
                                                 
299
 Divergent and convergent phases: Two different phases are necessary in the design thinking process: 
divergent and convergent phases. “The process of the design thinker, […], looks like a rhythmic exchange 
between the divergent and convergent phases, which each subsequent iteration less broad and more detailed 
than the previous ones. In the divergent phase, new options emerge. In the convergent phase […] it’s time to 
eliminate options an make choices” (T. Brown, 2009, p. 68). 
300
 The mental capabilities of design thinkers: Designers use analytical and synthetic tools in their work, both are 
necessary for the innovation process. It is not possible to be only analytical or only creative. They “use 
analytical tools to break apart complex problems to understand them better” and then the “creative process” 
starts that “relies on synthesis, the collective act of putting pieces together to create whole ideas” (T. Brown, 
2009, p. 69). 
301
 The operational element of design thinking: The designer and the design team are the operational element of 
design-oriented companies. The design team might be an external design agency or an internal design agency. 
The design team moves through three spaces: Inspiration space: “in which insights are gathered from every 
possible source” (T. Brown, 2009, p. 64), Ideation Space: “insights are translated into ideas” (T. Brown, 2009, 
p. 64), Implementation space: “the best ideas are developed into a concrete, fully conceived plan of action” (T. 
Brown, 2009, p. 64). 
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ANNEX 17: THE TURNOVER OF HCPR’S GOVERNANCE 
 
In order to better grasp the particularity of HCPR, we compared HCPR with Cap Digital and 
Systematic Paris Region, two other policy-driven clusters of the Paris Region (see Table 56 
and Table 57). The turnover of HCPR’s presidents and CEOs is much higher than the 
turnover of Cap Digital’s or Systematic’s presidents and CEOs. Since the beginning of the 
French cluster policy HCPR already counts five different CEOs while Cap Digital only counts 
one and Systematic two different CEOs.  
 
Table 56: Number of presidents: HCPR, Cap Digital & Systematic 
Policy-driven 
cluster name 
# Period  Years Name Company 
HealthCluster PR      
 
1 2005 - 2009 < 4 years Jean-Claude Muller Sanofi-Aventis 
 
2 2009 - 09/2011 < 2 years Emmanuel Canet Servier 
 
3 09/2011 - 03/2012 < 1 year David Sourdive Cellectis Sa 
 
4 since 03/2012 < 3 years Arnaud Gobet INNOTHERA 
Cap Digital      
 
1 01/2006 - 2008 < 2 years Jean-Pierre Cottet Lagardère 
 
2 2008 - 01/2013 < 5 years Henri Verdier MFG Labs  
 
3 since 01/2013 < 2 years Stéphane Distinguin Fabernovel 
Systematic PR      
 1 2005 - 06/2011  < 6 years Dominique Vernay Thales 
 2 since 06/2011 < 3 years Jean-Luc Beylat Alcatel Lucent 
Sources: divers (fieldwork discussions and newspaper articles) 
 
Table 57: Number of chief executive officers: HCPR, Cap Digital & Systematic 
Policy-driven 
cluster name 
# Period Years Nom 
HealthCluster 
PR 
    
 
1 01/2006 – 08/2007 < 2 years Bernard Brigonnet 
 
2 01/2008 – 2009 < 2 years Michel Vieillefosse 
 
3 09/2009 – 2010 < 1 year Jean Deregnaucourt 
 
4 01/2011 – 07/2013 < 3 years François Chevillard 
 
5 since 09/2013 < 1 year Jean-Roch Meunier 
Cap Digital     
 
1 since 04/2006 < 9 years Patrick Coquet 
Systematic PR     
 1 2005 - 10/2011 < 6 years  Sylvain Dorschner 
 2 since 10/2011 < 3 years François Cuny 
Sources: divers (fieldwork discussions and newspaper articles) 
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Evaluation moderne, évaluation modeste ? 
Le cas des pôles de compétitivité français 
(What should be expected from a public policy evaluation ? 
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Résumé : 
L’évaluation des politiques publiques est un thème récurrent pour les praticiens et chercheurs 
travaillant sur l’action publique. Mais au-delà de l’accord sur le principe, il n’y a pas 
stabilisation de la doctrine et de ses pratiques. Différents modèles coexistent ou se succèdent, 
selon les pays ou les époques. En nous appuyant sur le cas de l’évaluation de la politique 
française des pôles de compétitivité en 2008, nous montrons les principales difficultés de la 
démarche, liées au caractère systémique, multi-acteurs et hétérogène de l’objet « cluster ». A 
travers l’analyse des utilisations de l’évaluation, nous mettons ensuite en évidence que cette 
évaluation participe à la constitution progressive et simultanée d’une doctrine des clusters et 
de leur pilotage. En conclusion, nous traçons les bases d’un modèle de démarche évaluative, 
qui la désacralise et l’intègre à un dispositif plus large de pilotage des politiques publiques. 
Mots clés : Politique publique, évaluation, pôle de compétitivité, cluster 
 
Abstract: 
Public policy evaluations constitute a current topic among practitioners and academics 
working on public action. However, beyond a mutual agreement on the principles of 
evaluation, there is hardly any stabilisation of evaluation doctrines and practices. Different 
models coexist, according to the country and the period. Basing our analysis on the evaluation 
of the French cluster policy in 2008, we highlight the main difficulties of the evaluation 
process, which are linked to the systemic, multi-actor and heterogeneous character of a 
“cluster”. Through the analysis of how the results of the evaluation are used, we then show 
that this evaluation takes part of a progressive construction of doctrine on what a cluster is 
and how it should be managed. In conclusion, we build the basis of an evaluation framework, 
in which evaluation is integrated in a larger public policy management process. 
Keywords: Public policy, evaluation, competitiveness pole, cluster 
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1. Introduction 
 
L’évaluation des politiques publiques est, comme la réforme de l’Etat, une des thématiques 
récurrentes en France depuis plus de 30 ans dans les débats des praticiens et des chercheurs 
intéressés par le management public (Trosa, 2009). Chacun appelle de ses vœux l’expansion 
d’une « culture de l’évaluation ». L’évaluation est devenue un « badge de modernité » selon 
l’expression de Pollitt (citée par (Perret, 2001)). Le principe de l’évaluation des politiques 
publiques est maintenant d’autant moins contesté qu’il est inscrit dans la Constitution depuis 
juillet 2008 (article 47-2). L’Assemblée nationale devrait même consacrer en principe une 
semaine par mois au contrôle et à l’évaluation des activités gouvernementales ou des 
politiques publiques. Néanmoins, les divergences et les doutes apparaissent dès que l’on 
essaie de préciser les conceptions qui président à l’évaluation, les méthodes mises en œuvre, 
et les impacts qu’elle peut avoir sur les décisions (Perret, 2001; Bernard Perret, 2008; Stame, 
2009; Thoenig, 2002). 
 
Une occasion d’analyser une évaluation de politique publique « en actes » s’est présentée 
récemment. En effet, le gouvernement français a lancé en 2005 une politique ambitieuse de 
clusters, appelés « pôles de compétitivité »302. Cette politique est destinée à « renforcer la 
compétitivité de l'économie française et développer la croissance et l'emploi sur des marchés 
porteurs »303 principalement à travers le soutien financier à des projets de R&D innovants et 
collaboratifs entre entreprises et laboratoires de recherche. Dans ce cadre, 71 pôles de 
compétitivité, répartis sur tout le territoire français, ont été labellisés en 2005. Derrière ce mot 
de « pôles de compétitivité » se cachent donc des structures regroupant des entreprises et des 
laboratoires sur des territoires, avec une organisation et une gouvernance dédiées pour 
susciter les projets et animer l’action collective. Tous ces pôles de compétitivité ont été 
évalués en 2008 (soit trois ans après leur démarrage) dans le cadre d’une opération 
d’envergure commanditée par les pouvoirs publics en charge de leur tutelle.  
 
Travaillant depuis 2007 sur les pôles de compétitivité au sein d’une équipe de recherche 
pluridisciplinaire304, nous avons suivi avec attention le déroulement, les résultats et les effets 
de l’évaluation nationale réalisée en 2008 sur cette politique. Par ailleurs, nous avons pu avoir 
accès à une partie du matériau brut rassemblé par les évaluateurs, et recueillir les opinions de 
différents acteurs (notamment dirigeants de pôles) sur cette démarche d’évaluation. A travers 
ce cas particulier, il est intéressant de remettre en perspective le processus et les résultats de 
cette évaluation par rapport aux débats contemporains sur l’évaluation, et de tracer, au moins 
pour les politiques de clusters, les lignes de force des évaluations à venir. En quelque sorte, 
faire l’évaluation de l’évaluation. 
 
Après avoir rappelé succinctement les grandes problématiques de l’évaluation des politiques 
publiques, telles qu’elles apparaissent dans une abondante littérature, nous nous focalisons sur 
la manière dont cette question se décline en pratique sur les politiques de clusters. Suite à 
cette revue de la littérature, nous analysons les principes et les résultats de l’évaluation des 
pôles de compétitivité, clusters « à la française ». Nous abordons ensuite les effets de cette 
évaluation et sa place dans le dispositif de pilotage, pour finalement proposer des pistes sur la 
manière dont on peut continuer à apprendre de cette opération pour améliorer ses prochaines 
                                                 
302
 dont la logique, en tant que politique industrielle, est analysée dans (Menu, 2011). 
303
 Pour plus d’information sur les pôles de compétitivité, on peut visiter le site officiel : 
http://competitivite.gouv.fr/ 
304
 Les auteurs appartiennent à une équipe de chercheurs en gestion et en économie qui ont lancé un programme 
de recherche pluriannuel sur les clusters, financé par l’ANR. 
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moutures305. En conclusion, nous réinterrogeons la relation entre évaluation et politique 
publique. 
 
 
2. L’évaluation de politiques publiques dans la littérature : un changement de 
paradigme ? 
 
2.1. Des pratiques d’évaluation nationales 
 
Il n’est pas dans notre propos de refaire de manière détaillée un panorama de l’histoire de 
l’évaluation de politiques publiques en France (cf. Thoenig, 2002), ni une discussion des 
présupposés théoriques qui président aux diverses conceptions de l’évaluation (Chanut, 2009; 
Stame, 2009). On se contentera de noter qu’en France, après une importation des pratiques 
américaines par des chercheurs dans les années 70, l’évaluation se développe timidement, 
avant d’être institutionnalisée en 1990 par un décret qui n’en assure pas, pour autant, l’assise 
définitive. Après une refonte du système institutionnel en 1998, et une nouvelle mise en 
sommeil, l’entrée récente du principe dans la Constitution (article 47-2, juillet 2008) pourrait 
marquer une nouvelle phase de cette institutionnalisation, qui, en France, est considérée 
comme la clé d’un développement de la pratique évaluative. 
 
Chaque pays a des traditions propres en matière d’évaluation (Bachtler & Wren, 2006). Ainsi, 
on sait que dans les pays anglo-saxons, où le rôle de l’Etat est moins marqué, et où n’existe 
pas de tradition d’expertise étatique liée à la présence des grands corps techniques, 
l’évaluation repose davantage sur l’existence d’un corps de professionnels autonomes (Perret 
2003). En France, alors que la pratique de l’évaluation de politiques publiques s’est bien 
établie au niveau régional (grâce par exemple aux évaluations des politiques ou des 
« programmes » de développement régional de la Commission Européenne), elle peine à se 
routiniser et se banaliser au niveau étatique. Même si un certain nombre d’évaluations ont 
d’ores et déjà été effectuées306, de nombreux observateurs sont néanmoins critiques sur 
l’ampleur et la portée de cette pratique. Il est vrai que toute démarche évaluative se heurte à 
des problèmes génériques qui dépassent les spécificités nationales. 
 
2.2. Les difficultés intrinsèques de l’évaluation des politiques publiques 
 
L’évaluation d’une politique publique consiste à « apprécier son efficacité en comparant ses 
résultats aux objectifs assignés et aux moyens mis en œuvre » (décret du 18/11/1998). Au-
delà de cette définition, apparemment claire, apparaissent au moins trois séries de difficultés, 
ou de dilemmes, largement connus, que nous nous contentons de rappeler, et qui nous 
donneront une grille d’analyse de notre cas : 
 
• La formulation des objectifs est difficile. Le travail des évaluateurs consiste souvent à 
énoncer eux-mêmes les questionnements pertinents sur une politique. Les 
« résultats », quant à eux, à supposer qu’ils puissent être mesurés ou appréciés, 
                                                 
305
 Une deuxième évaluation nationale des pôles de compétitivité vient de se dérouler, en 2012. 
306
 Des dizaines d’évaluations ont été réalisées depuis 1990, dans le cadre des processus institutionnels 
mentionnés plus haut, par exemple : les politiques de contractualisation avec les universités, de sécurité routière, 
de la ville… Par ailleurs, un séminaire commun au cercle de la Réforme de l’Etat et à la Société Française 
d’évaluation, démarré début 2010, passe en revue toute une série de démarches évaluatives récentes, qui 
montrent que cette pratique est assez répandue, quoi qu’on en dise, même si elle est réalisée dans des cadres 
institutionnels variés. C’est ainsi que la Cour des Comptes a publié en mai 2010 son évaluation de la politique 
éducative. 
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doivent ensuite être intégrés dans une « théorie de l’action » qui en permette 
l’interprétation (Gibert, 2003). Cependant, la « théorie de l’action » est elle-même 
objet de débat dans une évaluation, d’autant qu’elle n’a pas nécessairement été 
formulée lors de la conception de la politique. Certains auteurs (Pawson, 2006 ; 
(Weiss, 1997), s’appuyant sur le paradigme de la rationalité limitée, sont même allés 
jusqu’à contester cette vision, qui présuppose la validité de la notion même de 
« résultats », et doutent que l’on puisse faire autre chose que d’identifier les 
mécanismes de fonctionnement de systèmes complexes, partiellement autonomes par 
rapport aux intentions des politiques. 
 
• Les choix méthodologiques de la démarche sont problématiques. Parmi les plus 
structurantes, trois catégories de questions peuvent être isolées : 
- Le moment : Les évaluations peuvent être effectuées à différents moments du 
déroulement d’une politique, - ex ante, ex post, ex itinere -, ce qui en modifie 
considérablement le statut et l’usage possible, voire la pertinence (Gibert, 
2003). Implicitement, derrière ces options, sont présents des choix et des 
contraintes variés, en particulier politiques. 
- La méthode : Les méthodes utilisées, pour rigoureuses qu’elles cherchent à 
être, ne peuvent se limiter à des approches purement quantitatives, fondées sur 
un positivisme étroit. Elles puisent donc dans les méthodes et les grilles des 
sciences sociales, au prix d’une fragilité apparente plus grande des 
conclusions. Quel équilibre trouver entre méthodes quantitatives et 
qualitatives ? 
- Les participants : La participation des diverses parties prenantes, notamment 
les usagers ou les bénéficiaires finaux, est toujours source de connaissance. 
Cependant, l’évaluation ne peut, pour autant, du moins dans l’optique actuelle 
des pouvoirs publics français, se transformer en instance de négociation, et les 
conclusions être l’expression des compromis qui en résulteraient. Comment 
concilier les deux objectifs ? D’autant que cette vision encore restrictive de 
l’intervention des parties prenantes est actuellement dépassée307 par les 
partisans d’une évaluation « de 4ème génération » (Guba & Lincoln, 1989), 
voire « de 5ème génération », ou d’une évaluation « émancipatrice » 
(« empowerment evaluation ») (Fetterman, Kaftarian, & Wandersman, 1995), 
permettant à des groupes de citoyens de s’exprimer et d’intervenir directement 
sur la construction des politiques, donc source de démocratie. 
 
• L’interaction entre une évaluation et les suites qui y sont données par les 
« décideurs » est un phénomène complexe. Après une période d’attente déçue de la 
part des tenants de la démarche évaluative, force a été de constater qu’on ne pouvait la 
considérer, loin de là, comme seule source de la décision politique ou administrative 
(Lacasse, 1995). De fait, on observe peu d’infléchissements d’une politique liés à un 
processus évaluatif, et ses effets, sans être inexistants, sont plus diffus et indirects. En 
effet, au-delà du rôle d’aide à la décision et au pilotage des systèmes de gestion que 
peuvent jouer les évaluations, ont été mis en évidence des effets d’apprentissage ou de 
mobilisation des acteurs, ainsi que de déplacement et de partage de représentations. 
Ces derniers effets se révèlent essentiels dans un contexte où les politiques publiques 
reposent sur des partenariats entre de nombreux acteurs, et où « la production des 
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 Evolution plus spécifiquement anglo-saxonne, qui n’est pas directement transposable au contexte français, 
pour les raisons évoquées en 2.1 
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normes de l’action publique est partiellement déléguée aux acteurs et parties 
prenantes » (Bernard Perret, 2008). 
 
2.3. L’évaluation des politiques de clusters : des modèles qui se cherchent 
 
Ces difficultés d’évaluation des politiques publiques se retrouvent amplifiées en matière 
d’évaluation des politiques de clusters et de politiques d’innovation en général, alors même 
qu’est soulignée l’importance de l’évaluation pour l’apprentissage et la transmission du savoir 
(Potter, 2005). De nombreux travaux existent, tant en France qu’à l’étranger, sur les politiques 
de clusters, mais bien peu de travaux ont été menés sur l’évaluation de ces politiques (Sölvell, 
2008). Les auteurs qui s’y sont intéressés (Bellandi & Caloffi, 2010b; Diez, 2001; Russo & 
Rossi, 2009; Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, et al., 2007) soulignent en particulier la difficulté à 
spécifier des objectifs souvent impalpables (comme les processus d’apprentissage collectif), 
la complexité des modèles de causalité, le caractère systémique et dynamique de l’objet à 
évaluer. La plupart en déduisent la nécessité d’approches nouvelles (sans forcément les 
spécifier), et mettent l’accent en particulier sur deux points : la nécessité d’affirmer le 
caractère processuel de l’évaluation, l’intérêt d’approches plus participatives.  
 
Derrière ces débats, qu’il s’agisse de textes généraux sur l’évaluation des politiques publiques 
ou plus spécifiquement de l’évaluation des politiques de clusters, se joue en fait le 
renoncement à un modèle souvent critiqué, que certains ont qualifié de « balistique » 
(Padioleau, 1982) ou d’ « épidémiologique » (Stame, 2009). Ce modèle voyait dans 
l’évaluation le dernier maillon d’un processus d’action publique conçu comme séquentiel et 
linéaire : selon cette conception, la chaîne objectifs-moyens-résultats serait suivie d’une phase 
de correction, permise par un processus d’évaluation objectif et rigoureux. Mais le modèle qui 
pourrait s’y substituer se constitue par tâtonnements et les doctrines sont loin d’être 
stabilisées.  
 
En France, selon certains auteurs, on serait davantage actuellement dans un paradigme de 
l’évaluation « dans l’action » que d’évaluation « de l’action », pour reprendre les termes de 
Chanut (2009). L’évaluation « dans l’action » fait de l’évaluation un processus quasi-continu, 
et non spécifiquement ex post. Cette évolution, si elle est avérée, brouille donc les frontières 
entre évaluation et management ou contrôle de gestion, et contribue à déplacer la charge de 
l’évaluation des « experts » vers les managers eux-mêmes. Cette assertion est-elle vérifiée 
dans le cas de l’évaluation des politiques de pôles de compétitivité ? C’est ce que nous 
examinerons dans la suite, en présentant les modalités de cette évaluation et ses usages. Mais 
auparavant, nous allons préciser les principales questions que pose en pratique l’évaluation 
des politiques de clusters.  
 
 
3. L’évaluation des politiques de clusters en pratiques 
 
3.1. Une exigence contemporaine 
 
La multiplication des politiques de clusters, dans un grand nombre de pays, s’explique assez 
bien : schématiquement, dans un contexte où la mondialisation exacerbe la compétition 
internationale, et où les pays développés voient avec inquiétude leurs capacités de production, 
puis de R&D, délocalisées vers les pays émergents, le constat du succès économique de 
certains clusters spontanés (dont l’exemple emblématique est la Silicon Valley (Weil, 2010)), 
a conduit la puissance publique à tenter de soutenir, de manière volontariste, l’émergence et le 
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développement de clusters (Rosenberg, 2002). Ces politiques, s’appuyant sur un certain 
nombre de travaux théoriques (cf. revues de littérature dans FenChong, 2009 ou Cruz & 
Teixeira 2009), ont pour point commun de consacrer des ressources publiques notables 
(subventions, incitations fiscales, etc.) au développement de ces clusters. Le souci de rendre 
compte de l’utilisation de ces fonds et des effets de ces politiques (« accountability »), la 
volonté d’améliorer ces politiques ou de les réorienter, mais aussi des doutes persistants sur 
les effets des clusters sur la croissance et ses mécanismes (Martin & Sunley, 2003 ; Potter & 
Miranda, 2009 ; Torre, 2008) ainsi que sur la capacités des politiques à contribuer à la 
création et à la dynamique des clusters, sont à l’origine de la multiplication des évaluations, 
commanditées par les pouvoirs publics dans différents pays. La France, après le lancement de 
sa politique de pôles de compétitivité, n’a pas échappé à la règle. Ce besoin d’évaluation étant 
posé, qu’évalue-t-on en pratique et comment308 ?  
 
3.2. Que faut-il évaluer ? Les objectifs de l’évaluation et la question de l’imputabilité 
 
Une des difficultés classiques de l’évaluation de politiques publiques est en effet la variété des 
angles d’attaque qui peuvent se dissimuler sous l’unique vocable « évaluation ». En ce qui 
concerne les politiques de clusters, différents niveaux d’évaluation, qui renvoient souvent à 
des acteurs aux intérêts différents, peuvent être distingués : 
• d’abord, l’évaluation des politiques de clusters, c’est-à-dire des modalités de mise en 
œuvre et de l’efficacité de ces politiques, prises au niveau national, par opposition à 
l’évaluation individuelle des clusters ;  
• ensuite, si l’on s’intéresse à l’évaluation d’un cluster, on pourra distinguer : 
l’efficacité de son organisation (structuration, gouvernance, pilotage, etc.), ses 
résultats par rapport aux objectifs visés (par exemple le nombre de projets 
collaboratifs qu’il a suscités), son impact sur le territoire et sa dynamique économique 
(en termes de richesse, d’emplois, d’entreprises créées, etc.), son impact sur les 
acteurs (entreprises, organismes de recherche, collectivités territoriales). 
 
Ces différents éléments ne sont évidemment pas indépendants, comme l’illustre le graphique 
ci-dessous. Ce schéma met bien en évidence la différence entre évaluation d’une politique de 
clusters et évaluation des clusters eux-mêmes. Malgré son caractère simplificateur, le schéma 
montre également les déterminants potentiels des résultats atteints par un cluster, qui peuvent 
être liés à la politique publique en cause, à l’organisation interne du cluster, à des facteurs 
externes nationaux, mais aussi à des éléments de contexte propres à chaque cluster, comme 
ses caractéristiques « héritées ». Par ce terme, nous entendons notamment la configuration des 
acteurs concernés, les ressources, et les liens qu’entretiennent entre eux, et avec le territoire, 
ces différents acteurs, avant même la création institutionnelle du cluster (FenChong 2009). 
 
                                                 
308
 Nous nous appuyons sur un travail bibliographique comparatif réalisé sur les démarches d’évaluation de 
politiques de clusters : voir Lefebvre, P., & Pallez, F. 2009. Evaluation de la performance des pôles - Approches 
comparées. Mines ParisTech - Centre de gestion scientifique, rapport commandité par Advancia-Negocia et 
financé par la Chaire Entreprenariat CCIP. 
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Graphique 1 : Niveaux d’évaluation d’un cluster 
inspiré du BIPE309 (2007) et de FenChong (2009) 
 
 
Ces différentes remarques permettent de comprendre la relative variété des démarches 
d’évaluation des clusters à travers le monde, au-delà d’une diversité liée à des traditions 
nationales. Ce schéma permet aussi de comprendre que l’évaluation de l’efficacité de 
l’organisation d’un cluster, sur laquelle il est souvent mis l’accent, n’est qu’une des 
composantes de l’évaluation d’une politique de cluster. Enfin, il met en évidence le caractère 
systémique dont nous avons déjà parlé, source d’un problème d’imputabilité des résultats 
observés à une politique donnée. En effet :  
• en théorie, l’évaluation devrait être conduite par rapport à des objectifs définis ex ante, 
et sur la base d’une comparaison avec une situation de référence elle-même définie et 
caractérisée avant le lancement de la politique. 
• en pratique, on observe en général que les réseaux d’acteurs rassemblés au sein du 
cluster pré-existaient, que la dynamique de développement était déjà en germe, que les 
objectifs que se fixe le cluster évoluent au fil du temps et que différents facteurs 
exogènes peuvent avoir joué sur les résultats observés. Ces constats rendent délicate 
toute évaluation, et notamment tout jugement, en termes d’« additionnalité » de la 
politique, au sens de la Commission Européenne. 
 
3.3. Démarche et méthodologie 
 
Qui commandite l’évaluation et à quel moment ? 
Les évaluations sont toujours effectuées à la demande d’un acteur particulier, à un instant 
donné. Ces deux variables (origine et moment de la demande) influent sur la nature des 
questions posées, différente selon le type d’acteurs et selon la phase de développement du 
cluster. En l’occurrence, la plupart des évaluations de politiques de clusters sont faites à 
l’initiative des acteurs publics concepteurs et financeurs de la politique. En outre, dans le cas 
français, mais cela est vrai aussi pour beaucoup d’autres pays, l’évaluation est faite dans une 
phase relativement précoce du développement de la politique (3 ans après son lancement). 
                                                 
309
 Cabinet ayant réalisé un benchmark international des démarches d’évaluation de politiques de clusters, 
préparatoire à l’évaluation des pôles de compétitivité en 2008 (BIPE 2007) 
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Quels indicateurs ? 
Les critères pour évaluer les clusters découlent des « objets » que l’on a choisi d’évaluer, eux-
mêmes choisis en fonction du moment de l’évaluation et des intérêts du commanditaire. Ces 
indicateurs concernent en général aussi bien l’organisation du cluster que ses résultats, de 
toute nature310. Par exemple la qualité de l’animation sera jugée par des indicateurs comme 
le nombre et le coût des actions soutenues. On trouve des indicateurs de résultats 
« intermédiaires » qui qualifient l’action du cluster comme par exemple le montant consacré 
aux projets de R&D ou le montant des investissements réalisés (plateformes de recherche, 
etc.). La performance scientifique et technique sera estimée par le nombre de brevets et 
licences. Quant aux impacts « finaux » du cluster, ils sont qualifiés en général par des 
indicateurs économiques très classiques comme des indicateurs de croissance et de santé des 
entreprises (chiffre d’affaires, valeur ajoutée, taux d’exportation, etc.), mais également, pour 
apprécier l’impact sur le territoire, par des indicateurs de création d’emplois, de création 
d’entreprises, ou d’investissements directs sur ledit territoire.  
 
3.4. Usages et effets des évaluations 
 
Sans étude empirique détaillée, il est assez difficile d’appréhender les effets, directs et 
indirects des évaluations commanditées par les pouvoirs publics et même les usages que ceux-
ci en font. En effet, les liens entre recommandations des évaluateurs et décision politique 
n’ont rien de mécanique.  
 
A travers les quelques cas que nous avons pu étudier à l’étranger, et qui ne seront pas 
développés ici (Gallié, Glaser, & Pallez, 2010, 2011), nous nous contenterons de noter que les 
différentes évaluations ont toutes conduit à une reconduction des politiques de cluster, en 
suggérant des améliorations des dispositifs dans différents domaines (pilotage, 
financement…). Dans tous les cas, l'évaluation est considérée comme un outil pour réfléchir à 
la suite de la politique, et non comme un couperet qui déterminerait à lui seul de la poursuite 
ou non de la politique. Quant à l'évaluation des clusters eux-mêmes, elle a pu, dans certains 
cas, conduire à des arrêts du soutien public, comme par exemple dans la région wallonne 
(arrêt du financement de deux clusters) (cf. Lepage, 2009) ou en France (délabellisation de six 
pôles de compétitivité).  
 
Après avoir donné cet aperçu général des pratiques d’évaluation des politiques de clusters, 
nous allons présenter plus en détail un cas particulier, le cas français. 
 
 
4. L’évaluation, composante de la politique française des pôles de compétitivité 
 
En France, la politique des pôles, par contraste avec nombre de politiques antérieures, s’est 
construite en intégrant dès l’origine la question de l’évaluation. Dès le lancement de la 
politique des pôles, l’Etat avait prévu de l’évaluer au bout de trois ans et d’utiliser les résultats 
pour réorienter éventuellement la doctrine initiale. Sans être totalement nouvelle311, cette 
particularité est suffisamment notable pour que nous la signalions. Naturellement nous 
                                                 
310
 Toutefois, certains pays, comme l’Allemagne, disposant de plus de recul temporel, ont choisi de centrer leur 
évaluation des programmes BioRegio et Bioprofile sur les impacts économiques sur les territoires (10 ans après 
le lancement des programmes). 
311
 On se rappelle que, dès 1988, le lancement du RMI s’était accompagné d’un engagement de procéder à une 
évaluation. 
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distinguons cette démarche d’évaluation institutionnelle des travaux de chercheurs, qui, selon 
des méthodes diverses, se sont intéressés à la performance des pôles français (voir par 
exemple Chalaye & Massard, 2009 ; Duranton, Martin, Mayer & Mayneris, 2008 ; Bocquet & 
Mothe, 2009). 
 
Pour présenter les caractéristiques de la démarche d’évaluation menée en France, nous 
procéderons en deux temps :  
• dans un premier temps, nous décrirons factuellement la conception de la démarche en 
reprenant les rubriques générales que nous venons de présenter succinctement : 
objectifs et type de résultats évalués, méthodologie et démarche adoptées. Nous 
commenterons brièvement au passage les choix qui ont été faits par rapport aux 
questionnements généraux évoqués ci-avant ; 
• puis nous analyserons plus en détail la manière dont cette évaluation a été utilisée, et 
montrerons qu’elle est conçue comme un outil de pilotage.  
 
Nous nous appuierons pour ce faire sur un matériau constitué  
- des textes publics de synthèse produits par les évaluateurs en 2008, mais aussi 
d’un certain nombre de rapports d’évaluation confidentiels fournis par des 
pôles avec qui nous étions en contact 
- des séances de l’Observatoire des Pôles de Compétitivité312, séminaire mensuel 
au cours duquel dialoguent des chercheurs et des acteurs impliqués dans la 
politique des pôles (dirigeants de pôles, représentants de l’Etat et des 
collectivités territoriales, responsables d’entreprises ou d’établissements 
d’enseignement supérieur et de recherche, consultants…). L’une de ces 
séances, notamment, a été consacrée à l’évaluation de 2008 
- d’entretiens avec les évaluateurs ainsi qu’avec divers responsables de pôles 
(une quinzaine) et des représentants de l’Administration (DGCIS), pendant et 
après la phase d’évaluation. 
 
4.1. La démarche d’évaluation des pôles : objectifs, méthodes, résultats 
 
Après avoir établi un cahier des charges s’appuyant sur le cadrage fourni par le BIPE, la 
DIACT (Délégation Interministérielle à l’Aménagement et à la Compétitivité des 
Territoires)313 lança un appel d’offres en 2007, qui fut remporté par deux cabinets de conseil, 
CM International (CMI) et Boston Consulting Group (BCG). Sur la base du cahier des 
charges, les cabinets précisèrent les objectifs et la méthodologie. 
 
Les objectifs de l’évaluation 
La mission consistait à mener de front l’analyse de l’orientation stratégique et des modalités 
d’intervention de la politique nationale et celle de la cohérence et de l’efficacité du dispositif, 
pôle par pôle, donc de manière exhaustive. On notera en cela l’ambition de la démarche, mais 
aussi l’idée, pertinente, de notre point de vue, que l’évaluation de la politique nationale devait 
s’alimenter de la connaissance fine des dispositifs qu’elle avait créés, à savoir les pôles.  
 
L’évaluation de la politique s’intéressait à trois grands thèmes : sa pertinence/cohérence, sa 
mise en œuvre et ses premiers effets ; les évaluateurs avaient en effet jugé peu pertinent, 
compte tenu de la jeunesse de la politique, de détecter des impacts économiques. Quant à 
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 http://observatoirepc.org/ 
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 Qui a repris, depuis, le nom de DATAR 
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l’évaluation des 71 pôles, structures légères de statut associatif, dotées de quelques 
permanents financés par des fonds publics, elle portait surtout sur l’efficacité de ces 
organisations, et sur leurs premières actions. Elle reposait donc sur l’analyse de trois axes : la 
dynamique des pôles, leur structuration et leurs projets de R&D. Sur chaque axe ont été 
définis les résultats qui seraient considérés comme satisfaisants, moyens ou insuffisants.  
 
Par rapport au graphique 1, on en restait donc à l’évaluation de l’organisation (de sa 
dynamique) et de résultats intermédiaires (comme les financements obtenus) à l’exclusion de 
la mesure de tout « impact » final. Quant à la délicate question de l’imputabilité de la 
politique, elle n’était pas traitée explicitement, les évaluateurs ayant probablement conscience 
de sa difficulté dans un contexte aussi systémique. En effet, la causalité supposée R&D  
innovation  compétitivité, qui est à la base de la politique des pôles, n’est pas déterministe. 
Ainsi des projets de recherche collaboratifs peuvent avoir des impacts très divers, parfois 
immédiatement visibles s’ils débouchent sur une innovation rencontrant un succès 
commercial, parfois plus indirects s’ils contribuent seulement à la constitution d’un réseau 
entre acteurs complémentaires. En outre, il peut s’agir de coalitions opportunistes d’acteurs 
désireux de trouver des financements complémentaires pour des actions qu’ils souhaitaient 
engager de toute façon. En France, les évaluateurs ont d’ailleurs remarqué, dans les débuts de 
la vie des pôles, un effet de « déstockage » de projets de R&D existants, qui ont pu trouver 
ainsi un financement.  
On notera toutefois que l’évaluation a cherché à analyser la « vie antérieure » des pôles et a 
donc pris en compte, de manière implicite, le fait que les caractéristiques « héritées » d’un 
pôle (la nature des partenaires et leurs liens antérieurs, leurs modalités historiques de 
coopération et d’innovation, etc.) pouvaient expliquer une partie des résultats constatés.  
 
La méthodologie et le pilotage de l’évaluation 
La méthodologie utilisait l’analyse documentaire, les entretiens et réunions avec les acteurs et 
organismes concernés, ainsi qu’une enquête qualitative et quantitative par questionnaire 
envoyé aux pôles préalablement aux entretiens, ceux-ci étant réalisés selon une procédure 
formalisée pour garantir la comparabilité et le caractère normé de l’évaluation. Au total, plus 
de mille personnes furent interrogées, dont 720 au niveau des pôles, soit dix par pôle en 
moyenne. Une phase de test sur quatre pôles « pilotes » avait par ailleurs permis de mettre au 
point le questionnaire, de manière à ce qu’il prenne en compte au mieux la diversité des pôles. 
L’opération fut pilotée de manière rapprochée par les commanditaires : une rencontre par 
semaine avec la DIACT, des contacts fréquents également avec la Direction générale des 
Entreprises, un comité interministériel par mois, un comité de pilotage tous les deux ou trois 
mois… Les résultats globaux de l’évaluation furent présentés au comité de pilotage en juin 
2008, et furent suivis d’une communication gouvernementale. Mais seuls les documents de 
synthèse furent publiés sur le web, les évaluations « individuelles » des pôles restant 
strictement confidentielles. Des retours furent par ailleurs effectués vers chacun des pôles 
classés en 3ème catégorie par les évaluateurs (voir 4.1.3), sous forme d’ « entretiens 
contradictoires » en présence des différentes parties prenantes (tutelle, gouvernance des pôles, 
évaluateurs, collectivités territoriales concernées, etc.).  
 
S’appuyant aussi bien sur des analyses qualitatives que quantitatives, l’évaluation a donc 
utilisé différentes approches méthodologiques, dans un cadre néanmoins très formalisé, qui 
assurait en particulier une « égalité de traitement » entre les pôles. Mais, même si la démarche 
semblait emprunter certains de ses traits à l’audit, il s’agissait bien d’explorer des 
fonctionnements et des dynamiques non pré-déterminés par des standards (Fouquet, 2009). En 
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revanche, il ne s’agit pas, à l’évidence, d’une évaluation participative, les commanditaires 
tenant à maîtriser le processus et ses résultats de bout en bout.  
  
Les résultats de l’évaluation 
La conclusion principale de CMI et BCG fut que le « dispositif des pôles de compétitivité 
semble suffisamment prometteur pour être maintenu dans ses grands principes ». Elle était 
assortie de diverses recommandations d’amélioration, sur lesquelles nous reviendrons.  
 
Quant à l’évaluation des pôles de compétitivité, pris isolément, elle conduisit à un classement 
en trois catégories, proposé par les évaluateurs sur la base de trois axes-clés (stratégie du pôle, 
gouvernance, capacité à monter des projets de R&D) :  
• Les pôles (39) qui « ont atteint les objectifs de la politique des pôles » 
• Les pôles (19) qui « ont atteint partiellement les objectifs de la politique des pôles et 
qui doivent travailler à l’amélioration de certaines dimensions de leur action » 
• Les pôles (13) qui « pourraient tirer parti d’une reconfiguration en profondeur ».  
Mais, au-delà de ce classement, l’évaluation permit aussi le renvoi à chaque pôle - c’est-à-dire 
à sa gouvernance - d’une image de son fonctionnement, à travers une « fiche » assez fouillée 
d’une quinzaine de pages. 
 
A la suite de ces conclusions, le gouvernement annonça un certain nombre de décisions314 qui 
constituent ce que l’on a appelé « la politique 2.0 » des pôles, et sur lesquelles nous 
reviendrons ci-dessous. D’ores et déjà, notons le lien fort qui a été fait entre les résultats de 
l’évaluation et l’annonce de la deuxième phase de la politique. 
 
 
5. Quel usage a-t-on fait de l’évaluation ? 
 
Il est souvent reproché à l’Etat français de peu évaluer ses politiques et dans tous les cas, de 
donner peu de suite à ses évaluations (Duranton, Martin, Mayer & Mayneris, 2008). Quels ont 
donc été les effets et les usages de l’évaluation par les différentes parties prenantes ? Nous 
nous interrogeons d’abord sur l’appropriation des résultats de l’évaluation par l’Etat, puis sur 
les effets possibles de cette dernière sur les pôles, pour terminer par les apprentissages pour 
l’évaluation suivante.  
 
5.1. Une évaluation pour réorienter la politique et améliorer le pilotage 
 
Nous avons déjà noté que cette démarche évaluative s’inscrit dans un mouvement très 
général, qui fait de l’obligation de « rendre compte » une exigence maintenant naturelle de la 
vie économique (Dumez, 2008) et, quand il s’agit de politiques publiques, de la vie 
démocratique. Cela dit, même si la communication politique sur les résultats de la politique 
des pôles en était évidemment un objectif important, la démarche d’évaluation était aussi 
explicitement conçue comme un élément du dispositif de pilotage. Nous allons indiquer 
comment cela s'est traduit en pratique. 
 
Le principe de la reconduction de la politique des pôles avait été annoncé par le chef de l’Etat 
dès juin 2007, soit un an plus tôt. Néanmoins, l’évaluation a permis de montrer la pertinence 
du dispositif en termes de structuration des acteurs et de réflexion stratégique territoriale, et a 
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 Pour une synthèse, on pourra se reporter au compte rendu de la séance du 21 octobre 2008 du séminaire de 
l’Observatoire des pôles de compétitivité (http://observatoirepc.org/) auquel participèrent le CMI, le BCG et la 
DIACT. 
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conduit l’Etat à réaffirmer la prorogation de sa politique sur les trois ans à suivre 
(actuellement prolongée jusqu’en 2012), en renouvelant le budget initial dans les mêmes 
conditions à savoir 1,5 milliard d’euros. 
 
Plus que la décision même de reconduire la politique nationale des pôles de compétitivité, que 
l’on ne peut imputer à l’évaluation, la nouvelle politique 2.0 peut lui être reliée. Il y a eu, bien 
sûr, avant l’évaluation, de nombreuses occasions d’interactions entre les pôles et les 
représentants de leur tutelle. Mais il est indéniable que certains des nouveaux dispositifs 
exploitent directement les résultats et puisent dans les nombreuses préconisations issues de 
l’évaluation. Nous commentons ci-dessous deux de ces dispositifs qui nous semblent parmi 
les plus significatifs.  
 
Une formalisation accrue de la stratégie 
Ainsi, l’évaluation met en avant la faiblesse des pôles en matière d’élaboration et de 
formalisation de leur stratégie. Il semble que la conséquence de ce résultat a été, à la demande 
de l’Etat, la rédaction de « feuilles de route technologiques » par les pôles et la signature d’un 
« contrat de performance » pluriannuel entre l’Etat, les collectivités territoriales et chaque 
pôle. Dans ce contrat, signé par le président du pôle, celui-ci s'engage sur un programme 
d'actions, assorti d’un calendrier de réalisation. La tutelle montre donc un désir de 
formalisation accrue de la relation entre l’Etat et les pôles, avec des objectifs pour chaque 
pôle mieux définis.  
 
La mise en place d’indicateurs de suivi des résultats 
Dans la logique du contrat de performance, la tutelle impose maintenant à chaque pôle la mise 
en place d’indicateurs. L’insistance sur la construction d’indicateurs est particulièrement 
intéressante, car elle montre dès à présent la préoccupation de l’Etat pour l’évaluation future 
de l’action du pôle. Une première série d’environ 70 indicateurs sont communs à tous 
(création d’entreprises, nombre de projets de R&D retenus pour un financement public, 
nombre de brevets, etc.). Ces indicateurs doivent faciliter la comparaison entre les pôles. Mais 
l’Etat a également pris en compte la diversité des pôles, en demandant à chacun de produire 
des indicateurs spécifiques.  
 
Même si, en apparence, ces évolutions paraissent relativement attendues, on peut y déceler 
des éléments plus originaux, que l’on peut interpréter comme le résultat d’un apprentissage de 
la tutelle, obtenu notamment à travers le processus d’évaluation. Ce nouveau savoir pourrait 
être sommairement qualifié comme suit : affirmation du lien entre la dynamique de 
développement et la formulation détaillée d’une stratégie (y compris en termes 
technologiques), que les pôles sont dès lors encouragés à établir par un formalisme 
contractuel ; reconnaissance de l’existence de schémas de développement diversifiés des 
pôles, au-delà d’un socle d’indicateurs communs à tous.  
 
5.2. Une évaluation pour mobiliser les pôles 
 
L’évaluation peut aussi avoir des effets directs sur les pôles. En effet, à travers la 
connaissance « pôle par pôle » qu’elle apporte, les comparaisons qu’elle autorise, et surtout, 
la légitimité qu’apporte une expertise extérieure aux décisions étatiques, l’évaluation peut 
permettre de piloter ou de mobiliser les pôles, voire de les sanctionner. Il est intéressant 
d’analyser les choix de l’Etat en la matière. 
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L’effet le plus visible de l’évaluation pour les pôles a été leur classement en trois catégories. 
Un tel classement récompense symboliquement les « bons élèves ». Mais les 13 pôles classés 
en catégorie 3 l’ont vécu comme une sanction. Certains des pôles mal classés se sont 
interrogés sur la pertinence même des critères utilisés. On peut en effet défendre l’idée que la 
compétitivité de certains pôles reposerait moins sur des innovations technologiques radicales 
que sur des innovations par l’usage (exemple du pôle Enfant, construit autour d’un 
marché315) ; ou sur la disponibilité d’une main d’œuvre formée à des compétences 
spécialisées et l’organisation d’une filière industrielle (exemple du Pôle Nucléaire de 
Bourgogne (Fen Chong & Pallez, 2008)). Or ces critères ont été peu pris en compte par les 
évaluateurs. Ces pôles ont pu alors considérer qu’ils n’avaient pas été évalués à l’aune de 
leurs spécificités.  
 
Pour la tutelle, diverses attitudes étaient envisageables à l’issue de l’évaluation : sanctionner 
immédiatement en délabellisant les « mauvais » pôles pour se focaliser sur les plus 
performants, se rapprochant ainsi d’un schéma plus « élitiste » que certains avaient défendu 
lors du lancement de la politique ; ou conserver pour l’instant le statu quo, en espérant que la 
remobilisation soit forte d’elle-même.  
L’Etat a opté pour une position intermédiaire, en proposant aux pôles mal classés une phase 
transitoire de réorganisation/restructuration, qui devait durer un an, mais s’est en fait 
prolongée presque deux ans. Des décisions de délabellisation, qui ont touché finalement six 
des treize pôles classés en catégorie 3, n’ont en effet été prises qu’en mai 2010. 
 
Cette position a eu des effets notables puisque l’on a pu observer une motivation certaine des 
pôles mal classés à travailler sur des réorientations de leur stratégie et de leur fonctionnement. 
En outre, l’électrochoc lié à l’évaluation a conduit à une forte mobilisation des partenaires 
territoriaux de ces pôles en leur faveur, parfois à un haut niveau politique (députés, sénateurs, 
présidents de conseils régionaux, dont certains anciens ministres). Cette mobilisation était 
évidemment liée à la menace crédible d’une délabellisation qui constituait une sanction 
symbolique lourde, risquant de plus d’entraîner des conséquences importantes sur le pôle 
(perte de visibilité, tarissement de certains financements publics, etc.) et sur son territoire 
(risques accrus de délocalisation, démobilisation des acteurs privés, recentrage des chercheurs 
sur une recherche plus académique, etc.). On notera que le poids important accordé aux 
« labels » est probablement une caractéristique profonde de la culture nationale française, 
attachée aux marques d’excellence attribuées par l’Etat. 
 
Ce faisant, la tutelle a utilisé l’effet de « sunshine regulation », jouant sur la publication (et 
donc la comparaison) des résultats. Mais elle l’assortissait aussi d’une procédure plus 
directive : injonction pour certains pôles à la « remise en ordre » et deuxième évaluation 
(effectuée pendant le deuxième semestre 2009 par les mêmes évaluateurs et avec la même 
grille que la première évaluation), avec une échéance et une « menace ». Plus généralement, 
même pour les pôles mieux classés, le regard extérieur porté par des évaluateurs et la publicité 
donnée aux résultats ont constitué un incitatif à la réflexion interne et à la remise en cause de 
certains fonctionnements. D’autant que l’évaluation de 2012 s’appuiera nécessairement sur 
les résultats de l’évaluation de 2008.  
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 Voir l’audition du Pôle Enfant par la Mission d’évaluation et de contrôle de l’Assemblée Nationale : 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-mec/08-09/c0809045.asp  
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5.3. Des pistes d’apprentissage pour une évaluation future ? 
 
Peut-on aussi tirer de cette expérience des enseignements pour la prochaine évaluation? Il 
nous semble que l’expérience qui vient de se dérouler en France peut modifier sensiblement 
les choses sur deux points : l’objectivation des jugements portés par les évaluateurs et la prise 
en compte de la diversité des pôles. 
 
L’objectivation des jugements 
En matière d’objectivation des données et de rigueur de la méthode, l’élaboration des feuilles 
de routes et des contrats de performance devrait contribuer à faciliter la prochaine évaluation 
puisque les objectifs auront été plus clairement formulés, et que des indicateurs normalisés 
ont été fixés. En outre, grâce à la première évaluation, une situation de référence aura été 
définie, permettant ainsi d’objectiver la notion de trajectoire. 
 
Quant à la question de la fiabilité des données, on pourrait craindre qu’elle reste sujette à 
caution, les évalués étant pour partie les fournisseurs de ces données. Même si le risque n’est 
pas nul, il nous semble qu’il doit être mis en balance des cercles vertueux enclenchés dans les 
pôles par cette obligation (incitation à l’autoévaluation). En outre, la confrontation de données 
quantitatives aux points de vue des acteurs, qui du coup devrait être systématisée par la tutelle 
pour permettre de contrôler la fiabilité, peut être en soi source de connaissance, notamment 
pour mettre en évidence les schémas de causalité expliquant la performance. Mais, ce faisant, 
on accepte une conception moins positiviste de la vérité, en se contentant de vérités « non 
invraisemblables » (GRETU, 1980). 
 
Une meilleure prise en compte de la diversité des pôles ? 
Par ailleurs, on l’a dit, un des enjeux futurs réside dans la prise en compte de la diversité des 
pôles dans les évaluations à venir. Il s’agirait en effet de mener les comparaisons au sein de 
catégories au sein desquelles la comparabilité entre pôles, en termes de trajectoires de 
développement et de performance attendue, soit avérée. Mais sur quelles bases construire 
cette typologie ? 
 
Les différences sectorielles sont classiquement une première explication pour justifier la 
diversité. Par exemple Colgan et Baker (2003) proposent de regrouper les clusters du Maine, 
qu’ils étudient, en trois groupes. Cette classification, basée sur la nature des ressources 
mobilisées (technologie, ressources naturelles, autres), doit permettre, selon eux, de 
différencier les clusters, et donc d’en améliorer le pilotage par les autorités publiques. Mais la 
richesse des données rassemblées lors de la première évaluation par le CMI et le BCG, et de 
celles que les différents organismes publics concernés accumulent actuellement, permet 
maintenant de dépasser ces typologies simples et intuitives (Bonnafous-Boucher & Saussois, 
2010 ; Caillou et al., 2012 ; Glaser, Gallié, Mérindol, & Weil, 2010 ; Hussler, Muller, & 
Ronde, 2010 ). Sur cette base, on pourra ainsi travailler simultanément sur la question de 
l’imputabilité des résultats et sur la différenciation des trajectoires et des performances des 
pôles.  
 
A travers ce passage en revue des effets de l’évaluation, on retrouve les grandes catégories 
d’usages déjà identifiées dans la littérature : aide à la décision et au pilotage, mobilisation des 
acteurs et construction de visions partagées, apprentissage (tutelle autant que gouvernance des 
pôles). Si l’effet direct de l’évaluation (au sens de ses résultats finaux) sur la reconfiguration 
de la politique a été relativement modéré, on peut en revanche faire l’hypothèse que le 
processus même de l’évaluation a fait mûrir certaines idées (par exemple élargissement des 
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missions des pôles, ou lancement d’une politique de « grappes » d’entreprises316) et a 
contribué à un processus réflexif pour tous les acteurs concernés. 
 
 
6. Conclusion : Evaluation moderne, évaluation modeste 
 
Cette exploration de l’évaluation des pôles de compétitivité nous incite, en conclusion, à nous 
demander comment caractériser le modèle d’évaluation qui ressort de cette expérience et s’il 
est par ailleurs conforté par d’autres exemples dans d’autres secteurs. 
 
Sur le premier point, il nous semble que la démarche que nous avons analysée, critiquable à 
certains égards, porte néanmoins en germe un nouveau modèle de l’évaluation,  
• qui abandonne l’ambition d’être la seule source des décisions stratégiques ; 
• qui renonce à une vision positiviste en laissant place à des approches plus qualitatives,  
• qui, par la mobilisation qu’elle suscite, accélère la construction des collectifs et des 
référentiels communs que la politique des pôles elle-même souhaitait encourager ; 
• qui, finalement, par les apprentissages qu’elle induit, participe à la production 
simultanée d’une politique publique et de sa doctrine de pilotage.  
 
Ces différents éléments nous semblent en faire une démarche qui rejoint le modèle de 
l’évaluation « dans l’action » selon la terminologie de Chanut (2009). Une évaluation « de 
l’action » (ou ex post) viserait en effet à mesurer les résultats des actions au regard des 
objectifs d’une politique parvenue à maturité afin d’en tirer les enseignements rétrospectifs. 
Or, étant donné la temporalité du processus de développement, cette conception n’est pas 
soutenable. Et pourtant, compte tenu des sommes allouées, l’évaluation à trois ans résulte 
d’une exigence démocratique, qui oblige à s’interroger sur la pertinence et la réorientation au 
plus juste de la politique. Le schéma de l’évaluation « dans l’action » tel que nous avons 
essayé de le caractériser, permet de dépasser cette contradiction. 
 
Retrouve-t-on ces caractéristiques dans les dernières évaluations de politiques publiques 
réalisées en France ? Répondre à cette question nécessiterait une analyse systématique qui 
dépasse le propos de cet article. Mais sur l’exemple de l’évaluation récemment réalisée par la 
Cour des Comptes sur la politique éducative on peut déjà remarquer que, malgré les 
nombreuses différences des deux démarches, il existe un point commun dans la philosophie 
de l’évaluation, telle qu’elle est présentée par Jean Picq, président de la troisième chambre de 
la Cour des comptes : la volonté d’ouvrir des questionnements plus que de clore les débats par 
des réponses, l’exigence d’humilité qui découle des imperfections de toute évaluation, 
l’évaluation vue comme élément d’un processus qui se déroule sur le temps long. 
 
Pour conclure, il faut prendre conscience que ce positionnement de l’évaluation comme une 
des composantes du dispositif de pilotage, lui confère en même temps un statut plus modeste : 
l’évaluation devient un outil « parmi d’autres », autant à la disposition des responsables qui 
conduisent une politique, que des acteurs évalués. Elle s’éloigne de ce fait d’un modèle de 
production de connaissance objective, incontestable, indépendante, dictant ses décisions au 
décideur, modèle qui a longtemps constitué l’ultima ratio de l’évaluation. Une évaluation plus 
modeste mais plus utile, n’est-ce pas la voie de l’évaluation moderne ? 
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 Des grappes d’entreprises sont des clusters d’orientation moins technologique et plus petits que les pôles. 
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Résumé : Dans ce volet de nos recherches sur l’évaluation des clusters (cf. Gallié, et al., 
2012, qui analyse le cas de l'évaluation de la politique française des pôles de compétitivité), 
nous comparons quatre cas européens d’évaluation de clusters : Wallonie, Allemagne, Basse-
Autriche et France. Nous développons d’abord une grille de lecture avec laquelle nous 
analysons ensuite ces différentes évaluations. Cette grille de lecture nous aide surtout à 
souligner les différences entre ces évaluations sur trois dimensions : les objets de l’évaluation 
et l’imputabilité des résultats, la démarche et la méthodologie des évaluations, et les effets et 
usages des évaluations. En conclusion, à partir de ces cas empiriques, nous proposons de 
distinguer deux modèles idéal-typiques d’évaluation, qui combinent ces différentes 
caractéristiques de manière cohérente et renvoient à des usages contrastés des évaluations : un 
modèle « économiste » et un modèle « gestionnaire ». 
Mots clés : Politique publique, évaluation, pôle de compétitivité, cluster, politique de cluster 
 
Abstract: In this article, part of our research programme on cluster evaluations (cf. Gallié, 
Glaser, Lefebvre, & Pallez, 2012, which is an in-depth analyzes of the evaluation of the 
French policy of competitiveness clusters), we compare four European cluster evaluations: 
Wallonia, Germany, Lower Austria and France. We first develop a framework with which we 
then analyze these evaluations. This framework particularly helps us to underline the 
differences of these evaluations on three dimensions: the objects of the evaluations and the 
accountability of results, the approach and methodology of the evaluations, and finally the 
effects and uses of the evaluations. In conclusion, based on these empirical cases, we propose 
to distinguish two ideal-typical evaluation models that combine these different characteristics 
in a consistent manner and that point to two contrasted evaluation uses: an “economist” model 
and a “management model”. 
 
Keywords: Public policy, evaluation, competitiveness cluster, cluster, cluster policy 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Le succès de la Silicon Valley et d’autres clusters spontanés (Saxenian, 1994) ainsi que les 
travaux de Porter (1990 (1998), 1998c) sur l'avantage concurrentiel des entreprises situées 
dans des clusters, ont entraîné la multiplication, dans le monde entier, de politiques de 
clusters. Ces politiques s’inspirent de ces modèles pour essayer de faire émerger des clusters 
ou d’amplifier la dynamique de clusters spontanés (OECD, 2007; D. Rosenberg, 2002). 
Parallèlement, de nombreuses recherches ont tenté de théoriser les composantes de ces 
politiques et, en amont, d’analyser les mécanismes vertueux produisant, dans un cluster, des 
effets bénéfiques sur l’efficacité économique des firmes et des territoires sur lesquels elles 
sont implantées (cf. Cruz & Teixeira, 2009 pour un résumé de la littérature sur les clusters). 
 
Pourtant, certains chercheurs académiques émettent des doutes sur les effets des clusters. 
Martin & Sunley (2007) écrivent par exemple qu’ «il n’existe pas d’étude ayant cherché à 
tester l’hypothèse clé de Porter, à savoir l’impact positif de l’appartenance à un cluster sur la 
compétitivité des entreprises » (traduit et cité par Bocquet & Mothe (2009, p. 106)). D’autres, 
comme Duranton, Martin, & Mayer (2008), doutent également du bien-fondé des politiques 
cherchant à encourager ou accélérer la naissance de clusters. 
 
Les pouvoirs publics ne sont pas insensibles à ces critiques, et par ailleurs, même s’ils sont 
convaincus de l’efficacité des clusters et des politiques de clusters, particulièrement en 
Europe, ils ont besoin de justifier l’emploi des fonds publics qui leur ont été consacrés. C’est 
pourquoi on assiste également à une multiplication de rapports d’évaluation commandités par 
les instigateurs de ces politiques (par exemple CMI & BCG, 2008; Jakoby, 2006; Staehler, 
Dohse, & Cooke, 2007), avec un double objectif : améliorer et éventuellement réorienter les 
politiques, ne serait-ce qu’à la marge, et rendre compte de l’utilisation des fonds publics. 
 
Malgré ces objectifs assez communément partagés, au vu des évaluations réalisées et publiées 
dans divers pays occidentaux, on constate assez vite la grande variété des démarches, et des 
critères d’évaluation adoptés. Au-delà de cette diversité, nous nous sommes demandé s’il était 
malgré tout possible d’identifier un ou plusieurs modèles d’évaluation des politiques de 
clusters, ce qui permettrait de se dispenser de réinventer chaque fois tout un dispositif 
d’évaluation. Nous verrons que nous sommes amenées à distinguer deux grands modèles 
idéal-typiques en matière d’évaluation des politiques de clusters et essaierons de les 
caractériser en les reliant notamment aux usages faits des évaluations réalisées. Cet article est 
volontairement centré sur les questions liées à l’évaluation des politiques de clusters mais 
comme nous le verrons, il s’inscrit dans des problématiques plus générales liées à l’évaluation 
des politiques publiques, problématiques que nous avons déjà traitées plus spécifiquement 
dans d’autres publications (Gallié, et al., 2012) et que nous ne reprendrons donc pas ici dans 
le détail.  
 
 
1. METHODOLOGIE 
 
Notre recherche, qui s’inscrit dans le courant de pensée de la recherche qualitative (ou 
compréhensive) défendant l’intérêt des études de cas (Dumez, 2013; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006), s’appuie sur différents travaux, bibliographiques et empiriques, réalisés 
depuis 2009, sur la question de l’évaluation de la performance des clusters et des politiques de 
clusters. Nous avons particulièrement travaillé sur l’évaluation des pôles de compétitivité 
français réalisée en 2008. Pour ceux-ci, nous avons eu accès aux sources les plus nombreuses 
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puisque, outre la synthèse publique de l’évaluation, nous avons pu disposer de matériau brut 
et interagir à la fois avec les commanditaires, les évaluateurs et un certain nombre des 
« évalués ». Nous renvoyons à l’article que nous en avons tiré, déjà cité (Gallié, et al., 2012). 
Nous avons aussi travaillé sur des expériences d’évaluation des politiques de clusters à 
l’étranger, de façon directe pour certains (accès aux rapports d’évaluation, entretiens avec les 
acteurs concernés), ou à travers une littérature secondaire. En Basse Autriche par exemple, un 
certain nombre d’entretiens ont également pu être réalisés : directeurs de cluster, responsables 
de l’agence Ecoplus et de la politique de cluster au gouvernement régional. Ces rencontres ont 
permis d’accéder au rapport d’évaluation. En revanche, en Wallonie et en Allemagne, nous 
n’avons pu disposer que de textes publics, qui étaient néanmoins suffisamment documentés 
pour apporter un contrepoint intéressant à nos deux premiers cas. Les investigations sont donc 
« de profondeur différente », ce qui est une limite pour certaines de nos analyses, comme on 
le verra. Au total, nous disposons donc de quatre cas : la France, la Wallonie (une des régions 
belges), l’Allemagne, la Basse Autriche (une des régions autrichiennes).  
 
Précisons enfin que cette recherche a été menée pour l’essentiel en 2010, avant la deuxième 
évaluation des pôles de compétitivité français menée en 2012, et également avant certaines 
évaluations qui, dans les pays sélectionnés, ont pu prolonger celles que nous avons analysées. 
 
Données 
 
Le tableau 1 ci-dessous résume les documents primaires, c’est à dire les rapports d’évaluation 
sur lesquels nous avons travaillé pour chacun des quatre pays. Le tableau 2 présenté ensuite 
résume les principaux documents et sources secondaires que nous avons mobilisés pour 
mieux comprendre et analyser nos quatre rapports d’évaluation. Les documents secondaires 
consultés pour chaque pays nous ont notamment permis de compléter mais aussi de trianguler 
nos informations, pour ensuite alimenter notre grille d’analyse, et pour enfin construire des 
cas comparables. Cependant il n’y a pas d’homogénéité entre les différents documents 
secondaires consultés pour chacun des pays. 
 
Pays Contenu du rapport d’évaluation Référence 
France 
Évaluation intermédiaire des 71 clusters français lancés en 
2005. Les administrations nationales responsables de cette 
nouvelle politique ont demandé une évaluation en 2008. 
CM 
International & 
BCG, 2008  
Allemagne 
Evaluation ex-post de la compétition BioRegio, qui a eu lieu en 
1996. Le ministre de l’éducation et de la recherche allemand a 
demandé cette évaluation, qui a été réalisée entre 2005 et 2007. 
Staehler, et al., 
2007  
Basse 
Autriche 
Evaluation intermédiaire de quatre clusters (lancés en 2001) de 
la région Basse Autriche. EcoPlus a demandé cette évaluation 
en 2004. EcoPlus est l’agence économique de la région Basse 
Autriche qui est responsable des clusters locaux. 
Kalcher, et al., 
2004  
Wallonie 
Évaluation intermédiaire de quatre clusters pilotes, sélectionnés 
en 2001. Le conseil économique et social de la région wallonne 
a demandé une évaluation en 2004. 
Nauwelares & 
Pellegrin, 2004  
Tableau 1 – Documents primaires 
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Pays Documents et sources secondaires  
France Article académique sur l’évaluation de la politique des clusters (Gallié, et al., 
2012) ; séminaires de l’observatoire des pôles de compétitivité à Mines ParisTech 
(Blivet, Ezvan, & Moulet, 2008; Gallié, Glaser, & Pallez, 2011) ; communiqués de 
presse et circulaires du gouvernement; site internet officiel de la politique 
(http://competitivite.gouv.fr/) ; accès aux données brutes de l’évaluation de la 
politique en 2008 ; discussions avec les responsables de la mise en oeuvre de la 
politique et de son évaluation, ainsi qu’avec de nombreux responsables de pôles 
de compétitivité, lors des séminaires et workshops organisés à Mines ParisTech ; 
participation à une étude préparatoire à l’évaluation 2012, pour la DATAR.  
Allemagne Articles académiques et documents de travail des évaluateurs de la politique des 
clusters (Dohse, 2000, 2007) ; séminaires de l’observatoire des pôles de 
compétitivité à Mines ParisTech (Champenois, 2008; Muller, 2011) ; rapport de 
mission sur la politique de clusters allemande (Lefebvre & Masson, 2011) ; site 
internet officiel de la politique (http://www.go-cluster.de/)317; rapport ministériel 
annuel 2010/2011 de la politique 
Basse 
Autriche 
Site internet officiel de la politique (http://www.ecoplus.at/) ; rapport annuel 2004 
d’Ecoplus ; communiqué officiel sur l’évaluation 2004 d’Ecoplus ; rapports 
commandités par le gouvernement sur les clusters en Autriche (Clement & 
Welbich-Macek, 2007) ; entretiens avec un des clusters managers de la Basse 
Autriche ainsi qu’un responsable d’Ecoplus 
Wallonie Articles académiques sur l’évaluation et la politique des clusters (Lepage, 2009) ; 
conférence de presse sur le premier bilan de la politique ; rapports de clôture de la 
politique (Vaessen, 2010) ; site internet officiel de la politique 
(http://clusters.wallonie.be/) 
Tableau 2 – Documents et sources secondaires 
 
Plan de l’article 
 
Dans un premier temps, nous présenterons la grille d’analyse que nous avons utilisée pour 
étudier les quatre cas sélectionnés. Cette grille permet de structurer l’essentiel des 
problématiques présentes dans la littérature sur l’évaluation des politiques de clusters et 
d’effectuer ensuite l’analyse comparative visée. Dans un deuxième temps, après avoir 
succinctement présenté les politiques de clusters dans les quatre pays choisis, et les modalités 
de leur évaluation, nous tenterons d’analyser, sur la base de cette grille, quelques traits 
marquants de ces évaluations, en travaillant sur un mode comparatif. Enfin, nous montrerons, 
en conclusion, comment ces éléments nous semblent renvoyer à deux modèles idéal-typiques 
d’évaluation, que nous essaierons de caractériser et dont la validation empirique constituerait 
une perspective de recherche future. 
 
 
2. EVALUATION DE POLITIQUES DE CLUSTERS : CONSTRUCTION D’UNE 
GRILLE D’ANALYSE A PARTIR DES PROBLEMATIQUES RECURRENTES 
 
Bien que les politiques de clusters diffèrent d’un pays à l’autre (OECD, 2005, 2007, 2009), 
tous les pays font face aux mêmes difficultés en matière d’évaluation de ces politiques : le 
caractère systémique des clusters et la multiplicité des parties prenantes en sont à l’origine. 
Les réflexions sur l’évaluation des politiques de clusters ou d’innovation en sont encore à 
leurs balbutiements (Diez, 2001; Learmonth, et al., 2003). Bellandi et Caloffi (2010a, p. 70) 
                                                 
317
 Jusqu’à juillet 2012 la politique allemande de clusters était appelée « Kompetenznetze » (réseaux des 
compétences), depuis juillet 2012 la politique s’appelle « go-cluster ». 
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résument les difficultés en montrant que ces évaluations demandent « une combinaison 
pertinente des langages et des outils de domaines d'étude différents : l’évaluation des 
politiques publiques et l’analyse des processus d'innovation et de développement ». 
 
La Commission européenne a cherché à surmonter ces difficultés à travers deux initiatives 
différentes qui illustrent bien la variété des approches possibles : le European Cluster 
Observatory (ECO), mis en place en 2007, et le programme European Cluster Excellence 
Initiative (ECEI), lancé en septembre 2009. Chacun de ces deux programmes cible un aspect 
particulier de l’évaluation des politiques de clusters : 
- Le projet ECO cherche à rassembler de l’information sur les conditions de la 
compétitivité régionale. En conséquence, le cadre d’analyse est construit à partir des 
indicateurs économiques classiques (taux de chômage, valeur ajoutée, taux 
d’exportation, croissance des firmes, etc).  
- De son côté, l’ECEI a pour objectif « de créer un processus objectif de mesure et 
d’évaluation de la qualité de management d’un cluster » et « de développer un 
ensemble modulaire d’indicateurs de qualité »318. Il s’agit donc de se centrer sur 
l’évaluation de la qualité du management des clusters, à un niveau beaucoup plus 
« micro ».  
 
Pour caractériser et comparer des évaluations de politiques de clusters, il était donc nécessaire 
de construire une grille d’analyse qui rende compte de la variété des approches tout en 
structurant les principales questions. Sur la base d’une revue de la littérature académique, 
ainsi que deux rapports importants en la matière, celui du BIPE (2007) et le « Redbook » de 
Sölvell (2008)319, nous avons identifié trois grandes dimensions, classiques en matière 
d’évaluation des politiques publiques, qui constitueront la structure de notre grille d’analyse, 
grille très proche de celle que nous avons déjà utilisée pour analyser le cas français (Gallié, et 
al., 2012) : 
 
- d’abord la question des « objets » évalués, et du schéma de causalité, souvent 
implicite, qui les relie. Comment ces objets d’évaluation sont-ils déterminés ? En quoi 
diffèrent-ils d’un pays à l’autre ? 
- ensuite, les questions de méthodologie : peut-on caractériser les démarches et les outils 
des différents processus évaluatifs observés ? 
- enfin, la dernière thématique concerne la question de l’interaction entre les évaluations 
et les décisions politiques qui les suivent, en d’autres termes celle des effets et des 
usages des évaluations. 
 
Nous ne développerons pas en tant que telles ces questions qui concernent toute évaluation de 
politique publique et qui ont été abondamment traitées dans la littérature (Chanut, 2009; 
Gibert, 2003; B Perret, 2008; Thoenig, 2002). Nous allons seulement revenir rapidement sur 
chacun de ces trois items pour les expliciter et montrer le type de problématiques que ces 
questions génèrent, dans le cas des politiques de clusters, sans qu’il y ait, à l’heure actuelle, 
dans la littérature, de réponse univoque. Cela permettra de mettre en perspective, ensuite, les 
choix opérés dans les quatre pays étudiés. 
 
                                                 
318
 Source : http://www.cluster-excellence.eu/ 
319
 Le BIPE est un cabinet de conseil français qui était mandaté par la DIACT (Délégation Interministérielle à 
l'Aménagement et à la Compétitivité des Territoires) pour élaborer un travail de synthèse sur l’évaluation des 
clusters, préparatoire à l’évaluation de la politique de clusters française. Örjan Sölvell est professeur à la 
Stockholm School of Economics et publie régulièrement des rapports sur les clusters.  
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2.1. Objets de l’évaluation et schéma de causalité 
 
Le problème des objets de l’évaluation 
Théoriquement, une évaluation de politique devrait s’appuyer sur la connaissance des 
objectifs de cette politique, qu’on suppose clairement définis ex ante. De nombreux auteurs, 
comme par exemple Perret (2008), ont toutefois mis en évidence le caractère largement 
irréaliste d’une telle position dans toute évaluation de politique publique, problème 
particulièrement visible dans le cas des politiques de clusters :  
- Les objectifs des politiques de clusters sont souvent formulés de manière vague 
(compétitivité et visibilité d’un territoire, performance économique des entreprises…) 
qui autorise de multiples interprétations. Ceci n’a rien d’étonnant : la logique politique 
s’accommode mieux du confort de l’ambigüité que des contraintes de la précision 
(Benzerafa, et al., 2011). 
- La nature systémique des clusters et les multiples acteurs impliqués rendent la 
définition de la performance problématique et donc les processus d’évaluation 
compliqués (Diez, 2001; Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, et al., 2007). En effet, les acteurs 
peuvent avoir des intérêts et des buts variés. Par exemple, on peut s’interroger sur 
l’identité des bénéficiaires d’une politique de cluster : s’agit-il des entreprises ou de la 
« collectivité » (région, nation) ? En outre, les clusters eux-mêmes peuvent avoir des 
objectifs différents selon leur maturité, leur secteur d’activité, etc. Comment intégrer 
cette diversité dans une évaluation standardisée ?  
- Enfin, à supposer qu’on puisse les identifier à un instant donné, les objectifs sont eux-
mêmes évolutifs, en fonction des changements de personne ou des évolutions de la 
politique.  
 
Il n’est donc pas étonnant que beaucoup d’évaluations de politiques de clusters mettent 
surtout en évidence des « objets » d’évaluation, qui sont reliés aux objectifs supposés de la 
politique par une rhétorique parfois assez lâche. Il faut donc avant tout prêter attention à ces 
objets, qui, de notre point de vue, discriminent fortement les différentes démarches 
d’évaluation et sont, eux, parfaitement observables quand on analyse a posteriori des 
démarches d’évaluation. Pour les définir de manière un peu systématique, nous nous 
appuyons sur les auteurs, déjà cités (BIPE, 2007; Sölvell, 2008), qui ont cherché à modéliser 
les processus d’évaluation de politiques de clusters, ainsi que sur nos connaissances 
empiriques concernant le cas français (Fen Chong, 2009; Gallié, et al., 2012). 
 
La figure 1 tente de représenter les grandes catégories d’objets évalués quand on cherche à 
évaluer une politique de clusters. Les objets d’évaluation peuvent se focaliser sur les clusters 
eux-mêmes (rectangles blancs), mais ils peuvent concerner globalement la politique de 
clusters ou, pour chaque cluster, les conditions historiques de son émergence (rectangles gris 
clair). Tous les objets sont en permanence influencés par les facteurs « exogènes » du cluster 
comme par exemple l’environnement fiscal, juridique, ou social (rectangle gris foncé). 
 
Annex 19: Article on European cluster policies evaluation 
 
 418 
 
Figure 1 – Les objets d'évaluation d'un cluster 
 
Ce schéma met d’abord en évidence la différence entre l’évaluation d’une politique de cluster 
(rectangle gris clair, côté gauche) et l’évaluation d’un cluster (rectangles blanc). En effet, si la 
première nécessite l’évaluation des seconds, la réciproque n’est pas vraie et l’évaluation d’un 
cluster peut tout-à-fait être faite isolément. 
 
Il montre surtout que, concernant l’évaluation des clusters, les « objets » évalués, regroupés 
dans les rectangles blancs, peuvent se situer, schématiquement, à trois niveaux différents (de 
bas en haut) : celui des impacts finaux, celui des actions et résultats intermédiaires, ou celui 
de l’organisation du cluster.  
 
Les impacts finaux sur le territoire, ou sur les acteurs impliqués dans le cluster (représentés 
sur le niveau du bas du schéma) semblent mesurer l’atteinte des objectifs de la politique (par 
exemple compétitivité accrue des entreprises, attractivité des territoires) et sont donc a priori 
les plus pertinents. 
 
Cependant, outre le fait que ces impacts ne sont pas évidents à objectiver (quels impacts, 
économiques, sociaux, environnementaux etc. identifier, et comment les mesurer ?), les effets 
réels de la politique ne peuvent être décelés qu’au bout d’un certain temps en termes 
d’impacts finaux. Faute de ce recul temporel, on est donc souvent conduit à évaluer d’autres 
objets, à un niveau intermédiaire, à savoir des résultats intermédiaires de l’action de chaque 
cluster, ainsi que les actions menées par ces clusters. Il s’agira par exemple d’évaluer les 
succès des clusters en matière de financement de projets collaboratifs, ou la nature des actions 
menées en matière de mise en réseau des entreprises, d’aide au montage de projets, de soutien 
au développement international, de communication, etc. Ces actions et résultats 
intermédiaires pouvant être eux-mêmes difficiles à appréhender et à objectiver, on peut 
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finalement souhaiter se centrer sur des objets qui caractérisent l’efficacité de l’organisation et 
du pilotage des clusters (comme le fait l’ECEI évoquée plus haut), en faisant l’hypothèse que 
cette efficacité sera source de résultats pour le cluster. On examinera alors les modalités 
d’animation mises en place, l’organisation de la structure de gouvernance, les compétences 
des dirigeants, etc. On est ainsi amené à « remonter » le schéma de bas en haut pour 
appréhender des objets possibles à évaluer. 
 
Nous percevons maintenant mieux la variété des démarches évaluatives en matière de 
clusters : elles peuvent ainsi se focaliser sur la politique de clusters ou sur les clusters eux-
mêmes ; sur les impacts économiques ou sur l’efficacité organisationnelle, sur les territoires 
ou sur les entreprises, etc. Chaque démarche évaluative est caractérisée par un choix 
spécifique des objets qui sont soumis à évaluation. 
 
Mais ces différents objets ne sont pas indépendants les uns des autres. Ils sont en général 
reliés par un schéma de causalité, sur lequel s’appuie plus ou moins explicitement la politique 
publique et son évaluation. Dans ce schéma interviennent d’ailleurs aussi, comme on l’a dit, 
des facteurs exogènes (environnement fiscal par exemple), ou les caractéristiques « héritées » 
du cluster comme les ressources du territoire ou l’histoire des coopérations entre acteurs 
(Crespo, 2010; Fen Chong, 2009; St. John & Pouder, 2006). Ce schéma de causalité est à 
notre sens le deuxième élément important qui caractérise telle ou telle démarche évaluative. 
Nous allons donc examiner ce point dans ce qui suit. 
 
 
Le problème de l’imputabilité des résultats et du schéma de causalité 
La question centrale pour juger des effets d’une politique de clusters est : que se serait-il passé 
en l’absence de cette politique, c’est-à-dire sans soutien volontariste à la création et au 
développement de clusters ?  
 
On peut tenter de mesurer des résultats par rapport à une situation de référence. Mais, même 
quand cela est possible, si l’on veut imputer ces résultats à la politique menée, il est 
nécessaire, dans le processus évaluatif, d’explorer le schéma de causalité, pas toujours 
explicité, qui est sous-jacent à cette politique, d’autant que d’une politique à l’autre, ces 
schémas peuvent être sensiblement différents. En effet, les jugements portés par les 
évaluateurs s’appuieront sur les liens de cause à effet qu’ils supposent entre les objets évalués.  
 
Ainsi, certaines politiques de clusters comme la politique française s’emploient à inciter les 
entreprises à développer des projets de R&D collaboratifs en supposant que ces collaborations 
stimuleront leurs capacités d’innovation, ce qui sera source d’impacts économiques positifs 
pour elles et leur territoire d’implantation. Pourtant, on peut se demander si les projets 
coopératifs accélèrent toujours l’innovation, certains pensant que « la mauvaise collaboration 
est pire que son absence » (Hansen, 2009, p. 1). Mais, si la politique est construite sur 
l’hypothèse du rôle majeur des projets collaboratifs, la démarche évaluative devra identifier 
des critères qui permettent de tester cette hypothèse. 
 
En d’autres termes, une politique publique met toujours en œuvre une « théorie de l’action » 
(Gibert, 2003), même si celle-ci n’est pas toujours explicite, et ce n’est autre que le schéma de 
causalité qui relie les différents objets du schéma précédent. Ce sont donc ces liens logiques 
supposés qu’il s’agit d’explorer dans le processus évaluatif, et dont la caractérisation 
distingue les différents processus d’évaluation. 
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2.2. Démarche et méthodologie de l’évaluation 
 
Le processus institutionnel et les choix de méthode propres au processus évaluatif constituent 
une deuxième grande catégorie de variables qui interviendront dans notre analyse 
comparative. 
 
Concernant ce processus, la palette des possibilités est large, sans qu’une doctrine dominante 
se dégage (Stame, 2009) et les modèles institutionnels nationaux sont assez variés en ce 
domaine. Différents paramètres sont à considérer, qui influent fortement sur la nature des 
résultats obtenus dans le processus évaluatif, mais également sur sa légitimité et son insertion 
dans l’action (Chanut, 2002) : nature du commanditaire, de l’évaluateur, des parties prenantes 
impliquées, et de leurs relations, qui renvoient au thème de l’indépendance de l’évaluation ; 
caractère plus ou moins participatif de la démarche320 ; moment où se déroule l’évaluation par 
rapport au déroulement de la politique publique ; moyens qui y sont affectés, qui peut en 
affecter la « profondeur », etc. 
 
Les choix méthodologiques constituent également une autre source importante de variété. Ils 
doivent donc être caractérisés précisément. La méthodologie suppose en général un choix 
entre démarche qualitative ou quantitative, ou une combinaison entre ces deux approches. 
Mais, dans tous les processus d’évaluation, l’idée est d’objectiver les jugements, et donc de 
rechercher au maximum à quantifier les phénomènes analysés, par exemple l’impact 
économique de la politique. D’où l’importance du choix des indicateurs.  
 
Le choix des indicateurs est largement dépendant des objets d’évaluation que le 
commanditaire et les évaluateurs ont choisis. Nous en donnons quelques exemples dans le 
schéma déjà utilisé ci-avant, que nous reprenons ci-dessous. Ces choix sont néanmoins 
fortement contraints par la disponibilité et la fiabilité des données recherchées.  
 
Figure 2 - Exemples d'indicateurs sur les différents objets évalués 
                                                 
320
 Les démarches d’évaluation « participatives » connaissent en particulier un fort développement (Diez, 2001; 
Plottu & Plottu, 2009). 
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Cependant, certains des phénomènes que l’on cherche à appréhender ainsi que la pertinence 
même des schémas de causalité qui ont été explicités ne peuvent être finement compris que si 
l’on utilise des méthodes qualitatives, fondées sur des entretiens avec les acteurs. Exemples : 
la collaboration, la qualité du management et de l’animation, les liens préexistants à la 
création du cluster, la progression des mises en relation, etc. Il faudra donc caractériser le 
« mix » méthodologique choisi dans chaque cas étudié. 
 
 
2.3. Effets et usages de l’évaluation 
 
Dernier volet de notre grille d’analyse : l’interaction entre les résultats de l’évaluation et les 
décisions politiques, en d’autres termes les effets et usages du processus d’évaluation.  
 
Un processus d’évaluation de politique publique a en effet, on le sait, des objectifs affichés 
qui sont en général de deux ordres : 
- rendre compte de l’usage des fonds publics 
- réorienter la politique et améliorer son pilotage par les pouvoirs publics 
 
Sur le premier volet, on peut voir dans l’évaluation, plus cyniquement, l’occasion, pour les 
acteurs décisionnaires, de communiquer sur le bien-fondé et les résultats de leurs politiques. 
Sur le deuxième, on sait que les résultats des évaluations sont diversement utilisés par les 
décideurs, et qu’ils peuvent aussi servir à légitimer des décisions déjà prises.  
 
Il faut donc se départir d’une vision utopique où « … l’évaluation est vue comme un processus 
linéaire dans lequel les résultats scientifiques corroborés, basés sur les meilleurs moyens de 
mesure, sont transmis à une machine de prise de décision bien huilée, où les résultats sont 
reçus, adoptés et mis en œuvre par les responsables publics. » (Vedung, 2009, p. 267). La 
réalité est tout autre. 
 
Une évaluation a aussi des effets collatéraux importants, recherchés ou non. Une évaluation 
peut avoir pour effet de mobiliser les différents acteurs de clusters, de forger des 
représentations communes, d’accroître les connaissances des acteurs, notamment les pouvoirs 
publics, sur le fonctionnement des clusters et les pratiques d’évaluation efficaces (effet 
d’apprentissage). 
 
Nous essaierons donc, autant que possible, dans nos quatre cas, de caractériser ces différents 
effets et usages. Cependant, il s’agit là des éléments les plus difficiles à appréhender quand on 
n’a accès qu’à des sources secondaires, car leur compréhension nécessite en général une étude 
empirique fine auprès des principales parties prenantes de la politique. Nos analyses sur ce 
troisième volet seront donc nécessairement succinctes. 
 
A l’aide de la grille en trois points que nous venons de présenter, nous allons maintenant 
analyser les démarches d’évaluation des politiques de clusters menées dans les quatre pays 
(ou les quatre régions)321 choisis, après avoir présenté succinctement au préalable ces 
politiques.  
                                                 
321
 En France et en Allemagne, les politiques de clusters sont conçues à un niveau national alors qu’en Autriche 
et en Belgique, elles le sont à un niveau régional. 
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3. L’EMERGENCE DE POLITIQUES DE CLUSTERS DANS QUATRE PAYS 
EUROPEENS ET LEURS EVALUATIONS 
 
France. En 2005, le gouvernement français lançait une politique de clusters (appelés pôles de 
compétitivité) sur l’ensemble de son territoire. Cette politique nationale devait stimuler 
l’innovation des entreprises, et donc la compétitivité des territoires grâce à un dispositif de 
subventions à des projets de R&D faisant collaborer entreprises, petites et grandes, et 
laboratoires de recherche publics. Entre 2005 et 2008, le gouvernement français consacra une 
enveloppe de 1,5 milliards d’euros à cette politique, et la reconduisit pour 3 ans en 2008, à la 
même hauteur. A noter qu’une petite partie des fonds (3.3%) était consacrée, non pas au 
financement des projets collectifs, mais au financement de l’animation des clusters, et que par 
ailleurs, les collectivités territoriales (notamment les Régions) participèrent également au 
financement des pôles labellisés nationalement.  
 
Allemagne. Au milieu des années 90, l’Allemagne, comme d’autres, se lançait dans une 
politique industrielle fondée sur la notion de clusters (Dohse, 2007), notamment en organisant 
en 1996 un processus de sélection national (BioRegio), destiné à soutenir des clusters de 
pointe dans le domaine des biotechnologies. Des processus analogues suivirent dans d’autres 
secteurs. L’objectif était de devenir le leader européen dans ce domaine en stimulant la 
croissance des entreprises. Sur la base de dossiers, un jury choisit trois régions qui reçurent 
chacune 50 millions de marks (environ 26 millions d’euros), charge à elles d’aider les acteurs 
concernés à atteindre les objectifs fixés en cinq ans (Staehler, et al., 2007). A la différence de 
la France, le gouvernement fédéral allemand joua uniquement un rôle de « catalyseur et de 
facilitateur » (Dohse, 2007, p. 90), laissant aux Länder la liberté du pilotage de la politique.  
 
Basse Autriche. En Autriche, la responsabilité des politiques de clusters incombe aux régions 
(même si, récemment, le gouvernement autrichien a commencé à mettre l’accent sur la 
question de la coordination des initiatives régionales). En 1995, la Styrie, bientôt suivie par 
les autres, fut la première région autrichienne à développer une politique dans ce domaine. Le 
principe en est un soutien financier destiné à encourager la structuration de clusters et à 
développer les services aux entreprises qu’ils proposent. En revanche, ces subsides publics 
n’ont pas pour but de financer des projets de recherche, qui continuent à émarger aux sources 
traditionnelles de financement. La Basse Autriche, qui créa quatre clusters entre 2001 et 2004, 
date de la première évaluation, est la région que nous avons étudiée. En Basse Autriche, la 
structure de management de chaque cluster est abritée par l’agence économique régionale, 
EcoPlus. Deux des objectifs majeurs de la politique sont de stimuler la compétitivité des PME 
locales et de les aider à accéder à de nouveaux marchés (par le biais de projets coopératifs au 
niveau national et international). 
 
Wallonie. Comme en Autriche, les politiques de clusters en Belgique sont régionales. En 
Wallonie, elles ont démarré en 2000, le gouvernement régional ayant décidé d’encourager la 
naissance de réseaux d’entreprises (Lepage, 2009). De 2001 à 2006, quatre clusters 
expérimentaux furent mis en place. Les subventions publiques avaient pour but le soutien à 
l’émergence de ces regroupements, en prenant en charge les frais de fonctionnement au début 
du processus : pendant les trois premières années, un budget annuel de 480 k€ était garanti 
aux clusters, budget qui fut ensuite réduit progressivement.  
 
Le tableau 3 ci-dessous résume les principales caractéristiques de ces politiques. 
 
Annex 19: Article on European cluster policies evaluations 
 
 423 
 France Allemagne Basse Autriche Wallonie 
Début 2005 1996 2001 2001 
Echelle Nationale Nationale Régionale Régionale 
Etendue - Multisectoriel 
 
- 71 pôles de 
compétitivité 
- Monosectoriel 
 
- BioRegio : 3 
régions 
- Multisectoriel 
 
- 4 clusters 
- Multisectoriel 
 
- 4 clusters pilotes 
Objectifs - Renforcer la 
compétitivité 
 
 
 
- Stimuler 
l’innovation par 
l’encouragement à 
la R&D 
collaborative 
- Faire de 
l’Allemagne le n°1 
européen des 
biotechnologies 
 
- Stimuler 
l’entrepreneuriat 
- Renforcer la 
compétitivité 
 
 
 
- Mise en relation 
des membres et 
prestation de 
services 
- Encourager le 
développement des 
entreprises 
 
 
- Faciliter les 
interactions entre 
les entreprises 
Orientation 
du 
financement 
Projets de R&D et 
animation 
Enveloppe globale 
affectée 
Animation Animation 
Tableau 3 - Quatre politiques de clusters 
 
 
4. QUATRE PROCESSUS EVALUATIFS : UN REGARD COMPARATIF 
 
Après cet aperçu rapide des quatre politiques développées dans les quatre pays européens 
choisis, nous nous intéressons aux évaluations réalisées dans les quatre cas. 
 
Nous allons maintenant, en nous aidant de la grille d’analyse présentée plus haut, sur les trois 
dimensions choisies, mettre en évidence un certain nombre de rapprochements ou de 
différences observés en comparant nos quatre cas. 
 
 
4.1. Objets des évaluations et schémas de causalité 
 
Les objets des évaluations 
Nous résumons d’abord, pour les quatre pays étudiés, la nature des objets d’évaluation choisis 
dans chacun des processus évaluatifs. 
 
L’évaluation des pôles français s’est centrée sur trois grandes catégories d’objets, à 
l’exception des impacts économiques, qu’il semblait prématuré de regarder. L’évaluation 
française a d’abord investigué la politique publique en termes de cohérence, pertinence, et 
implémentation. Ensuite, elle s’est concentrée sur la gouvernance et l’organisation des pôles 
(structuration des organes de gouvernance, budgets et moyens humains, mise en place…). 
Enfin, elle a également regardé les actions menées et leurs résultats intermédiaires 
(subventions obtenues, projets labellisés…). Les éléments quantifiés, fournis par les tutelles et 
les pôles, et qui ont permis de nourrir ces investigations, ont été complétés par des entretiens 
avec les responsables de clusters et de la politique. Le point de vue des membres des pôles n’a 
pas été sollicité de manière systématique. 
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L’évaluation autrichienne a considéré trois objets. D’abord, la politique de cluster, et son 
insertion dans la politique industrielle de la Basse Autriche (sur la base d’indicateurs 
généraux de structure et de budget). Ensuite, le management de l’agence économique Ecoplus 
qui coiffe les quatre clusters. Enfin, la satisfaction des entreprises membres concernant le 
fonctionnement du cluster, ses moyens et ses actions, les projets coopératifs menés. Comme 
en France, aucune analyse d’impact n’a été réalisée. 
 
En Wallonie, l’évaluation a abordé de nombreux thèmes. Schématiquement, après avoir 
caractérisé chaque cluster en termes de composition, de poids économique, de nature du 
management interne, les évaluateurs ont réalisé une étude de leur activité et de leurs résultats 
(nombre d’actions collectives, taux de participation, nombre de projets R&D, etc.) et ont 
tenté, au cours des entretiens, de qualifier leur impact sur deux niveaux: (i) les entreprises 
situées dans le cluster (nouveaux produits, taux de création de nouvelles entreprises, etc.); (ii) 
le territoire dans son ensemble (développement d’exportations, offres d’emploi, etc). Ils ont 
parallèlement analysé la pertinence et la cohérence de la politique, ainsi que la qualité du 
pilotage gouvernemental.  
 
Enfin, en Allemagne, l’évaluation s’est centrée sur la question de la valeur ajoutée 
économique du programme, de sa place par rapport aux autres politiques, et surtout sur 
l’analyse de ses résultats macroéconomiques (développement du nombre d’entreprises, du 
marché du travail, mobilisation du capital risque, résultats technologiques en termes de 
brevets et licences…). Cette analyse quantitative et comparative par rapport à des régions non 
retenues dans les programmes a été complétée par des analyses qualitatives sur les effets de la 
politique, le rôle des clusters, le développement de la coopération, la structuration du secteur 
des biotechnologies, en interrogeant l’ensemble des entreprises, les instituts de recherche et 
des « experts ». Enfin, une comparaison avec des clusters britanniques leaders en 
biotechnologies a été effectuée, sur la base d’indicateurs quantitatifs (caractéristiques du 
cluster, de sa composition, et des produits scientifiques et économiques de son activité).  
 
Finalement, trois points nous semblent discriminants dans le choix des objets d’évaluation : 
- l’évaluation explore ou non, selon les cas, les impacts économiques finaux 
- ces impacts finaux sont ciblés selon les cas sur les entreprises, ou la collectivité 
- les évaluations s’attachent plus ou moins à l’analyse des organisations (des clusters ou 
des pouvoirs publics en charge de la politique) 
 
On retrouve le fait que les objets d’évaluation choisis dans les quatre pays ne sont pas les 
mêmes, malgré des recouvrements : l’évaluation allemande se concentre sur les impacts 
économiques finaux, alors que l’évaluation française ne traite pas cet aspect, mais cherche à 
caractériser à la fois l’efficacité du management et les résultats intermédiaires obtenus (par 
exemple en termes d’obtention de subventions ou de nombre de projets labellisés). 
L’évaluation autrichienne est également centrée sur l’efficacité du management des clusters et 
les résultats obtenus notamment en termes de services offerts aux entreprises, mais, outre une 
analyse interne, elle utilise une évaluation de la satisfaction des entreprises membres des 
clusters pour apprécier cette efficacité. 
 
En termes de bénéficiaires, il est notable que la Wallonie et l’Allemagne, bien qu’attentives 
aux effets de la politique sur les entreprises, cherchent à caractériser, plus généralement, 
l’impact sur la collectivité, au moins au niveau du territoire, en analysant par exemple les 
investissements de R&D, l’évolution de l’emploi, la création d’entreprises. La Basse 
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Autriche, par contraste, met davantage l’accent sur la satisfaction des entreprises qui 
apparaissent comme les bénéficiaires essentiels.  
 
Il est à noter enfin que, contrairement à l’Allemagne, les évaluations wallonne et autrichienne 
s’intéressent apparemment d’assez près au pilotage public de la politique : en Autriche, 
l’organisme qui pilote et gère les clusters, Ecoplus, est évalué (en termes de stratégie, de 
système de reporting, de développement du know-how), mais l’insertion de la politique de 
clusters dans la politique industrielle de Basse Autriche est également examiné.  
En Wallonie, les évaluateurs se sont penchés sur la gestion de la politique par l’administration 
wallonne, notamment sur le processus de sélection, mais également sur l’organisation de 
l’administration, et ont participé aux « comités d’accompagnement » réunissant les 
représentants des clusters et de la région.  
L’évaluation française a également, dans une moindre mesure, analysé le pilotage public de la 
politique des pôles de compétitivité, essentiellement sous l’angle des procédures de 
financement et de reporting, mais sans rentrer dans les modes d’organisation des pouvoirs 
publics. 
 
Dans le tableau 4, nous reprenons les catégories d’objets d’évaluation présentées dans la 
figure 1 pour résumer d’une manière synthétique la palette d’objets évalués par chacune des 
évaluations analysées. Cette synthèse illustre que l’évaluation wallonne est la plus complète 
car elle a essayé de couvrir la totalité des objets répertoriés pour évaluer une politique de 
cluster tandis que les autres pays se sont focalisés sur une partie de ces objets. Toutes les 
quatre ont essayé d’investiguer les actions et résultats intermédiaires. Mais l’évaluation 
allemande, typique d’une évaluation ex post se concentre surtout sur les impacts 
économiques. Les évaluations intermédiaires réalisées en France et en Basse Autriche, quant à 
elles, se concentrent surtout sur la mise en œuvre de la politique et l’efficacité de 
l’organisation des clusters.  
 
Nous verrons plus loin que le choix de ces objets d’évaluation n’est pas sans lien avec les 
usages qui ont été faits des évaluations. 
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Catégorie 
d’objet 
Les objets d’évaluation 
concentrés sur... France Allemagne 
Basse 
Autriche Wallonie 
L’environnemen
t historique ou 
politique des 
clusters 
...les caractéristiques 
« héritées » des clusters (X)
322
   X 
...la mise en œuvre de la 
politique de clusters X  X X 
Les clusters 
eux-mêmes 
...l’efficacité de 
l’organisation des 
clusters : moyens, 
gouvernance, pilotage 
X  X X 
...les actions et résultats 
intermédiaires des 
clusters 
X X X X 
...l’impact des clusters 
sur les acteurs impliqués 
 X  (X)323 
..l’impact des clusters 
sur leur territoire  X  (X) 
Tableau 4 - les objets d'évaluation dans les quatre pays 
 
 
Les schémas de causalité 
Les schémas de causalité ont été reconstitués à partir des documents d’évaluation et des 
exposés de la politique. Comme on l’a dit, le schéma de causalité sous-jacent à la politique 
française fait le lien entre projets collaboratifs de R&D, innovation, et compétitivité des 
entreprises et du territoire concernés. Pour les autres pays étudiés, la situation est assez 
contrastée : 
- la Basse Autriche fait l’hypothèse que la qualité des services offerts par le cluster aux 
entreprises, alliée à ses actions de mise en réseau, va augmenter la coopération des 
entreprises et donc les rendre plus compétitives ; 
- l’Allemagne, quant à elle, ne détaille pas de schéma de causalité de sa politique, ce qui 
est cohérent avec le fait que l’Etat laisse les Länder libres de l’utilisation des fonds qui 
leur sont attribués à l’issue du concours. Les schémas de causalité sont donc en fait 
construits par les Länder, éventuellement différemment les uns des autres, et l’Etat ne 
cherche pas à les tester : ce sont essentiellement les résultats macro-économiques de la 
politique qui sont examinés ; 
                                                 
322
 En France, une seule question (à savoir « une structure similaire à un cluster était-elle déjà en place avant le 
lancement de la politique ?») était posée concernant les caractéristiques « héritées » des clusters, c’est pourquoi 
nous l’indiquons dans le tableau mais préférons le mettre en parenthèse.  
323
 L’impact final des clusters sur les acteurs ou sur le territoire a simplement été approché par les appréciations 
qualitatives qu’en ont données certains de leurs membres dans les entretiens. 
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- enfin, dans le cas de la Wallonie, le schéma de causalité sous-jacent à la politique est 
peu apparent, les actions encouragées dans le cadre de la politique de clusters étant 
diverses (R&D, formation, investissements). Sur ce point, ce cas se rapproche du cas 
autrichien par la transmission de la responsabilité des modalités d’action aux 
managers des clusters, et du cas allemand par l’absence d’explicitation des modalités 
d’action à mettre en œuvre… 
 
France Allemagne  Basse Autriche  Wallonie  
Le soutien à des projets 
collaboratifs de R&D 
va stimuler les 
innovations et donc la 
compétitivité des 
entreprises et la 
croissance économique 
du territoire 
Le soutien à quelques 
régions sélectionnées 
va stimuler leur 
croissance économique 
Le haut niveau de 
service apporté aux 
entreprises par le 
cluster va accroître 
leurs coopérations et les 
rendre plus 
compétitives  
Le développement de 
diverses actions (R&D, 
formation, 
investissements), 
soutenues par la 
politique de clusters, 
contribue à la 
compétitivité des 
entreprises et à la 
croissance économique 
Tableau 5 - Les schémas de causalité dans les quatre processus évaluatifs 
 
Ces situations contrastées permettent d’éclairer le choix des objets d’évaluation qui ont été 
identifiés, dans chacun des quatre pays : en particulier, on comprend pourquoi l’évaluation 
allemande se centre sur les effets et impacts économiques des clusters ; alors que l’Autriche 
se préoccupe de l’évaluation du management des clusters, tournés vers les entreprises. 
 
A travers cette comparaison, on peut aussi d’ores et déjà noter que c’est le schéma de la 
politique française qui est le plus explicite, ce qui devrait permettre d’évaluer la pertinence 
même de la politique, si, à plus long terme, tous les maillons de la chaîne de causalité 
deviennent observables (en particulier les impacts économiques, mais aussi les 
caractéristiques héritées des pôles). Une telle observation n’est guère surprenante quand on 
sait que, en France, l’Etat pilote lui-même de près un certain nombre de politiques publiques. 
A l’inverse, l’Etat allemand, qui finance et conçoit une politique, mais en délègue la mise en 
œuvre aux Länder, peut difficilement s’intéresser à sa mise en œuvre détaillée sans mettre en 
cause le partage des rôles institué entre les deux niveaux institutionnels.  
 
 
4.2. Démarche et méthodologie des évaluations 
 
Démarche  
A l’exception de l’Allemagne, les évaluations ont toutes été lancées trois ou quatre ans après 
le lancement de la politique ; elles peuvent donc être considérées comme des évaluations 
intermédiaires.  
 
Dans les quatre cas, les évaluations ont été déclenchées par les commanditaires des politiques 
de clusters ou des entités publiques qui leur étaient proches, mais les évaluateurs avaient des 
profils assez différents selon les cas (consultants plus ou moins internationaux, universitaires 
d’autres pays, experts internationaux…). Ces choix donnent des indications sur la question de 
l’indépendance de l’évaluation, qui peut jouer un rôle dans les idéaux-types d’évaluation que 
nous tentons de mettre en lumière en conclusion. 
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 France Allemagne Basse Autriche Wallonie 
Période 
évaluée 2005-2007 
BioRegio: 1996 
BioProfile: 1999 2000-2003 2001-2004 
Date de 
l’évaluation 2008 (après 3 ans) 
2005-2007 (après 
10 ans) 2004 (après 4 ans) 2004 (après 4 ans) 
Type 
d’évaluation Intermédiaire Ex post Intermédiaire Intermédiaire 
Qui a 
commandité 
l’évaluation ? 
DATAR et DGCIS 
(administrations en 
charge de la 
politique nationale) 
Ministre de 
l’éducation et de la 
recherche 
Eco Plus: agence 
économique de la 
Basse Autriche 
Conseil 
Economique et 
Social de la Région 
wallonne  
Qui sont les 
évaluateurs ? 
- Boston 
Consulting Group 
(grand cabinet de 
conseil 
international) 
 
- CMI (cabinet de 
conseil français) 
- Un professeur de 
l’université Kiel en 
Allemagne (Dohse) 
 
- Un professeur de 
l’université Cardiff 
Pays de Galles, 
spécialiste internat. 
(Cooke)  
 
- Un expert 
freelance 
-Trigon (entreprise 
autrichienne, 
conseil régional) 
 
-Joanneum 
Research 
(entreprise semi-
publique, détenue à 
90% par une autre 
région 
autrichienne, la 
région Styria) 
Université de 
Maastricht 
(MERIT) 
Tableau 6 - Les quatre processus évaluatifs 
 
 
Méthodologie 
Si l’on s’intéresse maintenant aux choix méthodologiques mis en œuvre dans les quatre pays, 
on constate que, même si des points communs existent, une certaine diversité des approches 
se manifeste, notamment 
- dans la volonté de mettre en évidence des impacts économiques par des mesures 
objectives 
- dans l’accent mis sur la comparaison avec des entités “témoin” 
- dans l’équilibre choisi entre approches quantitative et qualitative,  
- dans le croisement des points de vue, et en particulier l’importance accordée aux 
jugements des membres des clusters (notamment les entreprises) sur les dispositifs 
 
Les évaluateurs allemands optèrent pour une approche analytique la plus scientifique possible, 
en réalisant une comparaison statistique entre les régions distinguées par les programmes 
gouvernementaux et d’autres régions « témoins ». Pour ce faire, toutes les entreprises qui, 
début 2006, en Allemagne, avaient pour activité principale les biotechnologies (630 
entreprises) ont été contactées, alors que 98 d’entre elles seulement (soit moins de 20%) 
avaient bénéficié des subventions liées aux programmes BioRegio et BioProfile ; ces enquêtes 
ont cherché à savoir par exemple si les programmes avaient amélioré la réputation 
internationale de l’Allemagne en tant que site économique dans les biotechnologies, si, grâce 
aux programmes, des coopérations avaient été réalisées qui sans ceux-ci n’auraient pas 
débuté, ou si les coopérations étaient fructueuses et durables. On notera que le recul temporel 
de l’évaluation allemande permettait d’évaluer la progression de certains indicateurs 
économiques (valeur ajoutée par exemple). Par ailleurs, la comparaison s’effectuant au sein 
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d’un même secteur (les biotechnologies), elle s’affranchissait des critiques portant sur la non-
pertinence des comparaisons multisectorielles. Enfin, une comparaison des principales 
caractéristiques de la structure, de l’activité et du financement des clusters a été effectuée 
(pour les clusters leaders) avec des clusters britanniques majeurs, manifestant à nouveau le 
souci de trouver des entités témoin, auxquelles comparer les clusters allemands. Cela dit, des 
éléments en partie qualitatifs ont également été recueillis auprès des entreprises et des 
institutions de recherche pour caractériser l’action et les résultats des clusters. 
 
A l’inverse, la France, la Basse Autriche, et la Wallonie optèrent pour des approches plus 
descriptives et qualitatives, imposées de toute façon par la faible durée d’existence de leurs 
clusters. C’est une des raisons qui explique qu’en France, mais aussi en Wallonie et en 
Autriche, une partie importante de l’évaluation s’attache à spécifier, par quelques indicateurs 
quantitatifs (nombre de membres des clusters, nombre de salariés concernés, nombre de 
projets, volume des subventions accordées…), mais surtout qualitativement, par des 
entretiens, la qualité de management des clusters et les résultats de leur activité. 
 
Enfin, il est intéressant de caractériser la manière dont la variété des parties prenantes a été 
prise en compte dans les différentes évaluations. Dans toutes les démarches sont interviewés 
des acteurs impliqués dans la politique, des responsables de clusters, et à un moindre degré, 
des représentants d’institutions de recherche. Toutefois, deux spécificités notables 
apparaissent :  
- dans l’évaluation allemande, 19 interviews d’“experts” sont réalisées dans les 10 
régions concernées par le secteur Biotechnologie.  
- dans deux des quatre pays étudiés (l’Allemagne et la Basse-Autriche), un 
questionnaire est adressé à toutes les entreprises concernées (y compris, pour 
l’Allemagne, des entreprises du secteur, mais dans des régions non lauréates). Ces 
questionnaires, destinés entre autres, à recueillir de l’information économique dans le 
cas allemand, sont centrés, en Autriche, sur l’appréciation de la compréhension et de 
la satisfaction des entreprises vis-à-vis de la politique et de l’action des clusters qui les 
concernent. 
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France 
(exhaustif : 71 pôles) 
Allemagne 
(sectoriel : Bio) 
Basse Autriche 
(4 clusters) 
Wallonie 
(4 clusters pilotes) 
- entretiens avec des 
acteurs nationaux, des 
responsables clusters 
et un échantillon de 
membres 
 
 
 
- pas d’enquête 
 
 
 
 
 
- indicateurs d’activité 
des clusters mais pas 
d’indicateur 
économique 
 
- pas de comparaison 
internationale 
- entretiens avec des 
experts dans les 
différentes régions 
 
 
 
 
 
- enquête auprès des 
instituts de recherche 
et toutes les 
entreprises du secteur 
des biotechnologies 
 
- indicateurs micro et 
macroéconomiques, 
comparaison avec 
régions témoins 
 
- comparaison 
quantitative avec 
clusters anglais 
- entretiens et 
workshops avec les 
acteurs de la politique, 
(cluster managers) 
 
 
 
 
- enquête de 
satisfaction auprès des 
membres 
 
 
 
- indicateurs d’activité 
mais pas d’indicateur 
économique 
 
 
- pas de comparaison 
internationale 
 
- entretiens avec les 
gestionnaires des 
clusters, un 
échantillon des 
membres, et 
observation 
participante 
 
- pas d’enquête  
 
 
 
 
 
- indicateurs 
microéconomiques sur 
les entreprises 
 
 
- pas de comparaison 
internationale 
 
Tableau 7 – Sources des données et éléments de méthodologie 
 
Au total, au-delà de difficultés classiques rencontrées par tous les évaluateurs en matière de 
collecte de données fiables, ou de définition de périmètres pertinents, problèmes que nous ne 
détaillerons pas ici, on constate surtout que toutes les évaluations essaient de multiplier les 
approches en termes d’angles d’attaque et de méthode. 
 
Cela dit, dans le “mix” méthodologique ainsi défini, on remarque le contraste notable entre 
l’approche allemande, beaucoup plus centrée sur les résultats économiques de la politique, 
appréciés par rapport à des points de référence, et l’approche autrichienne, orientée vers la 
mesure détaillée de la satisfaction des entreprises par rapport aux services apportés par les 
clusters. Les approches française, et surtout wallonne, sont plus hybrides. 
 
 
4.3. Effets et usages des évaluations 
 
Dans les sections précédentes nous venons d’analyser en profondeur les quatre rapports 
d’évaluation présentés dans le tableau 1. Dans cette dernière section, nous abordons 
maintenant, sur la base d’autres types de sources (entretiens, communiqués publics, presse…) 
présentées dans le tableau 2, les effets et usages des évaluations analysées. Mais sur ce point, 
compte tenu de la différence de profondeur de nos investigations selon les pays, nous ne 
pourrons donner que quelques aperçus succincts portant sur les usages faits par les pouvoirs 
publics des évaluations réalisées. 
 
D’abord, la publicité des évaluations n’a pas été la même dans les quatre pays. En France par 
exemple, la synthèse de l’évaluation a été largement diffusée et le gouvernement a utilisé 
cette évaluation pour confirmer sa politique et son investissement. En Autriche, une partie de 
l’information sur l’évaluation (les recommandations des évaluateurs, les résultats les plus 
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importants de l’enquête de satisfaction) a aussi été diffusée sur le site web de l’agence 
responsable des clusters et dans le rapport annuel de l’agence. En revanche, dans ces deux 
cas, l’information sur les résultats de l’évaluation de chaque cluster a été réservée aux 
responsables du cluster. En Wallonie, en revanche, le rapport fait par les universitaires a été 
intégralement mis en ligne, alors qu’il comportait des analyses détaillées concernant chaque 
cluster. Quant au rapport d’évaluation allemand, il est également accessible intégralement par 
internet324.  
 
Ensuite, en ce qui concerne l’intervention sur le pilotage des clusters eux-mêmes et la 
mobilisation de leurs acteurs par le risque de sanction liée à l’évaluation, elle a été différente 
selon les pays. En Wallonie, deux des quatre clusters pilotes ont été délabellisés 
immédiatement, avec les conséquences concomitantes en termes de soutien financier (Lepage, 
2009). Suite à cette phase pilote et son évaluation, qui ont donc permis à la Wallonie 
d’apprendre d’abord à petite échelle sur l’utilité et les effets de la politique, le « vrai » 
programme de cluster a été lancé en Wallonie. En France, où il n’y a pas eu de phase pilote, 
les 71 clusters ont été évalués. Pour treize d’entre eux, les évaluateurs ont recommandé de 
procéder à une « reconfiguration en profondeur », recommandation qui a été une incitation à 
restructurer et à clarifier leur politique et qui a fortement mobilisé les clusters concernés et 
leurs soutiens politiques régionaux. Presque deux ans plus tard (en mai 2010) six des treize 
pôles « mal évalués » lors de l’évaluation (publiée en juin 2008) se sont vu retirer leur label, 
avec les subventions associées. Contrairement à la Wallonie, l’effet sanction, en France, n’a 
joué qu’in fine, après avoir laissé les pôles apprendre de l’évaluation.  
 
Enfin, en ce qui concerne la réorientation de la politique, en France, une politique 2.0 est 
partiellement issue des préconisations des évaluateurs (par exemple obligation pour chaque 
cluster de développer un plan stratégique et ensuite de signer un contrat de performance avec 
la tutelle nationale et les régions ; plus grande ouverture vers les financements européens). 
Cependant, il faut se garder de toute forme d’angélisme et remarquer qu’un certain nombre de 
décisions ont été prises en amont, avant l’achèvement formel de l’évaluation. On sait plus 
généralement que l’évaluation d’une politique publique ne peut être considérée comme seule 
source de la décision politique ou administrative (Lacasse, 1995). En Allemagne, l’évaluation, 
effectuée ex post, ne pouvait avoir de conséquences sur un programme à durée déterminée. 
Cependant, l’évaluation positive du programme a influencé la réplication de celui-ci sur 
d’autres secteurs. 
 
Les usages de l’évaluation en terme de pilotage par les décisionnaires publics semblent donc 
plus manifestes dans les cas français et wallon que dans le cas allemand. Dans le cas 
autrichien, malgré l’absence de décision spectaculaire comme une délabellisation, nous ne 
pouvons émettre de jugement étayé sur ce point. Nous pouvons seulement faire l’hypothèse, 
par analogie avec des situations semblables, que le renvoi aux clusters des jugements portés 
par les entreprises a pu constituer un stimulant à l’amélioration du management, et donc un 
outil de pilotage.  
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 sur le site de l’EFI (Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation ), organisme qui joue le rôle conseil 
scientifique sur la recherche et l’innovation du gouvernement allemand.  
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CONCLUSION : AU-DELA DE LA DIVERSITE, DEUX MODELES CONTRASTES 
D’EVALUATION ? 
 
Au-delà de la variété des démarches évaluatives constatée dans les quatre pays étudiés, peut-
on repérer quelques invariants et, au moins, trouver des explications à la diversité ? La 
première observation qui peut être faite, est que, dans chaque pays, nous décelons une 
certaine cohérence entre les trois grandes catégories de caractéristiques de notre grille 
d’analyse. Les objets d’évaluation et le schéma de causalité qui les relie, la méthodologie 
utilisée, les usages faits de l’évaluation ne sont pas indépendants les uns des autres. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Résumé : Les trois volets d’une évaluation 
 
Ainsi, en Allemagne,  
- les objets d’évaluation sont centrés sur la question de l’impact économique, et aucun 
schéma de causalité n’est explicité 
- la méthodologie est essentiellement quantitative et l’évaluation s’appuie sur des 
universitaires et un expert international 
- il n’y a pas d’usage direct des résultats (publics) de l’évaluation pour piloter la 
politique, (autre que le lancement ultérieur d’autres programmes analogues dans des 
secteurs différents)  
 
Par contraste, en France, 
- les objets d’évaluation sont des résultats intermédiaires (des projets de R&D financés) 
et des modes d’organisation, mais pas les impacts finaux 
- la méthodologie a une forte composante qualitative et les évaluateurs sont des cabinets 
de consultants pilotés par les administrations qui exercent la tutelle des pôles 
- les résultats de l’évaluation, en partie publics seulement, sont utilisés à des fins de 
mobilisation des acteurs, de pilotage et de réorientation de la politique (Politique 2.0.) 
 
Le cas wallon, plus hybride en termes d’objets et de méthodologie, se rapproche toutefois 
davantage du cas français, en ce que l’évaluation est directement utilisée pour piloter la 
politique. 
 
Quant à l’Autriche, elle se rapproche du cas français, en termes d’objets et de méthodologie 
mais semble viser essentiellement, en termes d’usages, un pilotage des clusters via la 
mobilisation des managers, plus qu’une réorientation ou amélioration de la politique elle-
même. 
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Nous synthétisons ces constats dans le tableau ci-dessous. 
 
 
 France Allemagne Basse Autriche Wallonie 
Effets et usages 
« Mieux piloter » : 
infléchir la 2ème 
phase de la 
politique et 
mobiliser les 
clusters  
« Rendre compte » 
et disposer d’un 
bilan pour répliquer 
la politique sur 
d’autres secteurs 
« Mieux piloter » : 
mobiliser les 
clusters managers 
« Rendre compte » 
et « Mieux 
piloter »: infléchir la 
politique et 
mobiliser les 
clusters 
Démarche 
et 
méthodol
ogie 
Type de 
l’évaluation intermédiaire finale intermédiaire intermédiaire 
Indépendance 
supposée325 de 
l’évaluation 
moyenne forte moyenne forte 
Spécificités 
des données et 
d’analyse 
 Forte composante 
quantitative 
(indicateurs 
d’impact 
macroéconomique) 
et comparative 
Enquête de 
satisfaction des 
entreprises 
 
Objets de l’évaluation et 
schéma de causalité 
Objets : résultats 
intermédiaires 
(activités, projets 
R&D) et 
organisation des 
clusters 
Schéma de 
causalité explicite 
Objets : Impacts 
économiques 
Pas de schéma de 
causalité 
Objets : 
organisation et 
activités des 
clusters 
Schéma de 
causalité explicite 
Objets : 
organisation et 
activités des 
clusters, 
caractéristiques 
économiques des 
clusters 
Pas de schéma de 
causalité 
Modèle Modèle 
« gestionnaire »  
Modèle 
« économiste »  
Modèle 
« gestionnaire » 
Modèle 
« hybride » 
Tableau 8 – Résumé : Les deux modèles d’évaluation 
 
A titre d’hypothèse heuristique, qui demanderait à être testée de manière plus approfondie et 
sur de plus nombreux exemples, on pourrait avancer que deux modèles idéal-typiques sont 
sous-jacents à ces différences, caractérisés notamment par des usages contrastés des 
évaluations : 
 
- un modèle « économiste », qui s’intéresse prioritairement au bilan ex post de la 
politique, fait en termes d’impacts économiques, et qui, pour cela s’appuie 
nécessairement sur des approches quantitative et comparative, qui permettent, en 
apparence au moins, une « objectivation » plus grande des résultats, et dont la 
légitimité est renforcée par les caractéristiques des évaluateurs  
- un modèle « gestionnaire » qui met en exergue le rôle d’aide au pilotage d’une 
démarche évaluative, et qui, à ce titre, cherche à qualifier in itinere des résultats 
intermédiaires, et à explorer des schémas de causalité explicites, sous-jacents à la 
politique, pour les tester et éventuellement réorienter la politique. A ce titre, ce type de 
démarche, qui, sans négliger l’intérêt d’indicateurs quantitatifs, s’appuie sur des 
méthodes qualitatives, pour « rentrer dans la boîte noire » du fonctionnement des 
clusters, ne revendique pas, en général, les mêmes caractéristiques de scientificité que 
la précédente. Un signe en est que l’indépendance de la démarche évaluative n’y est 
pas spécifiquement recherchée, le caractère « actionnable » de la démarche, souvent 
corollaire de la proximité aux décideurs, y étant en revanche privilégié. 
                                                 
325
 Comme indiqué en 2.2, l’indépendance de l’évaluation est supposée liée au design institutionnel du processus 
(nature du commanditaire et des évaluateurs et de leurs relations, implication des parties prenantes, etc) 
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On retrouvera là une dualité qui renvoie, de manière plus générale, à l’opposition, classique 
en évaluation des politiques publiques (EPP), entre « évaluation de l’action » et « évaluation 
dans l’action » (Chanut, 2009).  
 
Comment, alors, les différents pays se déterminent-ils par rapport à ces deux idéaux-types ? 
Bien sûr, on sait que les modèles d’évaluation des politiques publiques sont largement 
nationaux, modelés par l’histoire institutionnelle et socio-politique de chaque pays (Barbier & 
Matyjasik, 2010; Lacouette-Fougère & Lascoumes, 2013). Mais, pour ce qui concerne le 
champ des politiques de clusters, le choix d’une démarche évaluative renvoyant à l’un ou 
l’autre de ces modèles nous semble orienté par au moins deux considérations 
complémentaires :  
- d’une part, la maturité de la politique de clusters, car, on l’a vu, le modèle 
« économiste » demande un recul temporel qui n’est pas exigé par l’autre ;  
- d’autre part, la légitimité des modes d’intervention des pouvoirs publics. En effet, les 
systèmes politico-économiques des différents pays et leur culture nationale, ne 
permettent pas toujours aux pouvoirs publics d’intervenir directement dans des 
processus gérés par d’autres acteurs, même si des soutiens financiers sont accordés via 
la politique de clusters : ainsi, en Allemagne, l’état fédéral n’est pas légitime à 
intervenir dans des programmes gérés par les Länder, alors que la tradition 
interventionniste de l’Etat français lui permet de demander des comptes sur les 
processus de gestion internes des pôles de compétitivité. 
 
Par ailleurs, on observera que ces deux modèles, également légitimes, ne sont bien sûr pas 
exclusifs l’un de l’autre. Ils apportent des points de vue complémentaires sur une politique et 
peuvent donc se combiner, ou se succéder au fil du temps. Ces choix dépendront des 
commanditaires des évaluations et des usages qu’ils souhaitent en faire. Mais la mise en 
évidence de ces deux modèles peut permettre aux instigateurs des évaluations de construire 
des démarches évaluatives plus cohérentes.  
 
Enfin, même si le modèle « gestionnaire» semble a priori plus tourné vers la production de 
connaissances actionnables, source d’apprentissage pour les acteurs opérationnels 
(responsables de clusters autant que décideurs politiques), on fera observer que, dans les deux 
cas, la démarche évaluative a une vertu qui n’est pas souvent mise en exergue : elle oblige 
l’évaluateur (en commun avec le commanditaire), en se posant le problème du choix des 
objets d’évaluation, à révéler les objectifs de la politique menée, qui ne sont pas 
nécessairement très explicites. A travers ce processus, les acteurs impliqués commencent 
alors à faire rétrospectivement sens de leurs actions déjà menées. Cette « interaction entre 
action et interprétation » (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409) ajoute à l’évaluation 
cette vertu souvent oubliée : la clarification des objectifs sous-jacents de la politique. Cette 
clarification permet donc d’améliorer potentiellement l’orientation des politiques et des 
actions futures. 
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Abstract: The objective of this article is to explore reasons for the resource 
variations between clusters, which were triggered under the same public policy. 
More precisely, we investigate the relationship between a cluster’s governance 
and its ability to attract resources. We approach this question by taking a 
resource based and a resource dependence view of clusters. The resource based 
view helps to define the set of resources that explain performance differences 
between clusters. The resource dependence view then allows us to discuss the 
role of a cluster’s governance to attract important resources. Our methodology 
differs from most case-study-based examinations of clusters as we have access 
to data on 66 French clusters accredited by the French government. We are thus 
able to use a quantitative approach in our analysis. The results of our analysis 
show that we can categorise French clusters in three broad categories (support, 
scientist and corporate class) and that one of these categories (corporate class) 
possesses more resources than the other two categories. Finally, we discuss the 
results in the light of the resource dependence theory, highlight possible 
implications for cluster evaluations and propose avenues for further research. 
 
Keywords: Cluster; Governance; Resources; Categorisation 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this article is to explore possible reasons for the resource variations between 
clusters (Porter, 2008), which were triggered under the same public policy (Chiaroni & 
Chiesa, 2006). More precisely, we investigate the following question: is there a relationship 
between a cluster’s governance and its ability to attract resources? 
 
Several scholars discuss clusters’ resources and capabilities, for example de Oliveira Wilk & 
Fensterseifer (2003) analyse the resources of a wine cluster in Brazil, Hervas-Oliver & 
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Albors-Garrigos (2007) compare the resources of a Spanish and an Italian ceramic cluster, or 
St. John & Pouder (2006) highlight the differences between the resources of technology and 
industry clusters. The spectrum of investigated resources is very large, ranging from natural 
resources to external linkages, social interactions, skilled workers, researchers, entrepreneurs, 
service providers, etc. However, one resource element that we consider important is to our 
knowledge always missing, a cluster’s governance. The objective of this article is to 
investigate the role of this rarely studied resource in the cluster literature. Therefore we first 
define what we understand by cluster governance and then discuss its influence on other 
available cluster resources.  
 
Our analysis is based on a resource based view (Barney, 1991, 2001; Wernerfelt, 1984) and a 
resource dependence view (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003 (1978)), two 
well-known strategic management theories, which are often used to frame research on firms, 
but rarely used to frame research on clusters (De Oliveira Wilk & Fensterseifer, 2003; 
Hervas-Oliver & Albors-Garrigos, 2007; St. John & Pouder, 2006; Wu, Geng, Li, & Zhang, 
2010). By taking a resource based view, which derives from economics (Popp, Toms, & 
Wilson, 2006), we define the set of resources that explain differences between clusters. By 
taking a resource dependence view, which derives from sociology (Popp, et al., 2006), we 
discuss the role of a cluster’s governance to attract important resources (financial, human, 
etc.) to the cluster. According to Popp et al. (2006) both perspectives are needed to 
understand the resource differences between clusters.  
 
Our methodological approach differs from most case-study-based examinations of clusters in 
that we have access to data on 66 French cluster governances, accredited by the French 
government in 2005 and 2006. The variables we use stem from two data sources, the 2008 
French clusters evaluation and from the General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry 
and Services (DGCIS). Using an exploratory data analysis (Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, 
One-Way ANOVA, Post-Hoc Test) we contribute with this article to the cluster policy 
literature and more precisely to the understanding of clusters’ governances. Additionally, we 
provide a categorisation based on governance structures, which according to Reinau & Dalum 
(2008) is still a missing element in cluster typologies (Iammarino & McCann, 2006; 
Markusen, 1996; Paniccia, 2006). 
 
The article is organised as follow. Firstly, we give a presentation of the resource based and 
resource dependence view and discuss their roles in a cluster context. Secondly, we establish 
cluster categories by focusing on the composition of their governance. We group the clusters 
into homogenous categories based on the weight of the actors (groups, small and medium 
enterprises, research and/or training institutes, support entities) in the supervisory board and 
the board of directors. Thirdly, we take a closer look at these categories to highlight the 
differences in resources they possess (i.e. budget for the animation and the functioning of the 
cluster, amount of public R&D funding, number of full time equivalents working for the 
cluster organisation) depending on which governance category they belong to. Finally, we 
discuss the results in the light of the resource dependence theory, highlight possible 
implications for cluster evaluations and propose avenues for further research. 
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Clusters in the light of two resource perspectives 
 
A resource based view of clusters 
The resource based view (Barney, 1991, 2001; Wernerfelt, 1984) of the firm is a well-
established research stream in strategic management. According to this view, every firm has a 
unique set of resources and capabilities that explain performance differences between firms. 
For Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) for example, a resource is “anything which could be thought of 
as a strength or weakness of a given firm” and can thus be either tangible or intangible (e.g. 
brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel, trade 
contacts, machinery, efficient procedures, capital, etc.). More generally, according to Barney 
(1991), “all firms are different because they do not have the same history, the same 
experiences, the same organisational culture or the same assets and abilities” (De Oliveira 
Wilk & Fensterseifer, 2003, p. 996). 
 
Clusters, such as firms, also differ from each other due to their unique history, culture 
or resources. However, due to the fact that the cluster concept itself still lacks a clear 
definition (Enright, 2003; Gordon & McCann, 2000; R. Martin & Sunley, 2003), the general 
resources of a cluster are not yet as well conceptualised as firm resources. Guinet (2003, p. 
154) for example highlights that it is difficult to compare clusters as “a clusters is always a 
singularity in the economic space. Cluster is a universal concept that materialises always as an 
economic sub-system with unique properties regarding the respective role of main actors, and 
knowledge flows between them. Clusters are inherently different between countries (or 
regions), between technological areas and ultimately between individual clusters themselves." 
 
Despite these problems, scholars recently started to apply the resource based theory to 
clusters (De Oliveira Wilk & Fensterseifer, 2003) to highlight for example the competitive 
advantage of certain clusters compared to other clusters (Hervas-Oliver & Albors-Garrigos, 
2007; St. John & Pouder, 2006) or to analyse the impact of cluster resources on firm 
performance (Wu, et al., 2010). However, due to the fuzziness of the cluster concept, scholars 
mobilise a variety of terms (Wu, et al., 2010), each trying in its own way to resume the 
spectrum of unique cluster resources (factor conditions (Porter, 1990 (1998)), higher-order 
capabilities (Foss, 1996), shared resources (Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2003), 
research capabilities (St. John & Pouder, 2006), cluster capabilities (Hervas-Oliver & Albors-
Garrigos, 2007), etc.). Due to the lack of a commonly accepted definition of cluster resources, 
we tried to summarise the main cluster resources (more or less important dependent on the 
cluster type) found in the literature (see Table 1). Additionally we grouped the resources into 
two broad categories326: component capitals (natural, human, educational, business, financial 
and animation resources), which can be seen as the bricks of a cluster, and architectural 
capitals (social, reputation, network and governance resources), which can be seen as the 
cement of a cluster, holding the bricks together. For every resource we give illustrative 
examples in Table 1. In this article, as already underlined, we focus on the rarely studied 
governance resource that we consider as an important part of a cluster’s cement. We thus 
question which type of governance resource (or type of governance structure) best allows 
attracting or complementing existent bricks, in particular animation and financial resources. 
To answer this question we refer to the resource dependence view, explained hereinafter. 
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 Inspired by Tallman et al. (2004) who distinguish clusters’ component and architectural knowledge. 
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Table 1. Illustrations of the main cluster resource categories 
 
COMPONENT CAPITALS: 
Natural - Rosenfeld (2005): “the roots of clusters can be found…in access to critical natural resources 
or infrastructure” (p. 9) 
- Audretsch & Feldman (1996): “a high dependence on natural resources tends to result in a 
greater geographic concentration of production” (p. 268) 
Human - Porter (1990): “highly educated personnel such as graduate engineers and computer 
scientists” (p. 77) 
- St. John & Pouder (2006): “researchers or inventors conducting basic research in a new 
technology area” (p. 153) 
Educational - St. John & Pouder (2006): “knowledge and research from universities and national 
laboratories are often essential resources that serve as the attractors to and anchors in the 
region” (p. 147) 
- Hervas-Oliver & Albors-Garrigos (2007): “Educational and training cluster’s programmes 
contribute…to renovate and upgrade the community of people and thus extending the 
cluster’s knowledge platform.” (p. 118) 
Business - Hervas-Oliver & Albors-Garrigos (2007): “Business sophistication…a way to describe 
firm’s strategies as contributions for upgrading competitiveness in certain regions and 
countries…it implies activities such as enhancing marketing, distribution or in-house R&D” 
(p. 118) 
Financial 
 
- Chiaroni & Chiesa (2006): ”Diffusion of innovative funding mechanisms, which means that 
there are funding schemes in place (especially related to seed and venture capital) tailored to 
and appropriate for high-tech new ventures” (p. 1073) or/and “Governmental funds dedicated 
to support the creation of industrial spin-offs for new companies.” (p. 1074) 
Animation - Rosenfeld (2005): “[cluster]organisations became the symbol of a cluster’s very existence; 
the growth of the association or its resources a proxy for success of the cluster.” (p. 10) 
 
 
ARCHITECTURAL CAPITALS: 
Social - Hervas-Oliver & Albors-Garrigos (2007): “trust, common language, objectives and 
assumptions, local vocabulary and mutual understandings, similar values, expectations, etc.” 
(p. 116), “social capital enables network eﬀectiveness and facilitates knowledge absorption 
and dissemination by the community of people” (p. 117) 
Reputational - Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez (2003): “within the industrial district there is an 
image of itself that is independent of the individual firms...The industrial district…enjoys a 
collective reputation" (p. 158) 
Network - Hervas-Oliver & Albors-Garrigos (2007): “continuous interactions outside the workplace, 
especially frequent face-to-face relationships…are associated with high-quality information 
flows and tacit knowledge held by workers and managers available in the area” (p. 116-117); 
“linkages can be either internal, if they occur just within cluster located members, or external 
when connectivity is provided between the cluster and outside agents” (p. 118), both are 
important 
Governance - Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez (2003): “as intermediaries, local institutions 
facilitate net value for firms by compiling and disseminating knowledge, and by reducing 
search costs” (p. 161) 
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A resource dependence view of clusters 
Instead of seeing a firm as an accumulation of a unique set of resources and capabilities, a 
firm can also be seen as a coalition of interests (March, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003 
(1978)) that depends on external resources to survive. The theory that illustrates very well this 
behaviour is called resource dependence theory, which has its theoretical origin in 
organisational theory and sociology (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), and mainly draws from the 
works of Pfeffer (1972, 1973) and Pfeffer & Salancik (2003 (1978)), who investigated the 
impact of a board’s size and composition on the ability of a company to attract important 
external resources. Pfeffer (1972, p. 226) concludes “that the board size and composition are 
not random or independent factors, but are, rather, rational organisational responses to the 
conditions of the external environment”. 
 
Since then, many scholars (e.g. Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Peng, 2004; Provan, 
1980), have built on the work of Pfeffer & Salancik and continue to investigate the link 
between an organisation’s board and its resources (for an extensive review, see Hillman, 
Withers, & Collins, 2009). Hillman & Dalziel (2003) for example consider the board as a 
provider of resources (e.g., legitimacy, advice and counsel, links to other organisations, etc.). 
Boyd (1990) on the other hand particularly underlines the importance of ‘resource-rich’ 
individuals in boards. Hillman & Dalziel (2003, p. 383) call this the board capital, which can 
consist of two types of capital: human capital (experience, expertise, reputation) and relational 
capital (network of ties to other firms and external contingencies). In other words, the boards 
“are a cooptative mechanism to extract resources vital to company performance”, “serve a 
boundary spanning role” and “enhance organizational legitimacy” (Zahra & Pearce, 1989, p. 
293). What does this mean exactly in the context of a cluster?  
 
The academic literature on cluster governance bodies is still very scarce, even though 
Europe already counts 1205 cluster organisations327. Cluster organisations can be defined as 
“intermediate bodies employing people in charge of animating clusters” (Coletti, 2010, p. 
679). In order to enlarge this minimalistic definition, cluster organisations are here taken as 
organisations, composed of different governance bodies, that on the one hand develop 
strategic plans for a defined geographic area in a specific sector and, that, on the other hand, 
through a variety of tasks (e.g. networking events, place marketing, aid in accessing venture 
capital or other research subsidies), try to improve the area’s competitiveness. Literature that 
investigates the governance of clusters started to emerge approximately ten years ago in Italy 
and Spain (Ahedo, 2004; Alberti, 2001; Mistri, 1999) and has recently been growing in 
France following the competitiveness cluster policy328 introduction in 2005 (Bocquet, 
Mendez, Mothe, & Bardet, 2009; Bocquet & Mothe, 2009; Ehlinger, Perret, & Chabaud, 
2007; Gomez, 2009). Mendel & Bardet (2009) for example question in their article what role 
the governance structure plays in the development of cooperation between companies for 
knowledge accumulation and diffusion. Bocquet et al. (2009) on the other hand state that the 
implication of a cluster’s governance is a key element for the collective and individual 
performance. Others try to question what kind of governance are adapted for territorial 
networks (Ehlinger, et al., 2007) or try to find the right theoretical angle to analyse these new 
organisational artefacts (Gomez, 2009). A few studies adopt a theoretical approach to these 
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 www.clusterobservatory.eu (2010) 
328
 In France, the policy dedicated to develop clusters is called “competitiveness cluster policy” (“Politique des 
pôles de compétitivité”). Every French cluster has a dedicated cluster organisation, and thus governance, which 
is responsible for the cluster’s management and strategic orientation. We will explain the particularities of this 
policy in the next section. 
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questions (Ehlinger, et al., 2007; Gomez, 2009), but most of the literature dealing with the 
governance of French clusters focuses on empirical case studies (Bocquet, et al., 2009; 
Bocquet & Mothe, 2009; Mendel & Bardet, 2009). None of these studies tries to develop a 
general picture of clusters and their governance. 
 
In France, clusters are largely dependent on the subsidies provided by public 
authorities and try to maximise the resources they can obtain. Indeed, French clusters were 
created ex nihilo in 2005 and were thus almost entirely financed by the public authority. If a 
cluster received the official cluster label from the national government, the cluster could profit 
from the three billion euros that the public authorities reserved for the cluster policy between 
2005 and 2011. In contrast to other European cluster policies, only a small part (3.3%) was 
used for the functioning of the cluster organisation and its animation329. The majority of this 
money was dedicated to concrete projects (96.7%), i.e. R&D projects, innovation platforms or 
other thematic collective actions. It is important to underline that the subsidies for the projects 
are most of the time distributed through public tenders, which means that the distribution of 
this money between the clusters is not even but related to their success in the tender process. 
This means that cluster governance structures, which for example are very experienced in 
tendering processes or have an influential political network, might have a competitive 
advantage compared to inexperienced or more isolated governance structures. 
 
According to the theory of Pfeffer (1972) we expect thus the following hypothesis: 
The member composition of the supervisory board and the board of directors impact the 
capacity to acquire necessary resources for the clusters survival. Moreover, we wonder 
whether the structure of the cluster organisation influences the capability of receiving 
resources. Our analysis should try to highlight if a well-balanced mixture of different types of 
actors or the representation of only one specific actor in the governance structure of a cluster 
influences a cluster’s ability to acquire important financial (R&D subsidies) and animation 
resources (operating budget, employees). 
 
Even though several quantitative studies exist that investigate the link between board 
composition and firm resources (e.g. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), to our knowledge no such study exists on the link between 
cluster governance composition and cluster resources. The current literature on cluster 
governance mainly focuses on empirical case studies (Bocquet, et al., 2009; Bocquet & 
Mothe, 2009; Mendel & Bardet, 2009), but does not try to establish a more systematic view 
on this subject. Also Provan et al. (2007, p. 507) highlight that governance structures have 
“implicitly been considered in many of the network-level studies” but “it is important to 
explicitly consider network governance” and to study them accordingly. In this perspective 
we wish to contribute to this gap in the literature by proposing an analysis on a cluster’s 
governance composition and its associated resources. 
 
A categorisation of French clusters according to their governance 
 
Cluster categorisation in the literature 
Several cluster categorisations have already been suggested to allow a more distinctive look at 
this fuzzy concept (Iammarino & McCann, 2006; Markusen, 1996; Paniccia, 2006). The 
typologies focus on the density of relationships between members and exchanges of 
knowledge (Eisingerich, Bell, & Tracey, 2010), the different modes of formal and informal 
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 Additionally to these 3.3%, the cluster organisations receive money for their functioning and cluster 
animation activities from local authorities and their members. 
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intervention from local and national authorities (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005) and 
sector characteristics, like the strength of links between science and industry (Marcon, 2008; 
C. Saublens, et al., 2007). Recently, two studies developed categorisations for French 
clusters: one typology characterises the economic structure of the companies that make up 
clusters and then attempts to study their entrepreneurial dynamics (Bonnafous-Boucher & 
Saussois, 2010); the other one tries to link the pre-existing regional R&D activities to the 
performance of the clusters (Gallié, Glaser, Mérindol, & Weil, 2011).  
All these categorisations try to grasp the different aspects of a cluster’s reality and 
they tend to show that there is no unique concept and therefore few reasons to take a uniform 
look at the role played by clusters in the performance of companies or territories. Despite the 
variety of approaches, it appears that cluster governance structures have rarely been the 
subject of categorisations (Reinau & Dalum, 2008). Additionally, only few authors integrate 
in their analysis the members‘ composition of the clusters (Carpinetti, Gerolamo, & 
Galdámez, 2007). For instance, Markusen (1996) identifies four types of clusters: the 
Marshallian industrial district structured by a large and exclusive number of SME; the hub-
and-spoke industrial cluster, revolving around one or more dominant, externally oriented 
firms; a satellite platform, an assemblage of unconnected branch plants embedded in external 
organisation links; and the state-anchored district focused on one or more public-sector 
institutions. From this literature, we expect that our categorisation will include a SME, a large 
group and finally a research-oriented class. We wonder if some categories can be 
characterised by the mix of the members in their governance structure. 
 
In this section, we provide thus a categorisation of French cluster organisations based 
on their governance structure. This categorisation ultimately allows us to look in a more 
distinctive manner at the characteristics of these governance classes and to better apprehend 
their particularities. By doing this we strive for what Rosch (1999) calls the ultimate situation, 
i.e. creating categories with the highest amount of information but that need the least 
cognitive effort. This situation can either be achieved by defining or redefining attributes “to 
render a given set of categories appropriately structured” or by mapping “categories to given 
attribute structures” (Rosch, 1999, p. 190). We chose to stick to the second approach as we 
first define our classes, and then once we have obtained our different cluster governance 
categories, we attribute specific characteristics (i.e. resources) to these categories. 
 
Context 
The French competitiveness cluster policy, launched in 2005, is based on national 
programmes and initiatives with the objective to foster the competitiveness of the French 
territory through economic and employment growth in future oriented industry sectors (Blanc, 
2004). France would like to reach this objective by increasing its innovation capacity, by 
reinforcing or creating activities of high technology content and by improving its 
attractiveness through better international visibility330. Instead of focusing on key sectors or 
key regions, the French policy opted to focus on a wide range of different sectors and to 
implement one or several clusters in nearly all of its 27 regions. A cluster, which receives the 
official “competitiveness cluster label” from the French government, is allowed to apply for 
specific subsidies, most of which are distributed through public tenders.331 
 
                                                 
330
 For more information, visit the official French cluster webpage: http://competitivite.gouv.fr/ (2012) 
331
 The number of clusters has fluctuated since the introduction of the policy as new clusters were labelled and 
existing clusters lost their accreditation. In March 2012, France officially counts 71 labelled clusters (and thus 
cluster organisations) spread over the whole French territory. 
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French clusters are characterised by a certain number of common characteristics, e.g. 
the modalities to apply for public subsidies or the formalised governance structure imposed 
by the French government. Thus, most of the French clusters registered as an association 
whose aim is to stimulate and to promote the innovation capacities inside the cluster 
(Ehlinger, et al., 2007). The governance structure of a French cluster can be split into two 
broad categories: strategic governance (comprising the supervisory board and the board of 
directors) and operational governance (comprising the management committee) (Bocquet & 
Mothe, 2009). 
 
In this article we focus on the strategic governance, which is composed of the (1) 
supervisory board and (2) board of directors. The supervisory board normally consists of 
different colleges (i.e. SMEs, large groups, research and/or training institutes or support 
entities), which meet a few times a year. The objectives of the supervisory board range from 
deciding on the general orientation of the cluster and nominating and supervising the board of 
directors to establishing links with the larger environment of the cluster (e.g. other clusters, 
institutions). On the other hand, the board of directors, which is composed of representatives 
of the supervisory board and the management committee, watches if the general cluster 
orientation defined by the supervisory board is correctly implemented by the management 
committee, or for example raises new future oriented questions for the well functioning and 
development of the association. So each of the 71 French clusters is steered by a different 
proportion of small and large companies, research and/or training institutes as well as support 
entities (e.g. local development agencies). Figure 1 summarises the hierarchical relations of 
the different cluster governing bodies.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchical relations of the governing bodies of a French cluster 
 
Data Source 
The data for the cluster categorisation stems from the consortium CM International (CMI) & 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) (CMI-BCG hereafter), two consulting firms, which were 
responsible for the French cluster evaluation in 2008. The mission of this evaluation was 
twofold. The first objective was to analyse the strategic orientation of the intervention 
modalities of the national policy, and the second objective was to investigate the coherency 
and the efficiency of the plan, cluster by cluster, in an exhaustive manner. The evaluators 
analysed the period between July 2005 (launch of the French cluster policy) and December 
2007. In December 2007, a total of 71 clusters were already officially labelled. However, our 
analysis only takes into account the 66 clusters that disposed of an official competitiveness 
label since 2005 and 2006, as more data is available for those clusters. Appendix 1 lists all 66 
clusters taken into account in our study. For the evaluation, CMI-BCG sent an online 
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questionnaire to all French cluster organisations in January 2008. Through the questionnaire, 
CMI-BCG collected data regarding the dynamic of the clusters (e.g. members, implication in 
projects) and the structure of the cluster organisations (e.g. strategy, governance, management 
of R&D projects). The report of this evaluation is publicly available (CMI & BCG, 2008) but 
we were able to access the raw data of this study thanks to CMI . 
 
Variables 
The CMI-BCG survey had one section dedicated to the governance of the clusters. In this 
section, CMI-BCG collected the number of members per type for each of the two governance 
bodies (supervisory board and board of directors) at the end of 2007. We choose these 
variables relating to the composition of the boards, as they constitute a proxy of the 
governance structures. 
 
We first looked at the correlation between the member structure and the governance 
structure to rule out that the two are the same. According to the Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient, no correlation (α > 0.05) exists between the proportion of SMEs (or RTIs) within 
the members and the proportion of SMEs (or RTIs) within the board of directors. However a 
correlation exists between the proportion of SMEs (or RTIs) within the members and the 
proportion of SMEs (or RTIs) within the supervisory board. The number of groups among the 
members significantly correlates (α < 0.05) with the number of groups in the board of 
directors and the supervisory board. The governance structure of a cluster is thus not exactly 
the same as the member structure of a cluster, which justifies the choice of our variables. 
 
We distinguished four different types of members per governance body, which means 
that in total we have eight variables. However, to avoid a size effect (big vs. small governance 
structures) we decided to conduct our analysis with relative data (e.g. Board_SME + 
Board_Group + Board_RTI + Board_Support = 100%), which leaves us with only six 
independent variables (to avoid collinearity). Table 2 summarises the variables used in the 
governance categorisation. The different types of members per governance body are (1) small 
and medium enterprises with less than 2000 employees (SME), (2) firms with more than 2000 
employees (groups), (3) research and/or training institutes (RTI), and (4) support entities, 
which combines different kinds of agencies, such as professional associations, local 
authorities, regional chambers of industry and trade unions (support entities). This 
homogenous dataset on the strategic governance structure of 66 clusters allows us to group 
the clusters in more homogenous classes. 
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Table 2. Description of the variables used for the governance categorisation 
 
Category 
 
Name 
 
Description 
 
Number of 
members per 
type in the 
supervisory 
board at the 
end of 2007 
Board_SME The relative number of small and medium enterprises (SME <2000 
employees) within the supervisory board. 
 
Board_Group The relative number of groups (>2000 employees) within the 
supervisory board. 
 
Board_RTI The relative number of research and/or training institutes (RTIs) 
within the supervisory board. 
 
Board_Support The relative number of support entities (e.g. professional 
associations, local authorities, regional chambers of industry, trade 
unions) within the supervisory board. 
 
Number of 
members per 
type in the 
board of 
directors at 
the end of 
2007 
Executive_SME The relative number of small and medium enterprises (SME <2000 
employees) within the board of directors. 
 
Executive_Group The relative number of groups (>2000 employees) within the board 
of directors. 
 
Executive_RTI The relative number of research and/or training institutes (RTIs) 
within the board of directors. 
 
Executive_Support The relative number of support entities (e.g. professional 
associations, local authorities, regional chambers of industry, trade 
unions) within the board of directors. 
 
Regarding the data quality, five clusters332 did not reply to all of the governance 
questions in the questionnaire administrated by CMI-BCG. To avoid losing clusters already in 
the categorisation, we decided to use a common method in organisational studies, which is the 
mean substitution method (Schwab, 2005) and which replaces the missing values by the 
average of the variable. The disadvantage of the method is for example that the standard error 
is biased downwards, but if only a few missing values exist, which is the case, then the 
method only leads to minor errors (Outhwaite & Turner, 2007) and preserves all observations. 
Another point we would like to highlight is the reason why we choose SME < 2000 
employees. In the CMI-BCG survey, they distinguished between SME < 250 and SME > 250 
employees. However, we decided to merge SME < 250 and SME > 250 employees because 
we discovered that the respondents found it hard to distinguish between the two categories. 
 
Methodology 
We conducted a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) to group the 66 clusters in relatively 
homogeneous groups of similar strategic governance structures. The HCA “starts with each 
case as a separate cluster […] and then combines the clusters sequentially, reducing the 
number of clusters at each step until only one cluster is left. The clustering method uses the 
dissimilarities or distances between objects when forming the clusters” (Burns & Burns, 
2008, p. 555). For the cluster method (rules for cluster formation), we used Ward’s method, 
which uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters. The 
                                                 
332
 Data was missing for the clusters Xylofutur (XYL) and Q@LI-MEDéditerranée (QMED) in the variable 
“Supervisory board” and for the clusters Atlantic Biothérapies (ATL), Minalogic (MIN) and Imaginove (IMAG) 
in the variable “Board of directors”. 
Annex 20: Article on clusters’ governance structures 
 
 445 
recommended interval measure for the Ward’s method is the squared Euclidean distance 
measure (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005). 
 
In order to verify the significance between the groups and in order to obtain the 
characteristics of the groups defined through the HCA we first conducted a One-Way 
ANOVA and then a post-hoc test. The analysis of variance, or ANOVA, is “a nondirectional 
procedure that tests the equality among two or more population means” (Weinberg & 
Abramowitz, 2002, p. 339). Compared to a simple T-test, which can only compare the means 
of two groups, the ANOVA allows the comparison of the means of several groups with a 
single test. We calculated the F ratio, in order to determine if the mean values (in our case the 
relative number of members per type) vary significantly between groups. 
 
The ANOVA tells us if the mean of a specific variable differs significantly between at 
least two groups of our sample, but it does not indicate which of the groups significantly 
differ. To compare the means of every group with every other group, we conducted a post-hoc 
test. For a pairwise comparison between means, one appropriate test is the Tukey Honestly 
Significant Difference (or Tukey HSD) test (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2002). 
 
Results 
Before presenting the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis and subsequently the results 
of the ANOVA and the post-hoc test, we first propose a descriptive analysis of the variables 
used: 
• Supervisory board: The RTIs (average participation: 29%) are slightly more present in 
the supervisory board than groups (average participation: 22%). The participation of 
RTIs also tends to be more homogenous across clusters (Standard Deviation of 0.10) 
than the participation of other types of members (e.g. Standard Deviation: 0.18 for 
support entities, 0.15 for SMEs). Finally, there are also some clusters, which have a 
strong representation of only one type of member in their supervisory board. For 
example: Imaginove’s (IMAG, dedicated to video games, cinema, audiovisual, 
animation, and interactive multimedia) supervisory board consists of 67% SMEs; or 
Filière équine’s (EQU, dedicated to the horse industry) supervisory board consists of 
90% support entities). 
• Board of directors: support entities (average participation: 21%) are slightly less 
represented within the board of directors than the other three member types (average 
participation: 26% SME, 25% Group, 27% RTI). In general, the results for the board 
of directors are less homogenous across clusters (higher standard deviations) than for 
the supervisory board. Finally, there are again some clusters, which have a strong 
representation of only one type of member in their board of directors as for example 
Génie Civil Ecoconstruction’s (GCO, dedicated to civil engineering and 
ecoconstruction), whose board of directors consists only of SMEs, or LyonBioPole 
(LYB, dedicated to biotechnology and health), whose board of directors is made up 
80% of groups. 
 
Table 3 summarises the descriptive statistics for the relative number of members per 
type in the supervisory board and board of directors. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistic of the governance data 
 
 N Minimum (%) Maximum (%) Mean (%) Std. Deviation 
Board_SME 66 0 67 25 .15 
Board_Group 66 0 50 22 .14 
Board_RTI 66 10 55 29 .10 
Board_Support 66 0 90 24 .18 
Executive_SME 66 0 100 26 .17 
Executive_Group 66 0 80 25 .20 
Executive_RTI 66 0 57 27 .14 
Executive_Support 66 0 67 21 .20 
 
The HCA allows us to retain 3 classes. Appendix 1 indicates for every cluster to 
which class the cluster belongs. In order to verify if the variables are significantly different 
between the groups defined in the HCA we conducted a One-Way ANOVA, which revealed a 
significant difference (α < 0.05) between the groups for every variable (see Table 4). This 
means that for every variable at least two classes of our total three governance classes are 
significantly different. 
 
Table 4. ANOVA with the governance classes as independent variable 
 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Board_SME Between Groups .282 2 .141 8.081 .001 
Within Groups 1.098 63 .017  
Total 1.380 65  
Board_Group Between Groups .783 2 .391 47.768 .000 
Within Groups .516 63 .008  
Total 1.299 65  
Board_RTI Between Groups .174 2 .087 12.002 .000 
Within Groups .456 63 .007  
Total .629 65  
Board_Support Between Groups .313 2 .157 5.626 .006 
Within Groups 1.754 63 .028  
Total 2.067 65  
Executive_SME Between Groups .411 2 .205 8.489 .001 
Within Groups 1.525 63 .024  
Total 1.936 65  
Executive_Group Between Groups 1.325 2 .663 33.668 .000 
Within Groups 1.240 63 .020  
Total 2.565 65  
Executive_RTI Between Groups .387 2 .194 12.718 .000 
Within Groups .959 63 .015  
Total 1.346 65  
Executive_Support Between Groups 1.020 2 .510 20.244 .000 
Within Groups 1.587 63 .025  
Total 2.607 65  
 
However we do not know yet which exact groups significantly differ for every 
variable. Therefore we conducted a Tukey HSD test. The Tukey HSD test allowed us to 
compare the means of every group and thus to highlight the distinctiveness of each of the 
three classes. According to the predominance of one of the four member types (i.e. SMEs, 
groups, RTIs or support entities) within the governance structure we attributed a specific 
name to the class. The 3 categories can be defined as follow and are summarised in Table 5:  
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• Class 1 - The scientist class (31.8% of the sample): research and/or training institutes 
clearly dominate boards of directors and to a lesser extent the supervisory board. 
Another particularity of the scientist class is that groups are almost absent from the 
governance structure. 
• Class 2 - The support class (25.8% of the sample): support entities (e.g. professional 
associations, local authorities, regional chambers of industry, trade unions), which 
dominate this class, are entities which have a supporting role but do not conduct 
research or create competitiveness themselves. Most of the time the support entities 
are structures that existed in the region or industry sector before the introduction of the 
competitiveness cluster policy. These support entities clearly dominate the board of 
directors and to a lesser extent the supervisory board in the support class. On the 
supervisory board, the support entities seem to share responsibilities with SMEs. 
Another particularity of the support class is that groups and even more so RTIs are 
almost absent from the governance structure. 
• Class 3 - The corporate class (42.4% of the sample): This class is the most distinctive 
class. Groups clearly dominate the supervisory board and the board of directors while 
SMEs and support entities are rather absent. 
 
Table 5. Summary of the significant differences between the three classes 
 
 Board of directors Supervisory board 
 sig. positive sig. negative sig. positive sig. negative 
Class 1: The 
scientist class 
 
RTI* 
SME3 
Groups3 
Support entities2 
RTI2 Groups3 
Class 2: The 
support class 
 
Support entities* RTI1 
Groups3 
Support entities3 
SME3 
RTI* 
Groups3 
Class 3: The 
corporate class 
 
 
Groups* Support entities2 
SME1 
RTI1 
Groups* 
RTI2 
Support entities2 
SME2 
* significant difference vs. the remaining two classes (α <0.05) 
1 significant difference only vs. class 1 (α <0.05) 
2
 significant difference only vs. class 2 (α <0.05) 
3
 significant difference only vs. class 3 (α <0.05) 
 
In each of the three classes, one type of actor dominates the governance structure. 
After establishing these three classes of cluster organisations we now turn to the attributes 
that might distinguish these classes. 
 
Governance categories and their ability to attract resources 
 
In this section we investigate the capability of clusters to obtain different kinds of resources. 
We examine how the structure of the strategic governance might be correlated with the 
resources available to the cluster. 
 
Data Source 
The data for the analysis of the obtained classes of cluster organisations draws from two 
different data sets. One part of the data was derived from the CMI-BCG survey as already 
described; the other part came from the General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and 
Services (DGCIS). The DGCIS’ mission is to develop the competitiveness and the growth of 
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the French industry and service enterprises and to this end collects structural data on French 
clusters. All of the French clusters as well as all the financing institutions of the clusters have 
to report statistical indicators to the DGCIS every year. All these indicators (i.e. member, 
financial indicators, etc.) are assembled by the DGCIS and published in the form of charts and 
tables on the official French cluster web site333. 
 
Variables 
We chose financial and animation resource indicators to analyse the differences between the 
three cluster governance categories. Table 6 summarises the variables. 
 
Financial resources 
Cluster members need a sufficient amount of financial resources in order to develop their full 
potential. Sölvell (2008, p. 107) for example discusses in his report the evaluation of 
“Uppsala Bio” (a Swedish government initiative to promote the local life science cluster) and 
highlights that during this evaluation, “the lack of financial support was identified as the 
biggest barrier to starting a new company…[and that] financing is an important area that 
requires more attention”. One respondent to the “Uppsala Bio” evaluation for example stated: 
“Promoting inflow of venture capital is by far the most important activity for the long term 
survival of a cluster like Uppsala. Without money no new companies can emerge, it is that 
simple! All other activities are just glazing the cake!”. Additionally also Chiaroni & Chiesa 
(2006) underline in their article that crucial components of clusters are either the ”diffusion of 
innovative funding mechanisms, which means that there are funding schemes in place 
(especially related to seed and venture capital) tailored to and appropriate for high-tech new 
ventures (p. 1073)” or, depending on the type of cluster, “governmental funds dedicated to 
support the creation of industrial spin-offs for new companies (p. 1074)”. Based on this 
literature, we thus assume that the amount of financial resources available to cluster members 
constitute an important indicator to differentiation clusters from each other. 
 
Therefore, to differentiate the financial resources of the French clusters under scrutiny, 
we use “public R&D funding” distributed by French government agencies to cluster 
members. In total we distinguish three main public financing institutions in France, i.e. the 
French National Research Agency (ANR), the Unique Interministerial Fund (FUI) and 
OSEO:  
(1) The French National Research Agency (ANR) finances research projects based on 
partnerships between public and private actors, or just between public laboratories. 
The aim of the ANR is to fund exploratory research projects that focus on developing 
new knowledge. ANR selects projects based on criteria of scientific excellence and 
then grants a “cluster bonus” to the projects selected that have been accredited by a 
cluster, indicating that the project is in line with the cluster’s strategy. The total 
funding granted to cluster projects is counted (not just the bonus). 
(2) The Unique Interministerial Fund (FUI) grants funding to joint research projects 
coming exclusively from cluster projects. The fund brings together contributions from 
all ministries. To be eligible, projects must involve at least a minimum of two 
companies and a research laboratory. The projects financed must relate to innovations 
relatively close to the market. Local authorities can co-fund joint research projects 
funded by the FUI.  
(3) OSEO funding supports innovation and economic development within French SMEs, 
whether they are members of a cluster or not. There are various types of aid for SMEs 
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 http://competitivite.gouv.fr/ (2012) 
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(e.g. technological transfer, funding for commercialising a new product). We make 
use of data relating to OSEO funding granted to SMEs that are members of clusters. 
 
The financial amounts distributed to cluster members by these three institutions were 
made available to us by the DGCIS. As public R&D funding can vary strongly from one year 
to another we decided to use the average amount of 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
 
Animation resources 
But not only cluster members also cluster organisations need a sufficient amount of resources 
(financial and human) in order to best support the local cluster members. Rosenfeld (2005, p. 
10) splits cluster strategies into two waves: the fist wave of cluster strategies was fuelled by 
the ideas of Porter (1990) and “emphasised the basic non-specialised conditions for growth 
and the factors that could be influenced by the public sector – but without appreciably 
changing the structure of the public sector.” The second wave was influenced by the ideas of 
Putnam (1993), emphasising the “value of relationships, networking and strategies targeting 
cluster organisations.” European countries currently invest a high amount of money into 
cluster policies334 and create cluster organisations to manage these clusters. Rosenfeld (2005, 
p. 10) even argues that “[cluster]organisations became the symbol of a cluster’s very 
existence; the growth of the association or its resources a proxy for success of the cluster.” In 
cluster evaluations, the resources of these cluster organisations are thus taken as an important 
proxy for analysing the health and development of the general cluster. 
 
Therefore, to differentiate the animation resources of the French clusters under 
scrutiny, we use two types of indicators: the “budget for the animation and the functioning” 
and the “number of full-time equivalents (FTE)” of the cluster organisation. 
 
The first type of indicator, the “budget for the animation and the functioning of the 
cluster”, was derived from the CMI-BCG online survey. This budget includes the cash and 
in-kind contributions (expressed in monetary terms) received from the national government, 
national agencies, regional government, regional agencies, local authorities, companies and 
research and/or training institutes (RTIs). We looked at each of these indicators separately, 
but we also analysed the total budget (financial resources and in-kind contributions 
transformed in monetary values) available to each cluster organisation for their animation and 
functioning. The term “functioning” corresponds to all indirect costs (e.g. salaries, energy, 
rent) and the term “animation” corresponds to all direct costs (e.g. workshops, leaflets, 
company visits). The year under scrutiny for every variable was the average budget of 2006 
and 2007. 
 
The second type of indicator deals with the number of full time equivalents (FTE) 
dedicated to the cluster for its animation and functioning. This indicator was also derived 
from the CMI-BCG survey. The number of FTEs is split in three variables according to the 
origin of the FTE: hired by the cluster itself, made available by a company or private 
organisation or made available by a local authority or public organisation. We also took into 
consideration the total number of full time equivalents (FTE) dedicated to the cluster 
regardless of the origin. All variables indicate the situation of FTEs at the end of 2007. 
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 E.g. the French government invested 3 billion euros between 2005 and 2011, the Walloon government plans 
to invest 618 million Euros between 2006 and 2014. 
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Table 6. Description of the variables used for the governance classes analysis 
 
Category Name Description 
Unit 
(Variable 
Type) 
Year Source 
ANIMATION RESSOURCE INDICATORS: 
Budget for 
the 
animation 
and the 
functioning 
of the 
cluster 
Budget_National Financial resources received from 
the national government or 
national agencies 
€ in 000’s 
(scale) 
{2006, 
2007} 
CMI-
BCG 
Budget_Regional Financial resources received from 
the regional government, regional 
agencies, local authorities 
Budget_Company Financial resources received from 
companies 
Budget_RTI Financial resources received from 
research and/or training institutes 
(RTIs) 
Budget_Inkind Total in-kind contributions 
transformed in monetary values 
received from the national 
government, national agencies, 
regional government, regional 
agencies, local authorities, 
companies, RTIs, support entities 
Budget_Total Total budget (financial resources 
and in-kind contributions 
transformed in monetary values) 
received from the national 
government, national agencies, 
regional government, regional 
agencies, local authorities, 
companies, RTIs, support entities 
Number of 
Full time 
equivalents 
(FTE) 
FTE_Own Number of FTEs dedicated to the 
cluster and hired by the cluster 
itself 
# 
(scale) 2007 
CMI-
BCG 
FTE_Privat Number of FTEs dedicated to the 
cluster and made available by a 
company or private organisation 
FTE_Public Number of FTEs dedicated to the 
cluster and made available by a 
local authority or public 
organisation 
FTE_Total Total number of FTEs dedicated 
to the cluster 
 
FINANCIAL RESSOURCE INDICATORS: 
Public R&D 
funding 
ANR Funding received from the 
National Research Agency (ANR) 
€ in 000’s 
(scale) 
{2006, 
2007, 
2008} 
DGCIS 
FUI Funding received from the Single 
Interministerial Fund (FUI) 
OSEO Funding received from OSEO 
Funding_Total Total funding received from 
OSEO and ANR and FUI 
 
Methodology 
We used the same methodology as described in the previous section. We first verified with 
the help of the One-Way ANOVA if a significant difference exists between the groups and 
then, to highlight the specific characteristics of every group, we used the Tukey HSD test.  
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Results 
Before presenting the characteristics of the governance classes we shortly present a 
descriptive analyses of the variables used: 
(1) Budget for the animation and the functioning of the cluster: on average (2006, 2007) 
every cluster had 730,000 euros at its disposal to finance the functioning of its cluster 
organisation and its animation activities. The regional governments, regional agencies 
and local authorities are on average the highest contributors (32.9%), followed by 
national governments and national agencies (29.2%). Companies (11.8%) and RTIs 
(1.6%) contribute less to the budget. As a side note, 19.8% of the total budget is 
provided in kind. 
(2) Number of full time equivalents (FTE): on average (2007) every cluster had 5.2 FTEs 
at its disposal. The majority (67%) of FTEs are hired directly by the cluster itself 
whereas the others are made available as “in-kind contributions” either by a private or 
public entity. 
(3) Public R&D funding: on average (2006, 2007, 2008), each cluster received €10.9 
million in total from FUI, OSEO or ANR. This amount stems very equally from the 
three financing institutes: FUI (35.11%), OSEO (35.45%) and ANR (29.44%). 
However, the amount of public R&D funding is very dispersed as one cluster only 
received €14,000 and another cluster €68.9 million. 
 
Table 7 summarises the results for budget, FTE and public R&D funding variables. 
 
Table 7. Description of the scale variables used to characterise the governance classes 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Percentage 
Std. 
Deviation 
Members 
 
66 15.00 502.00 115.77 - 90.43 
Budget_National (€ in 000’s) 66 30.00 825.00 213.64 29.2 164.69 
Budget_Regional (€ in 000’s) 66 15.00 861.00 240.09 32.9 173.69 
Budget_Companies (€ in 000’s) 66 .00 403.00 86.24 11.8 91.73 
Budget_RTI (€ in 000’s) 66 .00 89.00 11.29 1.6 18.55 
Budget_Inkind (€ in 000’s 66 .00 700.00 144.59 19.8 180.96 
Budget_Total (€ in 000’s) 
 
66 134.50 2 021.50 730.60 100.0 463.83 
FTE_own 66 .00 10.80 3.53 68.3 2.62 
FTE_privat 66 .00 5.00 .72 13.9 1.09 
FTE_public 66 .00 4.70 .93 18.0 1.25 
FTE_Total 
 
66 1.00 12.80 5.17 100.0 2.73 
FUI (€ in 000’s) 66 .00 32 626.00 3 832.27 35.1 6 343.58 
OSEO (€ in 000’s) 66 10.00 24 782.00 3 868.69 35.5 6 342.32 
ANR (€ in 000’s) 66 .00 18 772.67 3 213.52 29.4 3 737.21 
 Total_funding (€ in 000’s) 66 14.33 68 870.67 10 914.48 100.0 12 991.38 
 
We will now point out the differences of the three governance classes according to these 
variables (summarised in Table 8): 
(1) The analysis of the budget for the animation and the functioning of the cluster reveals 
that the corporate class disposes of a significantly higher total budget than the scientist 
and support classes. The corporate class is particularly strong in obtaining money from 
the national government and national agencies compared to the other two classes. The 
scientist class, on the other hand, is particularly weak in obtaining money from the 
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regional government, regional agencies or local authorities compared to the corporate 
class. Finally, the support class is particularly weak in obtaining money from 
companies and research and/or training institutes compared to the corporate class. 
There is no significant difference between the three classes regarding the in-kind 
donations. Finally, we wonder if this result means that in order to obtain for example 
funds from companies or RTIs, clusters should place in their governance structures 
actors from these organisations. 
(2) The analysis of the number of full time equivalents within the management committee 
shows that the corporate class has the highest while the scientist class has the lowest 
number of FTEs. While no significant difference exists between the three classes 
regarding the number of FTEs made available by a company / private organisation or 
by a local authority / public organisation, the scientist class stands out by the very low 
number of FTEs hired by the cluster itself. Does this mean that clusters from the 
scientist class are less able to attract or to finance FTEs, or does this mean that these 
clusters have another perception of a cluster’s development, where the number of 
FTEs for example is not that important? 
(3) The analysis of the public R&D funding shows that in total the corporate class receives 
significantly more public R&D funding than the support class. However, when 
looking at each financing body separately (ANR, FUI, OSEO), we do not observe a 
significant difference between the three classes. Only the difference of the total sum of 
the three institutions is significant. These results are interesting in two ways: first, the 
absence of difference between the financing bodies could mean that clusters manage 
to support every type of actor even if the funding is dedicated to actors not present in 
the governance (for example OSEO is particularly dedicated to SMEs). Second, the 
difference of the total sum could be linked to the fact that groups are maybe more able 
to manage more or bigger projects than small companies or RTIs.  
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Table 8. Results of the governance classes analysis (significant if α <0.05)* 
 
Category Name Class 1: Scientist class 
Class 2: 
Support class 
Class 3: 
Corporate class 
Budget for the 
animation and 
the functioning 
of the cluster 
Budget_National sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
sig. positive 
vs. class 1 & 2 
Budget_Regional sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
 sig. positive 
vs. class 1 
Budget_Company  sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
sig. positive 
vs. class 2 
Budget_RTI  sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
sig. positive 
vs. class 2 
Budget_Inkind no significant differences 
Budget_Total sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
sig. positive 
vs. class 1 & 2 
Number of Full 
time equivalents 
(FTE) 
FTE_Own sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
 sig. positive 
vs. class 1 
FTE_Privat 
no significant differences FTE_Public 
FTE_Total sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
 sig. positive 
vs. class 1 
Public R&D 
funding 
ANR 
no significant differences FUI 
OSEO 
Funding_Total  sig. negative 
vs. class 3 
sig. positive 
vs. class 2 
* One-Way ANOVA (Tukey HSD) 
 
To conclude, the HCA and the subsequent ANOVA revealed that French clusters could be 
categorised into three categories according to the weight of the different members in their 
strategic governance structure: 
(1) In the clusters of the scientist class (class 1), research and/or training institutes clearly 
dominate the board of directors, while groups are quite absent of the governance 
structure. The clusters of this class have problems obtaining budget from the national 
government and national agencies as well as from the regional government, regional 
agencies or local authorities for the animation and the functioning of its clusters. 
Possible reasons of these results could be that in 2007 RTIs were not yet really aware 
of the importance of developing science-industry relations or of how to obtain public 
funding. As already mentioned, another characteristic of the clusters of the scientist 
class is that they have the fewest number of FTEs. The scientist class is particularly 
lagging behind in the number of FTEs directly hired by the cluster. One possible 
explanation might be that for RTIs sending some of their staff on temporary 
assignments to cluster organisations might be easier than for groups. 
(2) In the clusters of the support class (class 2), support entities dominate the board of 
directors, while RTIs are particularly absent from the governance structure. This class 
has difficulties in obtaining public R&D funding for their members. Additionally, the 
clusters of this class have smaller budgets allocated by the national government, 
national agencies, RTIs and companies to use for animation and functioning. An 
interpretation of this result might be that support entities are very competent in helping 
regional actors in their economic development but not so competent in helping 
regional actors in their scientific development. Support entities might have to enlarge 
their competences and also propose more scientific oriented help, as for example how 
to write an R&D project application to attract public R&D funding. 
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(3) In the clusters of the corporate class (class 3), groups clearly dominate the supervisory 
board and the board of directors while SMEs and support entities are rather absent. 
The corporate class has most of the advantages on its side. First of all, the corporate 
class has considerably more budget, regardless of the origin, for the animation and the 
functioning of its clusters. Second, it has the highest amount of FTEs. Finally, its 
members also receive the highest total amount of public R&D funding. The good 
results of the clusters of the corporate class might be linked to different characteristics 
of groups: broad experience in how to obtain research funding, large pool of internal 
resources (human, financial…), large network of partners which allows forming R&D 
consortia in a short period of time, etc. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study tries to fill a gap in the cluster literature by focusing particularly on cluster 
governance structures. Firstly, we show that the repartition of the different actors inside 
governance structures is very heterogeneous between clusters and that in each governance 
class one dominant type of actor exists. We are nevertheless quite surprised that SMEs play a 
minor role in the governance structures and that no SME cluster class emerges from our 
statistical analysis. Secondly, we put in evidence that a linkage between certain types of 
governance structures and their ability to attract resources (and in particular public resources) 
might exist. Our results advocate for a resource dependence view of cluster organisations and 
highlight possible implications for cluster performance evaluations. 
 
 
A resource dependence view of clusters 
Our analysis identifies that the corporate class is very strong in its ability to obtain resources 
such as animation and functioning budget, public R&D funding and FTEs. Governance could 
thus be seen as a part of the cement of a cluster in order to attract resources. However, this 
result does not necessarily mean that all clusters should have a governance structure 
consisting predominantly of groups with more than 2000 employees. Our analysis is a 
descriptive analysis and does not allow drawing direct cause-effect conclusions between the 
governance structure and the resources we analysed. Other structural variables, not analysed, 
such as historic relationships between local actors, firms’ stock of R&D resources, decision 
processes, might also play an important role in explaining these results. Additionally we do 
not know if these resources (i.e. animation and functioning budget, public R&D funding, 
FTEs) are decisive for the long-term success of a cluster.  
 
However, our analysis does show that some cluster governance categories have to 
operate with fewer resources than other categories and that this is particularly the case if 
groups are absent from the governance structure. Using the vocabulary of the resource 
dependence theory (Hillman, et al., 2009; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003 
(1978)), we could say that the clusters of the corporate category have governance structures 
that best suit the external environment. So if we think that attracting more of our defined 
resources is better (however we do not know which are the resources really needed to build 
successful clusters (Rosenfeld, 2005)), then the composition of the governance of these 
clusters is better adapted to the challenges of their environment or in other words, they 
manage better their resource dependency to the public authorities. However, the other side of 
the coin is that the structural disadvantaged classes (in our case the scientist and support 
category) not only have more difficulties to access these resources but additionally might also 
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be more severely punished if the national government decides to delete or redirect the public 
subsidies to other national priorities.  
 
Why are clusters where groups dominate the governance structure more “successful”, 
than clusters where groups are absent? Are groups what Boyd (1990) calls “resource-rich 
individuals”? Why are some clusters not placing groups in their governance structure? We 
draw several interpretations that of course need to be investigated further. 
(1) Some regional stakeholders, particularly SMEs (OECD, 2001), might lack crucial 
skills compared to large groups. According to Zahra & Pearce (1989) a board should 
scan the environment, represent the cluster in the community and secure valuable 
resources. In order to do this, the board needs human and relational capital (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). In the light of our results, we might ask if groups have more of this 
relational and human capital than less experienced regional actors (i.e. PMEs and 
support entities). Groups might have a broader established professional network and 
they might also be more used to organise R&D projects and thus subsequently be 
more successful in applying for subsidies than these less experienced and smaller 
actors. 
 
(2) As mentioned in the literature review, according to the theory of Pfeffer (1972), we 
could expect that clusters place actors in their supervisory board and board of 
directors, which are best suited to acquire the necessary resources for survival. In this 
perspective, it seems illogical that not all clusters place large groups in their 
governance structure, which, according to our results, might be the most capable 
entities to do so. Firstly, we are not allowed to forget that clusters are regionally 
embedded and that their pool of members and thus representatives in their governance 
structures is geographical limited. There are several clusters that simply do not have 
large groups on their territories and which thus cannot mobilise their aid in the 
governance structure. Secondly, some sectors are mainly developed by SMEs as for 
example the digital service sector. Finally, political issues might also play a role when 
nominating certain cluster members in the governance structures.  
 
Possible implications for cluster evaluations 
This article also identifies possible implications for cluster performance evaluations. The 
present study shows that evaluators have to be very careful when comparing clusters directly 
with each other. This is particularly the case if resource indicators such as operational budget 
or R&D subsidies are taken as measures in evaluations that try to inspect the performance of 
clusters. Mceldowney (1997) for example distinguishes two goals of evaluations (1) “assess 
the value for money” of the policy (control model), and (2) “providing feedback on the 
policy” (helping model). In the helping model the main goal is a learning process for all 
actors and thus there is no punishment in case the goal is not reached, while in the control 
model sanctions or budget cuts could be the consequent of a bad performance. Being aware of 
the structural disadvantages of clusters having no groups in their governance structure might 
be particularly important in cluster evaluations that correspond to the control model. 
Traditionally, cluster evaluations do not take into account the influence of cluster governance 
structures on clusters performance (e.g. Learmonth, et al., 2003; Schmiedeberg, 2010), 
however our results encourage to complete cluster evaluations by testing possible links 
between governance and resources attraction. 
 
Indeed, when French clusters are evaluated (and thus compared among one another) 
by the national government, evaluators should bear in mind that a “bad performance” in 
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resource attraction could be linked to the absence of large companies in their governance 
structure. Enlarging thus the spectrum of investigations in cluster evaluations would lead to 
improve the usefulness but also the impact of evaluations on clusters. Maybe it could be 
stated that some clusters (support and scientist class) lack the needed governance resources to 
advance as fast as the corporate class. However, we still do not know if more resources 
automatically result in better performance. The question remains whether more budget and 
FTEs automatically triggers a better cluster performance or if clusters possessing less (support 
and scientist class) simply manage better their limited resources and obtain the same or even 
better results in the long term. For public policy conception, the question is then posed: Does 
public policy have to adapt their tools according to the governance structure of the cluster? In 
other words, do governments need to address a special aid and help to these clusters, which 
are structurally disadvantaged by the absence of large groups? Indeed, these clusters possess 
less board capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) than other clusters for an efficient resource 
attraction. Further research is needed on this topic.  
 
Finally, we thus retain from our research that governance structures contribute to 
explain some differences between the resources clusters manage to attract. This can have 
important implications for the creation of clusters. If one objective of a new cluster is to 
obtain a lot of resources, then placing large groups in its governance structure might be better 
than support entities. Moreover, our work suggests that beyond evaluation, policy makers 
could propose different kind of aids to corporate clusters, scientist clusters and support 
clusters. However, our research has also some limitations. First, it would be interesting to 
have more variables to define the governance structure. Secondly, it would be worthwhile to 
verify if the link between governance structure and resources is stable with other types of 
resources. Thirdly, further research should investigate the causality link between governance-
resource-performance. 
We think that our study serves as an interpretive lens, which helps shed light on the 
existing diversity of cluster governance structures. We hope that this first quantitative study 
on cluster governance will prompt scholars to further investigate this topic in a theoretical and 
also empirical manner, to build more insight into this relatively new type of cluster resource. 
Researchers interested in cluster governance issues could for example try to verify if our 
results can be generalised to other European and Non-European clusters, to technology and 
industry clusters, to spontaneous or policy driven clusters, to bottom-up and top-down 
clusters, etc. 
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Appendix 1. Cluster acronyms, cluster names and corresponding HCA class 
 
Acro. Name Class Acro. Name Class 
AERO Aerospace Valley                                      1 TES Transactions 
Electroniques Sécurisées 
2 
ATL Atlantic Biothérapies 1 TRI Trimatec                                                2
CBS Cancer-Bio-Santé 1 UPT Up-tex                                                  2
CEN Capénergies                                             1 VAL Valorial-L'aliment de 
demain                           
2 
DERB Derbi                                           1 VEG Végépolys                                               2
EUBM EuroBioMed                               1 ADV Advancity 3 
F&L Innovation fruits et légumes                            1 AUTO Automobile Haut de 
Gamme                                
3 
FGE Fibres Grand Est 1 AXEL Axelera                                                 3
GCO Génie Civil Ecoconstruction 1 CD Cap Digital                                             3
INV InnoViandes                                           1 CERQ Céramique                                               3
MAUD Maud                                                    1 CERV Céréales Vallée                                         3
MOV Mov’eo                                               1 COSV Cosmetic Valley                                         3 
OPT Optitec                                                 1 EMC2 EMC2                                                    3
PLA Plastipolis                                          1 I&R Images et Réseaux                                       3 
PROD Prod'Innov                                              1 IAR Industries et Agro-
Ressources 
3 
QMED Q@LI-MEDéditerranée                                     1 IC Industries du commerce                                  3
RLAS Route des lasers                                        1 ITR I-Trans                                                 3 
S2E2 S²E²                                                    1 LYB LyonBioPole                                             3
SPOR Sporaltec                                               1 LYUT Lyon Urban Truck, Bus 
2015                                
3 
TEC Techtera                                                1 MED HealthCluster Paris 
Region                                                
3 
VIAM Viaméca                                                 1 MERB Pole Mer Bretagne                                       3
ALBV Alsace Biovalley 2 MERP Mer Paca                                                3
AQUA Aquatiques 2 MIN Minalogic                                               3
ARV Arve-Industries                                         2 MTA Mobilité et transports 
avancés                           
3 
ELOP Elopsys                                                 2 NOV Novalog 3 
ENF Pôle Enfant                                             2 NUC Pôle Nucléaire Bourgogne                                3
EQU Filière équine 2 NUT Nutrition Santé Longévité                        3 
IMAG Imaginove 2 SCS SCS                                                     3
MAT Mateleria 2 SYS Systematic                                              3
MIC Microtechnique                                          2 TEN Tenerrdis                                               3
PASS Pass                                                    2 VF Véhicule du futur                                       3
QTRO Qualitropic                                             2 VITA Vitagora                                                3 
RISQ Gestion des risques                                     2 XYL Xylofutur 3 
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LA MISE EN OEUVRE DES POLITIQUES DE CLUSTER :  
DILEMMES ORGANISATIONNELS, PATHOLOGIES ET EVALUATION. 
LE CAS D’UN POLE DE COMPETITIVITE FRANCAIS. 
 
Résumé : Confrontés au succès du concept de « cluster », les gouvernements du monde entier mettent 
aujourd’hui en œuvre des politiques de cluster. Cependant, l’écart entre la recherche et la pratique ne 
cesse de grandir. Tandis que les chercheurs élaborent des théories présentant les clusters comme des 
entités permettant de susciter efficacement innovation et compétitivité, les praticiens des clusters – 
gouvernements, animateurs de pôles de compétitivité et entreprises membres – semblent se débattre 
dans la gestion de ces objets particulièrement entremêlés. Notre thèse porte sur ce « relevance gap ». 
Une étude systématique de la littérature (SLR) est menée sur les politiques de cluster : elle démontre 
que les animateurs de clusters font constamment face à une multitude de dilemmes organisationnels, 
c’est-à-dire un ensemble de décisions et de choix pour lesquels il n’existe pas une réponse rationnelle 
unique. Ces dilemmes portent sur la mise en œuvre de la politique, sur la gestion des membres des 
pôles de compétitivité, et sur l’adaptation structurelle du pôle aux réalités locales. Apporter des réponses 
à ces dilemmes est évidemment du ressort des pôles de compétitivité, mais cela génère des effets 
secondaires et pathologies, qui doivent être pris en compte et évalués. Dans cette thèse, nous 
développons une étude de cas qualitative d’un pôle de compétitivité situé en région parisienne : nous 
analysons en détail dilemmes et pathologies. Quatre pathologies sont identifiées : l’inefficacité (suscitée 
par des dilemmes de leadership), la méfiance (suscitée par les dilemmes autour des subventions), la 
non-conformité (suscitée par des dilemmes structurels) et le pragmatisme (suscité par des dilemmes 
managériaux et de collaboration). Cette pathogénèse peut contribuer à améliorer la mise en œuvre et 
l’évaluation des politiques de cluster. Enfin, la thèse invite les chercheurs à passer de l’étude de 
l’ « anatomie des clusters » à celle des « pathologies des clusters».  
 
Mots clés : Pôle de compétitivité, mise en œuvre de politique, évaluation de cluster, dilemme 
organisationnel, pathologie 
 
 
 
 
IMPLEMENTING CLUSTER POLICIES: 
ORGANIZATIONAL DILEMMAS, PATHOLOGIES AND EVALUATION. 
THE CASE OF A FRENCH POLICY-DRIVEN CLUSTER. 
 
Abstract: As “cluster” became a new buzzword, governments around the world increasingly implement 
cluster policies. However, a relevance gap is growing between cluster research and practice. Scholars 
build theories about the roles of clusters as powerful entities fostering innovation and competitiveness. 
Meanwhile, governments and policy-driven cluster organizations struggle to manage these highly 
entangled objects. This thesis addresses such a relevance gap. A systematic literature review (SLR) is 
conducted on cluster policy research, which demonstrates that governments and policy-driven cluster 
managers constantly face a multitude of organizational dilemmas, i.e. a set of decisions and choices for 
which there is no “one best choice”, in matters such as how to implement cluster policy (political 
dilemmas), how to manage policy-driven cluster members (managerial dilemmas) and how to adapt the 
policy-driven cluster to the local reality (structural dilemmas). Answering these dilemmas is constitutive 
of the management of policy-driven clusters, but it generates side-effect pathologies that need to be 
monitored and evaluated. In this thesis, we conduct a qualitative empirical investigation of a French 
policy-driven cluster located in the Paris Region: we analyse in detail the organisational dilemmas and 
their related side-effect pathologies. Four different pathologies are identified: inefficiency (driven by 
leadership dilemmas), distrust (driven by subsidies dilemmas), non-conformity (driven by structural 
dilemmas), and pragmatism (driven by managing innovation and collaboration dilemmas). The deeper 
knowledge of these pathologies contributes to improve cluster policy implementation and cluster 
evaluations. Finally, this thesis argues that academics need to shift from studying the “anatomy of 
clusters” to studying the “pathology of clusters”. 
 
Keywords: Policy-driven cluster, policy implementation, cluster evaluation, organizational dilemma, 
pathology 
